Microeconomics: competition, conflict, and coordination
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | DETAILED CONTENTS About the Authors Preface ¡X Guide to the Online Resources Acknowledgments Part 1 1 People, Economy, and Society Society: Coordination Problems and Economic Institutions XV xvii 1 3 1.1 Introduction: Poor Economics 4 1.2 Societal Coordination: The Classical Institutional Challenge 4 1.3 The Institutional Challenge Today 7 1.4 Anatomy of a Coordination Problem: The Tragedy of the Commons 8 1.5 Institutions: Games and the Rules of the Game 11 1.6 Overexploiting Nature: Illustrating the Basics of Game Theory 15 1.7 Predicting Economic Outcomes: The Nash Equilibrium 18 1.8 Evaluating Outcomes: Pareto Comparisons and Pareto Efficiency 23 1.9 The Value and Limitations of Pareto Efficiency 25 1.10 Conflict and Common Interest in a Prisoners Dilemma 2 vii 26 1.11 Coordination Successes: An Invisible Hand Game 31 1.12 Assurance Games: Win-Win and Lose-Lose Equilibria 33 1.13 Disagreement Games: Conflict About How to Coordinate 36 1.14 Why History (Sometimes) Matters 38 1.15 Application: Segregation as a Nash Equilibrium Among People Who Prefer Integration 39 1.16 How Institutions Can Address Coordination Problems 45 1.17 Game Theory and Nash Equilibrium: Importance and Caveats 47 1.18 Application: Cooperation and Conflict in Practice 49 1.19 Conclusion 51 People: Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints 54 2.1 Introduction: The Custom of the Country” 55 2.2 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints 56 2.3 Taking Risks: Payoffs and Probabilities 62 2.4 Expected Payoffs and the Persistence of Poverty 65 2.5 Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: Risk-Dominance 69 2.6
Leadership in Sequential Games: When Order of Play Matters 72
XXÜ Detailed Contents 2.7 Equi Libri um Selection: First-Mover Advantage in a Sequential Game 75 2.8 Institutional Challenges: Common Property Resources, Public Goods, and Club Goods 77 2.9 The Public Goods Game 81 2.10 Application: Experiments on Economic Behavior 2.11 Application: Changing the Rules Matters—Experimental Evidence 2.12 Social Preferences: Blame Economic Man for Coordination Failures? 2.13 The Ultimatum Game: 83 85 87 Reciprocity and Retribution 90 2.14 Application: A Global View—Common Patterns and Cultural Differences 3 93 2.15 Social Preferences Are Not Irrational 96 2.16 Application: The Lab and the Street 97 2.17 Application: A Fine Is a Price 99 2.18 Complexity: Diverse, Versatile, and Changeable People 100 2.19 Conclusion 103 Doing the Best You Can: Constrained Optimization 107 3.1 Introduction: The Map and the Territory 108 3.2 Time: A Scarce Resource 108 3.3 Utility Functions and Preferences 112 3.4 Indifference Curves: Graphing Preferences 115 3.5 Marginal Utility and the Marginal Rate of Substitution 118 3.6 Application: Homo Economicos with Cobb-Douglas Utility 124 3.7 The Feasible Set of Actions: Opportunity Costs and the mrt 126 3.8 Constrained Utility Maximization: The mrs = mrt Rule 132 3.9 The Price-Offer Curve, Willingness to Pay, and Demand 137 3.10 Social Preferences and Utility Maximization 141 3.11 Application: Environmental Trade-Offs 145 3.12 Application: Optimal Abatement of Environmental Damages 147 3.13 Cardinal Interpersonally Comparable Utility: Evaluating Policies to Reduce Inequality 151 3.14 Application: Cardinal Utility and
Subjective Well-Being 154 3.15 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints: An Assessment 156 3.16 Conclusion 158
Dťtailed Content1, 4 Property, Power and Exchange: Mutual Gains and Conflicts 161 4.1 Introduction: Strange and Hard to Believe 162 4.2 Mutual Gains From Trade: Conflict and Coordination 163 4.3 Feasibte Allocations: The Edgeworth Box 166 4.4 The Pareto-Efficient Set of Feasible Allocations 169 4.5 Adam Smith s Impartial Spectator Suggests a Fair Outcome 174 4.6 Property Rights and Participation Constraints 179 4.7 Symmetrical Exchange: Trading into the Pareto-lmproving Lens 183 4.8 Bargaining Power: Take It or Leave It 185 4.9 Application: Bargaining Over Wages and Hours 189 4.10 Application: The Rules of the Game Determine Hours and Wages 194 4.11 First-Mover Advantage: Price-Setting Power 198 4.12 Setting the Price Subject to an Incentive-Compatibility Constraint 203 4.13 Application: Other-Regarding Preferences—Allocations Among Friends 207 5 4.14 Conclusion 212 Coordination Failures and Institutional Responses 216 5.1 Introduction: Tragedy Averted 217 5.2 A Common Property Resources Problem: Preferences 219 5.3 Technology and Environmental· Limits: The Source of a Coordination Failure 223 5.4 A Best Response: Another Constrained Optimization Problem 227 5.5 How Will the Game Be Played? A Symmetric Nash Equilibrium 232 5.6 Dynamics: Getting to the Nash Equilibrium 235 5.7 Evaluating Outcomes: Participation Constraints, Pareto Improvements, and Pareto Efficiency 238 5.8 A Pareto-Inefficient Nash Equilibrium 243 5.9 A Benchmark Socially Optimal Allocation 246 5.10 Government Policies: Regutation and Taxation 252 5.11 Private Ownership: Permits and Employment 255 5.12
Community: Repeated Interactions and Altruism 260 5.13 Application: Is Inequality a Problem or a Solution? 266 5.14 Overexptoitation of a Non-Excludable Resource 270 5.15 The Rules of the Game Matter: Alternatives to Overexploitation 274 5.16 Conclusion 279 ХХІІІ
Detailed Contents XXIV Part 2 6 Markets for Goods and Services Production: Technology and Specialization 7 283 285 6.1 Introduction: Dream Lifters 286 6.2 The Division of Labor, Specialization, and the Market 286 6.3 Production Functions With a Single Input 289 6.4 Economies of Scale and the Feasible Production Set 292 6.5 Specialization and Exchange 295 6.6 Comparative and Absolute Advantage 303 6.7 Specialization According to Comparative Advantage 307 6.8 Application: History, Specialization, and Coordination Failures 311 6.9 Application: The Limits of Specialization and Comparative Advantage 315 6.10 Production Technologies 316 6.11 Production Functions With More Than One Input 320 6.12 Cost-Minimizing Techniques 326 6.13 Application: Technical Change and Innovation Rents 333 6.14 Application: Characterizing Technologies and Technical Change 336 6.15 Application: What Does the Model of Innovation Miss? 340 6.16 Conclusion 341 Demand: Willingness to Pay and Prices 344 7.1 Introduction: Markets, Up Close 345 7.2 The Budget Set, Indifference Curves, and the Rules of the Game 346 7.3 Income and Demand: Differences in the Budget 352 7.4 Cobb-Douglas Utility and Demand 355 7.5 Appiication: Doing the Best You Can Dividing Your Time 358 7.6 Application: Social Comparisons, Work Hours, and Consumption as a Social Activity 361 7.7 Quasi-Linear Utility, Willingness to Pay, and Demand 367 7.8 Price Changes: Income and Substitution Effects 373 7.9 Application: Income and Substitution Effects of a Carbon Tax and Citizen s Dividend 377 7.10 Application: Giffen Goods and the Law of
Demand 382 7.11 Market Demand and Price Elasticity 383 7.12 Application: Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Price on Demand 388 7.13 Consumer Surplus and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility 391 7.14 Application: The Effect of a Sugar Tax on Consumer Surplus 395
Detailed Contret:, 7.15 Application: Willingness to Pay (for an Integrated Neighborhood) 398 7.16 Application: Market Dynamics and Segregation 403 7.17 Conclusion 407 8 Supply: Firms’ Costs, Output, and Profit 410 8.1 Introduction: Solar Panels and Armored Trucks 411 8.2 Costs of Production: An Owner’s Eye View 413 8.3 Accounting Profits and Economic Profits 415 8.4 Cost Functions: Decreasing and Increasing Average Costs 417 8.5 Application: Evidence About Cost Functions 420 8.6 A Monopolistic Competitor Selects an Output Level 423 8.7 Profit Maximization: Marginal Revenues and Marginal Costs 430 8.8 The Markup, the Price Elasticity of Demand, and Entry Barriers 435 8.9 Application: Evidence on the Markup in Drug Prices 440 8.10 Willingness to Sell: Capacity Constraints and Market Supply 442 8.11 Economic Profits and the Market Supply Curve 446 8.12 Perfect Competition Among Price-Taking Buyers and Sellers: Shared Gains From Exchange 448 8.13 The Effects of a Tax: Consumer Surplus, Profits, Tax Revenues, and Deadweight Loss 452 8.14 Application: The Distributional Impact of Public Policies-Rent Control 455 8.15 Perfect Competition Among Price-Takers: An Assessment 461 8.16 Two Benchmark Models of the Profit-Maximizing Firm: Price-Takers and Price-Makers 463 8.17 Application: The Dynamics of Firm Growth and the Survival of Competition 8.18 Conclusion 9 Competition, Rent-Seeking, and Market Equilibration 465 469 472 9.1 Introduction: Stay Hungry, Stay Foolish” 473 9.2 Modeling the Continuum of Competition: From One Firm to Many 474 9.3 Reviewing the Monopoly Case, n = 1 478
9.4 Duopoly: Two Firms’ Best Responses and the Nash Equilibrium 479 9.5 Oligopoly and Unlimited Competition”: From a Few Firms to Many Firms 9.6 Unlimited Competition and the Price Markup Over Costs 488 491 9.7 Market Dynamics: Barriers to Entry and the Equilibrium Number of Firms 493 XXV
XXVI Detailed Contents 9.8 A Conflict of Interest: Profits, Consumer Surplus, and the Degree of 499 Competition 9.9 Limited Competition and Inefficiency: Deadweight Loss 500 9.10 Coordination Among Firms: Duopoly and Cartels 504 9.11 Perfect Price Discrimination: Eliminating Deadweight Loss at a Cost to Consumers 509 9.12 Application: Price Discrimination in Action 512 9.13 Rent-Seeking, Price-Making, and Market Equilibration 514 9.14 Application: When Rent-Seeking Does Not Equilibrate a Market—A Housing Bubble 519 9.15 How Competition Works: The Forces of Supply and Demand 524 9.16 The Perfect Competitor”: Rent-Seeking Firms Competing in and for Markets 528 9.17 Application: Declining Competition and Increasing Markups 532 9.18 Application: Modern Monopoly, Winners Take All, and Public Policy 534 9.19 Conclusion 538 Part 3 Markets with Incomplete Contracting 10 Information: Contracts, Norms, and Power 543 545 10.1 Introduction: Who Invented Hard Red Winter Wheat #2? 546 10.2 Incomplete Contracts: “Not Everything Is in the Contract” 547 10.3 Principals and Agents: Hidden Actions and Hidden Attributes 551 10.4 Hidden Attributes and Adverse Selection: The Lemons Problem 554 10.5 Application: Health Insurance 557 10.6 Hidden Actions and Moral Hazards: A Contingent Renewal Contract 559 10.7 The Expected Value of the Transaction to the Agent 562 10.8 The Agent’s Best Response: An Incentive Compatibility Constraint 570 10.9 The Principal s Cost Minimization and the Nash Equilibrium 574 10.10 Short-Side Power in Principal-Agent Relationships 582 10.11 A Comparison with Complete
Contracts 584 10.12 Features of Equilibria With Incomplete Contracts: Summing Up 589 10.13 Incomplete Contracts and the Distribution of Gains From Exchange 591 10.14 Application: Complete Contracts in the GIG Economy 596 10.15 Application: Norms in Markets With Incomplete Contracts 599 10.16 Conclusion 601
Derailed LoiitfüV, 11 Work, Wages, and Unemployment 605 11.1 Introduction: Henry Ford s Shocker 606 11.2 Employment as a Principal-Agent Relationship 606 11.3 Nash Equilibrium Wages, Effort, and Hiring 610 11.4 The Employer s Profit-Maximizing Level of Hiring 614 11.5 Comparing the Incomplete and Complete Contracts Cases 620 11.6 Employment Rents and the Workers Fallback Option 626 11.7 Connecting Micro to Macroeconomics: A No-Shirking Condition 630 11.8 Incomplete Contracts and the Distribution of Gains From Exchange 634 11.9 Application: Contract Enforcement Technologies 636 11.10 Equilibrium Unemployment and the Wage Curve 639 11.11 The Whole-Economy Model: Profits, Wages, and Employment 643 11.12 Monopsony, the Cost of Inputs, and the Level of Hiring 650 11.13 Monopsony and the Cost of Hiring (Non-Shirking) Labor 654 11.14 The Effects of a Minimum Wage on Hiring and Labor Earnings 659 11.15 Conclusion 664 12 Interest, Credit, and Wealth Constraints 12.1 Introduction: Why Mary Bolender’s Car Would Not Start 12.2 Evidence on Credit and Wealth Constraints 668 669 671 12.3 The Wealthy Owner-Operator Case 674 12.4 Complete Credit Contracts: A Hypothetical Case 678 12.5 The General Case: Incomplete Credit Contracts 685 12.6 The Nash Equilibrium Level of Risk and Interest 689 12.7 Many Lenders: Competition and Barriers to Entry 697 12.8 Wealth Matters: Borrowing With Equity 701 12.9 Excluded and Credit-Constrained Borrowers 705 12.10 Comparison of Complete and Incomplete Contracts 707 12.11 Why Redistributing Wealth Can Increase the Sum of Economic Rents 711 12.12 Competition,
Barriers to Entry, and the Distribution of Rents 715 12.13 Application: From Micro to Macro—The Multiplier and Monetary Policy 719 12.14 Application: The Case of Collateral Rather Than Equity 723 12.15 Application: Cotton as Collateral in the US Following the End of Slavery 726 12.16 Why and How Wealth Matters 728 12.17 Conclusion 730 xxvii
XXVÜÎ Detailed Contents Part 4 Economie Systems and Policy 735 13 A Risky and Unequal World 737 13.1 Introduction: Crashed 738 13.2 Choosing Risk: Gender Differences 739 13.3 Risk Preferences Over Lotteries 742 13.4 Decreasing Risk Aversion: The Person and the Situation 746 13.5 Application: Risk, Wealth, and the Choice of Technology 749 13.6 Doing the Best You Can in a Risky World 751 13.7 How Risk Aversion Can Perpetuate Economic Inequality 756 13.8 How Insurance Can Mitigate Risk and Reduce Inequality 759 13.9 Buying and Selling Risk: Two Sides of an Insurance Market 764 13.10 Application: Free Tuition With an Income-Contingent Tax on Graduates 768 13.11 Another Form of Insurance: A Linear Tax and Lump-Sum Transfer 774 13.12 A Citizen s Preferred Level of Tax and Transfers 779 13.13 Political Rents: Conflicts of Interest Over Taxes and Transfers 784 13.14 Application: Choosing Justice, a Question of Ethics 786 13.15 Risk, Uncertainty, and Loss Aversion: Evaluation of the Model 790 13.16 Conclusion 793 14 Perfect Competition and the Invisible Hand 795 14.1 Introduction: Kitchen Talk in Moscow 796 14.2 A General Competitive Equilibrium 798 14.3 Market Clearing and Pareto Efficiency 803 14.4 Prices as Messages, Markets as Information Processors 807 14.5 Pareto Efficiency and the Invisible Hand: The First Welfare Theorem 810 14.6 Market Failures Due to Uncompensated External Effects 813 14.7 Perfect Competition and Inequality: Distributional Neutrality 817 14.8 Efficiency, Fairness, and Wealth Redistribution: The Second Welfare theorem 820 14.9 Market Dynamics: Getting to an
Equilibrium and Staying There 824 14.10 Bargaining and Rent-Seeking: A More Realistic Model of Market Dynamics 826 14.11 Computational General Equilibrium: Markets, Efficiency, and Inequality 829 14.12 Bargaining to an Efficient Outcome: The Coase Theorem 834 14.13 An Example: How Coasean Bargaining Works 837 14.14 Application: Bargaining Over a Curfew 844
Detailed Contents 14.15 Bargaining, Markets, and Public Policy 854 14.16 Application: Planning Versus the Market in the History of Economics 856 14.17 Perfect Competition, Markets, and Capitalism 858 14.18 Conclusion: Ideal Systems in an Imperfect World 860 15 Capitalism: Innovation and Inequality 863 15.1 Introduction: Capitalism and History s Hockey Stick 864 15.2 Capitalism’s Success: Innovation and Economic Growth 866 15.3 Capitalist Firms as Innovators: Employment as Insurance 869 15.4 Capitalism and Inequality 871 15.5 Application: Measuring Inequality—The Gini Coefficient and the Lorenz Curve 873 15.6 Innovation and Equality 878 15.7 The Microeconomics of Inequality and the Macroeconomy 882 15.8 Market Power and the Distribution of Income 887 15.9 Public Policy to Raise Wages and Reduce Unemployment and Inequality 892 15.10 Application: Trade Unions, Inequality, and Economic Performance 895 15.11 The Rules of the Game and the Distribution of Rents 900 15.12 Capitalism as a Social System: Disparities in Wealth and Power 903 15.13 Application: A Worker-Owned Cooperative 910 15.14 Risk and Redistribution 913 15.15 Application: The Dual Economy and History’s Hockey Sticks 918 15.16 Conclusion 923 16 Public Policy and Mechanism Design 927 16.1 Introduction: Seat Belt Surprises 928 16.2 Mechanism Design: The Classical Institutional Challenge, 2.0 929 16.3 Optimal Contracts: Internalizing External Effects of Public Goods 932 16.4 Enter, the Mechanism Designer: An Optimal Subsidy 936 16.5 The Social Multiplier Effects of Public Policies 939 16.6 Mechanism Design With Social
Interactions: A Cigarette Tax 946 16.7 The Theory of the Second-Best and Public Policy 949 16.8 The Perfect Competitor as an Impediment to Efficient Exchange 955 16.9 Mechanism Design in an Imperfect World 960 16.10 When Optimal Contracts Fail: The Case of Team Production 965 16.11 The Limits of Incentives: Crowding Out and Crowding In 969 XXIX
XXX Detailed Contents 16.12 Beyond “Market Versus Government”: Expanding the Space for Policies and Institutions 16.13 Rules for Redistribution: Addressing Coordination Failures 975 979 16.14 Why Governments AlsoFail: A Caveat 983 16.15 Conclusion 985 Glossary 989 Notes 1003 Bibliography 1008 Index 1025
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DETAILED CONTENTS About the Authors Preface ¡X Guide to the Online Resources Acknowledgments Part 1 1 People, Economy, and Society Society: Coordination Problems and Economic Institutions XV xvii 1 3 1.1 Introduction: Poor Economics 4 1.2 Societal Coordination: The Classical Institutional Challenge 4 1.3 The Institutional Challenge Today 7 1.4 Anatomy of a Coordination Problem: The Tragedy of the Commons 8 1.5 Institutions: Games and the Rules of the Game 11 1.6 Overexploiting Nature: Illustrating the Basics of Game Theory 15 1.7 Predicting Economic Outcomes: The Nash Equilibrium 18 1.8 Evaluating Outcomes: Pareto Comparisons and Pareto Efficiency 23 1.9 The Value and Limitations of Pareto Efficiency 25 1.10 Conflict and Common Interest in a Prisoners' Dilemma 2 vii 26 1.11 Coordination Successes: An Invisible Hand Game 31 1.12 Assurance Games: Win-Win and Lose-Lose Equilibria 33 1.13 Disagreement Games: Conflict About How to Coordinate 36 1.14 Why History (Sometimes) Matters 38 1.15 Application: Segregation as a Nash Equilibrium Among People Who Prefer Integration 39 1.16 How Institutions Can Address Coordination Problems 45 1.17 Game Theory and Nash Equilibrium: Importance and Caveats 47 1.18 Application: Cooperation and Conflict in Practice 49 1.19 Conclusion 51 People: Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints 54 2.1 Introduction: "The Custom of the Country” 55 2.2 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints 56 2.3 Taking Risks: Payoffs and Probabilities 62 2.4 Expected Payoffs and the Persistence of Poverty 65 2.5 Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: Risk-Dominance 69 2.6
Leadership in Sequential Games: When Order of Play Matters 72
XXÜ Detailed Contents 2.7 Equi Libri um Selection: First-Mover Advantage in a Sequential Game 75 2.8 Institutional Challenges: Common Property Resources, Public Goods, and Club Goods 77 2.9 The Public Goods Game 81 2.10 Application: Experiments on Economic Behavior 2.11 Application: Changing the Rules Matters—Experimental Evidence 2.12 Social Preferences: Blame Economic Man for Coordination Failures? 2.13 The Ultimatum Game: 83 85 87 Reciprocity and Retribution 90 2.14 Application: A Global View—Common Patterns and Cultural Differences 3 93 2.15 Social Preferences Are Not "Irrational" 96 2.16 Application: The Lab and the Street 97 2.17 Application: A Fine Is a Price 99 2.18 Complexity: Diverse, Versatile, and Changeable People 100 2.19 Conclusion 103 Doing the Best You Can: Constrained Optimization 107 3.1 Introduction: The Map and the Territory 108 3.2 Time: A Scarce Resource 108 3.3 Utility Functions and Preferences 112 3.4 Indifference Curves: Graphing Preferences 115 3.5 Marginal Utility and the Marginal Rate of Substitution 118 3.6 Application: Homo Economicos with Cobb-Douglas Utility 124 3.7 The Feasible Set of Actions: Opportunity Costs and the mrt 126 3.8 Constrained Utility Maximization: The mrs = mrt Rule 132 3.9 The Price-Offer Curve, Willingness to Pay, and Demand 137 3.10 Social Preferences and Utility Maximization 141 3.11 Application: Environmental Trade-Offs 145 3.12 Application: Optimal Abatement of Environmental Damages 147 3.13 Cardinal Interpersonally Comparable Utility: Evaluating Policies to Reduce Inequality 151 3.14 Application: Cardinal Utility and
Subjective Well-Being 154 3.15 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints: An Assessment 156 3.16 Conclusion 158
Dťtailed Content1, 4 Property, Power and Exchange: Mutual Gains and Conflicts 161 4.1 Introduction: "Strange and Hard to Believe" 162 4.2 Mutual Gains From Trade: Conflict and Coordination 163 4.3 Feasibte Allocations: The Edgeworth Box 166 4.4 The Pareto-Efficient Set of Feasible Allocations 169 4.5 Adam Smith's Impartial Spectator Suggests a Fair Outcome 174 4.6 Property Rights and Participation Constraints 179 4.7 Symmetrical Exchange: Trading into the Pareto-lmproving Lens 183 4.8 Bargaining Power: Take It or Leave It 185 4.9 Application: Bargaining Over Wages and Hours 189 4.10 Application: The Rules of the Game Determine Hours and Wages 194 4.11 First-Mover Advantage: Price-Setting Power 198 4.12 Setting the Price Subject to an Incentive-Compatibility Constraint 203 4.13 Application: Other-Regarding Preferences—Allocations Among Friends 207 5 4.14 Conclusion 212 Coordination Failures and Institutional Responses 216 5.1 Introduction: Tragedy Averted 217 5.2 A Common Property Resources Problem: Preferences 219 5.3 Technology and Environmental· Limits: The Source of a Coordination Failure 223 5.4 A Best Response: Another Constrained Optimization Problem 227 5.5 How Will the Game Be Played? A Symmetric Nash Equilibrium 232 5.6 Dynamics: Getting to the Nash Equilibrium 235 5.7 Evaluating Outcomes: Participation Constraints, Pareto Improvements, and Pareto Efficiency 238 5.8 A Pareto-Inefficient Nash Equilibrium 243 5.9 A Benchmark Socially Optimal Allocation 246 5.10 Government Policies: Regutation and Taxation 252 5.11 Private Ownership: Permits and Employment 255 5.12
Community: Repeated Interactions and Altruism 260 5.13 Application: Is Inequality a Problem or a Solution? 266 5.14 Overexptoitation of a Non-Excludable Resource 270 5.15 The Rules of the Game Matter: Alternatives to Overexploitation 274 5.16 Conclusion 279 ХХІІІ
Detailed Contents XXIV Part 2 6 Markets for Goods and Services Production: Technology and Specialization 7 283 285 6.1 Introduction: Dream Lifters 286 6.2 The Division of Labor, Specialization, and the Market 286 6.3 Production Functions With a Single Input 289 6.4 Economies of Scale and the Feasible Production Set 292 6.5 Specialization and Exchange 295 6.6 Comparative and Absolute Advantage 303 6.7 Specialization According to Comparative Advantage 307 6.8 Application: History, Specialization, and Coordination Failures 311 6.9 Application: The Limits of Specialization and Comparative Advantage 315 6.10 Production Technologies 316 6.11 Production Functions With More Than One Input 320 6.12 Cost-Minimizing Techniques 326 6.13 Application: Technical Change and Innovation Rents 333 6.14 Application: Characterizing Technologies and Technical Change 336 6.15 Application: What Does the Model of Innovation Miss? 340 6.16 Conclusion 341 Demand: Willingness to Pay and Prices 344 7.1 Introduction: Markets, Up Close 345 7.2 The Budget Set, Indifference Curves, and the Rules of the Game 346 7.3 Income and Demand: Differences in the Budget 352 7.4 Cobb-Douglas Utility and Demand 355 7.5 Appiication: Doing the Best You Can Dividing Your Time 358 7.6 Application: Social Comparisons, Work Hours, and Consumption as a Social Activity 361 7.7 Quasi-Linear Utility, Willingness to Pay, and Demand 367 7.8 Price Changes: Income and Substitution Effects 373 7.9 Application: Income and Substitution Effects of a Carbon Tax and Citizen's Dividend 377 7.10 Application: Giffen Goods and the Law of
Demand 382 7.11 Market Demand and Price Elasticity 383 7.12 Application: Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Price on Demand 388 7.13 Consumer Surplus and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility 391 7.14 Application: The Effect of a Sugar Tax on Consumer Surplus 395
Detailed Contret:, 7.15 Application: Willingness to Pay (for an Integrated Neighborhood) 398 7.16 Application: Market Dynamics and Segregation 403 7.17 Conclusion 407 8 Supply: Firms’ Costs, Output, and Profit 410 8.1 Introduction: Solar Panels and Armored Trucks 411 8.2 Costs of Production: An Owner’s Eye View 413 8.3 Accounting Profits and Economic Profits 415 8.4 Cost Functions: Decreasing and Increasing Average Costs 417 8.5 Application: Evidence About Cost Functions 420 8.6 A Monopolistic Competitor Selects an Output Level 423 8.7 Profit Maximization: Marginal Revenues and Marginal Costs 430 8.8 The Markup, the Price Elasticity of Demand, and Entry Barriers 435 8.9 Application: Evidence on the Markup in Drug Prices 440 8.10 Willingness to Sell: Capacity Constraints and Market Supply 442 8.11 Economic Profits and the Market Supply Curve 446 8.12 Perfect Competition Among Price-Taking Buyers and Sellers: Shared Gains From Exchange 448 8.13 The Effects of a Tax: Consumer Surplus, Profits, Tax Revenues, and Deadweight Loss 452 8.14 Application: The Distributional Impact of Public Policies-Rent Control 455 8.15 Perfect Competition Among Price-Takers: An Assessment 461 8.16 Two Benchmark Models of the Profit-Maximizing Firm: Price-Takers and Price-Makers 463 8.17 Application: The Dynamics of Firm Growth and the Survival of Competition 8.18 Conclusion 9 Competition, Rent-Seeking, and Market Equilibration 465 469 472 9.1 Introduction: "Stay Hungry, Stay Foolish” 473 9.2 Modeling the Continuum of Competition: From One Firm to Many 474 9.3 Reviewing the Monopoly Case, n = 1 478
9.4 Duopoly: Two Firms’ Best Responses and the Nash Equilibrium 479 9.5 Oligopoly and "Unlimited Competition”: From a Few Firms to Many Firms 9.6 Unlimited Competition and the Price Markup Over Costs 488 491 9.7 Market Dynamics: Barriers to Entry and the Equilibrium Number of Firms 493 XXV
XXVI Detailed Contents 9.8 A Conflict of Interest: Profits, Consumer Surplus, and the Degree of 499 Competition 9.9 Limited Competition and Inefficiency: Deadweight Loss 500 9.10 Coordination Among Firms: Duopoly and Cartels 504 9.11 Perfect Price Discrimination: Eliminating Deadweight Loss at a Cost to Consumers 509 9.12 Application: Price Discrimination in Action 512 9.13 Rent-Seeking, Price-Making, and Market Equilibration 514 9.14 Application: When Rent-Seeking Does Not Equilibrate a Market—A Housing Bubble 519 9.15 How Competition Works: The Forces of Supply and Demand 524 9.16 The "Perfect Competitor”: Rent-Seeking Firms Competing in and for Markets 528 9.17 Application: Declining Competition and Increasing Markups 532 9.18 Application: Modern Monopoly, Winners Take All, and Public Policy 534 9.19 Conclusion 538 Part 3 Markets with Incomplete Contracting 10 Information: Contracts, Norms, and Power 543 545 10.1 Introduction: Who Invented Hard Red Winter Wheat #2? 546 10.2 Incomplete Contracts: “Not Everything Is in the Contract” 547 10.3 Principals and Agents: Hidden Actions and Hidden Attributes 551 10.4 Hidden Attributes and Adverse Selection: The Lemons Problem 554 10.5 Application: Health Insurance 557 10.6 Hidden Actions and Moral Hazards: A Contingent Renewal Contract 559 10.7 The Expected Value of the Transaction to the Agent 562 10.8 The Agent’s Best Response: An Incentive Compatibility Constraint 570 10.9 The Principal's Cost Minimization and the Nash Equilibrium 574 10.10 Short-Side Power in Principal-Agent Relationships 582 10.11 A Comparison with Complete
Contracts 584 10.12 Features of Equilibria With Incomplete Contracts: Summing Up 589 10.13 Incomplete Contracts and the Distribution of Gains From Exchange 591 10.14 Application: Complete Contracts in the GIG Economy 596 10.15 Application: Norms in Markets With Incomplete Contracts 599 10.16 Conclusion 601
Derailed LoiitfüV, 11 Work, Wages, and Unemployment 605 11.1 Introduction: Henry Ford's Shocker 606 11.2 Employment as a Principal-Agent Relationship 606 11.3 Nash Equilibrium Wages, Effort, and Hiring 610 11.4 The Employer's Profit-Maximizing Level of Hiring 614 11.5 Comparing the Incomplete and Complete Contracts Cases 620 11.6 Employment Rents and the Workers'Fallback Option 626 11.7 Connecting Micro to Macroeconomics: A No-Shirking Condition 630 11.8 Incomplete Contracts and the Distribution of Gains From Exchange 634 11.9 Application: Contract Enforcement Technologies 636 11.10 Equilibrium Unemployment and the Wage Curve 639 11.11 The Whole-Economy Model: Profits, Wages, and Employment 643 11.12 Monopsony, the Cost of Inputs, and the Level of Hiring 650 11.13 Monopsony and the Cost of Hiring (Non-Shirking) Labor 654 11.14 The Effects of a Minimum Wage on Hiring and Labor Earnings 659 11.15 Conclusion 664 12 Interest, Credit, and Wealth Constraints 12.1 Introduction: Why Mary Bolender’s Car Would Not Start 12.2 Evidence on Credit and Wealth Constraints 668 669 671 12.3 The Wealthy Owner-Operator Case 674 12.4 Complete Credit Contracts: A Hypothetical Case 678 12.5 The General Case: Incomplete Credit Contracts 685 12.6 The Nash Equilibrium Level of Risk and Interest 689 12.7 Many Lenders: Competition and Barriers to Entry 697 12.8 Wealth Matters: Borrowing With Equity 701 12.9 Excluded and Credit-Constrained Borrowers 705 12.10 Comparison of Complete and Incomplete Contracts 707 12.11 Why Redistributing Wealth Can Increase the Sum of Economic Rents 711 12.12 Competition,
Barriers to Entry, and the Distribution of Rents 715 12.13 Application: From Micro to Macro—The Multiplier and Monetary Policy 719 12.14 Application: The Case of Collateral Rather Than Equity 723 12.15 Application: Cotton as Collateral in the US Following the End of Slavery 726 12.16 Why and How Wealth Matters 728 12.17 Conclusion 730 xxvii
XXVÜÎ Detailed Contents Part 4 Economie Systems and Policy 735 13 A Risky and Unequal World 737 13.1 Introduction: Crashed 738 13.2 Choosing Risk: Gender Differences 739 13.3 Risk Preferences Over Lotteries 742 13.4 Decreasing Risk Aversion: The Person and the Situation 746 13.5 Application: Risk, Wealth, and the Choice of Technology 749 13.6 Doing the Best You Can in a Risky World 751 13.7 How Risk Aversion Can Perpetuate Economic Inequality 756 13.8 How Insurance Can Mitigate Risk and Reduce Inequality 759 13.9 Buying and Selling Risk: Two Sides of an Insurance Market 764 13.10 Application: Free Tuition With an Income-Contingent Tax on Graduates 768 13.11 Another Form of Insurance: A Linear Tax and Lump-Sum Transfer 774 13.12 A Citizen's Preferred Level of Tax and Transfers 779 13.13 Political Rents: Conflicts of Interest Over Taxes and Transfers 784 13.14 Application: Choosing Justice, a Question of Ethics 786 13.15 Risk, Uncertainty, and Loss Aversion: Evaluation of the Model 790 13.16 Conclusion 793 14 Perfect Competition and the Invisible Hand 795 14.1 Introduction: Kitchen Talk in Moscow 796 14.2 A General Competitive Equilibrium 798 14.3 Market Clearing and Pareto Efficiency 803 14.4 Prices as Messages, Markets as Information Processors 807 14.5 Pareto Efficiency and the Invisible Hand: The First Welfare Theorem 810 14.6 Market Failures Due to Uncompensated External Effects 813 14.7 Perfect Competition and Inequality: Distributional Neutrality 817 14.8 Efficiency, Fairness, and Wealth Redistribution: The Second Welfare theorem 820 14.9 Market Dynamics: Getting to an
Equilibrium and Staying There 824 14.10 Bargaining and Rent-Seeking: A More Realistic Model of Market Dynamics 826 14.11 Computational General Equilibrium: Markets, Efficiency, and Inequality 829 14.12 Bargaining to an Efficient Outcome: The Coase Theorem 834 14.13 An Example: How Coasean Bargaining Works 837 14.14 Application: Bargaining Over a Curfew 844
Detailed Contents 14.15 Bargaining, Markets, and Public Policy 854 14.16 Application: Planning Versus the Market in the History of Economics 856 14.17 Perfect Competition, Markets, and Capitalism 858 14.18 Conclusion: Ideal Systems in an Imperfect World 860 15 Capitalism: Innovation and Inequality 863 15.1 Introduction: Capitalism and History's Hockey Stick 864 15.2 Capitalism’s Success: Innovation and Economic Growth 866 15.3 Capitalist Firms as Innovators: Employment as Insurance 869 15.4 Capitalism and Inequality 871 15.5 Application: Measuring Inequality—The Gini Coefficient and the Lorenz Curve 873 15.6 Innovation and Equality 878 15.7 The Microeconomics of Inequality and the Macroeconomy 882 15.8 Market Power and the Distribution of Income 887 15.9 Public Policy to Raise Wages and Reduce Unemployment and Inequality 892 15.10 Application: Trade Unions, Inequality, and Economic Performance 895 15.11 The Rules of the Game and the Distribution of Rents 900 15.12 Capitalism as a Social System: Disparities in Wealth and Power 903 15.13 Application: A Worker-Owned Cooperative 910 15.14 Risk and Redistribution 913 15.15 Application: The Dual Economy and History’s Hockey Sticks 918 15.16 Conclusion 923 16 Public Policy and Mechanism Design 927 16.1 Introduction: Seat Belt Surprises 928 16.2 Mechanism Design: The Classical Institutional Challenge, 2.0 929 16.3 Optimal Contracts: Internalizing External Effects of Public Goods 932 16.4 Enter, the Mechanism Designer: An Optimal Subsidy 936 16.5 The Social Multiplier Effects of Public Policies 939 16.6 Mechanism Design With Social
Interactions: A Cigarette Tax 946 16.7 The Theory of the Second-Best and Public Policy 949 16.8 The Perfect Competitor as an Impediment to Efficient Exchange 955 16.9 Mechanism Design in an Imperfect World 960 16.10 When Optimal Contracts Fail: The Case of Team Production 965 16.11 The Limits of Incentives: Crowding Out and Crowding In 969 XXIX
XXX Detailed Contents 16.12 Beyond “Market Versus Government”: Expanding the Space for Policies and Institutions 16.13 Rules for Redistribution: Addressing Coordination Failures 975 979 16.14 Why Governments AlsoFail: A Caveat 983 16.15 Conclusion 985 Glossary 989 Notes 1003 Bibliography 1008 Index 1025 |
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| spelling | Bowles, Samuel 1936- Verfasser (DE-588)120898241 aut Microeconomics competition, conflict, and coordination Samuel Bowles & Simon D. Halliday Oxford Oxford University Press [2022] © 2022 xxx, 1035 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd rswk-swf Mikroökonomik / (DE-627)091377803 / (DE-2867)10144-5 Spieltheorie / (DE-627)091390885 / (DE-2867)15458-6 Microeconomics (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 s DE-604 Halliday, Simon D. Verfasser (DE-588)1075648572 aut Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033874789&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Bowles, Samuel 1936- Halliday, Simon D. Microeconomics competition, conflict, and coordination Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
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| title | Microeconomics competition, conflict, and coordination |
| title_auth | Microeconomics competition, conflict, and coordination |
| title_exact_search | Microeconomics competition, conflict, and coordination |
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| title_full | Microeconomics competition, conflict, and coordination Samuel Bowles & Simon D. Halliday |
| title_fullStr | Microeconomics competition, conflict, and coordination Samuel Bowles & Simon D. Halliday |
| title_full_unstemmed | Microeconomics competition, conflict, and coordination Samuel Bowles & Simon D. Halliday |
| title_short | Microeconomics |
| title_sort | microeconomics competition conflict and coordination |
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