Reform and rebellion in weak states:
Throughout history, reform has provoked rebellion - not just by the losers from reform, but also among its intended beneficiaries. Finkel and Gehlbach emphasize that, especially in weak states, reform often must be implemented by local actors with a stake in the status quo. In this setting, the prom...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
[2020]
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| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge elements: Elements in political economy
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Throughout history, reform has provoked rebellion - not just by the losers from reform, but also among its intended beneficiaries. Finkel and Gehlbach emphasize that, especially in weak states, reform often must be implemented by local actors with a stake in the status quo. In this setting, the promise of reform represents an implicit contract against which subsequent implementation is measured: when implementation falls short of this promise, citizens are aggrieved and more likely to rebel. Finkel and Gehlbach explore this argument in the context of Russia's emancipation of the serfs in 1861 - a fundamental reform of Russian state and society that paradoxically encouraged unrest among the peasants who were its prime beneficiaries. They further examine the empirical reach of their theory through narrative analyses of the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, land reform in ancient Rome, the abolition of feudalism during the French Revolution, and land reform in contemporary Latin America. |
| Beschreibung: | 72 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme, Karten |
| ISBN: | 9781108796477 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Theory 5 3 Russia 15 4 Other Cases 39 5 Conclusion 61 Bibliography 64
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72 Bibliography Thaler, Richard H. 1980. Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal ofEconomic Behavior Organization, 1(1), 39-60. Thiesenhusen, William C. 1995. Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Thome, Joseph R. 1989. Law, Conflict, and Change: Frei’s Law and Allende’s Agrarian Reform. In Thiesenhusen, William C. (ed.), Searchingfor Agrarian Reform in Latin America. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, pp. 188-215. Ting, Michael Μ. 2011. Organizational Capacity. Journal ofLaw, Economics, and Organization, 27(2), 245-271. Tsentr Ekonomicheskikh i Politicheskikh Reform. 2018. Rost protestnoi aktivnosti naseleniia: Resul’taty vserossiiskogo monitoringa 2017-2018 gg. http://cepr.su/2018/1 l/08/protests-2017-2018. Tuma, Elias H. 1965. Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform: A Comparative Analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ust’iantseva, N. 1992. Institut Mirovykh Posrednikov v Krest’ianskoi Reforme. Pages 166-183 of: Zakharova, Larisa, Eklof, Ben, and Bushnell, John (eds), Velikie Reformy v Rossii: 1856-1874. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta. van Zomeren, Martijn, Spears, Russell, Fischer, Agneta H., and Leach, Colin Wayne. 2004. Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is! Explaining Collective Action Tendencies Through Group-Based Anger and Group Efficacy. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 87, 649-664. van Zomeren, Martijn, Leach, Colin Wayne, and Spears, Russell. 2012. Protesters as “Passionate Economists”: A Dynamic Dual Pathway Model of Approach Coping with Collective Disadvantage.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16(2), 180-199. Volin, Lazar. 1943. The Russian Peasant and Serfdom. Agricultural History, 17(1), 41-61. Watts, Edward J. 2018. Mortal Republic: How Rome Fell into Tyranny. New York: Basic Books. Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press. Zaionchkovskii, Petr. 1968. Otmena Krepostnogo Prava v Rossii. 3rd edn. Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Zaionchkovskii, Petr, and Paina, Esfir’ (eds.). 1968. Krest’ianskoe Dvizhenie v Rossii v 1870-1880 gg.: Sborník Dokumentov. Moscow: Nauka. Žarnose, Leon. 1986. The Agrarian Question and the Peasant Movement in Colombia: Struggles ofthe National Peasant Association, 1967-1981. New York: Cambridge University Press. Zürcher, Erik J. 2004. Turkey: A Modern History. London: IB Tauris.
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Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Theory 5 3 Russia 15 4 Other Cases 39 5 Conclusion 61 Bibliography 64
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66 Bibliography Chong, Dennis. 2014. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Cleaves, Peter S., and Scurrah, Martin J. 1980. Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Cobban, Alfred. 1999. The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. Davies, James C. 1962. Toward a Theory ofRevolution. American Sociological Review, 27(1), 5-19. de Janvry, Alain. 1981. The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. de Tocqueville, Alexis. 2002 [1835/40]. Democracy in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. de Tocqueville, Alexis. 2008 [1856]. The Ancien Régime and the Revolution. New York: Penguin Classics. de Tocqueville, Alexis. 2011 [1856]. The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. DellaVigna, Stefano. 2009. Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field. Journal ofEconomic Literature, 47(2), 315-372. Dennison, Tracy. 2011. The Institutional Framework of Russian Serfdom. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dewatripont, Mathias, and Roland, Gérard. 1992. Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints. Review ofEconomic Studies, 59(4), 703-730. Dewatripont, Mathias, and Roland, Gérard. 1995. The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty. American Economic Review, 85(5), 1207-1223. Dimitrov, Martin. 2013. Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe. New York: Cambridge
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72 Bibliography Thaler, Richard H. 1980. Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal ofEconomic Behavior Organization, 1(1), 39-60. Thiesenhusen, William C. 1995. Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Thome, Joseph R. 1989. Law, Conflict, and Change: Frei’s Law and Allende’s Agrarian Reform. In Thiesenhusen, William C. (ed.), Searchingfor Agrarian Reform in Latin America. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, pp. 188-215. Ting, Michael Μ. 2011. Organizational Capacity. Journal ofLaw, Economics, and Organization, 27(2), 245-271. Tsentr Ekonomicheskikh i Politicheskikh Reform. 2018. Rost protestnoi aktivnosti naseleniia: Resul’taty vserossiiskogo monitoringa 2017-2018 gg. http://cepr.su/2018/1 l/08/protests-2017-2018. Tuma, Elias H. 1965. Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform: A Comparative Analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ust’iantseva, N. 1992. Institut Mirovykh Posrednikov v Krest’ianskoi Reforme. Pages 166-183 of: Zakharova, Larisa, Eklof, Ben, and Bushnell, John (eds), Velikie Reformy v Rossii: 1856-1874. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta. van Zomeren, Martijn, Spears, Russell, Fischer, Agneta H., and Leach, Colin Wayne. 2004. Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is! Explaining Collective Action Tendencies Through Group-Based Anger and Group Efficacy. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 87, 649-664. van Zomeren, Martijn, Leach, Colin Wayne, and Spears, Russell. 2012. Protesters as “Passionate Economists”: A Dynamic Dual Pathway Model of Approach Coping with Collective Disadvantage.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16(2), 180-199. Volin, Lazar. 1943. The Russian Peasant and Serfdom. Agricultural History, 17(1), 41-61. Watts, Edward J. 2018. Mortal Republic: How Rome Fell into Tyranny. New York: Basic Books. Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press. Zaionchkovskii, Petr. 1968. Otmena Krepostnogo Prava v Rossii. 3rd edn. Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Zaionchkovskii, Petr, and Paina, Esfir’ (eds.). 1968. Krest’ianskoe Dvizhenie v Rossii v 1870-1880 gg.: Sborník Dokumentov. Moscow: Nauka. Žarnose, Leon. 1986. The Agrarian Question and the Peasant Movement in Colombia: Struggles ofthe National Peasant Association, 1967-1981. New York: Cambridge University Press. Zürcher, Erik J. 2004. Turkey: A Modern History. London: IB Tauris. |
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| geographic | Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Russland |
| id | DE-604.BV048477112 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:38:08Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:39:12Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781108796477 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033854831 |
| oclc_num | 1349550865 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 72 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme, Karten |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20230127 |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSearch | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cambridge elements: Elements in political economy |
| spelling | Finkel, Evgeny 1978- Verfasser (DE-588)1021292214 aut Reform and rebellion in weak states Evgeny Finkel (Johns Hopkins University), Scott Gehlbach (The University of Chicago) Cambridge Cambridge University Press [2020] 72 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme, Karten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge elements: Elements in political economy Throughout history, reform has provoked rebellion - not just by the losers from reform, but also among its intended beneficiaries. Finkel and Gehlbach emphasize that, especially in weak states, reform often must be implemented by local actors with a stake in the status quo. In this setting, the promise of reform represents an implicit contract against which subsequent implementation is measured: when implementation falls short of this promise, citizens are aggrieved and more likely to rebel. Finkel and Gehlbach explore this argument in the context of Russia's emancipation of the serfs in 1861 - a fundamental reform of Russian state and society that paradoxically encouraged unrest among the peasants who were its prime beneficiaries. They further examine the empirical reach of their theory through narrative analyses of the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, land reform in ancient Rome, the abolition of feudalism during the French Revolution, and land reform in contemporary Latin America. Geschichte 1861 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte gnd rswk-swf Political development Begrenzte Staatlichkeit (DE-588)107904809X gnd rswk-swf Reform (DE-588)4115716-3 gnd rswk-swf Rebellion (DE-588)4136264-0 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Reform (DE-588)4115716-3 s Geschichte 1861 z DE-604 Begrenzte Staatlichkeit (DE-588)107904809X s Rebellion (DE-588)4136264-0 s Geschichte z Gehlbach, Scott 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)130393517 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-108-85511-2 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033854831&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033854831&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Finkel, Evgeny 1978- Gehlbach, Scott 1967- Reform and rebellion in weak states Political development Begrenzte Staatlichkeit (DE-588)107904809X gnd Reform (DE-588)4115716-3 gnd Rebellion (DE-588)4136264-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)107904809X (DE-588)4115716-3 (DE-588)4136264-0 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Reform and rebellion in weak states |
| title_auth | Reform and rebellion in weak states |
| title_exact_search | Reform and rebellion in weak states |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Reform and rebellion in weak states |
| title_full | Reform and rebellion in weak states Evgeny Finkel (Johns Hopkins University), Scott Gehlbach (The University of Chicago) |
| title_fullStr | Reform and rebellion in weak states Evgeny Finkel (Johns Hopkins University), Scott Gehlbach (The University of Chicago) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reform and rebellion in weak states Evgeny Finkel (Johns Hopkins University), Scott Gehlbach (The University of Chicago) |
| title_short | Reform and rebellion in weak states |
| title_sort | reform and rebellion in weak states |
| topic | Political development Begrenzte Staatlichkeit (DE-588)107904809X gnd Reform (DE-588)4115716-3 gnd Rebellion (DE-588)4136264-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Political development Begrenzte Staatlichkeit Reform Rebellion Russland |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033854831&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033854831&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT finkelevgeny reformandrebellioninweakstates AT gehlbachscott reformandrebellioninweakstates |