Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Warszawa
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar
2022
|
| Ausgabe: | Wydanie pierwsze |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis Abstract Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | 375 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9788366849242 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048469904 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20221213 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 220915s2022 a||| |||| 00||| pol d | ||
| 015 | |a UWD 2022/15998 |2 dnb | ||
| 020 | |a 9788366849242 |9 978-83-66849-24-2 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1346086753 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV048469904 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a pol | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Luty, Damian |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)126813550X |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni |c Damian Luty |
| 250 | |a Wydanie pierwsze | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Warszawa |b Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar |c 2022 | |
| 300 | |a 375 Seiten |b Illustrationen |c 24 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 546 | |a Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Czasoprzestrzeń |2 dbn | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Metafizyka |2 dbn | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Ogólna teoria względności |2 dbn | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Ontologia |2 dbn | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Czasoprzestrzeń |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Metafizyka |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Względności teoria ogólna |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Ontologia |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Raum-Zeit |0 (DE-588)4302626-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Raum-Zeit |0 (DE-588)4302626-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Literaturverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000007&line_number=0004&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 940 | 1 | |q BSB_NED_20221213 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033847721 | ||
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 001.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090513 |g 438 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804184417996898304 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Spis treści Wstęp ....................................................................................................................... 11 CZĘŚĆ I. Realizm strukturalny Rozdział 1. Kontekst problemowy ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego .. 19 1.1. Poincaré ........................................................................................................ 20 1.1.1. Prawdziwość równań matematycznych ............................................ 20 1.1.2. Rzeczywistość a obiektywność............................................................ 23 1.2. Cassirer......................................................................................................... 25 1.2.1. Relacyjny charakter treści poznania .................................................. 26 1.2.2. Zasady konstytutywne i regulatywne ................................................ 30 1.3. Weyl................................................................................................................ 33 1.3.1. Tożsamość cząstek i pierwsza teoria Weyla...................................... 34 1.3.2. Motywacja fenomenologiczna............................................................ 38 1.4. Eddington..................................................................................................... 40 1.4.1. Strukturalizm, selektywny subiektywizm, budowanie świata........ 40 1.4.2. Trudności stanowiska Eddingtona .................................................... 44 1.5. Epistemiczny realizm strukturalny............................................................ 47 1.5.1. Główne argumenty w
debacie realistów z antyrealistami................ 48 1.5.2. Trzecia droga w sporze o status poznawczy teorii............................ 54 1.5.3. Natura i struktura ............................................................................... 57 1.5.4. Zarzut Newmana.................................................................................. 61 1.6. Podsumowanie rozdziału............................................................................ 69 Rozdział 2. Założenia epistemologiczne ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego ....................................................................................................... 71 2.1. Założenia epistemologiczne pierwszej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego................................................................ 72 2.1.1. Semantyczne podejście do teorii naukowych .................................. 72 2.1.2. Struktury częściowe.............................................................................. 77 2.1.3. Ciągłość teoretyczna a struktury częściowe...................................... 79 2.2. Założenia epistemologiczne drugiej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego................................................................ 84 2.2.1. Domknięcie naturalistyczne i pierwszeństwo fizyki...........................85 2.2.2. Tryb formalny i tryb materialny ........................................................ 86
6 2.3. Ocena założeń epistemologicznych ............................................................ 88 2.3.1. Problem pragmatyzmu i fundamentalizm teoriomnogościowy ... 88 2.3.2. Status zasad i pojęć w schemacie tryb formalny-tryb materialny ... 92 2.4. Podsumowanie rozdziału........................................................................... 94 Rozdział 3. Ontyczny realizm strukturalny..................................................... 95 3.1. Tezy metafizyczne pierwszej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego (EOSR1) ................................................................... 96 3.1.1. Eliminacja obiektów jednostkowych i pojęcie indywidualności ... 98 3.1.2. Struktura modalna............................................................................. 110 3.2. Tezy metafizyczne drugiej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego (EOSR2) ................................................................. 118 3.2.1. Redukcjonizm i zorientowane na obiekty wyjaśnianie zjawisk ... 118 3.2.2. Ontologia rzeczywistych wzorców .................................................. 121 3.3. Zarzuty wobec eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego................................................................................................... 125 3.3.1. Reifikacja struktury abstrakcyjnej................................................... 125 3.3.2. Zagadnienie przyczynowości........................................................... 129 3.3.3. Relacje bez elementów relacji...........................................................
131 3.3.4. Trudności argumentu z metafizycznego niedookreślenia............ 133 3.3.5. Manewr Poincarégo i zagadnienie indywiduów................. ............ 137 3.4. Podsumowanie rozdziału......................................................................... 140 CZĘŚĆ IL Ontologia czasoprzestrzeni Rozdział 4. Spór o naturę czasu, przestrzeni, czasoprzestrzeni.................. 4.1. Absolutyzm Newtonowski....................................................................... 4.1.1. Sensy terminu „absolutność”............................................................ 4.1.2. Natura ruchu w klasycznym absolutyzmie...................................... 4.1.3. Indywidualność punktów w absolutyzmie Newtonowskim ........ 4.2. Relacjonizm leibnizjański......................................................................... 4.2.1. Natura ruchu u Leibniza................................................................... 4.2.2. Przestrzeń jako byt idealny................................................................ 4.2.3. Argumenty Leibniza .......................................................................... 4.3. Współczesny spór absolutystów z relacjonistami w kontekście filozofii czasoprzestrzeni ................................................................................. 4.3.1. Teza substancjalizmu rozmaitościowego ........................................ 4.3.2. Relacjonizm redukcjonistyczny........................................................ 4.3.3. Argument dziury................................................................................ 4.4.
Podsumowanie rozdziału.......................................................................... 143 144 146 148 152 158 160 161 163 168 168 173 176 183
7 Rozdział 5. Status ontologiczny czasoprzestrzeni w świetle argumentu dziury............................................................................... 185 5.1. Modalistyczna strategia odpowiedzi na argument dziury.................... 185 5.1.1. Esencjalizm metryczny...................................................................... 185 5.1.2. Negacja transświatowej identyfikacji punktów............................. 193 5.2. Strategia negacji pierwotnej tożsamości punktów ................................ 198 5.2.1. Substancjalizm rozmaitościowy z akceptacją równoważności Leibniza............................................................................. 198 5.2.2. Substancjalizm metryczny ................................................................ 205 5.3. Relacjonizm po argumencie dziury ........................................................ 213 5.3.1. Algebry Leibniza ................................................................................ 214 5.3.2. Dynamiczne podejście do fizyki relatywistycznej............................ 221 5.3.3. Relacjonizm nieredukcjonistyczny.................................................. 226 5.3.4. Relacjonizm minimalistyczny .......................................................... 231 5.4. Podsumowanie rozdziału.......................................................................... 237 Rozdział 6. Strukturalistyczna indywiduaqa punktów czasoprzestrzeni ... 239 6.1. Problem teorii ról strukturalnych............................................................ 239 6.1.1. Sformułowanie
problemu.................................................................. 240 6.1.2. Substancjalizm a teoria ról strukturalnych...................................... 241 6.2. Esencjalizm strukturalny Jerzego Gołosza.............................................. 244 6.2.1. Strukturalna tożsamość transświatowa............................................ 244 6.2.2. Ocena esencjalizmu strukturalnego .................................................. 247 6.3. Minimalny esencjalizm strukturalny Davida Glicka ............................ 249 6.3.1. Miejsca esencjalne i teza słabej wystarczalności ............................ 251 6.3.2. Problemy.............................................................................................. 256 6.4. Czasoprzestrzenny realizm strukturalny.................................................. 258 6.4.1. Struktura egzemplifikowana.............................................................. 260 6.4.2. Strukturalizm antymetafizyczny ...................................................... 266 6.5. Dynamiczny realizm strukturalny ............................................................ 271 6.5.1. Strukturalna indywidualność w koncepcji Stachela........................ 272 6.5.2. Teoria wiązek włóknistych a strukturalizm.................................... 274 6.6. Podsumowanie rozdziału............................................................................ 279 Rozdział 7. Strukturalizmy czasoprzestrzenne inspirowane ontycznym realizmem strukturalnym ....................................................................................
281 7.1. Ontyczny czasoprzestrzenny realizm strukturalny................................ 281 7.1.1. Rola czasoprzestrzeni w pierwszej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego............................................................ 282 7.1.2. Strukturalistyczna redukcja czasoprzestrzeni .................................. 285
8 7.2. Umiarkowany ontyczny realizm strukturalny.......................................... 289 7.2.1. Ontologicznarównorzędność obiektowi relacji.............................. 289 7.2.2. Krytyka umiarkowanego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego ... 297 7.2.3. Odpowiedzi na zarzut Wuthricha...................................................... 300 7.3. Minimalny strukturalizm............................................................................306 7.3.1. Interpretacje przestrzeni stanów........................................................ 307 7.3.2. Przestrzenie możliwości a spór substancjalizm-relacjonizm........ 311 7.3.3. Ontologia obserwabli ..........................................................................313 7.4. Silny strukturalizm metryczny .................................................................. 317 7.4.1. Punkty czasoprzestrzeni jako strukturalne nie-indywidua.......... 319 7.4.2. Kategoria relacji w silnym strukturalizmie metrycznym.............. 325 7.4.3. Rozwiązania problemów w ramach silnego strukturalizmu metrycznego ........................................................................331 7.5. Podsumowanie rozdziału............................................................................346 Zakończenie ........................................................................................................... 347 Wykaz stosowanych skrótów............................................................................... 349
Bibliografia........................................................................................................... 351 Streszczenie............................................................................................................. 376 Summary............................................................................................................... 377
Bibliografia Abbott В. i in. (2016), Observation of Gravitational Waves from a Binary Black. Hole Merger, „Physical Review Letters” 116: 061102-1-061102-16. Adams R. (1979), Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity, „The Journal of Philo sophy” 76 (1): 5 -26. Afriat A. (2013), Weyls Gauge Argument, „Foundations of Physics” 43 (5): 699-705. Ainsworth P. (2009), Newmans Objection, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 60: 135-171. Anderson J. (1967), Principles of Relativity Physics, Academic Press, New York. Anderson E., Barbour J. Foster B„ O’Murchadha N. (2003), Scale-invariant gravi ty: geometrodynamics, „Classical and Quantum Gravity” 20:1571-1604. Arenhart J. (2012), Many entities, no identity, „Synthese” 187: 801-812. Arenhart J. (2013), Wither away individuals, „Synthese” 190 (16): 3475-3494. Arenhart J. (2017), The received view on quantum non-individuality: Formal and metaphysical analysis, „Synthese” 194(4): 1323-1347. Armstrong D. (1978), Universals and Scientific Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Armstrong D. (1983), What Is a Law of Nature7., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Armstrong D. (1993), The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem, „Phi losophy and Phenomenological Research” 53 (2): 421-422. Armstrong D. (1995), What makes induction rational7., [w:] The Problem of Rationality in Science and its Philosophy, J. Misiek (red.), Springer, Dordrecht: 45-54. Arnovitt R., Deser S., Misner C. (1959), Dynamical Structure and Definition of Energy in General Relativity, „Physical Review” 116 (5): 1322-1330. Arnovitt R„
Deser S., Misner C. (1960), Canonical Variables for General Relativity, „Physical Review” 117 (6): 1595-1602. Arntzenius E (2012), Space, Time and Stuff, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Arthur R. (1994), Space and Relativity in Newton and Leibniz, „Ihe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 45 (1): 219-240.
352 Bibliografia Arystoteles (2013), Kategorie; Analityki Pierwsze; Analityki Wtóre, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa. Augustynek Z. (1993), Czasoprzestrzeń. Eseje filozoficzne, Wydział Filozofii i So cjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa. Bailer-Jones D. (1999), Tracing the Development of Models in the Philosophy of Science, [w:] Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, L. Magnani (red.), Springer Science+Business Media, New York: 23-40. Bain ƒ. (2003), Einstein Algebras and the Hole Argument, “Philosophy of Science” 70: 1073-1085. Bain ƒ. (2006), Spacetime Structuralism, [w:] The Ontology of Spacetime Volume 1, D. Dieks (red.), Elsevier, Amsterdam: 37-66. Bain ƒ. (2013), Category-theoretic structure and radical ontic structural realism, „Synthese” 190: 1621-1635. Bartels A. (1996), Modern essentialism and the problem of individuation ofspaceti me points, „Erkenntnis” 45: 25-43. Beisbart C. (2009), Can We Justifiably Assume the Cosmological Principle in Order to Break Model Underdetermination in Cosmology?, „Journal for General Philosophy of Science” 40: 175-205. Bell J. (1987), Speakable and unspeakable in quantum physics, Cambridge Uni versity Press, Cambridge. Belot G. (1995), New Work for Counterpart Theorists: Determinism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 46:185-195. Belot G. (1996), Why general relativity does need an interpretation, „Philosophy of Science” 63: 80-88. Belot G. (1998), Understanding Electromagnetism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 49: 531-555. Belot G. (2000), Geometry and motion, „The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 51: 561-595. Belot G. (2011), Geometric Possibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Belot G., Earman J. (1999), From metaphysics to physics, [w:] From Physics to Philosophy, J. Butterfield, C. Pagonis (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge: 166-186. Belot G., Earman J. (2001), Pre-Socratic quantum gravity, [w:] Physics Meets Phi losophy at the Planck Scale, C. Callender, N. Hugget (red.), Cambridge Uni versity Press, Cambridge: 213-255. Ben-Menahem Y. (2006), Conventionalism, Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge. Bennett C. (1990). How to define complexity in physics, and why, [w:] Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information, W. Zurek (red.), Westview, Boulder: 137-148.
Bibliografia 353 Bergmann P. (1961), Observables in General Relativity, „Reviews of Modern Physics” 33(4): 510-514. Bergmann P., Komar A. (1972), The Coordinate Group Symmetries of General Relativity, „International Journal of Theoretical Physics” 5 (1): 15-28. BigaJ T. (2017), On essential structures and symmetries, [w:] Polish Contemporary Ontology, Μ. Szatkowski, В. Skowron (red.), de Gruyter, Berlin: 1-24. Bird A. (2007), Natures Metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Black Μ. (1952), The Identity of Indiscernibles, „Mind New Series” 61 (242): 153-164. Bohm D., Hiley В. (1993), The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory, Routledge, London-New York. Bohr N. (1985), Niels Bohr’s Collected Works, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Boyd R. (1983), Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method, [w:] Scientific Theories, C. Wade Savage (red.), University of Minnesota Press, Min neapolis: 355-391. Brading K. (2011), Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Mo dality, [w:] Scientific Structuralism, A. Bokulich, P. Bokulich (red.), Springer, New York: 43-66. Brading K., Brown H. (2003), Symmetries and Noethers theorems, [w:] Symmetries in Physics, K. Brading, E. Castellani (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge, 89-109. Brading K., Crull E. (2017), Epistemic Structural Realism and Poincares Philosophy of Science, „Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science” 7 (1): 108-129. Brading K., Landry E. (2006), Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and Represen tation, „Philosophy of
Science” 73 (5): 571-581. Brading K., Skilles A. (2012), Underdetermination as a Path to Structural Realism, [w:] Structural Realism, E. Landry, D. Rickles (red.), Springer, New York: 99-116. Braithwaite R. (1940), The Philosophy of Physical Science by Arthur Eddington, „Mind New Series” 49 (196): 455-466. Brigandt I. (2010), Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology, „Erkenntnis” 73: 295-311. Brighouse C. (1994), Spacetime and Holes, „PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association Volume One: Contributed Papers”: 117-125. Brighouse C. (1997), Determinism and Modality, „The British Journal for the Phi losophy of Science” 48: 465-481. Brown H. (2005), Physical Relativity, Oxford University Press, New York. Brown H., Holland P. (2004), Dynamical versus variational symmetries: under standing Noether s first theorem, „Molecular Physics” 102 (11-12): 1133-1139.
354 Bibliografia Brown H., Pooley О. (2006), Minkowski Space-Time: A Glorious Non-Entity, [w:] The Ontology of Spacetime, D. Dieks (red.), Elsevier, Amsterdam: 67-72. Brown H., Read ƒ. (2018), The dynamical approach to spacetime theories, http.7/ philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14592/ [dostęp: 20.06.2019]. Bueno O. (1997), Empirical Adequacy: A partial structures approach, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science” 28 (4): 585-610. Bueno O. (1999), What is structural empiricism? Scientific change in an empiricist setting, „Erkenntnis” 50: 59-85. Bueno O. (2008), Structural realism, scientific change, and partial structures, „Stu dia Logica” 89: 213-235. Bueno О. (2014), Why identity is fundamental, „American Philosophical Quar terly” 51(4): 325-332. Bueno O. French S. (2011), How Theories Represent, „Ihe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 62: 857-894. Bueno O., French S., Ladyman J. (2002), On representing the relationship between the mathematical and the empirical, „Philosophy of Science” 69 (3): 452-473. Bueno O., French S„ Ladyman ƒ. (2012), Models and structures: Phenomenological and partial, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 43:43-46. Busch ƒ. (2003), What structures could not be, „International Studies in the Philo sophy of Science” 17 (3): 211-221. Butterfield J. (1988), Albert Einstein Meets David Lewis, „PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers”: 65-81. Butterfield J. (1989), The Hole Truth, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science”, 40 (1):
1-28. Butterfield J. (2006), Against Pointillisme about Geometry, [w:] Time and History: Proceedings of the 28th Ludwig Wittgenstein symposium, E Stadler, Μ. Stoltzner (red.), Ontos, Frankfurt (Main): 181-222. Cao T.Y. (1997), Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, Cam bridge University Press, Cambridge. Cao T.Y. (2003), Can we dissolve physical entities into mathematical structures?, „Synthese” 136: 57-71. Carnap R. (1956), The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts, „Min nesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 1: 38-76. Carnap R. (1966), Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Basic Books Inc., New York. Carnap R. (1974), Foundations of the Unity of Science: Toward an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Carnap R. (2011), Logiczna struktura świata, tłum. P. Kawalec, PWN, Warszawa. Cartwright N. (1983), How the Laws ofPhysics Lie, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bibliografia 355 Cartwright N. (1999), The Dappled World, Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge. Cassirer E. (1956), Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. Yale Uni versity Press, New Haven. Cassirer E. (2006), O teorii względności Einsteina, tłum. P. Parszutowicz, Wydaw nictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty. Cassirer E. (2008), Substancja ifunkcja, tłum. P. Parszutowicz, Wydawnictwo Ma rek Derewiecki, Kęty. Caulton A., Butterfield J. (2012), Symmetries and Paraparticles as a Motivation for Structuralism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 63:233-285. Cei A. (2005), Structural Distinctions: Entities, Structures, and Changes in Science, „Philosophy of Science” 72:1385-1396. Chaitin G. (1975), Randomness and mathematical proof, „Scientific American” 232(5): 47-52. Chakravartty A. (2003), The Structuralist Conception of Objects, „Philosophy of Science” 70 (5): 867-878. Chakravartty A. (2007), A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. Knowing the Un observable, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chakravartty A. (2013), On the Prospects ofNaturalized Metaphysics, [w:] Scientific Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 27-50. Chisholm R. ( 1973), Parts as Essential to Their Wholes, „The Review ofMetaphysics” 26 (4): 581-603. Connes A. (1994), Noncommutative Geometry, Academic Press, New York Boston - London. Cross Ch. (1995), Max Black on the Identity of Indiscernibles, „The Philosophical Quarterly”, 45 (180): 350-360. Cross Ch. (2011), Brute Facts, The Necessity of Identity, and the Identity of Indis cernibles, „Pacific Philosophical Quarterly”
92:1-10. Cross Ch. (2014), Medieval Theories ofhaecceity, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/, [dostęp: 25.07.2019]. Cruse P., Papineau D. (2002), Scientific realism without reference, [w:] The Problem of Realism, Μ. Marsonet (red.), Ashgate, Farnham: 174-189. Czarnocka Μ. (1984), Kryteria istnienia w naukach empirycznych, praca doktor ska w IFiS PAN, Warszawa. da Costa N., Chuaqui R. (1988), On Suppes Set Theoretical Predicates, „Erkenntnis” 29:95-112. da Costa N., French S. (2000), Models, Theories, and Structures: Thirty Years On, „Philosophy of Science” 67: 116-127. da Costa N., French S. (2003), Science and Partial Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
356 Bibliografia Dalla Chiara Μ., Toralđo Di Francia G. (1993), Individuals, Kinds and Names in Physics [w:] Bridging the Gap: Philosophy, Mathematics, and Physics, G. Corsi, Μ. Dalia Chiara, G. Ghirardi (red.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/ Boston/London: 261-284. Dalia Chiara Μ., Toraldo Di Francia G. (1995), Identity Questions from Quantum Theory [w:] Physics, Philosophy, and the Scientific Community, K. Gavroglu, J. Stachel, Μ. Wartofsky (red.). Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht: 39-46. Dardis A. (1993), Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance, „Philo sophy and Phenomenological Research”, 53 (3): 577-598. Della Rocca Μ. (2005), Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the Identity of Indiscer nibles, „Pacific Philosophical Quarterly” 86: 480-492. Demopoulos W., Friedman Μ. (1985), Bertrand Russells The Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest, „Philosophy of Science” 52 (4): 621-639. Dennett D. (1991), Real patterns, „The Journal of Philosophy” 88 (1): 27-51. Deotto E., Ghirardi G. (1998), Bohmian Mechanics Revisited, „Foundations of Physics” 58: 377-397. Descartes R. (2001), Zasady filozofii, tłum. I. Dąbska, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Kęty. DiSalle R. (1994), On Dynamics, Indiscernibility, and Spacetime Ontology, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 45 (1): 265-287. DiSalle R. (1995), Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry, „Erkenntnis” 42:317-337. DiSalle R. (2006), UnderstandingSpace-Time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Dorato Μ. (2000), Substantivalism, relationism, and structural spacetime realism,
„Foundations of Physics” 30: 1605-1628. Dorato Μ. (2005), The Software of the Universe: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of the Laws of Nature, Ashgate, Aidershot. Dorato Μ. (2007), Dispositions, Relations Properties and the Quantum World (w:) Μ. Kistler, B. Gnassounou (red.). Dispositions and Causal Powers, Ashgate, Aidershot: 249-270. Dorato Μ. (2008), Is Structural Spacetime Realism Relationism in Disguise? The Su pererogatory Nature of the Substantivalism/Relationism Debate, [w:] The Onto logy of Spacetime Volume 2 of Philosophy and Foundations of Physics, D. Dieks (red.), Elsevier, Amsterdam: 17-38. Dorato Μ. (2016), The physical world as a blob: Is OSR really realism?, „Meta science” 25 (2): 173-181. Dorato Μ., Pauri M. (2006), Holism and Structuralism in Classical and Quantum General Relativity, [w:] The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, D. Rickles, S. French, J. Saatsi (red.), Oxford, New York: 121-151. Dowe P. (2000), Physical Causation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bibliografia 357 Dowe P. (2007), Causal Process, https://stanfordlibrary.sydney.edu.au/archives/ sum2010/entries/causation-process (dostęp: 20.09.2019). Dowe P. (2009), Causal Process Theories, [w:] The Oxford Handbook of Causation, H. Beebee, Ch. Hitchcock, P. Menzies (red.). Oxford University Press, Oxford. Earman J. (1977), Leibnizian Space-Times and Leibnizian Algebras, [w:] Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, R. Butts, J. Hintikka (red.). Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht: 93-112. Earman ƒ. (1986), A Primer on Determinism, Reidel, Dordrecht. Earman J. (1989). World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute Versus Relational Theo ries of Space and Time, MIT Press, Cambridge. Earman J. (2004), Laws, Symmetry, and Symmetry Breaking: Invariance, Conser vation Principles, and Objectivity, „Philosophy of Science” 71:1227-1241. Earman J., Norton J. (1987), What Price Spacetime Substantivalism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 38: 515-525. Eddington A. (1921), A Generalisation of Weyls Theory of the Electromagnetic and Gravitational Fields, „Proceedings of the Royal Society A” 99:104-122. Eddington A. (1929), The Nature of Physical World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Eddington A. (1930), The Mathematical Theory of Relativity, Cambridge Univer sity Press, Cambridge. Eddington A. (1934), New Pathways in Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Eddington A. (1939), The Philosophy of Physical Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Eddington A. (1953), Space, Time and Gravitation,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ehlers J. (1973), Survey of General Relativity Theory, [w:] Relativity, Astrophysics and Cosmology, W. Israel (red.), Reidel, Dordrecht: 1-125. Einstein A. (1997), The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity, [w:] The Collected Papers ofAlbert Einstein, vol. 6: The Berlin Years: Writings, 1914-1917, A. Kox, Μ. Klein, R. Schulmann (red.), Princeton University Press, Prince ton: 146-200. Einstein A. (2001), Pismafilozoficzne, tłum. К. Napiórkowski, De Agostini, Warszawa. Ellis G., Maartens R., MacCallum M. (2012), Relativistic Cosmology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ellis J. (2003), Dark matter and dark energy: summary and future directions, „Phi losophical Transactions of the Royal Society A” 361: 2607-2627. English J. (1973), Underdetermination: Craig and Ramsey, „The Journal of Philo sophy” 70 (14): 453-462.
358 Bibliografia Esfeld M. (2004), Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 35:601-617. Esfeld Μ., Deckert D.-A. (2018), A Minimalist Ontology of the Natural World, Routledge, New York, London. Esfeld Μ., Lam V. (2008), Moderate structural realism about space-time, „Synthese” 160: 27-46. Esfeld Μ., Lam V. (2010), Holism and structural realism, [w:] Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective, R. Vanderbeeken, B. D’Hooghe (red.). World Scientific, Singapore: 10-31. Esfeld Μ., Lazarovici D., Lam V., Hubert Μ. (2017), The Physics and Metaphysics of Primitive Stuff, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68” (1): 133-161. Esfeld Μ., Sachse Ch. (2011), Conservative Reductionism, Routledge, New York, London. Farajollahi H., Luckock H. (2002), Dirac Observables and the Phase Space of Ge neral Relativity, „General Relativity and Gravitation” 34 (10): 1685-1699. Feigl H. (1970), The Orthodox’ View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as well as Cri tique, [w:] Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology, vol. 4 of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Μ. Radner, S. Winokur, (red.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 3-16. Feigl H. (1975), Russell and Schlick: A Remarkable Agreement on a Monistic Solution of the Mind-Body Problem, „Erkenntnis” 9 (1): 11-34. Field H. (1989), Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, Blackwell, Oxford. Forrest P. (2010), The Identity of Indiscernibles,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible (dostęp: 15.05.2019). French S. (1997), Partiality, Pursuit and Practice [w:] Structures and Norms in Science, M. Dalia Chiara, K. Doets, D. Mundici, J. van Benthem (red.), Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht: 35-52. French S. (2000), The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: Partial Structures and the Application of Group Theory to Physics, „Synthese” 125:103-120. French S. (2001), Getting out of the Hole: Identity, Individuality and Structuralism in Space-Time Physics, „Philosophica” 67: 11-29. French S. (2003), Scribbling on the blank sheet: Eddingtons structuralist conception of objects, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 34:227-259. French S. (2006), Structure as a Weapon of the Realist, „Proceedings of the Aristo telian Society” 106: 169-187. French S. (2010a), Keeping quiet on the ontology ofmodels, „Synthese” 172:231-249. French S. (2010b), The interdependence ofstructure, objects and dependence, „Syn these” 175: 89-109.
Bibliografia 359 French S. (2014), The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford. French S. (2015), Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-idind/#Non-Ind (dostęp: 20.07.2019). French S. (2018), O zanikaniu obiektów fizycznych, [w:] Spór o realizm naukowy. Mala antologia, Μ. Kotowski (red.), tłum. Μ. Woszczek, Μ. Kotowski, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 177-198. French S. (2019), Defending eliminative structuralism and a whole lot more (or less), „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A” 74:22-29. French S., Cei A. (2009), On the Transposition of the Substantial into the Functional: Bringing Cassirers Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics into the Twenty-First Century, [w:] Constituting Objectivity, Μ. Bitből, P. Kerszberg, J. Petitot (red.), Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht: 95-116. French S., Krause D. (2007), Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical and Formal Analysis, Clarendon Press, Oxford. French S., Ladyman J. (1997), Superconductivity and Structures: Revisiting the Lon don Account, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 28 (3): 363-393. French S., Ladyman J. (1999), Reinfiating the semantic approach, „International Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 13 (2): 103-121. French S., Ladyman J. (2003), Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure, „Synthese” 136: 31-56. French S., Redhead Μ. (1988), Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles, „British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 39:
233-246. French S., Rickles D. (2003), Understanding permutation symmetry, [w:] Sym metries in Physics, K. Brading, E. Castellani (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 212-238. Friedman Μ. (1983), Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Friedman Μ. (1999), Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Friedman Μ. (2005a), Ernst Cassirer and the philosophy ofscience, [w:] Continental Philosophy of Science, G. Gutting (red.), Blackwell Publishing, New Jersey. Friedman Μ. (2005b), Ernst Cassirer and Contemporary Philosophy of Science, „Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities” 10 (1): 119-128. Frigg R. (2012), Models in Science, URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-science/#OntWhaMod , (dostęp: 15.08.2019). Frigg R, Votsis L (2011), Everything you always wanted to know about structu ral realism but were afraid to ask, „European Journal Philosophy of Science” 1: 227-276.
360 Bibliografia Geach P.T. (1962), Reference and Generality, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Geroch R. (1972), Einstein algebras, „Communications in Mathematical Physics” 26: 271-275. Gherab-Martin K. (2013), From structuralism to neutral monism in Arthur S. Ed dingtons philosophy ofphysics, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 44: 500-512. Ghins Μ. (2002), Putnams No-Miracle Argument: a Critique [w:] Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science, S. Clarke, T. Lyons (red.), Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht, 121-138. Giedymin J. (1982), Science and Convention, Pergamon Press, Oxford. Giere R., (2004), How models are used to represent reality, „Philosophy of Science” 71 (5): 742-752. Giles R. (1981), Reconstruction of gauge potentials from Wilson loops, „Physical Review D”, 24 (8): 2160-2168. Gillman L., Jerison Μ., (1960), Rings of Continuous Functions, D. Van Nostrand Company, Princeton. GiovanelliM. (2014), ‘But one must not legalize the mentioned sin’: Phenomenological vs. dynamical treatments of rods and clocks in Einsteins thought, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 48: 20-44. Gisin N. (2018), WhyBohmian Mechanics? One- and Two-Time Position Measure ments, Bell Inequalities, Philosophy, and Physics, „Entropy” 20: 105. Glick, D. (2016), Minimal Structural Essentialism, [w:] Individuals Across the Sciences, A. Guay, T. Pradeu (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 207-225. Glick D. (2018), Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism, „The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science”, axy008, https://doi.org/10.1093/ bjps/axy008. Glowala Μ. (2012), Pojedynczość. Spór o zasadę indywiduacji w scholastyce, Ofi cyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław. Goldman A. (2007), A Program for ‘Naturalizing’Metaphysics, with Application to the Ontology of Events, „The Monist” 90: 457-479. Gołosz J. (1999), On Field’s argumentfor substantivalism, „International Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 13 (1): 5-16. Gołosz J. (2001 ), Spór o naturę czasu i przestrzeni. Wybrane zagadnieniafilozofii cza su i przestrzeni Johna Earmana, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków. Gołosz J. (2005), Structural Essentialism and Determinism, „Erkenntnis” 63:73-100. Gower В. (2000), Cassirer, Schlick and ‘structural’ realism: the philosophy of the ex act sciences in the background to early logical empiricism, „The British Journal for the History of Philosophy” 8(1): 71-106.
Bibliografia 361 Gracia J. ( 1994), Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-reformation (1150-1650), State University of New York Press, New York. Grünbaum A. (1977), Absolute and Relational Theories of Space and Space-Time, [w:] Foundations of Space-Time Theories, J. Earman, C. Glymour, J. Stachel (red.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 303-373. Hall N. (2010), David Lewis’s Metaphysics, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lewis -metaphysics/#PerNatProRel, [dostęp: 21.12.2019]. Hall N. (2015), Humean Reductionism about Laws ofNature, [w:] A Companion to David Lewis, B. Loewer, J. Schaffer (red.), John Wiley Sons, Inc., New Jersey: 262-277. Halvorson H. (2012), What Scientific Theories Could Not Be, „Philosophy of Science” 79 (2):183֊206. Halvorson H. (2016), Scientific Theories, [w:] P. Humphreys (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 585-608. Harman G. (1965), The Inference to the Best Explanation, „The Philosophical Re view” 74: 88-95. Hartle J. (2003), Gravity, Addison Wesley, San Francisco. Hartz G., Cover J. (1988), Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic, „Nous” 22 (4): 493-519. Hawking S., Ellis G. (1973), The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hawley K. (2006), Weak Discernibility, „Analysis” 66 (4): 300-303. Healey R. (1991), Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism: A Prolegomenon to the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, „Philosophy of Science” 58: 503-505. Healey R. (1995), Substance, Modality and Spacetime, „Erkenntnis”
42:287-316. Healey R. (2001), On the Reality of Gauge Potentials, „Philosophy of Science” 68 (4): 432-455. Heil J. (2003), From an Ontological Point of View, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Heis J. (2014), Realism, functions, and the a priori: Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of science, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science” 48: 10 - 19. Held C. (2011), Truth does not explain predictive success, „Analysis” 71 (2): 232-234. Heller Μ. (1991), Osobliwy wszechświat, PWN, Warszawa. Heller Μ. (1993), Fizyka ruchu i czasoprzestrzeni, PWN, Warszawa. Heller Μ. (2004), Nieprzemienna unifikacja dynamiki i prawdopodobieństwa, „Fi lozofia Nauki” 12/1: 7-17. Heller Μ. (2012), Filozofia i wszechświat, Universitas, Kraków. Hempel C. (1945), Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I), „Mind” 54 (213): 1-26. Hempel C. (1952), Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, Uni versity of Chicago Press, Chicago.
362 Bibliografia Hempel C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Press, New York. Hempel C. (1970), On the ‘Standard Conception’ ofScientific Theories, [w:] Theories Methods of Physics and Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. IV, Μ. Radner, S. Winokur (red.). University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 142-163. Hempel C., Oppenheim P. (1948), Studies in the Logic ofExplanation, „Philosophy of Science”15 (2): 135-175. Henneaux Μ., Teitelboim C. (1992), Quantization of Gauge Systems, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Hilbert D., Bernays P. (1968), Grundlagen der Mathematik, t. 1, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Hilbert D., Hugget N. (2006), Groups in Mind, „Philosophy of Science” 73: 765-777. Hoefer C. (1996), The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism, „The Journal of Philosophy” 93 (1): 5-27. Hoefer C. (1998), Absolute versus Relational Spacetime: For Better or Worse, the Debate Goes on, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 49 (3): 451-467. Hoefer C. (2000), Energy Conservation in GTR, „Studies in History and Philoso phy of Modern Physics” 31 (2): 187-199. Horwich P. (1978), On the Existence of Time, Space and Space-Time, „Nous” 12 (4): 397-419. Howson C. (2013), Exhuming the No-Miracles Argument, „Analysis” 73 (2): 205-211. Hugget N. (2006), The Regularity Account of Relational Spacetime, „Mind” 115 (457): 41-73. Hugget N. (2008), Why the Parts of Absolute Space are Immobile, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 59:391-407. Hugget N.. Norton J. (2014), Weak Discernibility for Quanta, the Right Way, „The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 65:39-58. Huggett N., Wüthrich Ch. (2013), Emergentspacetime and empirical (in)coherence „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 44: 276-285. Ihmig K.-N. (1999), Ernst Cassirer and the Structural Conception of Objects in Modern Science: The Importance of the ‘Erlanger Programm’, „Science in Con text” 12 (4): 513-529. Ingarden R. (1987), Spór o istnienie świata, PWN, Warszawa. Ivanova Μ. (2015), Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poin cares philosophy of science, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 52: 114-122. Jackson E (1995), Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series” 95: 253-268.
Bibliografia 363 Jannsen M. (2002), COI Stories: Explanation and Evidence in the History of Science, „Perspectives on Science” 10 (4): 457-522. Jauernig A. (2008), Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypotheses, „The Leibniz Review” 18:1-40. Jones O. (1964), Identity and Countability, „Analysis” 24 (6): 201-206. Kant I. (2010), Dzieła zebrane, t.I: Pisma przedkrytyczne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń. Kaplan D. (1975), How to Russell a Frege-Church, „The Journal of Philosophy” 72 (19), 716-729. Keränen J. (2001), The Identity Problem for Realist Structuralism, „Philosophia Mathematic” 9; 308-330. Ketland J. (2004), Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 55 (2): 287-300. Kilmister C. (1994), Eddingtons Search for a Fundamental Theory: A Key to the Universe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Kim J. (2006), Emergence: Core ideas and issues, „Synthese” 151: 547-559. KincaidH. (2004), There Are Laws in the Social Sciences, [w:] Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, C. Hitchcock (red.), Blackwell, Oxford: 168-185. Knox, E. (2019), Physical relativity from a functionalist perspective, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 67:118-124. Kopczyński W., Trautman A. (1984), Czasoprzestrzeń i grawitacja, PWN, Warszawa. Koterski A. (2012), „Dwa dogmaty” Quine’a jako krytyka logicznego empiryzmu, „Filozofia Nauki” 77:45-58. Kotowski Μ. (2014), O rozwoju realizmu naukowego jako selektywnego scepty cyzmu, „Filozofia Nauki” 87: 105-123. Kotowski Μ. (2016), Realizm zreformowany.
Filozofia lana Hackinga a spór o sta tus poznawczy wiedzy naukowej, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław. Krause D. (2005), Structures and Structural Realism, „Logic Journal of the IGPL” 13(1): 113-126. Krause D., Arenhart J. (2019), Is Identity Really So Fundamental?, „Foundations of Science” 24: 51-71. Krause D., Arenhart J., Moraes F. (2011), Axiomatization and Models of Scientific Theories, „Foundations of Science” 16:363-382. Ladyman J. (2001), Science, Metaphysics and Structural Realism, „Philosophica” 67: 57-76. Ladyman J. (2004), Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and van Fraassen, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 55: 755-765. Ladyman J. (2014), Structural realism, URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ structural-realism, [dostęp: 18.06.2019].
364 Bibliografia Ladyman J. (2016a), lhe Foundations of Structuralism and the Metaphysics of Relations, [w:] The Metaphysics Relations, A. Marmodoro, D. Yates (red.), Ox ford University Press, Oxford: 177-197. Ladyman ƒ. (2016b), Are There Individuals in Physics, and If So, What Are They?, [w:] A. Guay, T. Pradeu (red.), Individuals Across the Sciences, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 193-206. Ladyman J. (2018), Czym jest realizm strukturalny?, [w:] Spór o realizm nauko wy. Mała antologia, Μ. Kotowski (red.), tłum. R. Rydz, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 199-218. Ladyman J. (2019), Introduction: Structuralists of the world unite, „Studies in His tory and Philosophy of Science Part A” 74: 1 -3. Ladyman J., Ross D. i in. (2007), Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lam V. (2011), Gravitational and Nongravitational Energy: The Need for Back ground Structures, „Philosophy of Science” 78: 1012-1024. Lam V„ Esfeld Μ. (2012), The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity, „Journal for General Philosophy of Science” 43: 243-258. Lam V., Wüthrich C. (2015), No Categorial Support for Radical Ontic Structural Realism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 66: 605-634. Lam, V.; Wüthrich C. (2018), Spacetime is as spacetime does, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 64: 39-51. Landry E. (2007), Shared structure need not be shared set-structure, „Synthese” 158: 1-17. Landry E. (2012), Methodological Structural Realism, [w:] Structural Realism, Springer, E. Landry, D. Rickles (red.),
Dordrecht, 29-58. Landry E. (2017), Structural Realism and Category Mistakes, [w:] Categories for the Working Philosopher, E. Landry (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 430-450. Landry E., Marquis J., (2005), Categories in Context: Historical, Foundational, and Philosophical, „Philosophia Mathematica” 13: 1-43. Langton R. (2007), Kantian humility: Our ignorance of things in themselves, Ox ford: Oxford University Press. Laudan L. (2018), Obalenie realizmu konwergentnego, [w:] Spór o realizm nauko wy. Mała antologia, tłum. Μ. Kotowski, Μ. Kotowski (red.), Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 29-66. Lawvere W, Schanuel S. (2009), Conceptual Mathematics: A First Introduction to Categories, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lazarovici D. (2018), Super-Humeanism: A starving ontology, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 64: 79-86.
Bibliografia 365 Lehmkuhl D. (2011), Mass-Energy-Momentum: Only there Because of Spacetime?, „Ihe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 62:453-488. Lehmkuhl D. (2014), Why Einstein did not believe that general relativity geometrizes gravity, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 46: 316-326. Lehmkuhl D. (2018), The Metaphysics ofSuper-Substantivalism, „Nous” 52:24-46. Leibniz G.W. (1969), Wyznanie wiary filozofa, Rozprawa metafizyczna, Mona dologia, Zasady natury i łaski, tłum. S. Cichowicz, J. Domański, H. Krzeczkowski, H. Moese, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa. Leibniz G.W. (1989), Philosophical Papers and Letters, tłum. L. Loemker, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Levi-Civita T. (1916), Nozione di Parallelismo in Una Varieta Qualunqe e Conseguente Specificazione Geometrica della Curvatura Riemananniana, „Adu nanza” 24:173-204. Lewis D. (1983), New work for a theory of universals, „Australasian Journal of Philosophy” 61: 343-377. Lewis D. (1986a), On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford. Lewis D. (1986b), Philosophical Papers II, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lewis D. (2001), Counterfactuals, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. Lipton P. (2004), Inference to the Best Explanation, Routledge - New York London. London E, LondonH. (1935), The Electromagnetic Equations ofthe Supraconductor, „Proceedings of the Royal Society A” 149: 71-88. Longair Μ. (2013), Quantum Concepts in Physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Losee J. (2001), Wprowadzenie do filozofii nauki, tłum. T. Bigaj, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa. Lovejoy A.
(1930), The Revolt Agaist Dualism, Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. Lowe J. (1994), Primitive Substances, „Philosophy and Phenomenological Re search” 54 (3): 531-552. Lowe J. (2016), Non-Individuals, [w:] Individuals Across the Sciences, A. Guay, T. Pradeu (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 49-60. Lusanna L. (1995), Hamiltonian constraints and Diracs observables: from relativ istic particles towards field theory and general relativity, https://arxiv.org/abs/ hep-th/9501112 (dostęp: 17.06.2019). Luty D. (2020), Sensy obiektywności. Henri Poincaré i Ernst Cassirer w kontekście realizmu strukturalnego, „Diametros”: 1-17. Lyre H. (1999), Gauges, Holes, and their ‘Connections’, https://arxiv.org/abs/gr -qc/9904036 (dostęp: 17.06.2019).
366 Bibliografia Łukasik A. (2006), Filozofia atomizmu. Atomistyczny model świata wfilozofii przy rody, fizyce klasycznej i współczesnej a problem elementarności, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin. Łukasik A. (2009), Atomizm dawniej i dziś. O niewspółmierności ontologicznej kla sycznego i kwantowo-mechanicznego pojęcia elementarnych składników mate rii, „Studia Philosophiae Christianae” 45(1): 133-162. Łukasik A. (2013), Przestrzeń w fizyce. Podstawowe koncepcje, „Ethos” 26(4): 19-45. MacBride E (2016), Relations, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations/ (do stęp: 20.08.2019). MacLeod R. (1982), The ‘bankruptcy of science’ debate: the creed of science and its critics, 1885 - 1900, „Science, Technology and Human Values” 41 (7): 2-15. Magnus P., Callender C. (2004), Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy, „Phi losophy of Science” 71 (3): 320-338. Maidens, A. (1993), Substantivalism and the hole argument, niepublikowana praca doktorska, University of Cambridge. Maidens A. (1998), Particles and the Perversely Philosophical Schoolchild: Rigid Designation, Haecceitism and Statistics, „Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía” 17 (1): 75-87. Malament D. (2012), Topics in the Foundations of General Relativity and Newtonian Gravitation Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Maudlin T. (1988), The Essence of Space-Time, „Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers”: 82-91. Maudlin T. (1990), Substances and Space-Time: What Aristotle Would Have Said to Einstein, „Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science Part A” 21 (4): 531-561. Maudlin T. (1993), Buckets of Water and Waves of Space: Why Space-Time is Probably a Substance, „Philosophy of Science” 60:183-203. Maudlin T. (2007), The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Maudlin T. (2012), Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Maurin A. (2018), Tropes, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/ (dostęp: 15.05.2019). Maxwell G. (1962), The ontological status of theoretical entities, „Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 3: 1-27. Maxwell G. (1970), Structural realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms, „Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 4: 181-192. McArthur D. (2007), Recent debates over structural realism, „Journal for General Philosophy of Science” 37: 209-224.
Bibliografia 367 McDonough J. (2016), Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Later Years, „Philosophical Review” 125 (1): 1-34. McDonough J. (2019), Leibniz’s Philosophy of Physics, https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/leibniz-physics/ (dostęp: 18.09.2019). McGuire J. (1978), Newton on Place, Time, and God: An Unpublished Source, „The British Journal for the History of Science” 11 (2): 114-129. McGuire J. (1995), Tradition and Innovation, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht. McKitrick J. (2004), Are Dispositions Causally Relevant?, „Synthese” 144:357-371. McLaughlin B. (1997), Emergence and Supervenience, „Intellectica” 25 (2): 25-43. McLaughlin B. (2018), Supervenience, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience (dostęp: 20.10.2019). Melia J. (1999), Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions ofDeterminism, „The Bri tish Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 50:639-664. Melia J., Saatsi J. (2006), Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 57 (3): 561-585. Melnyk A. (2013), Can Metaphysics Be Naturalized? And if So, How?, [w:] Scientific Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 79-95. Misner Ch., Thorne K., Wheeler J. (1973), Gravitation, W. H. Freeman and Com pany, San Francisco. Mizrahi Μ. (2013), The pessimistic induction: a bad argument gone too far, „Syn these” 190: 3209-3226. Møller-Nielsen T. (2015), Symmetry and Qualitativity, [w:] Metaphysics in Contem porary Physics, T. Bigaj, Ch. Wüthrich (red.), Brill Lodopi, Leiden: 179-214. Monton В. (2017), Constructive Empiricism,
URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/, [dostęp: 14.10.2019]. Morgan Μ. (1999), Learning from models, [w:] Models as Mediators, Μ. Morgan, Μ. Morrison (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 347-388. Morganti Μ. (2004), On the Preferability of Epistemic Structural Realism, „Syn these” 142: 81-107. Morganti Μ. (2011), Is There a Compelling Argumentfor Ontic Structural Realism?, „Philosophy of Science” 78 (5):1165-1176. Moriyasu K. (1983), An Elementary Primer for Gauge Theory, World Scientific, Singapore. Mormann T. (2007), The Structure of Scientific Theories in Logical Empiricism [w:] The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, A. Richardson, T. Uebel (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 136-164. Moss G. (2015), Ernst Cassirer and the Autonomy of Language, Lexington Books, New York. Moynahan G. (2013), Ernst Cassirer and the Critical Science of Germany 18991901, Anthem Press, London.
368 Bibliografia Mukhanov V. (2005), Physical Foundations of Cosmology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Muller E (2011a), Withering away, weakly, „Synthese” 180 (2): 223-233. Muller E (2011b), How to defeat Wüthrich’s abysmal embarrassment argument against space-time structuralism, „Philosophy of Science” 78 (5): 1046-1057. Muller E, Saunders S. (2008), Discerning Fermions, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 59: 499-548. Mumford S. (2004), Laws in Nature, Routledge, New York, London. Murawski R. (1986), Filozofia matematyki. Antologia tekstów klasycznych, Państ wowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Poznań. Musgrave A. (2018), Ostateczny argument za realizmem naukowym, [w:] Spór o realizm naukowy. Mała antologia, Μ. Kotowski (red.), tłum. Μ. Kacperak, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 89-116. Nagata J. (1985), Modern General Topology, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Nakayama Y. (2015), Scale invariance vs conformal invariance, „Physics Reports” 569: 1-93. Nerlich G. (2005), Can Parts of Space Move? On Paragraph Six of Newtons Scholium, „Erkenntnis” 62: 119-135. Nerlich G. (2010), Why Spacetime is Not a Hidden Cause: A Realist Story, [w:] Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski’s Unification of Space and Time, N. Petkov (red.), Springer, Heidelberg: 181-208. Newman Μ. H. (1928), Mr. Russels Causal Theory of Perception, „Mind” 146: 137-148. Newman Μ. (2005), Ramsey Sentence Realism as an Answer to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction, „Philosophy of Science” 72: 1373-1384. Newton I. (2004), Philosophical Writings, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge. Newton I. (2015), Matematyczne zasady filozofii naturalnej, tłum. S. Brzezowski, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków. Ney A. (2012), Neo-Positivist Metaphysics, „Philosophical Studies” 160: 53-78. Niiniluoto I. (2002), Critical Scientific Realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Nodelman U, Zalta E. (2014), Foundations for Mathematical Structuralism, „Mind” 123 (489): 39-78. Norton J. (1988), The Hole Argument, „PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association”: 56-64. Norton J. (2003), General covariance, gauge theories, and the Kretschmann objec tion, [w:] Symmetries in Physics, K. Brading, E. Castellani (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 110-123. O’Connor T., Wong H.Y., (2005), The Metaphysics of Emergence, „Nous” 39 (4): 658-678. Ohanian H. (1976), Gravitation and Spacetime, WW Norton, New York.
Bibliografia 369 O’Raifeartaigh L. (1986), Group Structure of Gauge Theories, Cambridge Univer sity Press, Cambridge. Pauli W. (1958), Theory of Relativity, Pergamon Press, London. Petkov V. (2005), Is There an Alternative to the Block Universe View?, [w:] The On tology of Spacetime, D. Dieks (red.), Elsevier, Amsterdam. Poincaré H. (1905), Science and Hypothesis, Ihe Walter Scott Publishing Company, New York. Poincaré H. (1958), The Value of Science, Dover Publications, New York. Pollok К. (2010), The ‘Transcendental Method’: On the Reception of the Critique of Pure Reason in Neo-Kantianism, [w:] The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, P. Guyer (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge: 346-379. Pooley O. (2006), Points, particles, and structural realism, [w:] The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, D. Rickles, S. French, J. Saatsi (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 83-120. Pooley O. (2013), Substantivalist and Relationalist Approaches to Spacetime, [w:] The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, R. Batterman (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford. Post, H. (1963), Individuality and physics, „The Listener”: 534-537. Przełęcki Μ. (1969), The Logic of Empirical Theories, Routledge, London. Przełęcki Μ. (1993), Dwa podejścia do logicznej struktury teorii: teoriomnogościowe versus teoriomodelowe, „Filozofia Nauki” 2-3: 237-251. Psillos S. (1999), Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, Routledge, New York, London. Psillos S. (2006), The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure?, „Philosophy of Science” 73
(5): 560-570. Psillos S. (2009), Knowing the Structure of Nature. Essays on Realism and Expla nation, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills. Psillos S. (2015), Conventions and Relations in Poincares Philosophy of Science, „Methode” 4: 98-140. Puntel L. (2008), Structure and Being, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania. Putnam H. (1975), Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Volume 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Putnam H. (2011), Argument teoriomodelowy a poszukiwanie realizmu zdrowo rozsądkowego, tłum. К. Czerniawski, T. Szubka, „Filozofia Nauki” 19 (1): 7-24. Putnam H. (2013), Wiele twarzy realizmu i inne eseje, tłum. A. Grobler, Wydaw nictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa. Quine W. V. ( 1969), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York.
370 Bibliografia Quine W. V. (1982), Theories and Things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Quine W. V. (2000), Dwa dogmaty empiryzmu, [w:] Z punktu widzenia logiki. Dziewięć esejów logiczno-filozoficznych, tłum. B. Stanosz, Warszawa, Aletheia: 49-75. Redhead Μ. (2001 ), The Intelligibility ofthe Universe, „Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement” 48: 73-90. Reichenbach H. (1958), The Philosophy of Space and Time, Dover Publications, New York. Reichenbach H. (1969), Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity, University of California Press, Berkeley. Resnik Μ. (1997), Mathematics as a Science ofPatterns, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Rickles D. (2007), Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, Elsevier, Amsterdam. Robb A. (1914), Theory of Time and Space, Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge. Roberts ƒ. (2003), Leibniz on Force and Absolute Motion, „Philosophy of Science” 70 (3): 553-573. Roberts J. (2008), The Law-Governed Universe, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Roberts B. (2011), Group Structural Realism, „The British Journal for the Phi losophy of Science” 62: 47-69. Robinson H. (2018), Substance, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/ (do stęp: 10.10.2019). Rodzeń J. (2006), Co to jest „argument z cudu”? Próba obrony realizmu naukowego oparta na fakcie sukcesu nauki, „Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce” 38: 3-34. Roeper P. (1997), Region-based topology, „Journal of Philosophical Logic” 26 (3): 251-309. Rovelli C. (1997), Halfway through the woods: contemporary research on space and time, [w:] The Cosmos of Science, J. Earman, J. Norton, (red.), University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh: 180-223. Rovelli C. (2002), Partial observables, „Physical Review” D65,124013. Rovelli C. (2004), Quantum Gravity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Russell B. (1995), An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Routledge, New York, London. Russell B. (2007), The Analysis of Matter, Russell Press, Nottingham. Ryckman T. (1999), Einstein, Cassirer, and General Covariance - Then and Now, „Science in Context” 12: 585-619. Ryckman T. (2005), The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915-1925, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Rynasiewicz R. ( 1992), Rings, holes and substantivalism: On the program ofLeibniz algebras, „Philosophy of Science” 59 (4): 572-589. Rynasiewicz R. (1994), The lessons of the hole argument, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 45 (2): 407-436.
Bibliografia 371 Rynasiewicz R. (1995), By Their Properties, Causes and Effects: Newtons Scholium on Time, Space, Place and Motion ֊ II. The context, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A” 26 (2): 295-321. Rynasiewicz R. (1996), Absolute versus relational space-time: An outmoded debate, „Journal of Philosophy” 93 (6): 279-306. Rynasiewicz R. (2000), On the distinction between absolute and relative motion, „Philosophy of Science” 67 (1): 70-93. Rzepiński T. (2006), Problem niedookreślenia teorii przez dane doświadczenia, Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, Poznań. Saatsi J. (2005), On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies, „Philosophy of Science” 72 (5): 1088-1098. Saatsi J. (2010), Whence ontological structural realism?, [w:] EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science, Μ. Suàrez, Μ. Dorato, M. Rėdei (red.). Springer, Dordrecht: 255-266. Sady W. (2013), Spór o racjonalność naukową: od Poincarégo do Laudana, Wy dawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń. Saunders S. (1997), Naturalizing Metaphysics, „The Monist” 80: 44-69. Saunders S. (2003a), Indiscernibles, General Covariance, and Other Symmetries: The Case for Non-Reductive Relationalism, [w:] Revisiting the Foundations of Relativistic Physics, J. Renn, L. Divarci, P. Schroeter (red.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht: 151-174. Saunders S. (2003b), Physics and Leibniz’s principles, [w:] Symmetries in Physics, K. Brading, E. Castellani (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 289-308. Saunders S. (2006), Are Quantum Particles Objects?, „Analysis” 66 (1): 52-63. Saunders S., McKenzie
K. (2015), Structure and Logic, [w:] Physical Theory, L. Sklar (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 127-162. Scholz E. (2016), The problem of space in the light of relativity: The views of H. Weyl and E. Cartan, [w:] Elements d’une biographie de l’espace mathéma tique, L. Bioesmat-Martagon (red.), Edition Universitaire de Lorraine, Nan cy: 255-312. Scholz E. (2018), Weyl’s search for a difference between ‘physical’ and ‘mathemati cal’ automorphisms, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 61: 57-67. Schrôdinger E. (2014), Nature and the Greeks and Science and Humanism, Cam bridge University Press, Cambridge. Schutz G. (1995), Wstęp do ogólnej teorii względności, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa. Shapiro S. (1997), Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
ՅՈ Bibliografia Simons P. (2000), Identity through Time and Trope Bundles, „Topoi” 19:147-155. Sklar L. (1974). Space, Time, and Spacetime, University of California Press, Berkeley. Skow B. (2007), Sklar’s Maneuver, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 58 (4): 777-786. Słowik E. (2016), The Deep Metaphysics of Space, Springer, Dordrecht. Smolin L. (2001), Three Roads to Quantum Gravity, Basic Books, New York. Sneed J. (1979), The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, D. Reidel Publish ing Company, Dordrecht. Sprenger J. (2016), The probabilistic no miracles argument, „European Journal for Philosophy of Science” 6: 173-189. Stachel J. (1993), The meaning ofgeneral covariance: The hole story, [w:] Philosophi cal Problems of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy of AdolfGrünbaum, J. Earman, A. Janis, G. Massey (red.), University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh: 129-160. Stachel J. (2002), ‘The relations between things’ versus ‘the things between relations’: The deeper meaning of the hole argument, [w:] Reading Natural Philosophy: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science and Mathematics, D. Malament (red.), Open Court, Chicago: 231-266. Stachel J. (2005), Structural Realism and Contextual Individuality, [w:] Hilary Putnam, Y. Ben-Menahem (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 203-219. Stachel J. (2006), Structure, Individuality, and Quantum Gravity, [w:] The Struc tural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, D. Rickles, S. French, J. Saatsi (red.), Oxford, New York: 53-82. Stachel J. (2014), The Hole Argument and Some Physical
and Philosophical Impli cations, „Living Reviews in Relativity” 17: 1-66. Stegmüller W. (1976), The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, Springer, New York. Stein H. (1967), Newtonian space-time, „Texas Quarterly” 10: 174-200. Stein H. (1977), On Space-Time Ontology: Extracts from a Letter to Adolf Grün baum [w:] Foundations of Space-Time Theories, J. Earman, C. Glymour, J. Sta chel (red.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 374-402. Stein H. (1989), Yes, but... Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism, „Dialectica” 43: 47-65. Stephani H. (1990), General Relativity: An Introduction to the Theory of Gravi tational Field, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Stephani H. et al. (2003), Exact Solutions of Einstein’s Field Equations, Cam bridge University Press, Cambridge. Strawson G. (2008), The identity of the categorical and the dispositional, „Analysis” 68 (4): 271-282.
Bibliografia 373 Stubenberg L. (2016), Neutral Monism, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutralmonism/ (dostęp: 28.09.2019). Suarez M. (1999), The role of models in the application of scientific theories: epis temological implications, [w:] Models as Mediators, Μ. Morgan, Μ. Morrison (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 168-195. Suppe F. (1977), The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, [w:] The Structure of Scientific Theories, E Suppe (red.), University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago: 3-243. Suppe E (1989), The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism, Uni versity of Illinois Press, Urbana 8c Chicago. Suppes P. (1957), Introduction to Logic, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York. Suppes P. (1962), Models of Data, [w:] Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, E. Nagel, P. Suppes, A. Tarski (red.), Stanford University Press, Stanford: 252-261. Suppes P. (1967), What Is a Scientific Theory?, [w:] Philosophy of Science Today, S. Morgenbesser (red.), Basic Book, New York: 55-67. Suppes P. (1972), Axiomatic Set Theory, D. Van Nostrand Company, New York. Suppes P. (2002), Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures, CSLI Pu blications, Stanford. Szlachcic К. (2011), Prawda w perspektywie konwencjonalistycznej. Pierwsze his toryczne diagnozy, [w:] Prawda, D. Leszczyński (red.), Wydawnictwo Uni wersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław: 345-361. Szumilewicz I. (1978), Poincaré, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa. Szydłowski Μ., Tambor P. (2016), Relacjonizm i substancjalizm
w kontekście teorii grawitacji i kosmologii, „Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria” 25 (4): 225-244. Tahko T., Lowe J. (2015), Ontological Dependence, https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/dependence-ontological/ (dostęp: 25.10.2019). Tegmark M. (2008), The Mathematical Universe, „Foundations of Physics” 38: 101-150. Teller P. (1991), Substance, Relations, and Arguments about the Nature of SpaceTime, „The Philosophical Review” 100 (3): 363-397. Torretti R. (1984), Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht. Torretti R. (1999), ThePhilosophy ofPhysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Urbański Μ. (2009), Rozumowania abdukcyjne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań. Väänänen J. (2019), Second order and higher order logie, https://plato.stanford. edu/entries/logic-higher-order/ (dostęp: 11.10.2019). van Cieve J. (1985), Three Versions of the bundle theory, „Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition” 47: 95-107.
374 Bibliografia van Fraassen В. (1980), The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, Oxford. van Fraassen B. (1989), Laws and Symmetry, Clarendon Press, Oxford. van Fraassen B. (1991), Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View, Clarendon Press, Oxford. van Fraassen B. (2006), Structure: Its shadow and substance, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 57: 275-305. Vassallo A„ Deckert D.-A., Esfeld Μ. (2017), Relationalism about mechanics based on a minimalist ontology of matter, „European Journal For Philosophy of Science” 7 (2): 299-318. Vassallo A., Esfeld Μ. (2016), Leibnizian relationalism for general relativistic phy sics, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 55:101-107. Vetter B. (2009), Review of Bird, „Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy” 8: 320-328. Votsis I. (2005), The upward path to structural realism, „Philosophy of Science” 72:1361-1372. Votsis I. (2011), Structural Realism: Continuity and Its Limits, [w:] Scientific Struc turalism, A. Bokulich, P. Bokulich (red.), Springer, New York: 105-118. Votsis I. (2020), Theory-ladenness: Testing the TJntestable’, „Synthese” 197:1447-1465. Wald R. (1984), General Relativity, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Weatherall J. (2017), Conservation, inertia, and spacetime geometry, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 67: 144-159. Weingard R. (1975), On the Ontological Status of the Metric in General Relativity, „The Journal of Philosophy” 72 (14): 426-431. Weyl H.
(1922), Space-Time-Matter, Methuen Co., London. Weyl H. (1929), On the foundations ofgeneral infinitesimal geometry, „Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society” 35 (5): 716-725. Weyl H. ( 1931 ), The Theory ofGroups and Quantum Mechanics, Dover Publications, New York. Weyl H. (1959), Philosophy ofMathematics and Natural Science, Princeton Univer sity Press, Princeton. Wheeler J. (1962), Geometrodynamics, Academic Press, Cambridge. Wheeler J., Ford K. (2000), Geons, Black. Holes, and Quantum Foam: A Life in Phy sics, W W. Norton Company, New York. Wigner E. ( 1967), Symmetries and Reflections, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Williams D. (1953), On the Elements of Being: I, „The Review of Metaphysics” 7(1): 3-18. Wilson J. (2002), Causal powers, forces, and superdupervenience, „Grazer Philo sophische Studien” 63 (1): 53-77.
Bibliografia 375 Winterbourne A. (1982), On the metaphysics ofLeibnizian space and time, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A” 13 (3): 201-214. Winther R. (2015), The Structure of Scientific Theories, https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/structure-scientific-theories/ (dostęp: 16.07.2019). Witczak J. (1999), Eddington i teoria względności, Biblos, Tarnów. Woleński J. (2016), Wykłady o naturalizmie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, Toruń. Worrall J. (1994), How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the ‘Luminiferous Ether’, „PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Phi losophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers”: 334-342. Worrall J. (2007), Miracles and Models: Why reports of the death of Structural Realism may be exaggerated, [w:] Philosophy of Science (Royal Institute of Philosophy 61), A. O’Hare (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 125-154. Worrall J. (2011), Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence, „Syn these” 180: 157-172. Worrall J. (2018), Realizm strukturalny. To, co najlepsze z dwóch światów?, [w:] Spór o realizm naukowy. Mała antologia, Μ. Kotowski (red.), tłum. Μ. Kotowski, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 145-176. Woszczek Μ. (2011), Serie Leibniza i problem dynamiki w kwantowaniu grawita cji, „Filozofia Nauki” 74 (2): 41-62. Woszczek Μ. (2017), Kwantowa teoria miary a ontologia, „Filozofia Nauki” 98 (2): 29-55. Woszczek Μ. (2018), Kontekstualność kwantowa i ontologia przyczynowości, Wy dawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań. Wójcicki R. (1974), Metodologiaformalna nauk empirycznych,
Wydawnictwo Pol skiej Akademii Nauk, Wrocław. Wüthrich Ch. (2009), Challenging the Spacetime Structuralist, „Philosophy of Science” 76: 1039-1051. Yolton J. (1960), The Philosophy of Science ofA.S. Eddington, Martinus Nijhoff, Hague. Zahar E. (1997), Poincares philosophy of geometry, or does geometric conventio nalism deserve its name?, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Phy sics” 28 (2): 183-218. Zahar E. (2004), Ramseyfication and structural realism, „Theoria” 19 (1): 5-30. Zamiara K. (1974), Metodologiczne znaczenie sporu o status poznawczy teorii, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa. Zeidler P. (2013), Models and Metaphors as Research Tools in Science, LIT Verlag, Berlin.
Streszczenie Praca poświęcona jest współczesnym metafizycznym interpretacjom czaso przestrzeni opisywanej przez ogólną teorię względności Alberta Einsteina. Szer szym kontekstem pracy są badania z zakresu metafizyki znaturalizowanej. Autor umieszcza swoje rozważania w ramach nurtu ontycznego realizmu struktural nego, należącego do wymienionej subdyscypliny filozoficznej. Pole problemowe pracy tworzą dwie debaty: pierwsza dotycząca poprawności i właściwej postaci metafizyki strukturalistycznej wykorzystywanej do interpretowania fizyki fun damentalnej, druga dotycząca współczesnej dyskusji na temat natury czaso przestrzeni. Głównym celem pracy jest sformułowanie oryginalnego stanowiska strukturalistycznego, które pozwala na trafne, metafizyczne ujęcie czasoprze strzeni ogólnorelatywistycznej i na rozwiązanie problemów zarówno innych opcji strukturalistycznych, jak i podejść substancjalistycznych oraz relacjonistycznych w filozofii czasoprzestrzeni. Cel ten jest realizowany przez krytyczną analizę poszczególnych stanowisk, argumentów na ich rzecz, a także przez odniesienie do literatury z dziedziny fi zyki. Rezultatem jest stanowisko, które autor nazywa silnym strukturalizmem metrycznym i w którym proponuje między innymi koncepcję strukturalnych nie -indywiduów. Poza tym celem systematyzuje również dostępne poglądy z zakresu metafizyki strukturalistycznej oraz z zakresu ontologii czasoprzestrzeni, niektóre stanowiska omawiając po raz pierwszy w polskiej literaturze z filozofii nauki i fi lozofii fizyki. Praca składa się z dwóch części. Pierwsza, obejmująca trzy
rozdziały, doty czy nurtu ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego: jego kontekstu problemowego, założeń, tez i konsekwencji. W części tej omówione zostają pojęcia indywiduum i struktury. Wskazana jest również preferencja własna autora w odniesieniu do metafizyki strukturalistycznej. Druga część pracy obejmuje filozofię i fizykę czaso przestrzeni. Analizy poszczególnych stanowisk pozwalają autorowi na wskazanie niezbędnych założeń adekwatnego poglądu strukturalistycznego w odniesieniu do natury czasoprzestrzeni, który wyrażony zostaje w rozdziale ostatnim. Bayerische Staatstibnolhek Munchen
Summary This dissertation deals with contemporary metaphysical interpretations of spacetime, as it is described by Albert Einsteins general theory of relativity. The work is embedded in a wider context: research in naturalized metaphysics. The author places his investigation within the current of ontic structural realism, which belongs to the aforementioned subdiscipline of philosophy. Two debates form the problem field of this work. Firstly, one is concerned with the correctness and the proper version of structural metaphysics used to interpret the fundamental physics. Secondly, one is concerned with diversified contemporary discussions about the nature of spacetime. The main goal of the thesis is to construct a distinct structuralistic position, which makes possible a sound metaphysical account of the general relativistic spacetime. This account is meant to solve some crucial problems of alternative structuralistic options as well as the substantival and relational approaches available in the philosophy of spacetime. This goal is realized through a critical analysis of each position and the arguments proposed to support them, and also by consulting the most relevant physical literature. The end result is a position proposed to be called the strong metrical structuralism, in which the author advances, among others, the concept of structural non-individuals. Another goal is the general systematization of the available viewpoints in structuralistic metaphysics and in the ontology of space time. Some theoretical positions are discussed in the Polish literature on the
philosophy of science and the philosophy of physics for the very first time. The whole thesis is divided into two parts. The first one, which consists in three chapters, is dedicated to the ontic structural realism: its theoretical context, assumptions, and consequences. In this part the notions of an individual and structure are thoroughly discussed. Here, authors preferences regarding the de velopment of structuralistic metaphysics are also clearly indicated. The second part deals with the spacetime philosophy and the spacetime physics. The analyses of available positions formulated in the course of discussions allow the author to capture some necessary or advisable assumptions of an adequate structuralistic view with respect to the nature of spacetime. This particular view is presented and examined in the last chapter.
|
| adam_txt |
Spis treści Wstęp . 11 CZĘŚĆ I. Realizm strukturalny Rozdział 1. Kontekst problemowy ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego . 19 1.1. Poincaré . 20 1.1.1. Prawdziwość równań matematycznych . 20 1.1.2. Rzeczywistość a obiektywność. 23 1.2. Cassirer. 25 1.2.1. Relacyjny charakter treści poznania . 26 1.2.2. Zasady konstytutywne i regulatywne . 30 1.3. Weyl. 33 1.3.1. Tożsamość cząstek i pierwsza teoria Weyla. 34 1.3.2. Motywacja fenomenologiczna. 38 1.4. Eddington. 40 1.4.1. Strukturalizm, selektywny subiektywizm, budowanie świata. 40 1.4.2. Trudności stanowiska Eddingtona . 44 1.5. Epistemiczny realizm strukturalny. 47 1.5.1. Główne argumenty w
debacie realistów z antyrealistami. 48 1.5.2. Trzecia droga w sporze o status poznawczy teorii. 54 1.5.3. Natura i struktura . 57 1.5.4. Zarzut Newmana. 61 1.6. Podsumowanie rozdziału. 69 Rozdział 2. Założenia epistemologiczne ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego . 71 2.1. Założenia epistemologiczne pierwszej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego. 72 2.1.1. Semantyczne podejście do teorii naukowych . 72 2.1.2. Struktury częściowe. 77 2.1.3. Ciągłość teoretyczna a struktury częściowe. 79 2.2. Założenia epistemologiczne drugiej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego. 84 2.2.1. Domknięcie naturalistyczne i pierwszeństwo fizyki.85 2.2.2. Tryb formalny i tryb materialny . 86
6 2.3. Ocena założeń epistemologicznych . 88 2.3.1. Problem pragmatyzmu i fundamentalizm teoriomnogościowy . 88 2.3.2. Status zasad i pojęć w schemacie tryb formalny-tryb materialny . 92 2.4. Podsumowanie rozdziału. 94 Rozdział 3. Ontyczny realizm strukturalny. 95 3.1. Tezy metafizyczne pierwszej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego (EOSR1) . 96 3.1.1. Eliminacja obiektów jednostkowych i pojęcie indywidualności . 98 3.1.2. Struktura modalna. 110 3.2. Tezy metafizyczne drugiej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego (EOSR2) . 118 3.2.1. Redukcjonizm i zorientowane na obiekty wyjaśnianie zjawisk . 118 3.2.2. Ontologia rzeczywistych wzorców . 121 3.3. Zarzuty wobec eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego. 125 3.3.1. Reifikacja struktury abstrakcyjnej. 125 3.3.2. Zagadnienie przyczynowości. 129 3.3.3. Relacje bez elementów relacji.
131 3.3.4. Trudności argumentu z metafizycznego niedookreślenia. 133 3.3.5. Manewr Poincarégo i zagadnienie indywiduów. . 137 3.4. Podsumowanie rozdziału. 140 CZĘŚĆ IL Ontologia czasoprzestrzeni Rozdział 4. Spór o naturę czasu, przestrzeni, czasoprzestrzeni. 4.1. Absolutyzm Newtonowski. 4.1.1. Sensy terminu „absolutność”. 4.1.2. Natura ruchu w klasycznym absolutyzmie. 4.1.3. Indywidualność punktów w absolutyzmie Newtonowskim . 4.2. Relacjonizm leibnizjański. 4.2.1. Natura ruchu u Leibniza. 4.2.2. Przestrzeń jako byt idealny. 4.2.3. Argumenty Leibniza . 4.3. Współczesny spór absolutystów z relacjonistami w kontekście filozofii czasoprzestrzeni . 4.3.1. Teza substancjalizmu rozmaitościowego . 4.3.2. Relacjonizm redukcjonistyczny. 4.3.3. Argument dziury. 4.4.
Podsumowanie rozdziału. 143 144 146 148 152 158 160 161 163 168 168 173 176 183
7 Rozdział 5. Status ontologiczny czasoprzestrzeni w świetle argumentu dziury. 185 5.1. Modalistyczna strategia odpowiedzi na argument dziury. 185 5.1.1. Esencjalizm metryczny. 185 5.1.2. Negacja transświatowej identyfikacji punktów. 193 5.2. Strategia negacji pierwotnej tożsamości punktów . 198 5.2.1. Substancjalizm rozmaitościowy z akceptacją równoważności Leibniza. 198 5.2.2. Substancjalizm metryczny . 205 5.3. Relacjonizm po argumencie dziury . 213 5.3.1. Algebry Leibniza . 214 5.3.2. Dynamiczne podejście do fizyki relatywistycznej. 221 5.3.3. Relacjonizm nieredukcjonistyczny. 226 5.3.4. Relacjonizm minimalistyczny . 231 5.4. Podsumowanie rozdziału. 237 Rozdział 6. Strukturalistyczna indywiduaqa punktów czasoprzestrzeni . 239 6.1. Problem teorii ról strukturalnych. 239 6.1.1. Sformułowanie
problemu. 240 6.1.2. Substancjalizm a teoria ról strukturalnych. 241 6.2. Esencjalizm strukturalny Jerzego Gołosza. 244 6.2.1. Strukturalna tożsamość transświatowa. 244 6.2.2. Ocena esencjalizmu strukturalnego . 247 6.3. Minimalny esencjalizm strukturalny Davida Glicka . 249 6.3.1. Miejsca esencjalne i teza słabej wystarczalności . 251 6.3.2. Problemy. 256 6.4. Czasoprzestrzenny realizm strukturalny. 258 6.4.1. Struktura egzemplifikowana. 260 6.4.2. Strukturalizm antymetafizyczny . 266 6.5. Dynamiczny realizm strukturalny . 271 6.5.1. Strukturalna indywidualność w koncepcji Stachela. 272 6.5.2. Teoria wiązek włóknistych a strukturalizm. 274 6.6. Podsumowanie rozdziału. 279 Rozdział 7. Strukturalizmy czasoprzestrzenne inspirowane ontycznym realizmem strukturalnym .
281 7.1. Ontyczny czasoprzestrzenny realizm strukturalny. 281 7.1.1. Rola czasoprzestrzeni w pierwszej wersji eliminacyjnego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego. 282 7.1.2. Strukturalistyczna redukcja czasoprzestrzeni . 285
8 7.2. Umiarkowany ontyczny realizm strukturalny. 289 7.2.1. Ontologicznarównorzędność obiektowi relacji. 289 7.2.2. Krytyka umiarkowanego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego . 297 7.2.3. Odpowiedzi na zarzut Wuthricha. 300 7.3. Minimalny strukturalizm.306 7.3.1. Interpretacje przestrzeni stanów. 307 7.3.2. Przestrzenie możliwości a spór substancjalizm-relacjonizm. 311 7.3.3. Ontologia obserwabli .313 7.4. Silny strukturalizm metryczny . 317 7.4.1. Punkty czasoprzestrzeni jako strukturalne nie-indywidua. 319 7.4.2. Kategoria relacji w silnym strukturalizmie metrycznym. 325 7.4.3. Rozwiązania problemów w ramach silnego strukturalizmu metrycznego .331 7.5. Podsumowanie rozdziału.346 Zakończenie . 347 Wykaz stosowanych skrótów. 349
Bibliografia. 351 Streszczenie. 376 Summary. 377
Bibliografia Abbott В. i in. (2016), Observation of Gravitational Waves from a Binary Black. Hole Merger, „Physical Review Letters” 116: 061102-1-061102-16. Adams R. (1979), Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity, „The Journal of Philo sophy” 76 (1): 5 -26. Afriat A. (2013), Weyls Gauge Argument, „Foundations of Physics” 43 (5): 699-705. Ainsworth P. (2009), Newmans Objection, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 60: 135-171. Anderson J. (1967), Principles of Relativity Physics, Academic Press, New York. Anderson E., Barbour J. Foster B„ O’Murchadha N. (2003), Scale-invariant gravi ty: geometrodynamics, „Classical and Quantum Gravity” 20:1571-1604. Arenhart J. (2012), Many entities, no identity, „Synthese” 187: 801-812. Arenhart J. (2013), Wither away individuals, „Synthese” 190 (16): 3475-3494. Arenhart J. (2017), The received view on quantum non-individuality: Formal and metaphysical analysis, „Synthese” 194(4): 1323-1347. Armstrong D. (1978), Universals and Scientific Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Armstrong D. (1983), What Is a Law of Nature7., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Armstrong D. (1993), The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem, „Phi losophy and Phenomenological Research” 53 (2): 421-422. Armstrong D. (1995), What makes induction rational7., [w:] The Problem of Rationality in Science and its Philosophy, J. Misiek (red.), Springer, Dordrecht: 45-54. Arnovitt R., Deser S., Misner C. (1959), Dynamical Structure and Definition of Energy in General Relativity, „Physical Review” 116 (5): 1322-1330. Arnovitt R„
Deser S., Misner C. (1960), Canonical Variables for General Relativity, „Physical Review” 117 (6): 1595-1602. Arntzenius E (2012), Space, Time and Stuff, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Arthur R. (1994), Space and Relativity in Newton and Leibniz, „Ihe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 45 (1): 219-240.
352 Bibliografia Arystoteles (2013), Kategorie; Analityki Pierwsze; Analityki Wtóre, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa. Augustynek Z. (1993), Czasoprzestrzeń. Eseje filozoficzne, Wydział Filozofii i So cjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa. Bailer-Jones D. (1999), Tracing the Development of Models in the Philosophy of Science, [w:] Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, L. Magnani (red.), Springer Science+Business Media, New York: 23-40. Bain ƒ. (2003), Einstein Algebras and the Hole Argument, “Philosophy of Science” 70: 1073-1085. Bain ƒ. (2006), Spacetime Structuralism, [w:] The Ontology of Spacetime Volume 1, D. Dieks (red.), Elsevier, Amsterdam: 37-66. Bain ƒ. (2013), Category-theoretic structure and radical ontic structural realism, „Synthese” 190: 1621-1635. Bartels A. (1996), Modern essentialism and the problem of individuation ofspaceti me points, „Erkenntnis” 45: 25-43. Beisbart C. (2009), Can We Justifiably Assume the Cosmological Principle in Order to Break Model Underdetermination in Cosmology?, „Journal for General Philosophy of Science” 40: 175-205. Bell J. (1987), Speakable and unspeakable in quantum physics, Cambridge Uni versity Press, Cambridge. Belot G. (1995), New Work for Counterpart Theorists: Determinism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 46:185-195. Belot G. (1996), Why general relativity does need an interpretation, „Philosophy of Science” 63: 80-88. Belot G. (1998), Understanding Electromagnetism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 49: 531-555. Belot G. (2000), Geometry and motion, „The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 51: 561-595. Belot G. (2011), Geometric Possibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Belot G., Earman J. (1999), From metaphysics to physics, [w:] From Physics to Philosophy, J. Butterfield, C. Pagonis (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge: 166-186. Belot G., Earman J. (2001), Pre-Socratic quantum gravity, [w:] Physics Meets Phi losophy at the Planck Scale, C. Callender, N. Hugget (red.), Cambridge Uni versity Press, Cambridge: 213-255. Ben-Menahem Y. (2006), Conventionalism, Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge. Bennett C. (1990). How to define complexity in physics, and why, [w:] Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information, W. Zurek (red.), Westview, Boulder: 137-148.
Bibliografia 353 Bergmann P. (1961), Observables in General Relativity, „Reviews of Modern Physics” 33(4): 510-514. Bergmann P., Komar A. (1972), The Coordinate Group Symmetries of General Relativity, „International Journal of Theoretical Physics” 5 (1): 15-28. BigaJ T. (2017), On essential structures and symmetries, [w:] Polish Contemporary Ontology, Μ. Szatkowski, В. Skowron (red.), de Gruyter, Berlin: 1-24. Bird A. (2007), Natures Metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Black Μ. (1952), The Identity of Indiscernibles, „Mind New Series” 61 (242): 153-164. Bohm D., Hiley В. (1993), The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory, Routledge, London-New York. Bohr N. (1985), Niels Bohr’s Collected Works, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Boyd R. (1983), Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method, [w:] Scientific Theories, C. Wade Savage (red.), University of Minnesota Press, Min neapolis: 355-391. Brading K. (2011), Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Mo dality, [w:] Scientific Structuralism, A. Bokulich, P. Bokulich (red.), Springer, New York: 43-66. Brading K., Brown H. (2003), Symmetries and Noethers theorems, [w:] Symmetries in Physics, K. Brading, E. Castellani (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge, 89-109. Brading K., Crull E. (2017), Epistemic Structural Realism and Poincares Philosophy of Science, „Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science” 7 (1): 108-129. Brading K., Landry E. (2006), Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and Represen tation, „Philosophy of
Science” 73 (5): 571-581. Brading K., Skilles A. (2012), Underdetermination as a Path to Structural Realism, [w:] Structural Realism, E. Landry, D. Rickles (red.), Springer, New York: 99-116. Braithwaite R. (1940), The Philosophy of Physical Science by Arthur Eddington, „Mind New Series” 49 (196): 455-466. Brigandt I. (2010), Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology, „Erkenntnis” 73: 295-311. Brighouse C. (1994), Spacetime and Holes, „PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association Volume One: Contributed Papers”: 117-125. Brighouse C. (1997), Determinism and Modality, „The British Journal for the Phi losophy of Science” 48: 465-481. Brown H. (2005), Physical Relativity, Oxford University Press, New York. Brown H., Holland P. (2004), Dynamical versus variational symmetries: under standing Noether s first theorem, „Molecular Physics” 102 (11-12): 1133-1139.
354 Bibliografia Brown H., Pooley О. (2006), Minkowski Space-Time: A Glorious Non-Entity, [w:] The Ontology of Spacetime, D. Dieks (red.), Elsevier, Amsterdam: 67-72. Brown H., Read ƒ. (2018), The dynamical approach to spacetime theories, http.7/ philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14592/ [dostęp: 20.06.2019]. Bueno O. (1997), Empirical Adequacy: A partial structures approach, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science” 28 (4): 585-610. Bueno O. (1999), What is structural empiricism? Scientific change in an empiricist setting, „Erkenntnis” 50: 59-85. Bueno O. (2008), Structural realism, scientific change, and partial structures, „Stu dia Logica” 89: 213-235. Bueno О. (2014), Why identity is fundamental, „American Philosophical Quar terly” 51(4): 325-332. Bueno O. French S. (2011), How Theories Represent, „Ihe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 62: 857-894. Bueno O., French S., Ladyman J. (2002), On representing the relationship between the mathematical and the empirical, „Philosophy of Science” 69 (3): 452-473. Bueno O., French S„ Ladyman ƒ. (2012), Models and structures: Phenomenological and partial, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 43:43-46. Busch ƒ. (2003), What structures could not be, „International Studies in the Philo sophy of Science” 17 (3): 211-221. Butterfield J. (1988), Albert Einstein Meets David Lewis, „PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers”: 65-81. Butterfield J. (1989), The Hole Truth, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science”, 40 (1):
1-28. Butterfield J. (2006), Against Pointillisme about Geometry, [w:] Time and History: Proceedings of the 28th Ludwig Wittgenstein symposium, E Stadler, Μ. Stoltzner (red.), Ontos, Frankfurt (Main): 181-222. Cao T.Y. (1997), Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, Cam bridge University Press, Cambridge. Cao T.Y. (2003), Can we dissolve physical entities into mathematical structures?, „Synthese” 136: 57-71. Carnap R. (1956), The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts, „Min nesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 1: 38-76. Carnap R. (1966), Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Basic Books Inc., New York. Carnap R. (1974), Foundations of the Unity of Science: Toward an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Carnap R. (2011), Logiczna struktura świata, tłum. P. Kawalec, PWN, Warszawa. Cartwright N. (1983), How the Laws ofPhysics Lie, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bibliografia 355 Cartwright N. (1999), The Dappled World, Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge. Cassirer E. (1956), Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. Yale Uni versity Press, New Haven. Cassirer E. (2006), O teorii względności Einsteina, tłum. P. Parszutowicz, Wydaw nictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty. Cassirer E. (2008), Substancja ifunkcja, tłum. P. Parszutowicz, Wydawnictwo Ma rek Derewiecki, Kęty. Caulton A., Butterfield J. (2012), Symmetries and Paraparticles as a Motivation for Structuralism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 63:233-285. Cei A. (2005), Structural Distinctions: Entities, Structures, and Changes in Science, „Philosophy of Science” 72:1385-1396. Chaitin G. (1975), Randomness and mathematical proof, „Scientific American” 232(5): 47-52. Chakravartty A. (2003), The Structuralist Conception of Objects, „Philosophy of Science” 70 (5): 867-878. Chakravartty A. (2007), A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. Knowing the Un observable, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chakravartty A. (2013), On the Prospects ofNaturalized Metaphysics, [w:] Scientific Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 27-50. Chisholm R. ( 1973), Parts as Essential to Their Wholes, „The Review ofMetaphysics” 26 (4): 581-603. Connes A. (1994), Noncommutative Geometry, Academic Press, New York Boston - London. Cross Ch. (1995), Max Black on the Identity of Indiscernibles, „The Philosophical Quarterly”, 45 (180): 350-360. Cross Ch. (2011), Brute Facts, The Necessity of Identity, and the Identity of Indis cernibles, „Pacific Philosophical Quarterly”
92:1-10. Cross Ch. (2014), Medieval Theories ofhaecceity, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/, [dostęp: 25.07.2019]. Cruse P., Papineau D. (2002), Scientific realism without reference, [w:] The Problem of Realism, Μ. Marsonet (red.), Ashgate, Farnham: 174-189. Czarnocka Μ. (1984), Kryteria istnienia w naukach empirycznych, praca doktor ska w IFiS PAN, Warszawa. da Costa N., Chuaqui R. (1988), On Suppes Set Theoretical Predicates, „Erkenntnis” 29:95-112. da Costa N., French S. (2000), Models, Theories, and Structures: Thirty Years On, „Philosophy of Science” 67: 116-127. da Costa N., French S. (2003), Science and Partial Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
356 Bibliografia Dalla Chiara Μ., Toralđo Di Francia G. (1993), Individuals, Kinds and Names in Physics [w:] Bridging the Gap: Philosophy, Mathematics, and Physics, G. Corsi, Μ. Dalia Chiara, G. Ghirardi (red.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/ Boston/London: 261-284. Dalia Chiara Μ., Toraldo Di Francia G. (1995), Identity Questions from Quantum Theory [w:] Physics, Philosophy, and the Scientific Community, K. Gavroglu, J. Stachel, Μ. Wartofsky (red.). Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht: 39-46. Dardis A. (1993), Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance, „Philo sophy and Phenomenological Research”, 53 (3): 577-598. Della Rocca Μ. (2005), Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the Identity of Indiscer nibles, „Pacific Philosophical Quarterly” 86: 480-492. Demopoulos W., Friedman Μ. (1985), Bertrand Russells The Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest, „Philosophy of Science” 52 (4): 621-639. Dennett D. (1991), Real patterns, „The Journal of Philosophy” 88 (1): 27-51. Deotto E., Ghirardi G. (1998), Bohmian Mechanics Revisited, „Foundations of Physics” 58: 377-397. Descartes R. (2001), Zasady filozofii, tłum. I. Dąbska, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Kęty. DiSalle R. (1994), On Dynamics, Indiscernibility, and Spacetime Ontology, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 45 (1): 265-287. DiSalle R. (1995), Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry, „Erkenntnis” 42:317-337. DiSalle R. (2006), UnderstandingSpace-Time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Dorato Μ. (2000), Substantivalism, relationism, and structural spacetime realism,
„Foundations of Physics” 30: 1605-1628. Dorato Μ. (2005), The Software of the Universe: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of the Laws of Nature, Ashgate, Aidershot. Dorato Μ. (2007), Dispositions, Relations Properties and the Quantum World (w:) Μ. Kistler, B. Gnassounou (red.). Dispositions and Causal Powers, Ashgate, Aidershot: 249-270. Dorato Μ. (2008), Is Structural Spacetime Realism Relationism in Disguise? The Su pererogatory Nature of the Substantivalism/Relationism Debate, [w:] The Onto logy of Spacetime Volume 2 of Philosophy and Foundations of Physics, D. Dieks (red.), Elsevier, Amsterdam: 17-38. Dorato Μ. (2016), The physical world as a blob: Is OSR really realism?, „Meta science” 25 (2): 173-181. Dorato Μ., Pauri M. (2006), Holism and Structuralism in Classical and Quantum General Relativity, [w:] The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, D. Rickles, S. French, J. Saatsi (red.), Oxford, New York: 121-151. Dowe P. (2000), Physical Causation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bibliografia 357 Dowe P. (2007), Causal Process, https://stanfordlibrary.sydney.edu.au/archives/ sum2010/entries/causation-process (dostęp: 20.09.2019). Dowe P. (2009), Causal Process Theories, [w:] The Oxford Handbook of Causation, H. Beebee, Ch. Hitchcock, P. Menzies (red.). Oxford University Press, Oxford. Earman J. (1977), Leibnizian Space-Times and Leibnizian Algebras, [w:] Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, R. Butts, J. Hintikka (red.). Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht: 93-112. Earman ƒ. (1986), A Primer on Determinism, Reidel, Dordrecht. Earman J. (1989). World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute Versus Relational Theo ries of Space and Time, MIT Press, Cambridge. Earman J. (2004), Laws, Symmetry, and Symmetry Breaking: Invariance, Conser vation Principles, and Objectivity, „Philosophy of Science” 71:1227-1241. Earman J., Norton J. (1987), What Price Spacetime Substantivalism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 38: 515-525. Eddington A. (1921), A Generalisation of Weyls Theory of the Electromagnetic and Gravitational Fields, „Proceedings of the Royal Society A” 99:104-122. Eddington A. (1929), The Nature of Physical World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Eddington A. (1930), The Mathematical Theory of Relativity, Cambridge Univer sity Press, Cambridge. Eddington A. (1934), New Pathways in Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Eddington A. (1939), The Philosophy of Physical Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Eddington A. (1953), Space, Time and Gravitation,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ehlers J. (1973), Survey of General Relativity Theory, [w:] Relativity, Astrophysics and Cosmology, W. Israel (red.), Reidel, Dordrecht: 1-125. Einstein A. (1997), The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity, [w:] The Collected Papers ofAlbert Einstein, vol. 6: The Berlin Years: Writings, 1914-1917, A. Kox, Μ. Klein, R. Schulmann (red.), Princeton University Press, Prince ton: 146-200. Einstein A. (2001), Pismafilozoficzne, tłum. К. Napiórkowski, De Agostini, Warszawa. Ellis G., Maartens R., MacCallum M. (2012), Relativistic Cosmology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ellis J. (2003), Dark matter and dark energy: summary and future directions, „Phi losophical Transactions of the Royal Society A” 361: 2607-2627. English J. (1973), Underdetermination: Craig and Ramsey, „The Journal of Philo sophy” 70 (14): 453-462.
358 Bibliografia Esfeld M. (2004), Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 35:601-617. Esfeld Μ., Deckert D.-A. (2018), A Minimalist Ontology of the Natural World, Routledge, New York, London. Esfeld Μ., Lam V. (2008), Moderate structural realism about space-time, „Synthese” 160: 27-46. Esfeld Μ., Lam V. (2010), Holism and structural realism, [w:] Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective, R. Vanderbeeken, B. D’Hooghe (red.). World Scientific, Singapore: 10-31. Esfeld Μ., Lazarovici D., Lam V., Hubert Μ. (2017), The Physics and Metaphysics of Primitive Stuff, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68” (1): 133-161. Esfeld Μ., Sachse Ch. (2011), Conservative Reductionism, Routledge, New York, London. Farajollahi H., Luckock H. (2002), Dirac Observables and the Phase Space of Ge neral Relativity, „General Relativity and Gravitation” 34 (10): 1685-1699. Feigl H. (1970), The Orthodox’ View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as well as Cri tique, [w:] Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology, vol. 4 of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Μ. Radner, S. Winokur, (red.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 3-16. Feigl H. (1975), Russell and Schlick: A Remarkable Agreement on a Monistic Solution of the Mind-Body Problem, „Erkenntnis” 9 (1): 11-34. Field H. (1989), Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, Blackwell, Oxford. Forrest P. (2010), The Identity of Indiscernibles,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible (dostęp: 15.05.2019). French S. (1997), Partiality, Pursuit and Practice [w:] Structures and Norms in Science, M. Dalia Chiara, K. Doets, D. Mundici, J. van Benthem (red.), Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht: 35-52. French S. (2000), The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: Partial Structures and the Application of Group Theory to Physics, „Synthese” 125:103-120. French S. (2001), Getting out of the Hole: Identity, Individuality and Structuralism in Space-Time Physics, „Philosophica” 67: 11-29. French S. (2003), Scribbling on the blank sheet: Eddingtons structuralist conception of objects, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 34:227-259. French S. (2006), Structure as a Weapon of the Realist, „Proceedings of the Aristo telian Society” 106: 169-187. French S. (2010a), Keeping quiet on the ontology ofmodels, „Synthese” 172:231-249. French S. (2010b), The interdependence ofstructure, objects and dependence, „Syn these” 175: 89-109.
Bibliografia 359 French S. (2014), The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford. French S. (2015), Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-idind/#Non-Ind (dostęp: 20.07.2019). French S. (2018), O zanikaniu obiektów fizycznych, [w:] Spór o realizm naukowy. Mala antologia, Μ. Kotowski (red.), tłum. Μ. Woszczek, Μ. Kotowski, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 177-198. French S. (2019), Defending eliminative structuralism and a whole lot more (or less), „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A” 74:22-29. French S., Cei A. (2009), On the Transposition of the Substantial into the Functional: Bringing Cassirers Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics into the Twenty-First Century, [w:] Constituting Objectivity, Μ. Bitből, P. Kerszberg, J. Petitot (red.), Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht: 95-116. French S., Krause D. (2007), Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical and Formal Analysis, Clarendon Press, Oxford. French S., Ladyman J. (1997), Superconductivity and Structures: Revisiting the Lon don Account, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 28 (3): 363-393. French S., Ladyman J. (1999), Reinfiating the semantic approach, „International Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 13 (2): 103-121. French S., Ladyman J. (2003), Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure, „Synthese” 136: 31-56. French S., Redhead Μ. (1988), Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles, „British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 39:
233-246. French S., Rickles D. (2003), Understanding permutation symmetry, [w:] Sym metries in Physics, K. Brading, E. Castellani (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 212-238. Friedman Μ. (1983), Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Friedman Μ. (1999), Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Friedman Μ. (2005a), Ernst Cassirer and the philosophy ofscience, [w:] Continental Philosophy of Science, G. Gutting (red.), Blackwell Publishing, New Jersey. Friedman Μ. (2005b), Ernst Cassirer and Contemporary Philosophy of Science, „Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities” 10 (1): 119-128. Frigg R. (2012), Models in Science, URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-science/#OntWhaMod , (dostęp: 15.08.2019). Frigg R, Votsis L (2011), Everything you always wanted to know about structu ral realism but were afraid to ask, „European Journal Philosophy of Science” 1: 227-276.
360 Bibliografia Geach P.T. (1962), Reference and Generality, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Geroch R. (1972), Einstein algebras, „Communications in Mathematical Physics” 26: 271-275. Gherab-Martin K. (2013), From structuralism to neutral monism in Arthur S. Ed dingtons philosophy ofphysics, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 44: 500-512. Ghins Μ. (2002), Putnams No-Miracle Argument: a Critique [w:] Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science, S. Clarke, T. Lyons (red.), Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht, 121-138. Giedymin J. (1982), Science and Convention, Pergamon Press, Oxford. Giere R., (2004), How models are used to represent reality, „Philosophy of Science” 71 (5): 742-752. Giles R. (1981), Reconstruction of gauge potentials from Wilson loops, „Physical Review D”, 24 (8): 2160-2168. Gillman L., Jerison Μ., (1960), Rings of Continuous Functions, D. Van Nostrand Company, Princeton. GiovanelliM. (2014), ‘But one must not legalize the mentioned sin’: Phenomenological vs. dynamical treatments of rods and clocks in Einsteins thought, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 48: 20-44. Gisin N. (2018), WhyBohmian Mechanics? One- and Two-Time Position Measure ments, Bell Inequalities, Philosophy, and Physics, „Entropy” 20: 105. Glick, D. (2016), Minimal Structural Essentialism, [w:] Individuals Across the Sciences, A. Guay, T. Pradeu (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 207-225. Glick D. (2018), Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism, „The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science”, axy008, https://doi.org/10.1093/ bjps/axy008. Glowala Μ. (2012), Pojedynczość. Spór o zasadę indywiduacji w scholastyce, Ofi cyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław. Goldman A. (2007), A Program for ‘Naturalizing’Metaphysics, with Application to the Ontology of Events, „The Monist” 90: 457-479. Gołosz J. (1999), On Field’s argumentfor substantivalism, „International Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 13 (1): 5-16. Gołosz J. (2001 ), Spór o naturę czasu i przestrzeni. Wybrane zagadnieniafilozofii cza su i przestrzeni Johna Earmana, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków. Gołosz J. (2005), Structural Essentialism and Determinism, „Erkenntnis” 63:73-100. Gower В. (2000), Cassirer, Schlick and ‘structural’ realism: the philosophy of the ex act sciences in the background to early logical empiricism, „The British Journal for the History of Philosophy” 8(1): 71-106.
Bibliografia 361 Gracia J. ( 1994), Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-reformation (1150-1650), State University of New York Press, New York. Grünbaum A. (1977), Absolute and Relational Theories of Space and Space-Time, [w:] Foundations of Space-Time Theories, J. Earman, C. Glymour, J. Stachel (red.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 303-373. Hall N. (2010), David Lewis’s Metaphysics, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lewis -metaphysics/#PerNatProRel, [dostęp: 21.12.2019]. Hall N. (2015), Humean Reductionism about Laws ofNature, [w:] A Companion to David Lewis, B. Loewer, J. Schaffer (red.), John Wiley Sons, Inc., New Jersey: 262-277. Halvorson H. (2012), What Scientific Theories Could Not Be, „Philosophy of Science” 79 (2):183֊206. Halvorson H. (2016), Scientific Theories, [w:] P. Humphreys (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 585-608. Harman G. (1965), The Inference to the Best Explanation, „The Philosophical Re view” 74: 88-95. Hartle J. (2003), Gravity, Addison Wesley, San Francisco. Hartz G., Cover J. (1988), Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic, „Nous” 22 (4): 493-519. Hawking S., Ellis G. (1973), The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hawley K. (2006), Weak Discernibility, „Analysis” 66 (4): 300-303. Healey R. (1991), Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism: A Prolegomenon to the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, „Philosophy of Science” 58: 503-505. Healey R. (1995), Substance, Modality and Spacetime, „Erkenntnis”
42:287-316. Healey R. (2001), On the Reality of Gauge Potentials, „Philosophy of Science” 68 (4): 432-455. Heil J. (2003), From an Ontological Point of View, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Heis J. (2014), Realism, functions, and the a priori: Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of science, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science” 48: 10 - 19. Held C. (2011), Truth does not explain predictive success, „Analysis” 71 (2): 232-234. Heller Μ. (1991), Osobliwy wszechświat, PWN, Warszawa. Heller Μ. (1993), Fizyka ruchu i czasoprzestrzeni, PWN, Warszawa. Heller Μ. (2004), Nieprzemienna unifikacja dynamiki i prawdopodobieństwa, „Fi lozofia Nauki” 12/1: 7-17. Heller Μ. (2012), Filozofia i wszechświat, Universitas, Kraków. Hempel C. (1945), Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I), „Mind” 54 (213): 1-26. Hempel C. (1952), Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, Uni versity of Chicago Press, Chicago.
362 Bibliografia Hempel C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Press, New York. Hempel C. (1970), On the ‘Standard Conception’ ofScientific Theories, [w:] Theories Methods of Physics and Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. IV, Μ. Radner, S. Winokur (red.). University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 142-163. Hempel C., Oppenheim P. (1948), Studies in the Logic ofExplanation, „Philosophy of Science”15 (2): 135-175. Henneaux Μ., Teitelboim C. (1992), Quantization of Gauge Systems, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Hilbert D., Bernays P. (1968), Grundlagen der Mathematik, t. 1, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Hilbert D., Hugget N. (2006), Groups in Mind, „Philosophy of Science” 73: 765-777. Hoefer C. (1996), The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism, „The Journal of Philosophy” 93 (1): 5-27. Hoefer C. (1998), Absolute versus Relational Spacetime: For Better or Worse, the Debate Goes on, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 49 (3): 451-467. Hoefer C. (2000), Energy Conservation in GTR, „Studies in History and Philoso phy of Modern Physics” 31 (2): 187-199. Horwich P. (1978), On the Existence of Time, Space and Space-Time, „Nous” 12 (4): 397-419. Howson C. (2013), Exhuming the No-Miracles Argument, „Analysis” 73 (2): 205-211. Hugget N. (2006), The Regularity Account of Relational Spacetime, „Mind” 115 (457): 41-73. Hugget N. (2008), Why the Parts of Absolute Space are Immobile, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 59:391-407. Hugget N. Norton J. (2014), Weak Discernibility for Quanta, the Right Way, „The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 65:39-58. Huggett N., Wüthrich Ch. (2013), Emergentspacetime and empirical (in)coherence „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 44: 276-285. Ihmig K.-N. (1999), Ernst Cassirer and the Structural Conception of Objects in Modern Science: The Importance of the ‘Erlanger Programm’, „Science in Con text” 12 (4): 513-529. Ingarden R. (1987), Spór o istnienie świata, PWN, Warszawa. Ivanova Μ. (2015), Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poin cares philosophy of science, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 52: 114-122. Jackson E (1995), Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series” 95: 253-268.
Bibliografia 363 Jannsen M. (2002), COI Stories: Explanation and Evidence in the History of Science, „Perspectives on Science” 10 (4): 457-522. Jauernig A. (2008), Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypotheses, „The Leibniz Review” 18:1-40. Jones O. (1964), Identity and Countability, „Analysis” 24 (6): 201-206. Kant I. (2010), Dzieła zebrane, t.I: Pisma przedkrytyczne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń. Kaplan D. (1975), How to Russell a Frege-Church, „The Journal of Philosophy” 72 (19), 716-729. Keränen J. (2001), The Identity Problem for Realist Structuralism, „Philosophia Mathematic” 9; 308-330. Ketland J. (2004), Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 55 (2): 287-300. Kilmister C. (1994), Eddingtons Search for a Fundamental Theory: A Key to the Universe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Kim J. (2006), Emergence: Core ideas and issues, „Synthese” 151: 547-559. KincaidH. (2004), There Are Laws in the Social Sciences, [w:] Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, C. Hitchcock (red.), Blackwell, Oxford: 168-185. Knox, E. (2019), Physical relativity from a functionalist perspective, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 67:118-124. Kopczyński W., Trautman A. (1984), Czasoprzestrzeń i grawitacja, PWN, Warszawa. Koterski A. (2012), „Dwa dogmaty” Quine’a jako krytyka logicznego empiryzmu, „Filozofia Nauki” 77:45-58. Kotowski Μ. (2014), O rozwoju realizmu naukowego jako selektywnego scepty cyzmu, „Filozofia Nauki” 87: 105-123. Kotowski Μ. (2016), Realizm zreformowany.
Filozofia lana Hackinga a spór o sta tus poznawczy wiedzy naukowej, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław. Krause D. (2005), Structures and Structural Realism, „Logic Journal of the IGPL” 13(1): 113-126. Krause D., Arenhart J. (2019), Is Identity Really So Fundamental?, „Foundations of Science” 24: 51-71. Krause D., Arenhart J., Moraes F. (2011), Axiomatization and Models of Scientific Theories, „Foundations of Science” 16:363-382. Ladyman J. (2001), Science, Metaphysics and Structural Realism, „Philosophica” 67: 57-76. Ladyman J. (2004), Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and van Fraassen, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 55: 755-765. Ladyman J. (2014), Structural realism, URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ structural-realism, [dostęp: 18.06.2019].
364 Bibliografia Ladyman J. (2016a), lhe Foundations of Structuralism and the Metaphysics of Relations, [w:] The Metaphysics Relations, A. Marmodoro, D. Yates (red.), Ox ford University Press, Oxford: 177-197. Ladyman ƒ. (2016b), Are There Individuals in Physics, and If So, What Are They?, [w:] A. Guay, T. Pradeu (red.), Individuals Across the Sciences, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 193-206. Ladyman J. (2018), Czym jest realizm strukturalny?, [w:] Spór o realizm nauko wy. Mała antologia, Μ. Kotowski (red.), tłum. R. Rydz, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 199-218. Ladyman J. (2019), Introduction: Structuralists of the world unite, „Studies in His tory and Philosophy of Science Part A” 74: 1 -3. Ladyman J., Ross D. i in. (2007), Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lam V. (2011), Gravitational and Nongravitational Energy: The Need for Back ground Structures, „Philosophy of Science” 78: 1012-1024. Lam V„ Esfeld Μ. (2012), The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity, „Journal for General Philosophy of Science” 43: 243-258. Lam V., Wüthrich C. (2015), No Categorial Support for Radical Ontic Structural Realism, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 66: 605-634. Lam, V.; Wüthrich C. (2018), Spacetime is as spacetime does, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 64: 39-51. Landry E. (2007), Shared structure need not be shared set-structure, „Synthese” 158: 1-17. Landry E. (2012), Methodological Structural Realism, [w:] Structural Realism, Springer, E. Landry, D. Rickles (red.),
Dordrecht, 29-58. Landry E. (2017), Structural Realism and Category Mistakes, [w:] Categories for the Working Philosopher, E. Landry (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 430-450. Landry E., Marquis J., (2005), Categories in Context: Historical, Foundational, and Philosophical, „Philosophia Mathematica” 13: 1-43. Langton R. (2007), Kantian humility: Our ignorance of things in themselves, Ox ford: Oxford University Press. Laudan L. (2018), Obalenie realizmu konwergentnego, [w:] Spór o realizm nauko wy. Mała antologia, tłum. Μ. Kotowski, Μ. Kotowski (red.), Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 29-66. Lawvere W, Schanuel S. (2009), Conceptual Mathematics: A First Introduction to Categories, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lazarovici D. (2018), Super-Humeanism: A starving ontology, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 64: 79-86.
Bibliografia 365 Lehmkuhl D. (2011), Mass-Energy-Momentum: Only there Because of Spacetime?, „Ihe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 62:453-488. Lehmkuhl D. (2014), Why Einstein did not believe that general relativity geometrizes gravity, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 46: 316-326. Lehmkuhl D. (2018), The Metaphysics ofSuper-Substantivalism, „Nous” 52:24-46. Leibniz G.W. (1969), Wyznanie wiary filozofa, Rozprawa metafizyczna, Mona dologia, Zasady natury i łaski, tłum. S. Cichowicz, J. Domański, H. Krzeczkowski, H. Moese, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa. Leibniz G.W. (1989), Philosophical Papers and Letters, tłum. L. Loemker, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Levi-Civita T. (1916), Nozione di Parallelismo in Una Varieta Qualunqe e Conseguente Specificazione Geometrica della Curvatura Riemananniana, „Adu nanza” 24:173-204. Lewis D. (1983), New work for a theory of universals, „Australasian Journal of Philosophy” 61: 343-377. Lewis D. (1986a), On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford. Lewis D. (1986b), Philosophical Papers II, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lewis D. (2001), Counterfactuals, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. Lipton P. (2004), Inference to the Best Explanation, Routledge - New York London. London E, LondonH. (1935), The Electromagnetic Equations ofthe Supraconductor, „Proceedings of the Royal Society A” 149: 71-88. Longair Μ. (2013), Quantum Concepts in Physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Losee J. (2001), Wprowadzenie do filozofii nauki, tłum. T. Bigaj, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa. Lovejoy A.
(1930), The Revolt Agaist Dualism, Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. Lowe J. (1994), Primitive Substances, „Philosophy and Phenomenological Re search” 54 (3): 531-552. Lowe J. (2016), Non-Individuals, [w:] Individuals Across the Sciences, A. Guay, T. Pradeu (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 49-60. Lusanna L. (1995), Hamiltonian constraints and Diracs observables: from relativ istic particles towards field theory and general relativity, https://arxiv.org/abs/ hep-th/9501112 (dostęp: 17.06.2019). Luty D. (2020), Sensy obiektywności. Henri Poincaré i Ernst Cassirer w kontekście realizmu strukturalnego, „Diametros”: 1-17. Lyre H. (1999), Gauges, Holes, and their ‘Connections’, https://arxiv.org/abs/gr -qc/9904036 (dostęp: 17.06.2019).
366 Bibliografia Łukasik A. (2006), Filozofia atomizmu. Atomistyczny model świata wfilozofii przy rody, fizyce klasycznej i współczesnej a problem elementarności, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin. Łukasik A. (2009), Atomizm dawniej i dziś. O niewspółmierności ontologicznej kla sycznego i kwantowo-mechanicznego pojęcia elementarnych składników mate rii, „Studia Philosophiae Christianae” 45(1): 133-162. Łukasik A. (2013), Przestrzeń w fizyce. Podstawowe koncepcje, „Ethos” 26(4): 19-45. MacBride E (2016), Relations, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations/ (do stęp: 20.08.2019). MacLeod R. (1982), The ‘bankruptcy of science’ debate: the creed of science and its critics, 1885 - 1900, „Science, Technology and Human Values” 41 (7): 2-15. Magnus P., Callender C. (2004), Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy, „Phi losophy of Science” 71 (3): 320-338. Maidens, A. (1993), Substantivalism and the hole argument, niepublikowana praca doktorska, University of Cambridge. Maidens A. (1998), Particles and the Perversely Philosophical Schoolchild: Rigid Designation, Haecceitism and Statistics, „Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía” 17 (1): 75-87. Malament D. (2012), Topics in the Foundations of General Relativity and Newtonian Gravitation Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Maudlin T. (1988), The Essence of Space-Time, „Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers”: 82-91. Maudlin T. (1990), Substances and Space-Time: What Aristotle Would Have Said to Einstein, „Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science Part A” 21 (4): 531-561. Maudlin T. (1993), Buckets of Water and Waves of Space: Why Space-Time is Probably a Substance, „Philosophy of Science” 60:183-203. Maudlin T. (2007), The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Maudlin T. (2012), Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Maurin A. (2018), Tropes, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/ (dostęp: 15.05.2019). Maxwell G. (1962), The ontological status of theoretical entities, „Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 3: 1-27. Maxwell G. (1970), Structural realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms, „Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 4: 181-192. McArthur D. (2007), Recent debates over structural realism, „Journal for General Philosophy of Science” 37: 209-224.
Bibliografia 367 McDonough J. (2016), Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Later Years, „Philosophical Review” 125 (1): 1-34. McDonough J. (2019), Leibniz’s Philosophy of Physics, https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/leibniz-physics/ (dostęp: 18.09.2019). McGuire J. (1978), Newton on Place, Time, and God: An Unpublished Source, „The British Journal for the History of Science” 11 (2): 114-129. McGuire J. (1995), Tradition and Innovation, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht. McKitrick J. (2004), Are Dispositions Causally Relevant?, „Synthese” 144:357-371. McLaughlin B. (1997), Emergence and Supervenience, „Intellectica” 25 (2): 25-43. McLaughlin B. (2018), Supervenience, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience (dostęp: 20.10.2019). Melia J. (1999), Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions ofDeterminism, „The Bri tish Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 50:639-664. Melia J., Saatsi J. (2006), Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 57 (3): 561-585. Melnyk A. (2013), Can Metaphysics Be Naturalized? And if So, How?, [w:] Scientific Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 79-95. Misner Ch., Thorne K., Wheeler J. (1973), Gravitation, W. H. Freeman and Com pany, San Francisco. Mizrahi Μ. (2013), The pessimistic induction: a bad argument gone too far, „Syn these” 190: 3209-3226. Møller-Nielsen T. (2015), Symmetry and Qualitativity, [w:] Metaphysics in Contem porary Physics, T. Bigaj, Ch. Wüthrich (red.), Brill Lodopi, Leiden: 179-214. Monton В. (2017), Constructive Empiricism,
URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/, [dostęp: 14.10.2019]. Morgan Μ. (1999), Learning from models, [w:] Models as Mediators, Μ. Morgan, Μ. Morrison (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 347-388. Morganti Μ. (2004), On the Preferability of Epistemic Structural Realism, „Syn these” 142: 81-107. Morganti Μ. (2011), Is There a Compelling Argumentfor Ontic Structural Realism?, „Philosophy of Science” 78 (5):1165-1176. Moriyasu K. (1983), An Elementary Primer for Gauge Theory, World Scientific, Singapore. Mormann T. (2007), The Structure of Scientific Theories in Logical Empiricism [w:] The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, A. Richardson, T. Uebel (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 136-164. Moss G. (2015), Ernst Cassirer and the Autonomy of Language, Lexington Books, New York. Moynahan G. (2013), Ernst Cassirer and the Critical Science of Germany 18991901, Anthem Press, London.
368 Bibliografia Mukhanov V. (2005), Physical Foundations of Cosmology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Muller E (2011a), Withering away, weakly, „Synthese” 180 (2): 223-233. Muller E (2011b), How to defeat Wüthrich’s abysmal embarrassment argument against space-time structuralism, „Philosophy of Science” 78 (5): 1046-1057. Muller E, Saunders S. (2008), Discerning Fermions, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 59: 499-548. Mumford S. (2004), Laws in Nature, Routledge, New York, London. Murawski R. (1986), Filozofia matematyki. Antologia tekstów klasycznych, Państ wowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Poznań. Musgrave A. (2018), Ostateczny argument za realizmem naukowym, [w:] Spór o realizm naukowy. Mała antologia, Μ. Kotowski (red.), tłum. Μ. Kacperak, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 89-116. Nagata J. (1985), Modern General Topology, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Nakayama Y. (2015), Scale invariance vs conformal invariance, „Physics Reports” 569: 1-93. Nerlich G. (2005), Can Parts of Space Move? On Paragraph Six of Newtons Scholium, „Erkenntnis” 62: 119-135. Nerlich G. (2010), Why Spacetime is Not a Hidden Cause: A Realist Story, [w:] Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski’s Unification of Space and Time, N. Petkov (red.), Springer, Heidelberg: 181-208. Newman Μ. H. (1928), Mr. Russels Causal Theory of Perception, „Mind” 146: 137-148. Newman Μ. (2005), Ramsey Sentence Realism as an Answer to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction, „Philosophy of Science” 72: 1373-1384. Newton I. (2004), Philosophical Writings, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge. Newton I. (2015), Matematyczne zasady filozofii naturalnej, tłum. S. Brzezowski, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków. Ney A. (2012), Neo-Positivist Metaphysics, „Philosophical Studies” 160: 53-78. Niiniluoto I. (2002), Critical Scientific Realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Nodelman U, Zalta E. (2014), Foundations for Mathematical Structuralism, „Mind” 123 (489): 39-78. Norton J. (1988), The Hole Argument, „PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association”: 56-64. Norton J. (2003), General covariance, gauge theories, and the Kretschmann objec tion, [w:] Symmetries in Physics, K. Brading, E. Castellani (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 110-123. O’Connor T., Wong H.Y., (2005), The Metaphysics of Emergence, „Nous” 39 (4): 658-678. Ohanian H. (1976), Gravitation and Spacetime, WW Norton, New York.
Bibliografia 369 O’Raifeartaigh L. (1986), Group Structure of Gauge Theories, Cambridge Univer sity Press, Cambridge. Pauli W. (1958), Theory of Relativity, Pergamon Press, London. Petkov V. (2005), Is There an Alternative to the Block Universe View?, [w:] The On tology of Spacetime, D. Dieks (red.), Elsevier, Amsterdam. Poincaré H. (1905), Science and Hypothesis, Ihe Walter Scott Publishing Company, New York. Poincaré H. (1958), The Value of Science, Dover Publications, New York. Pollok К. (2010), The ‘Transcendental Method’: On the Reception of the Critique of Pure Reason in Neo-Kantianism, [w:] The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, P. Guyer (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge: 346-379. Pooley O. (2006), Points, particles, and structural realism, [w:] The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, D. Rickles, S. French, J. Saatsi (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 83-120. Pooley O. (2013), Substantivalist and Relationalist Approaches to Spacetime, [w:] The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, R. Batterman (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford. Post, H. (1963), Individuality and physics, „The Listener”: 534-537. Przełęcki Μ. (1969), The Logic of Empirical Theories, Routledge, London. Przełęcki Μ. (1993), Dwa podejścia do logicznej struktury teorii: teoriomnogościowe versus teoriomodelowe, „Filozofia Nauki” 2-3: 237-251. Psillos S. (1999), Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, Routledge, New York, London. Psillos S. (2006), The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure?, „Philosophy of Science” 73
(5): 560-570. Psillos S. (2009), Knowing the Structure of Nature. Essays on Realism and Expla nation, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills. Psillos S. (2015), Conventions and Relations in Poincares Philosophy of Science, „Methode” 4: 98-140. Puntel L. (2008), Structure and Being, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania. Putnam H. (1975), Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Volume 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Putnam H. (2011), Argument teoriomodelowy a poszukiwanie realizmu zdrowo rozsądkowego, tłum. К. Czerniawski, T. Szubka, „Filozofia Nauki” 19 (1): 7-24. Putnam H. (2013), Wiele twarzy realizmu i inne eseje, tłum. A. Grobler, Wydaw nictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa. Quine W. V. ( 1969), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York.
370 Bibliografia Quine W. V. (1982), Theories and Things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Quine W. V. (2000), Dwa dogmaty empiryzmu, [w:] Z punktu widzenia logiki. Dziewięć esejów logiczno-filozoficznych, tłum. B. Stanosz, Warszawa, Aletheia: 49-75. Redhead Μ. (2001 ), The Intelligibility ofthe Universe, „Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement” 48: 73-90. Reichenbach H. (1958), The Philosophy of Space and Time, Dover Publications, New York. Reichenbach H. (1969), Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity, University of California Press, Berkeley. Resnik Μ. (1997), Mathematics as a Science ofPatterns, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Rickles D. (2007), Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, Elsevier, Amsterdam. Robb A. (1914), Theory of Time and Space, Cambridge University Press, Cam bridge. Roberts ƒ. (2003), Leibniz on Force and Absolute Motion, „Philosophy of Science” 70 (3): 553-573. Roberts J. (2008), The Law-Governed Universe, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Roberts B. (2011), Group Structural Realism, „The British Journal for the Phi losophy of Science” 62: 47-69. Robinson H. (2018), Substance, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/ (do stęp: 10.10.2019). Rodzeń J. (2006), Co to jest „argument z cudu”? Próba obrony realizmu naukowego oparta na fakcie sukcesu nauki, „Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce” 38: 3-34. Roeper P. (1997), Region-based topology, „Journal of Philosophical Logic” 26 (3): 251-309. Rovelli C. (1997), Halfway through the woods: contemporary research on space and time, [w:] The Cosmos of Science, J. Earman, J. Norton, (red.), University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh: 180-223. Rovelli C. (2002), Partial observables, „Physical Review” D65,124013. Rovelli C. (2004), Quantum Gravity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Russell B. (1995), An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Routledge, New York, London. Russell B. (2007), The Analysis of Matter, Russell Press, Nottingham. Ryckman T. (1999), Einstein, Cassirer, and General Covariance - Then and Now, „Science in Context” 12: 585-619. Ryckman T. (2005), The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915-1925, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Rynasiewicz R. ( 1992), Rings, holes and substantivalism: On the program ofLeibniz algebras, „Philosophy of Science” 59 (4): 572-589. Rynasiewicz R. (1994), The lessons of the hole argument, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 45 (2): 407-436.
Bibliografia 371 Rynasiewicz R. (1995), By Their Properties, Causes and Effects: Newtons Scholium on Time, Space, Place and Motion ֊ II. The context, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A” 26 (2): 295-321. Rynasiewicz R. (1996), Absolute versus relational space-time: An outmoded debate, „Journal of Philosophy” 93 (6): 279-306. Rynasiewicz R. (2000), On the distinction between absolute and relative motion, „Philosophy of Science” 67 (1): 70-93. Rzepiński T. (2006), Problem niedookreślenia teorii przez dane doświadczenia, Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, Poznań. Saatsi J. (2005), On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies, „Philosophy of Science” 72 (5): 1088-1098. Saatsi J. (2010), Whence ontological structural realism?, [w:] EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science, Μ. Suàrez, Μ. Dorato, M. Rėdei (red.). Springer, Dordrecht: 255-266. Sady W. (2013), Spór o racjonalność naukową: od Poincarégo do Laudana, Wy dawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń. Saunders S. (1997), Naturalizing Metaphysics, „The Monist” 80: 44-69. Saunders S. (2003a), Indiscernibles, General Covariance, and Other Symmetries: The Case for Non-Reductive Relationalism, [w:] Revisiting the Foundations of Relativistic Physics, J. Renn, L. Divarci, P. Schroeter (red.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht: 151-174. Saunders S. (2003b), Physics and Leibniz’s principles, [w:] Symmetries in Physics, K. Brading, E. Castellani (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 289-308. Saunders S. (2006), Are Quantum Particles Objects?, „Analysis” 66 (1): 52-63. Saunders S., McKenzie
K. (2015), Structure and Logic, [w:] Physical Theory, L. Sklar (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 127-162. Scholz E. (2016), The problem of space in the light of relativity: The views of H. Weyl and E. Cartan, [w:] Elements d’une biographie de l’espace mathéma tique, L. Bioesmat-Martagon (red.), Edition Universitaire de Lorraine, Nan cy: 255-312. Scholz E. (2018), Weyl’s search for a difference between ‘physical’ and ‘mathemati cal’ automorphisms, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 61: 57-67. Schrôdinger E. (2014), Nature and the Greeks and Science and Humanism, Cam bridge University Press, Cambridge. Schutz G. (1995), Wstęp do ogólnej teorii względności, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa. Shapiro S. (1997), Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
ՅՈ Bibliografia Simons P. (2000), Identity through Time and Trope Bundles, „Topoi” 19:147-155. Sklar L. (1974). Space, Time, and Spacetime, University of California Press, Berkeley. Skow B. (2007), Sklar’s Maneuver, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 58 (4): 777-786. Słowik E. (2016), The Deep Metaphysics of Space, Springer, Dordrecht. Smolin L. (2001), Three Roads to Quantum Gravity, Basic Books, New York. Sneed J. (1979), The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, D. Reidel Publish ing Company, Dordrecht. Sprenger J. (2016), The probabilistic no miracles argument, „European Journal for Philosophy of Science” 6: 173-189. Stachel J. (1993), The meaning ofgeneral covariance: The hole story, [w:] Philosophi cal Problems of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy of AdolfGrünbaum, J. Earman, A. Janis, G. Massey (red.), University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh: 129-160. Stachel J. (2002), ‘The relations between things’ versus ‘the things between relations’: The deeper meaning of the hole argument, [w:] Reading Natural Philosophy: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science and Mathematics, D. Malament (red.), Open Court, Chicago: 231-266. Stachel J. (2005), Structural Realism and Contextual Individuality, [w:] Hilary Putnam, Y. Ben-Menahem (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 203-219. Stachel J. (2006), Structure, Individuality, and Quantum Gravity, [w:] The Struc tural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, D. Rickles, S. French, J. Saatsi (red.), Oxford, New York: 53-82. Stachel J. (2014), The Hole Argument and Some Physical
and Philosophical Impli cations, „Living Reviews in Relativity” 17: 1-66. Stegmüller W. (1976), The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, Springer, New York. Stein H. (1967), Newtonian space-time, „Texas Quarterly” 10: 174-200. Stein H. (1977), On Space-Time Ontology: Extracts from a Letter to Adolf Grün baum [w:] Foundations of Space-Time Theories, J. Earman, C. Glymour, J. Sta chel (red.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 374-402. Stein H. (1989), Yes, but. Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism, „Dialectica” 43: 47-65. Stephani H. (1990), General Relativity: An Introduction to the Theory of Gravi tational Field, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Stephani H. et al. (2003), Exact Solutions of Einstein’s Field Equations, Cam bridge University Press, Cambridge. Strawson G. (2008), The identity of the categorical and the dispositional, „Analysis” 68 (4): 271-282.
Bibliografia 373 Stubenberg L. (2016), Neutral Monism, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutralmonism/ (dostęp: 28.09.2019). Suarez M. (1999), The role of models in the application of scientific theories: epis temological implications, [w:] Models as Mediators, Μ. Morgan, Μ. Morrison (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 168-195. Suppe F. (1977), The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, [w:] The Structure of Scientific Theories, E Suppe (red.), University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago: 3-243. Suppe E (1989), The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism, Uni versity of Illinois Press, Urbana 8c Chicago. Suppes P. (1957), Introduction to Logic, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York. Suppes P. (1962), Models of Data, [w:] Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, E. Nagel, P. Suppes, A. Tarski (red.), Stanford University Press, Stanford: 252-261. Suppes P. (1967), What Is a Scientific Theory?, [w:] Philosophy of Science Today, S. Morgenbesser (red.), Basic Book, New York: 55-67. Suppes P. (1972), Axiomatic Set Theory, D. Van Nostrand Company, New York. Suppes P. (2002), Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures, CSLI Pu blications, Stanford. Szlachcic К. (2011), Prawda w perspektywie konwencjonalistycznej. Pierwsze his toryczne diagnozy, [w:] Prawda, D. Leszczyński (red.), Wydawnictwo Uni wersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław: 345-361. Szumilewicz I. (1978), Poincaré, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa. Szydłowski Μ., Tambor P. (2016), Relacjonizm i substancjalizm
w kontekście teorii grawitacji i kosmologii, „Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria” 25 (4): 225-244. Tahko T., Lowe J. (2015), Ontological Dependence, https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/dependence-ontological/ (dostęp: 25.10.2019). Tegmark M. (2008), The Mathematical Universe, „Foundations of Physics” 38: 101-150. Teller P. (1991), Substance, Relations, and Arguments about the Nature of SpaceTime, „The Philosophical Review” 100 (3): 363-397. Torretti R. (1984), Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht. Torretti R. (1999), ThePhilosophy ofPhysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Urbański Μ. (2009), Rozumowania abdukcyjne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań. Väänänen J. (2019), Second order and higher order logie, https://plato.stanford. edu/entries/logic-higher-order/ (dostęp: 11.10.2019). van Cieve J. (1985), Three Versions of the bundle theory, „Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition” 47: 95-107.
374 Bibliografia van Fraassen В. (1980), The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, Oxford. van Fraassen B. (1989), Laws and Symmetry, Clarendon Press, Oxford. van Fraassen B. (1991), Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View, Clarendon Press, Oxford. van Fraassen B. (2006), Structure: Its shadow and substance, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 57: 275-305. Vassallo A„ Deckert D.-A., Esfeld Μ. (2017), Relationalism about mechanics based on a minimalist ontology of matter, „European Journal For Philosophy of Science” 7 (2): 299-318. Vassallo A., Esfeld Μ. (2016), Leibnizian relationalism for general relativistic phy sics, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 55:101-107. Vetter B. (2009), Review of Bird, „Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy” 8: 320-328. Votsis I. (2005), The upward path to structural realism, „Philosophy of Science” 72:1361-1372. Votsis I. (2011), Structural Realism: Continuity and Its Limits, [w:] Scientific Struc turalism, A. Bokulich, P. Bokulich (red.), Springer, New York: 105-118. Votsis I. (2020), Theory-ladenness: Testing the TJntestable’, „Synthese” 197:1447-1465. Wald R. (1984), General Relativity, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Weatherall J. (2017), Conservation, inertia, and spacetime geometry, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 67: 144-159. Weingard R. (1975), On the Ontological Status of the Metric in General Relativity, „The Journal of Philosophy” 72 (14): 426-431. Weyl H.
(1922), Space-Time-Matter, Methuen Co., London. Weyl H. (1929), On the foundations ofgeneral infinitesimal geometry, „Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society” 35 (5): 716-725. Weyl H. ( 1931 ), The Theory ofGroups and Quantum Mechanics, Dover Publications, New York. Weyl H. (1959), Philosophy ofMathematics and Natural Science, Princeton Univer sity Press, Princeton. Wheeler J. (1962), Geometrodynamics, Academic Press, Cambridge. Wheeler J., Ford K. (2000), Geons, Black. Holes, and Quantum Foam: A Life in Phy sics, W W. Norton Company, New York. Wigner E. ( 1967), Symmetries and Reflections, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Williams D. (1953), On the Elements of Being: I, „The Review of Metaphysics” 7(1): 3-18. Wilson J. (2002), Causal powers, forces, and superdupervenience, „Grazer Philo sophische Studien” 63 (1): 53-77.
Bibliografia 375 Winterbourne A. (1982), On the metaphysics ofLeibnizian space and time, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A” 13 (3): 201-214. Winther R. (2015), The Structure of Scientific Theories, https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/structure-scientific-theories/ (dostęp: 16.07.2019). Witczak J. (1999), Eddington i teoria względności, Biblos, Tarnów. Woleński J. (2016), Wykłady o naturalizmie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, Toruń. Worrall J. (1994), How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the ‘Luminiferous Ether’, „PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Phi losophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers”: 334-342. Worrall J. (2007), Miracles and Models: Why reports of the death of Structural Realism may be exaggerated, [w:] Philosophy of Science (Royal Institute of Philosophy 61), A. O’Hare (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 125-154. Worrall J. (2011), Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence, „Syn these” 180: 157-172. Worrall J. (2018), Realizm strukturalny. To, co najlepsze z dwóch światów?, [w:] Spór o realizm naukowy. Mała antologia, Μ. Kotowski (red.), tłum. Μ. Kotowski, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław: 145-176. Woszczek Μ. (2011), Serie Leibniza i problem dynamiki w kwantowaniu grawita cji, „Filozofia Nauki” 74 (2): 41-62. Woszczek Μ. (2017), Kwantowa teoria miary a ontologia, „Filozofia Nauki” 98 (2): 29-55. Woszczek Μ. (2018), Kontekstualność kwantowa i ontologia przyczynowości, Wy dawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań. Wójcicki R. (1974), Metodologiaformalna nauk empirycznych,
Wydawnictwo Pol skiej Akademii Nauk, Wrocław. Wüthrich Ch. (2009), Challenging the Spacetime Structuralist, „Philosophy of Science” 76: 1039-1051. Yolton J. (1960), The Philosophy of Science ofA.S. Eddington, Martinus Nijhoff, Hague. Zahar E. (1997), Poincares philosophy of geometry, or does geometric conventio nalism deserve its name?, „Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Phy sics” 28 (2): 183-218. Zahar E. (2004), Ramseyfication and structural realism, „Theoria” 19 (1): 5-30. Zamiara K. (1974), Metodologiczne znaczenie sporu o status poznawczy teorii, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa. Zeidler P. (2013), Models and Metaphors as Research Tools in Science, LIT Verlag, Berlin.
Streszczenie Praca poświęcona jest współczesnym metafizycznym interpretacjom czaso przestrzeni opisywanej przez ogólną teorię względności Alberta Einsteina. Szer szym kontekstem pracy są badania z zakresu metafizyki znaturalizowanej. Autor umieszcza swoje rozważania w ramach nurtu ontycznego realizmu struktural nego, należącego do wymienionej subdyscypliny filozoficznej. Pole problemowe pracy tworzą dwie debaty: pierwsza dotycząca poprawności i właściwej postaci metafizyki strukturalistycznej wykorzystywanej do interpretowania fizyki fun damentalnej, druga dotycząca współczesnej dyskusji na temat natury czaso przestrzeni. Głównym celem pracy jest sformułowanie oryginalnego stanowiska strukturalistycznego, które pozwala na trafne, metafizyczne ujęcie czasoprze strzeni ogólnorelatywistycznej i na rozwiązanie problemów zarówno innych opcji strukturalistycznych, jak i podejść substancjalistycznych oraz relacjonistycznych w filozofii czasoprzestrzeni. Cel ten jest realizowany przez krytyczną analizę poszczególnych stanowisk, argumentów na ich rzecz, a także przez odniesienie do literatury z dziedziny fi zyki. Rezultatem jest stanowisko, które autor nazywa silnym strukturalizmem metrycznym i w którym proponuje między innymi koncepcję strukturalnych nie -indywiduów. Poza tym celem systematyzuje również dostępne poglądy z zakresu metafizyki strukturalistycznej oraz z zakresu ontologii czasoprzestrzeni, niektóre stanowiska omawiając po raz pierwszy w polskiej literaturze z filozofii nauki i fi lozofii fizyki. Praca składa się z dwóch części. Pierwsza, obejmująca trzy
rozdziały, doty czy nurtu ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego: jego kontekstu problemowego, założeń, tez i konsekwencji. W części tej omówione zostają pojęcia indywiduum i struktury. Wskazana jest również preferencja własna autora w odniesieniu do metafizyki strukturalistycznej. Druga część pracy obejmuje filozofię i fizykę czaso przestrzeni. Analizy poszczególnych stanowisk pozwalają autorowi na wskazanie niezbędnych założeń adekwatnego poglądu strukturalistycznego w odniesieniu do natury czasoprzestrzeni, który wyrażony zostaje w rozdziale ostatnim. Bayerische Staatstibnolhek Munchen
Summary This dissertation deals with contemporary metaphysical interpretations of spacetime, as it is described by Albert Einsteins general theory of relativity. The work is embedded in a wider context: research in naturalized metaphysics. The author places his investigation within the current of ontic structural realism, which belongs to the aforementioned subdiscipline of philosophy. Two debates form the problem field of this work. Firstly, one is concerned with the correctness and the proper version of structural metaphysics used to interpret the fundamental physics. Secondly, one is concerned with diversified contemporary discussions about the nature of spacetime. The main goal of the thesis is to construct a distinct structuralistic position, which makes possible a sound metaphysical account of the general relativistic spacetime. This account is meant to solve some crucial problems of alternative structuralistic options as well as the substantival and relational approaches available in the philosophy of spacetime. This goal is realized through a critical analysis of each position and the arguments proposed to support them, and also by consulting the most relevant physical literature. The end result is a position proposed to be called the strong metrical structuralism, in which the author advances, among others, the concept of structural non-individuals. Another goal is the general systematization of the available viewpoints in structuralistic metaphysics and in the ontology of space time. Some theoretical positions are discussed in the Polish literature on the
philosophy of science and the philosophy of physics for the very first time. The whole thesis is divided into two parts. The first one, which consists in three chapters, is dedicated to the ontic structural realism: its theoretical context, assumptions, and consequences. In this part the notions of an individual and structure are thoroughly discussed. Here, authors preferences regarding the de velopment of structuralistic metaphysics are also clearly indicated. The second part deals with the spacetime philosophy and the spacetime physics. The analyses of available positions formulated in the course of discussions allow the author to capture some necessary or advisable assumptions of an adequate structuralistic view with respect to the nature of spacetime. This particular view is presented and examined in the last chapter. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Luty, Damian |
| author_GND | (DE-588)126813550X |
| author_facet | Luty, Damian |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Luty, Damian |
| author_variant | d l dl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048469904 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1346086753 (DE-599)BVBBV048469904 |
| edition | Wydanie pierwsze |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02532nam a2200505 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048469904</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20221213 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220915s2022 a||| |||| 00||| pol d</controlfield><datafield tag="015" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">UWD 2022/15998</subfield><subfield code="2">dnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9788366849242</subfield><subfield code="9">978-83-66849-24-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1346086753</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV048469904</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">pol</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Luty, Damian</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)126813550X</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni</subfield><subfield code="c">Damian Luty</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wydanie pierwsze</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Warszawa</subfield><subfield code="b">Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar</subfield><subfield code="c">2022</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">375 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen</subfield><subfield code="c">24 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="546" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Czasoprzestrzeń</subfield><subfield code="2">dbn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Metafizyka</subfield><subfield code="2">dbn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Ogólna teoria względności</subfield><subfield code="2">dbn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Ontologia</subfield><subfield code="2">dbn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Czasoprzestrzeń</subfield><subfield code="2">jhpk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Metafizyka</subfield><subfield code="2">jhpk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Względności teoria ogólna</subfield><subfield code="2">jhpk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Ontologia</subfield><subfield code="2">jhpk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Raum-Zeit</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4302626-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Raum-Zeit</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4302626-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Literaturverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000007&line_number=0004&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">BSB_NED_20221213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033847721</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">001.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090513</subfield><subfield code="g">438</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048469904 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:36:36Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:39:01Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788366849242 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033847721 |
| oclc_num | 1346086753 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 375 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20221213 |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Luty, Damian Verfasser (DE-588)126813550X aut Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni Damian Luty Wydanie pierwsze Warszawa Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar 2022 375 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache Czasoprzestrzeń dbn Metafizyka dbn Ogólna teoria względności dbn Ontologia dbn Czasoprzestrzeń jhpk Metafizyka jhpk Względności teoria ogólna jhpk Ontologia jhpk Raum-Zeit (DE-588)4302626-6 gnd rswk-swf Raum-Zeit (DE-588)4302626-6 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000007&line_number=0004&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Luty, Damian Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni Czasoprzestrzeń dbn Metafizyka dbn Ogólna teoria względności dbn Ontologia dbn Czasoprzestrzeń jhpk Metafizyka jhpk Względności teoria ogólna jhpk Ontologia jhpk Raum-Zeit (DE-588)4302626-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4302626-6 |
| title | Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni |
| title_auth | Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni |
| title_exact_search | Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni |
| title_full | Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni Damian Luty |
| title_fullStr | Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni Damian Luty |
| title_full_unstemmed | Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni Damian Luty |
| title_short | Ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni |
| title_sort | ontologie strukturalne czasoprzestrzeni |
| topic | Czasoprzestrzeń dbn Metafizyka dbn Ogólna teoria względności dbn Ontologia dbn Czasoprzestrzeń jhpk Metafizyka jhpk Względności teoria ogólna jhpk Ontologia jhpk Raum-Zeit (DE-588)4302626-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Czasoprzestrzeń Metafizyka Ogólna teoria względności Ontologia Względności teoria ogólna Raum-Zeit |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033847721&sequence=000007&line_number=0004&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lutydamian ontologiestrukturalneczasoprzestrzeni |