Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2022
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xii, 211 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme 22,3 cm |
| ISBN: | 0192864351 9780192864352 |
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| adam_text | Contents Abstract Acknowledgements ix xi 1. Introduction 1 I. A PERMISSIVE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 2. Varieties of Permissivism 2.1 What Sort of Doxastic State? 2.2 Interpersonal or Intrapersonal? 2.3 Radical or Not? 2.4 Common or Rare? 2.5 My Brand of Permissivism 11 11 14 15 16 17 3. Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Beliefs 19 4. Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Credences 4.1 Measuring the Epistemic Utility of an Individual Credence 4.2 Measuring the Epistemic Utility of an Entire Credal State 4.3 Why Should Our Measures Be Strictly Proper? 30 30 33 36 5. Foundational Results in Epistemic Utility Theory 5.1 Probabilism 5.2 The Principal Principle 5.3 Plan Conditionalization 46 46 47 49 6. Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors I: The Decision Rule 6.1 Risk-Sensitive Decision-Making Under Risk 6.1.1 Expected Utility Theory and the Diminishing Marginal Utility of Money 6.1.2 Risk-Weighted Expected Utility and the Allais Preferences 6.2 Risk-Sensitive Decision-Making Under Uncertainty 6.2.1 Subjective Bayesianism 6.2.2 Objective Bayesianism 6.2.3 Risk-Weighted SubjectiveBayesianism 6.2.4 Risk-Weighted Objective Bayesianism 53 54 55 56 61 64 64 65 66
vi CONTENTS 6.2.5 Wald’s Maximin Rule 6.2.6 Hurwicz’s Criterion of Realism 6.2.7 The Generalized Hurwicz Criterion 6.3 Characterizing Our Rules 6.3.1 The Axioms 6.3.2 The Representation Theorems 6.4 Appendix: Proofs 6.4.1 A Useful Lemma 6.4.2 Proof of Theorem 7(i): Characterizing Subjective Bayesianism 6.4.3 Proof of Theorem 7(ii) : Characterizing Objective Bayesianism 6.4.4 Proof of Theorem 7(iii): Characterizing Subjective Risk-Weighted Bayesianism 6.4.5 Proof of Theorem 7(iv): Characterizing Objective Risk-Weighted Bayesianism 6.4.6 Proof of Theorem 7(vi): Characterizing the Hurwicz Criterion 6.4.7 Proof of Theorem 7(v): Characterizing Minimax 6.4.8 Proofs of Theorems 7(vii): Characterizing the Generalized Hurwicz Criterion 7. Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors II: The Consequences of the Rule 7.1 Decomposing Options into Their Component Parts 7.2 The Credal Consequences of the Rules 7.2.1 The Credal Consequences of the Other Rules 7.2.2 The Credal Consequences of GHC 7.3 Appendix: Proofs 7.3.1 Proof of Theorem 9 8. Epistemic Risk and Picking Posteriors 8.1 GHC Forever 8.2 Priors and Plans Together 8.3 Using Priors to Pick Posteriors 8.4 Tying Up Loose Ends 8.4.1 Maximizing Expected Epistemic Utility from Whose Point of View? 8.4.2 In Favour of Maximizing Expected Utility 8.5 Appendix: Proofs 66 67 69 71 72 78 81 81 82 83 83 84 85 86 86 89 90 95 95 97 105 105 116 116 120 122 126 126 127 134
CONTENTS Vii II. PUTTING THE THEORY TO WORK 9. What Is the Value of Rationality? 9.1 The Value of Rationality 9.2 Deferring to Rationality 9.3 141 141 148 9.2.1 Levinstein’s Deference Argument Against Permissivism 9.2.2 Greco and Hedden on the Concept of Rationality 150 159 Life on the Edge of Rationality 161 10. Is Brute Shuffling Irrational? 168 11. Priors that Allow You to Learn Inductively 175 12. Clifford’s Shipowner, Conspiracy Theories, and Choosing with and for Others 12.1 Choosing for Others 12.2 Choosing with Others 183 183 191 13. Summing Up 201 References Index 203 209
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| adam_txt |
Contents Abstract Acknowledgements ix xi 1. Introduction 1 I. A PERMISSIVE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 2. Varieties of Permissivism 2.1 What Sort of Doxastic State? 2.2 Interpersonal or Intrapersonal? 2.3 Radical or Not? 2.4 Common or Rare? 2.5 My Brand of Permissivism 11 11 14 15 16 17 3. Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Beliefs 19 4. Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Credences 4.1 Measuring the Epistemic Utility of an Individual Credence 4.2 Measuring the Epistemic Utility of an Entire Credal State 4.3 Why Should Our Measures Be Strictly Proper? 30 30 33 36 5. Foundational Results in Epistemic Utility Theory 5.1 Probabilism 5.2 The Principal Principle 5.3 Plan Conditionalization 46 46 47 49 6. Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors I: The Decision Rule 6.1 Risk-Sensitive Decision-Making Under Risk 6.1.1 Expected Utility Theory and the Diminishing Marginal Utility of Money 6.1.2 Risk-Weighted Expected Utility and the Allais Preferences 6.2 Risk-Sensitive Decision-Making Under Uncertainty 6.2.1 Subjective Bayesianism 6.2.2 Objective Bayesianism 6.2.3 Risk-Weighted SubjectiveBayesianism 6.2.4 Risk-Weighted Objective Bayesianism 53 54 55 56 61 64 64 65 66
vi CONTENTS 6.2.5 Wald’s Maximin Rule 6.2.6 Hurwicz’s Criterion of Realism 6.2.7 The Generalized Hurwicz Criterion 6.3 Characterizing Our Rules 6.3.1 The Axioms 6.3.2 The Representation Theorems 6.4 Appendix: Proofs 6.4.1 A Useful Lemma 6.4.2 Proof of Theorem 7(i): Characterizing Subjective Bayesianism 6.4.3 Proof of Theorem 7(ii) : Characterizing Objective Bayesianism 6.4.4 Proof of Theorem 7(iii): Characterizing Subjective Risk-Weighted Bayesianism 6.4.5 Proof of Theorem 7(iv): Characterizing Objective Risk-Weighted Bayesianism 6.4.6 Proof of Theorem 7(vi): Characterizing the Hurwicz Criterion 6.4.7 Proof of Theorem 7(v): Characterizing Minimax 6.4.8 Proofs of Theorems 7(vii): Characterizing the Generalized Hurwicz Criterion 7. Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors II: The Consequences of the Rule 7.1 Decomposing Options into Their Component Parts 7.2 The Credal Consequences of the Rules 7.2.1 The Credal Consequences of the Other Rules 7.2.2 The Credal Consequences of GHC 7.3 Appendix: Proofs 7.3.1 Proof of Theorem 9 8. Epistemic Risk and Picking Posteriors 8.1 GHC Forever 8.2 Priors and Plans Together 8.3 Using Priors to Pick Posteriors 8.4 Tying Up Loose Ends 8.4.1 Maximizing Expected Epistemic Utility from Whose Point of View? 8.4.2 In Favour of Maximizing Expected Utility 8.5 Appendix: Proofs 66 67 69 71 72 78 81 81 82 83 83 84 85 86 86 89 90 95 95 97 105 105 116 116 120 122 126 126 127 134
CONTENTS Vii II. PUTTING THE THEORY TO WORK 9. What Is the Value of Rationality? 9.1 The Value of Rationality 9.2 Deferring to Rationality 9.3 141 141 148 9.2.1 Levinstein’s Deference Argument Against Permissivism 9.2.2 Greco and Hedden on the Concept of Rationality 150 159 Life on the Edge of Rationality 161 10. Is Brute Shuffling Irrational? 168 11. Priors that Allow You to Learn Inductively 175 12. Clifford’s Shipowner, Conspiracy Theories, and Choosing with and for Others 12.1 Choosing for Others 12.2 Choosing with Others 183 183 191 13. Summing Up 201 References Index 203 209 |
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| spelling | Pettigrew, Richard 1981- Verfasser (DE-588)1101486279 aut Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality Richard Pettigrew Epistemic risk & the demands of rationality First edition Oxford Oxford University Press 2022 xii, 211 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme 22,3 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd rswk-swf Rationalität (DE-588)4048507-9 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Knowledge, Theory of Rationalism Rationalität (DE-588)4048507-9 s Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, EPUB Pettigrew, Richard Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality 9780192679451 First edition Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2022 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033831552&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Pettigrew, Richard 1981- Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd Rationalität (DE-588)4048507-9 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
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| title | Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality |
| title_alt | Epistemic risk & the demands of rationality |
| title_auth | Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality |
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| title_full | Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality Richard Pettigrew |
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| title_short | Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality |
| title_sort | epistemic risk and the demands of rationality |
| topic | Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd Rationalität (DE-588)4048507-9 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Rationalismus Rationalität Erkenntnistheorie |
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