Russian information warfare: assault on democracies in the cyber wild west
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Annapolis, Maryland
Naval Institute Press
[2022]
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| Beschreibung: | xviii, 291 Seiten Diagramme 23,5 cm |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | CONTENTS List ofIllustrations.................................. Preface Acknowledgments List ofAbbreviations............................ xi xiii xv xvii Introduction.................................. 1 The Questions This Book Answers 3 Main Criteria for Case Selection.......................................................................... 4 Ldentifying the Cases This Book Analyzes.................... 6 Methodology and Data Collection 9 1. The Role of Cyber Operations and Forces in Russia’s Understanding of Warfare: A Foundation for Subsequent Frameworks........................ Russia’s Strategic Outlook..................................... Russia’s View ofModern Warfare: Increased Application of Nonmilitary Measures.......... Russia’s Cyber Strategy: Cyber Operations as a Part ofInformation Warfare in Peacetime and during War______ Russia’s Cyber Strategy in Practice: Forces and Capabilities Conclusion................... 17 17 20 22 27 30 2. Frameworks for Predicting and Analyzing Cyber Operations in the Context of Information Warfare 31 A Frameworkfor Identifying Factors Associated with the Initiation ofRussian Cyber Operations.............. 32 A Political Hack Map ofRussian Targets .................................................. 35 Russia’s CHAOS ................................ 40 Conclusion ............. 41 vii
viii · Contents 3. Web War I: How a Bronze Soldier Triggered a New Era in Cyber Warfare 44 Factors in Estonia-Russia Relations Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations............................. Russia’s Information Warfare Activities............. ............... Russia’s Interference in Estonia: Associated Factors and Mapping 44 45 the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS 52 The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaign......................................... ........ —................................ 54 4. Blowing Up Its Own Trojan Horse in Europe: DDoS Attacks against Bulgaria’s Political Infrastructure, Assassinations, and Explosions .....................56 Factors in Bulgaria-Russia Relations and the Bulgarian Election Environment Potentially Associated with the Launch ofCyber Operations 57 Russia’s Information Warfare Activities ....... 60 QCA and Visualization ofRussia’s Cyber Attacks and Other Activities 68 The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaign........................... 5. The 2016 and 2020 U.S. Presidential Elections, or Why the Devil Wears Gucci, Not Prada ......................... A Note on Standards ofEvidence ........ Factors in U.S.-Russia Relations and the U.S. Election Environment Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations............... 71 74 75 76 Russia’s Lnformation Warfare Activities.......... ................................................ 77 Russia’s Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections: Associated Factors and Mapping the Campaign
Using CHAOS 90 Observations about Russia’s Information Warfare Playbook..........................92 The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaign............. ........................................ 93 6. Phishing in Norway’s Nets in 2016: Where Sputnik Crashed and Burned Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch ofCyber Operations 96 96 Russia’s Lnformation Warfare Activities Russia’s Lnterference in Norway: Associated Factors and Mapping 97 the Lnformation Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information 102 Warfare Campaign...................... 102 7. How the Tiny Balkan Nation of Montenegro Withstood a Russian- Sponsored Coup ................................................. Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch ofCyber Operations 105 106
Contents ֊ ix Russia’s Information Warfare Activities ..................................... 106 Russia’s Interference in Montenegro: Associated Factors and Mapping the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS .......... 114 The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaign ............. 114 8. Trying to Trump En Marche! Russia’s Interference in the 2017 French Presidential Elections................................................................................ 117 Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations........ 118 Russia’s Information Warfare Activities........................................... Russia’s Interference in the 2017 French Presidential Elections: Associated Factors and Mapping the Information Warfare 119 Campaign Using CHAOS...................... The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information 126 Warfare Campaign 9. The Hack of the Bundestag and Aiding AfD ........................ 128 .............. 130 Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch ofCyber Operations Russia’s Information Warfare Activities ....... 131 131 Media Coverage and Social Activities: The Lisa Case Russia’s Interference in Germany: Associated Factors and Mapping 136 the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS........................... Germany’s Policy Response The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information 139 141 Warfare Campaign........................... 143 10. Cross-Country Analysis and Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaigns....... Cross-Country QCA
Analysis and Main Conclusions 145 145 Cross-Country Hack Map Analysis and Main Conclusions........................ 147 Cross-Country CHAOS Analysis and Main Conclusions . 149 Overall Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaigns: Is Being the Top Villain Worth Iti...... Main Takeaways ofthe Cross-Case Analysis and the Effectiveness ofRussia’s CHAOS 150 154 11. Policy Recommendations for Defending against Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 156 Improve Data Collection and Knowledge about the Different Information Warfare Activities That the Russian GovernmentSupports 156
x « Contents Address the C in CHAOS: How to Defend against Russia’s Most Likely Cyber Operations against Political Infrastructure..................................... 158 Address the H in CHAOS: How to Enhance Resilience against Disinformation and Strategic Messaging Campaigns.................................... 160 Address the AOS in CHAOS: How to Defend against Russia ’s Other Information Warfare Operations............................................ 161 Final Thoughts about Russia’s Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West .............................. 163 Notes ........ ............................................... -............................................................ Selected Bibliography.................. Index ............. 167 237 279
INDEX abbreviations, xvii—xviii Alternative for Germany (Alternative for Deutschland, AID), 131, 132-33, 136, 138-39, 142,144,150,155,229nl Anonymous (Bulgaria), 157 Anonymous Poland, 234n3 APT 28 (Fancy Bear or Sofacy): capabilities and focus of, 27, 29; GRU affiliation of, 27, 182n69; role in Bulgarian DDoS attacks, 64; role in Bundestag opera tions, 133—34,136,141, 143; role in DNC and DCCC operations, 81—87; role in French 2017 election operations, 123—24; role in Montenegrin phishing campaign, 222n42 APT 29 (Cozy Bear or Cozy Duke), 27, 28, 99, 182-83nn69-70 assassinations: destruction of democracies through, xiii; information warfare role of, 14, 164; poisoning attempt of Bulgarian arms dealers, 56-57, 59, 61, 65, 68, 70, 71, 161-62, 197n59; policy recommen dations to defend against, 161-62 Association Dialogue Franco-Russia, 120 Attack (Ataka), 60 attribution and evidence of cyber opera tions, 4—5, 7, 15; Bulgaria case study, 64, 71; Bundestag case study, 130, 133-34, 136, 141, 143; Estonia case study, 49—50, 190n40; French 2017 election case study, 123-24; Norway case study, 97, 99; U.S. 2016 election case study, 74, 75-76, 85-86,153 availability compromises/attacks: analysis and understanding of, 3, 145-47, 154, 163-64; Bulgaria case study, 62, 64; concept and objective of, 32-33; effec tiveness of, 164; Estonia case study, 33, 49; French 2017 election case study, 120; Montenegro case study, 110 Badin, Dmitri, 143 Balkan Federation of Russian Speaking Organizations (BaFRO), 108 ballistic missile defense (BMD), 19-20 Biden, Hunter, 161 Biden, Joseph, 75, 161
Bogacheva, Anna, 78 bots. See trolls, bots, and bloggers BSI (Federal Office for Information Security, Bundesamt for Sicherheit in der Informa tionstechnik), 134, 141, 142, 159 Bulgaria: airspace use by Russia, refusal to allow, 58-59, 72, 73; arms and ammu nition export business of, 56-57, 59, 61-62, 68, 69, 132, 199n70; attribution of operations, 64, 71; CHAOS visualiza tion of operations, 68, 70-71; cyber and 279
280 Index information warfare operations against, 149-50; cyber and information warfare operations in, 2, 60-68, 132; DDoS attack against political infrastructure, 7, 8, 56-57,60-61,62-64,68,70-71,147, 149,196ո40; effectiveness of cyber oper ations, 71-73,151, 155; explosions at weapons facilities, 61-62, 70, 71; factors in cyber operations initiation, 57-60, 71, 145—47; Hack Map, 63; media cover age related to events in, 60, 64-71, 72, 149-50,197nn58-60,197n62; NATO military forces and infrastructure in, 20; opposition to NATO membership in, 60; poisoning attempt of arms dealers, 56-57, 59, 61,65, 68, 70,71, 161-62, 197n59; pro-Russian political parties in, 59-60; QCA factors, 71, 145—47; relationship with Russia, 56, 57-60, 71-73,104 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), 59-60, 65-67, 72,197n62 Bundestag: approval for information war fare against, 133; attribution of opera tions against, 130, 133-34, 136, 141, 143; CHAOS visualization of operations, 139-41; cyber and information warfare operations against, 7, 8, 130, 131-36, 149-50; effectiveness of cyber opera tions against, 143-44,152,153,155; factors potentially associated with cyber operations initiation, 131, 139, 145-47; Hack Map, 135; leaks of data stolen from, 134; malware operations against, 133-34; media coverage related to elec tions, 136-39, 140, 144; media coverage related to events in, 149—50; objectives of information warfare activities against, 136, 143-44; QCA factors, 139,145-47 case studies: criteria for selection, 4—6, 169—70n21; data collection, 5-6, 9-10, 173n25; definitions, 13-14; hypotheses,
12; identification of candidate cases and selection of cases, 6-9, 170n22; literature review, 9, 10, 12, 14-15, 173n25; meth odology, xiii-xiv, 9-15, 31-43 Catalonian independence referendum, 7 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 6, 170n22 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), report of cyber operations, 5 CHAOS (Cyber, Hype, and Associated Operations): aggregation of all cases and conclusions about cyber operations, 149-50, 154-55; Bulgaria case study, 68, 70-71; Bundestag case study, 139^41; categories of, 40-41; development of, 15, 40-41; Estonia case study, 41, 42, 52-54; French 2017 election case study, 126—28; Montenegro case study, 114, 115; Norway case study, 102, 103; recommendations to address, 158-62; U.S. 2016 election case study, 90-92; visualization of infor mation warfare activities with, 15, 32, 40-41,42, 43 Christian Democratic Union (ChristlichDemokratische Union, CDU), 131, 133, 136, 138 Christian Social Union (Chrisdich-Soziale Union, CSU), 133 CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and avail ability) triad, 3, 32-33. See also specific categories Citizens for European Development of Bul garia (Grazhdani za evropeiysko razvitie na Bulgariya, GERB), 58, 65-67, 71, 72, 197n62 civilian hackers, 27, 30 Clapper, James, 85 Clinton presidential campaign and Hillary Clinton: attribution of operations against, 74, 75-76, 85-86; breach of computer systems of, 1-2, 81-85; dissemination of documents and emails related to, 1, 74; effectiveness of cyber operations against, 93-95; leaks of documents from, 86—87, 91, 93, 134; media coverage related to
leaked documents, 86—92,
Index ■ 123, 21 Inni 16—117; record of Clinton toward Russia, 76-77 CloudFlare, 64 cognitive component. See psychological component and operations Comey, James, 12, 76-77 computer emergency readiness teams (CERTs), 14-15, 54, 55, 64 computers and computer infrastructure: cyber effects of operations against, 38—39; information warfare role of destruction of capabilities of, 13, 25; offensive opera tions on, 38—39; operations against U.S. 2016 election infrastructure, 74; purposes of cyber weapons against, 38-39; Russian operations on U.S.-based computer servers, 74, 78—80 Concord Management and Consulting LLC, 78 Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 9,55 confidentiality compromises/attacks: anal ysis and understanding of, 3, 145-47, 149, 153, 154, 163-64; Bundestag case study, 100, 133; concept and objective of, 32—33; effectiveness of, 164; French 2017 election, 120; French 2017 election case study, 32; Norway case study, 99, 100; U.S. 2016 election case study, 85, 86—87, 93, 100 Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE, NATO), 55 country characteristics, xiv, 3, 33—35 coup d’état: attempted coup against Monte negro government, 108-9, 114; destruc tion of democracies through, xiii; failed U.S. coup, 167nl (preface); information warfare role of, 14, 164; policy recom mendations to defend against, 161-62 Crimea: annexation by Russia, 58, 72, 76, 154; French response to annexation of, 118—19; sanctions on Russia related to annexation of, 73, 76, 96—97, 109, 118, 119,131; Trump recognition of peninsula as part of Russia, 77 281 CrowdStrike, 14, 85, 92-93
cyber activities, definition of, 13 Cyber and Information Space Command, 142 cyber attack, definition of, 13 cyber campaigns, definition of, 13 cyber intrusion, definition of, 13 Cyber Kill Chain model, 9, 12, 83, 174n36 cyber operations: analysis and research for understanding of, 3-4,156-58; attribution and evidence of, 4—5, 7, 15; capabilities and forces for, 17, 27—30, 176nl, 182—83nn69—70; categorization of, 38-39, 186nl2; conditions associated with employment of types of, 3; defini tion of, 13; destruction of democracies through, xiii, 1-3; factors in initiation of, xiv, 11, 12, 14, 33-35; as foreign policy tool, xiii, 1—3; information warfare role of, 13, 25-27, 163-64; offensive operations, 29, 38-39; patterns in and defense against, xiv, 2, 12, 31, 164; pat terns in and understanding information warfare playbook, 12, 92-93; prevalence of, 2; proactive countermeasures against, xiv; purposes of cyber weapons, 38-39; tactics, techniques, and procedures for, 2, 12,14—15, 25-27,156-58; types of and capabilities for, 3, 32-33, 169nl 1 ; understanding of, 3, 163 cyber-blurring, 129 cybersecurity/information security: defini tion of, 13; German strategy for, 141-42; literature review of, 14-15; mandatory awareness and incident response training, 158-59, 164; resources and research to bolster policies, 153-54; threats in Rus sian doctrine, 23, 24 cyberspace, 180n36 Czech Republic, 8 Daniel, Michael, 94-95 data collection and analysis: availability of data, 5-6; case studies research and analysis, 9-Ю, 173n25; media coverage
282 - Index in CHAOS framework, 32, 40—41; rec ommendation to improve data collection, 156-58,164 DC Leaks/DCleaks.com, 85, 86-87, 122,134 Décodex project, 129 DefCon hacker conference, 9 Defending Digital Campaigns (DDC), 159 defense against information warfare activ ities: analysis and research for develop ment of, 3-4, 156-58; assessment of potential threats to NATO countries and policies to deter and mitigate Russian activities against, 151,153,233n2; holistic defense recommendations, 158-60, 234—35n7; information about hackers methods and development of, 14—15; patterns in cyber operations and develop ment of measures for, xiv, 2, 12, 31, 33-35, 43, 164; policy recommendations for, 16, 156-62; policy to detect, prevent, and mitigate intrusions, xiii, 3, 43 democracy and democratic systems, under mining integrity of, xiii, 1-3, 74, 93, 95, 128, 164 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), 74, 81—85, 87, 88 Democratic Front (DF), 106, 107—8, 109, 112-14, 116, 155 Democratic National Committee (DNC): attribution of operations against, 85-86; cyber operations against, 1-2, 7, 74, 81-85, 141; effectiveness of cyber opera tions against, 93-95, 117, 151; leaks of documents from, 86-87, 91, 93, 134; media coverage related to leaked doc uments, 86-92, 123, 21 Inni 16-117; resignation of chairwoman of, 94, 117 Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), 108, 109, 110, 112-14 denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks: Bulgarian political infrastructure as target of, 7, 8, 56-57, 60-61,62-64, 68, 70-71, 147, 149, 196n40; disputed issue between Russia and targeted state and
initiation of, 12; effectiveness of, 151; Estonia as target of, 2,6,7, 8,41,42,44,47-50, 149, 189n34; Macron presidential cam paign attacks, 120; Montenegro as target of, 7, 8, 149; Montenegro case study, 110, 221n41; objectives of, 39, 149; psychological effects of, 39; technical effects of, 39 disinformation: cyber effects of operations, 39; destruction of democracies through, xiii, 3; dissemination of related to Macron, 119,122-28,129; dissemination of related to U.S. 2016 election, 74, 87—90; dis semination tactics and activities, 25—27; divisive and misleading information to influence the minds of the adversary, 1, 3, 21, 23, 25,34,78-81, 90,162, 164, 206nn60-61; election disinformation planting and dissemination through social media, 77, 90, 205n52; German policies to counter disinformation on social media, 143; information warfare role of, 13, 14, 25; policy recommenda tions to address and remove, 160-61, 164; research on, 14; spread via social media, 3, 74 Djukanovic, Milo, 109, 114 Eastern Bloc states, former: Estonia case study, 35; factors in cyber operations ini tiation, 146-47, 154; fàctors in initiation of cyber operations, 34—35 economic/financial activities: Bulgaria case study, 57-59, 70, 71; Clinton presidency and removal of sanctions, 77; Estonia case study, 35, 41, 42, 46—47, 53; events related to information warfare campaigns, 32, 41, 42; factors in cyber operations initiation, xiv, 11, 34; information war fare role of, 25—27, 164; Montenegro case study, 109-10, 114; resilience against Russian sanctions, 162; sanctions against Russia by U.S. and
other Western nations, 76, 95; sanctions and block ades as nonmilitary measures, 26-27;
Index ‘ 283 sanctions between Russia and France, 118, 119; sanctions between Russia and Germany, 131; sanctions between Russia and Montenegro, 109, 116; sanctions between Russia and Norway, 96-97,102, 162; sanctions on Russia related to cyber intrusion, 130, 143; Trump presidency and removal of sanctions, 77 effectiveness of cyber operations and infor mation warfare campaigns: analysis and understanding of, xiii, 4, 158; Bulgaria case study, 71-73, 151; Bundestag case study, 143-44,152,153,155; against Clinton presidential campaign and Hil lary Clinton, 93-95; against Democratic National Committee (DNC), 93-95, 117, 151; Estonia case study, 54-55, 151, 155; French 2017 election case study, 117-18, 128-29,152, 153, 155; against Macron presidential campaign and Emmanuel Macron, 117-18, 155; Montenegro case study, 114, 116, 152, 153, 155; Norway case study, 102, 104, 152, 155; objectives of activities and, 164; summary of overall effectiveness, 150-54; U.S. 2016 election case study, 93-95,117,152 Egypt, 118 Election Assistance Commission (EAC), 159 elections: cyber and information warfare operations against, 1-3, 39; DDoS oper ation objectives against, 39; interagency agency exercises for protection of, 159; online platforms for interaction between candidates and voters, 157; pro-Russian candidates and initiation of cyber oper ations, 33, 34, 59-60,107-8,119,131, 155, 164; suspected Russian cyber opera tions against, 7, 8; technical and psycho logical effects of cyber operations against, 39; types of cyber operations against, xiii, 39, 164; undermining trust in and
integ rity of democratic systems, xiii, 1—3, 74, 93, 95, 128, 164. See also Clinton presi dential campaign and Hillary Clinton electoral infrastructure (political IT infra structure): Bulgaria case study, 62-64, 196n40; concept and components of, 36, 37; election systems as critical infrastruc ture, 37; Montenegro case study, 110, 111, 22In37, 221n41; operations against U.S. 2016 election infrastructure, 74; targeting of, 147—48; technical effects of cyber operations against, 39 electrical grids, cyber operations against, 7,29 electronic warfare, 13, 25 emleaks (En Marche Leaks), 122, 134 Estonia: attribution of operations, 49-50, 190n40; CHAOS visualization of operations, 41, 42, 52—54; cyber and information warfare operations against, 149-50; DDoS attacks against, 2, 6, 7, 8, 41,42, 44,47-50, 149, 189n34; DDoS operation objectives, 39; effectiveness of cyber operations, 54—55, 151, 155; factors in cyber operations initiation, 33, 34, 35,44-45, 52, 54,145-47; Hack Map, 48; information warfare activities, 45—52; media coverage related to events in, 34,35,41, 42,45, 50-54,191n47; QCA factors, 33, 35, 52, 54,145-47; relationship with Russia, 33, 44-45; statue relocation by, 2, 34, 39, 44-45, 46, 55, 155 explosions at weapons facilities, 61—62, 70,71 Facebook: anti-Macron messages on, 122; hacked material and anti-Clinton mes sages on, 1; identification and prevention of malicious and inauthentic use of, 95; IRA activities to target U.S. population, 78, 79—80; IRA promotion of rallies on, 81; Lisa case on, 139; Russian advertise ments on, 79, 80, 206nn60-61 facilitating
infrastructure (political IT infra structure): Bundestag case study, 133-34, 135; concept and components of, 36, 37; French 2017 election case study, 120—21;
284 index Norway case study, 97-99; targeting of, 37, 147-48, 163; United States 2016 election case study, 81-85 Farage, Nigel, 126 Federal Agency of Government Communi cations and Information (FAPSI), 28 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 1,5, 94-95,141, 159 Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informa tionstechnik, BSI), 134,141,142,159 Federal Security Service (Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB), 5, 27-28 FireEye, 14, 85 Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, SVR), 27-28 4chan, 79,122,157 France: agreement to build warships for Russia, 118; cyber and information warfare operations against, 8; media in, 129; preparations for potential Russian interference in elections, 117-18, 129; pro-Russian political party in, 119; relationship with Russia, 118—19, 120; Russian cultural center in, 119; Russian financial support for FN party, 119; TV5 Monde, cyber operation against, 7, 8 French 2017 election: attribution of opera tions against, 123-24; CHAOS visual ization of operations, 126-28; cyber and information warfare operations against, 2, 7, 8, 117-18,119-26,149-50; effec tiveness of cyber operations, 117—18, 128-29, 152, 153, 155; factors poten tially associated with cyber operations initiation, 118—19, 128, 145—47; leaks of documents related to, 117, 119, 122—28, 129, 134; media coverage after the election, 126, 228n59; media coverage related to events in, 123, 124—28, 129, 149-50; preparations for potential Rus sian interference in, 117—18, 129; QCA factors, 128, 145-47; voter suppression efforts in, 122.
See aho Macron presiden tial campaign and Emmanuel Macron gas exports and South Stream pipeline, 58, 59, 68, 72, 73 Gasprom, 58 Gauland, Alexander, 132 Gebrev, Emilian, 61, 71, 161-62, 197n59 General Directorate for Civil Registration and Administrative Services (Grazhdanska registratsiya i administrativno obsluzhvane, GRAO), 62, 64 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD), 182-83n70 geopolitics: criteria for case study selection, 5-6, 169—70n21; cyber operations initia tion and, xiv, 3,12,33—35,145^47; global environment and the strategic oudook of Russia, 17—20; indicators to monitor and detect Russian intrusions, 156-57 Georgia, 8 Gerasimov, Valery, 20, 21-22, 26-27 Germany: cyber and information warfare operations against, 6, 8; cyber defense center in, 142; ethnic Russians in, 132, 144; immigration and refugee policies in, 131, 136, 138-39, 144; Lisa case in, 138—39, 144, 162; policies to prevent further Russian cyber operations, 141— 43; preparations for potential Russian interference in elections, 142-43; pro Russian political parties in, 131, 132-33, 136,138-39, 142,144,155,164; relationship with Russia, 131; response to information warfare operations against, 130; Russian influence in 2017 elections, 131-32, 133; warnings to Russia about election interference, 142-43. See aho Bundestag Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (Glavnoye Upravleniye, GRU): attribu tion of cyber operations to, 5; capabili ties and focus of, 27, 28—29; poisoning attempt of arms dealers by, 56—57, 59, 61,65,68,70, 71,161-62, 197n59; role in French 2017
election operations, 123—24; trial of GRU officer, 161; U.S. 2016 election operations of, 81-87, 153
Index Group of 8 (G-8) summit, 76 Guccifer 2.0, 85, 86-87,91,199nl Hack Map/heat map: aggregation of all cases, 38, 147-48; color scale on, 38; identification of political infrastructure targets, xiv, 15, 31-32, 35-38, 43; values on, 38 hackers: civilian, 27, 30; competition between, 27; forces and capabilities of, 27-30, 182—83nn69-70; publication of methods of, 14—15 Hollande, Francois, 118-19 indicators of compromise (loCs), 15,156-57 information environment, 180n36 information security. See cybersecurity/ information security information space, 22 information sphere (political IT infrastruc ture): concept and components of, 36, 37-38; targeting of, 4, 147-48 information superiority, 18, 23, 27 information warfare: components of, 13, 22, 25-27,163-64; concept and defini tion of, xiii, 1,13, 22—23; cyber strat egy in peacetime and during war, 17, 22-27, 179—80n35; integration of hacks with media campaigns, 93; as modern method of warfare, 17—18; objectives of activities, xiii, 1-3, 13, 18, 23, 25, 154-55, 158, 163-64; operational level of, 22-23; patterns in cyber operations and understanding information warfare playbook, 12, 92-93, 164; terminology for, 179—80n35. See ako defense against information warfare activities information warfare campaigns/operations: analysis and research for understanding of, 3-4, 156-58; approval for, 77, 85, 133, 164—65; continuous monitoring and assessment of, 160, 164; continuous process of, 164; definition of, 14, 23; divisive and misleading information to influence the minds of the adversary, 1, 285 3, 21,23,25, 34, 78-81, 90,162,164,
206nn60-61; integration and potential interaction of activities in, xiv, 154—55; proactive countermeasures against, xiv Instagram: hacked material and anti Clinton messages on, 1; IRA activities to target U.S. population, 78, 79-80, 205n55 Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, 120 integrity compromises/attacks: analysis and understanding of, 3, 145-47; Bundestag case study, 133; concept and objective of, 32—33; Estonia case study, 49; French 2017 election case study, 120; U.S. 2016 election case study, 93 intelligence and counterintelligence activi ties, 13, 25 Internet Research Agency (Agenstvo Inter net Issledovaniy, IRA), 27, 78—81, 88, 93, 94, 95, 206nn60-61,21Խ115 January 6 riots, 167nl (preface) Johnson, Jeh, 85 Krylova, Alexandra, 78 Labor (Trud), 65-67, 68, 69, 197n60, 197n62 Lavrov, Sergey, 18-19, 20, 109-10, 139 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 119 Le Pen, Marine, 119, 122-23, 124, 126 Left (Die Linke), 132 Lisa case, 138-39, 144, 162 Lockheed Martin, Cyber Kill Chain model, 9,12, 83, 174n36 Macron presidential campaign and Emman uel Macron: attribution of operations against, 123-24; congratulations from foreign leaders after election of, 126; cyber and information warfare operations against, 2, 7, 8, 117-18,119-26; DDoS attacks against, 120; election of and effectiveness of cyber operations, 117—18,
286 Index 155; handshake battler with Trump, 228n59; leaks of documents from, 117, 119, 122-28, 129, 134; media coverage after die election, 126, 228n59; media coverage related to, 123, 124—28, 129; political party of, 224nl; position on Russia policy, 119; spear-phishing attacks against, 2, 120 Main Intelligence Directorate. See Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (Glavnoye Upravleniye, GRU) Malaysian flight MH-17 downing, 131 Malofeev, Konstantin, 61, 132 malware, 133-34 Marin, Angel, 59-60 media literacy curricula, 161, 162, 164 media/Russian state-sponsored media: Bul garia case study, 60, 64-71, 72, 149-50, 197nn58-60, 197n62; Bundestag case study, 136—39, 140, 144, 149—50; data collection and analysis on media coverage in CHAOS framework, 32, 40-41; databases and data collection on Russian strategic messaging in, 157; dissemi nation of election process or outcome through, 37—38; divisive and misleading information dissemination through, 25, 34, 162, 164; Estonia case study, 34, 35,41,42,45, 50-54,191n47; factors in initiation of cyber operations, 11, 34, 35; French 2017 election case study, 123, 124-28,129, 149-50; influence in disinformation activities, 14; inte gration of hacks with media campaigns, 93; journalists who cover Russian cyber operations, 9—10; Montenegro case study, 110, 112—14, 115, 149-50; Norway case study, 99-102, 103, 216-17nn25-26; policy recommendations to address and remove disinformation in, 160-61; quan tity of and spike in media coverage, 34, 35; strategic messaging campaigns in, 14, 32, 34,40-41,149-50, 152,160-61, 162, 164; U.S.
2016 election case study, 86-92,123,149-50,21 Inni 16-117 Merkel, Angela, 46, 130, 131, 133, 136, 138,139,142,150,155 Midzhur, 61-62 military activities: Estonia case study, 35, 41, 42; events related to information warfare campaigns, 32, 41, 42; factors in cyber operations initiation, xiv, 3, 11, 34; Norway case study, 97 Mimikatz, 133 Montenegro: access to ports, refusal of, 106; CHAOS visualization of operations, 114, 115; coup d’etat attempt in, 108-9, 114; cyber and information warfare operations against, 105, 106-14, 149-50; DDoS attacks against, 7, 8, 110, 149, 221n41; effectiveness of cyber operations, 114, 116, 152, 153, 155; election administra tion and information infrastructure in, 110, 111, 221n37, 221n41; factors potentially associated with cyber opera tions initiation, 106, 114, 145-47; Hack Map, 111; media coverage related to events in, 110,112-14, 115,149-50; NATO membership of, 105, 106, 107, 114,155,169-70n21,217nl; phishing campaign against parliament, 222n42; pro-Russian political parties in, 107—8, 155, 164; QCA factors, 114, 145-47; relationship with Russia, 106; Russian use of ports in, 106; tourism industry in, 109-10 Mueller, Robert, 20ІПІ0 Naryshkin, Sergey, 60 Nashi (Ours) movement, 45—46, 47, 49 National Front party (FN), 119 National Security Agency (NSA), report of cyber operations, 5 National Security Council (NSC), 94—95 NATO and NATO countries: assessment of potential threats to and policies to deter and mitigate Russian activities against, 151, 153, 233n2; assistance to Estonia from, 55; Brussels headquarters, cyber operations against,
7, 8; Cooperative
Index « 287 Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD СОЕ), 55; country-specific characteristics and types of operations against, 3; criteria for case study selection, 5—6, 169—70n21; cyber and information warfare operations against, 8, 154; cyber operations initiation and disputed issue between Russia and, 12; cyber operations initiation and membership status, xiv, 3, 146-47; expansion of as security threat to Russia, 19—20, 107; global environ ment and likelihood of conflict, 18—20; military exercises near Russia’s borders, 20; Montenegro membership in, 105, 106, 107, 114, 155, 169-70n21, 217nl; opposition to NATO membership of Bulgaria, 60; Russian policies toward, 2; targeting political IT infrastructure of, 1-3, 4, 8, 34-35 NATO-Russia Council, 76 Netherlands, The, 8 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 7, 25, 28,105,108,120,141-42, 157 Nord Stream pipeline, 131 Norway: attempted cyber intrusion into Labor Party, 96, 97-99, 215-16nl5; attribution of operations against, 97, 99; CHAOS visualization of operations, 102, 103; cyber and information warfare operations against, 97—101, 149-50; cyber operation against army and intelli gence services, 7, 8, 96, 99; effectiveness of cyber operations, 102, 104, 152, 155; factors potentially associated with cyber operations initiation, 96—97, 102, 145-47; Hack Map, 98; Labor Party, attempted cyber intrusion into, 7, 8; marines stationed on base in, 97; media coverage related to events in, 99—102, 103, 216-17nn25-26; NATO founding country status of, 96; QCA factors, 102, 145—47; relationship with Russia, 96-97, 102, 104, 162
NotPetya, 8, 29 nuclear forces and deterrence, 19-20 Obama, Barrack, 94, 95 Olympic doping scandal, 76 Olympic Games, 8 Open Campaign (ОС), 157 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 7, 8 Palo Alto Networks, 14 Pastebin, 122—23 peace/peacetime: cyber strategy in peace time and during war, 17, 22-27, 17980n35; sliding scale of conflict and bound aries of war and peace, xiii, 21, 30, 163 Pegida, 132 Petya, NotPetya, 8, 29 phishing campaigns: data exfiltration and leaks related to, 39; Macron presidential campaign spear-phishing attacks, 2, 120; Montenegro case study, 222n42; Norway case study spear-phishing attacks, 99; objectives of, 39; psychological effects of, 39; United States 2016 election opera tions, 82, 83 Plevneliev, Rosen, 64-65 Podesta, John, 81, 82, 86, 88 poisoning attempt, 56-57, 59, 61, 65, 68, 70,71,197n59 Poland: NATO military forces and infra structure in, 20; Warsaw stock exchange, cyber operation against, 7, 8 Poland, cyber operation against, 8 political attribution, 4—5 political IT infrastructure: categories of, 35-38; conditions associated with employment of types of cyber operations against, 3; definition of, 4; factors in initiation of cyber attacks against, xiv, 11, 12, 33-35, 154; identification of targeted elements, xiv, 15, 31—32, 35—38, 40-41; patterns in cyber operations and devel opment of measures to defend, xiv, 2, 12, 31, 43; patterns in cyber operations and understanding information warfare playbook, 12, 92—93, 164; state and local management of, 94—95; targeting of,
288 Index 37-38, 147-48, 163; targeting of NATO and post-Soviet countries, 1-3, 4, 34—35; types of cyber operations against, xiii, 39, 164; vulnerabilities of, 2-3. See abo specific categories political parties: facilitating infrastructure role of, 37; pro-Russian political parties, 33, 34; pro-Russian political parties in Germany, 131,132-33, 136,138-39, 142, 144, 155, 164; pro-Russian political party in Bulgaria, 59-60; pro-Russian political party in France, 119; proRussian political party in Montenegro, 107-8, 164; targeting of, 38, 154, 16364; transparency on financial sources for, 157 political/diplomatic activities: Bulgaria case study, 57—59, 71; Bundestag case study, 132-33; Estonia case study, 35, 41, 42, 46, 53; events related to information warfare campaigns, 32, 41, 42; factors in cyber operations initiation, xiv, 3, 11, 12, 33; information warfare role of, 25-27; Montenegro case study, 106-9, 114; political and diplomatic pressure as nonmilitary measure, 26-27; U.S. 2016 election case study, 74, 78 Powell, Colin, 86 process-tracing method, xiv, 9, 11-12, 40 Proofpoint, 123 propaganda, 23,34, 74 Protection of War Graves Act, 45 protests: Bulgaria case study, 59-60, 70, 71, 72; destruction of democracies through, xiii; Estonia case study, 45-46, 53, 55; information warfare role of, 14, 27, 162, 164; recommendations for response to, 162; Russian protests against Putin gov ernment, 77; U.S. 2016 election rallies, 80-81,91 psychological component and operations: GRU operations, 29; information warfare role of, 13, 22, 25; objectives and cyber effects of, 22, 32,
38-39, 154; preference for, 93; techniques to influence the minds of the adversary, 21; threats in Russian doctrine, 23, 24 psychological war, definition of, 180n39 Putin, Vladimir: approval for information warfare operations from, 77, 85,133, 164-65; disapproval of U.S. policies toward Russia by, 76; feelings of toward Clinton, 76—77; FSB reporting to, 27—28; involvement in Estonia, 46, 50, 53; Munich Security Conference speech by, 18; policy toward and relationship with Trump, 77; preference for Trump . by, 77; Russian protests against govern ment of, 77; warnings to about election interference from, 94, 142 Pyeong Chang Olympic Games, 8 qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): aggregation of all cases, 145-47; aggre gation of all cases and conclusions about factors related to initiation of operations, 154; application in case study methods, xiii-xiv, 9, 15, 31, 32—35, 43; Bulgaria case study, 71, 145-47; Bundestag case study, 139, 145—17; Estonia case study, 33,34, 35, 52, 54,145-47; factors identification and application of process, 10—12, 33-35; French 2017 election case study, 128, 145-47; Montenegro case study, 114, 145—47; Norway case study, 102, 145 —47; U.S. 2016 election case study, 92,145—17 regime-change focus of conflicts, 19 Rinehart, William, 86 Roshka, Georgiy Petrovich, 123 Rostec, 68 RT: Bulgaria case study, 65, 67; Clinton campaign and DNC coverage by, 87-88, 21 lnl 16; Lisa case coverage, 138-39; Macron campaign coverage by, 124, 129 RT Deutsch, 138-39 Russia: Clinton criticism of elections in, 77; cybersecurity threats to, 23, 24; diplo matic,
economic, and financial war
Index ՝ 289 between U.S. and, 20; diplomatic facil ities, closing of U.S.—based, 95; expan sionist policies and ambitions of, 20; financial support for French FN party, 119; forces and capabilities for cyber operations, 27—30,182—83nn69—70; foreign policy concepts of, 18; French agreement to build warships for, 118; gas exports and South Stream pipeline, 58, 59, 68, 72, 73; human rights violations in, 77, 131; military and nonmilitary activities to erode social cohesion, 1—3, 25-27; NATO expansion of as security threat to, 19—20, 107; policies toward NATO and NATO countries, 2; relation ship with Bulgaria, 56, 57-60, 71-73, 104; relationship with Estonia, 33, 44-Л5; relationship with France, 118—19, 120; relationship with Germany, 131; relationship with Montenegro, 106; rela tionship with Norway, 96-97, 102, 104, 162; reputation as first-class cyber power, 153-54; strategic oudookof, 17-20; warnings to about election interference from, 94,142-43 Russian Diary (Ruski Dnevnik), 65, 66, 67,197ոո58-59 Russian Orthodox Church, 108,112,120,157 sanctions: Clinton presidency and removal of, 77; information warfare role of block ades and, 26-27,164; related to Crimean annexation, 73, 76, 96-97, 109, 118, 119, 131; resilience against Russian, 162; between Russia and France, 118, 119; between Russia and Germany, 131; between Russia and Montenegro, 109, 116; between Russia and Norway, 96—97, 102, 162; against Russia by U.S. and other Western nations, 76, 95; on Russia related to cyber intrusion, 130, 143; on Russia related to war in Ukraine, 76; Trump presidency and removal of, 77
Sandworm, 27, 29, 182n69 Schmidt, Anke, 214nl Schroeder, Gerhard, 131 Schwartzenegger, Arnold, 167nl (preface) Serbian Orthodox Church, 108 Siderov, Volen, 60 Singhammer, Johannes, 133 Skobelev, Mikhail, 57 SNA News, 138 social activities: Bulgaria case study, 59—60, 70, 71, 72; Estonia case study, 35, 41, 42, 45-46, 53; events related to information warfare campaigns, 32, 41, 42; factors in cyber operations initiation, xiv, 3, 11, 33; U.S. 2016 election case study, 74, 78-81, 91 social media: activities and influence in French election, 117, 119, 122-23; activities and influence in Norway, 100; data collection on Russian government use of platforms, 157; disinformation spread via, 3, 74; dissemination of elec tion process or outcome through, 37—38; election disinformation planting and dissemination through, 77, 90, 205n52; exploitation of platforms, 74, 78-80; German policies on accuracy of informa tion on, 142; German policies to counter disinformation on, 143; hacked material and anti-Clinton messages on, 1, 79-80, 90; hacked material and anti-Macron messages on, 122—23, 129; identifica tion and prevention of malicious and inauthentic use of, 95; impersonation of French citizens on, 122; impersonation of U.S. citizens on, 74, 78—81, 206n60; IRA activities, data on, 88, 95, 21 Ini 15; IRA activities to target U.S. population, 78-81, 94, 205n52, 205n55, 206nn6061; IRA promotion of rallies on, 81; Lisa case on, 138-39, 144, 162; pro-AfD and Bundestag election information on, 138; racial issues and topics on, 79; Russian activities to denigrate democracy on, 93; Russian
advertisements on, 77, 79, 80, 206nn60-61; Russian operations on U.S.-based computer servers, 78-80;
290 ■ Index strategic messaging campaigns in, 164. See aho trolls, bots, and bloggers South Stream pipeline, 58, 59, 68, 72, 73 Soviet Union states, former: cyber and information warfare operations against, 2, 12; Estonia case study, 35; factors in initiation of cyber operations, 34—35 spear-phishing attacks. See phishing cam paigns Sputnik Deutschland, 136-38, 150 Sputnik France, 124—26,128,129 Sputnik International, Norway case study, 100-102, 216-17n26 Sputnik News·. Bulgaria case study, 65, 67; Lisa case coverage, 138-39; Norway case study, 99-100; ownership of, 88; U.S. 2016 election case study, 87—90, 91, 92, 123, 21ІПІ17 Sputnik Norge, 100, 102,104, 216n25 Sputnik Serbija, 112-14 Syria: Bulgarian airspace to transport cargo to, 58-59, 72, 73; Bulgarian export of ammunition to, 62; Le Pen support for Russia policy in, 119; Macron position on Russia policy in, 119; Montenegrin ports, refosal to allow access on way to, 106; naval fleet deployment to, 97; punishment of, 20; Russian involvement in and support for Al-Assad, 76 technical attribution, 4—5 technical component and operations: GRU operations, 29; objectives and cyber effects of, 22, 32, 38-39, 154; threats in Russian doctrine, 23, 24 ThreatConnect, 123 Trend Micro, 123, 182n69, 222n42 trolls, bots, and bloggers: activities and influence in Bulgaria, 65; activities and influence in French election, 117, 119, 122-23; activities and influence in Norway, 100; disinformation spread by, 40; election disinformation planting and dissemination through, 77, 78—80, 90, 205n52; German agreement among parties to not use,
142; IRA activities, data on, 88,21 lnl 15; number of Russianlinked Twitter accounts, 80 Trump, Donald: Access Hollywood video tape of, 86; allegations of collusion with Russia, 76,20ІПІ0; election of and effec tiveness of cyber operations, 117, 155; handshake batder with Macron, 228n59; media coverage related to, 88-90, 91, 21 lnl 17; policy toward and relationship with Putin, 77; preference of Putin for election of, 77 Twitter: hacked material and anti-Clinton messages on, 1; hacked material and anti-Macron messages on, 122—23; identification and prevention of mali cious and inauthentic use of, 95; IRA activities to target U.S. population, 78, 79-80, 205n52; IRA promotion of rallies on, 81 ; pro-AfD and Bundestag election information on, 138; Russian-linked automated accounts on, 80 Ukraine: corruption related to Biden in, 75; election interference by, 76; electrical grids, cyber operations against, 7, 8, 29; European military support for as provo cation to Russia, 20; Le Pen support for Russia policy in, 119; Macron position on Russia policy in, 119; Russian foreign policy toward and conflict in, 76, 131; sanctions on Russia related to war in, 76. See aho Crimea United Kingdom: Brexit referendum, 7, 8; suspected Russian cyber operations against, 7, 8 United Russia political party, 132 United States 2016 election: approval for information warfare against, 77, 85; attri bution of operations against, 74, 75—76, 85-86, 153; CHAOS visualization of operations, 90-92; cyber and informa tion warfare operations against, 1-2,
Index ՝ 291 7, 8,74-75, 77-90,149-50,199nl; effectiveness of cyber operations, 93-95, 117, 152; factors potentially associated with cyber operations initiation, 76-77, 92, 145—47; Hack Map, 84, 85; leaks of documents related to, 86-87, 91, 93, 134; media coverage and tensions after election, 81, 90; media coverage related to Clinton and DNC documents, 86—92, 123, 21 Inni 16-117; media coverage related to events in, 149-50; objectives of information warfare activities against, 74, 78—81, 85; operations against voter databases and software systems, 7, 81-85; QCA factors, 92, 145—47; response to information warfare operations against, 94—95; standards of evidence related to, 75-76, 20ІПІ0; uncertainty about out come of, 93; warnings to Russia about election interference, 94. See abo Clinton presidential campaign and Hillary Clinton United States (U.S.): cyber operations against 2018 midterm elections, 6, 8, 153—54; cyber operations against 2020 elections, 75, 95, 153-54, 160-61; diplomatic, economic, and financial war between Russia and, 20; failed coup d’etat on January 6, 167nl (preface); global environment and likelihood of conflict, 18—20 Vahrushev, Viktor, 20 VMZ-Sopot, 62 voter databases, 7, 81-85 voter suppression, 79, 122, 136 Warsaw stock exchange, cyber operation against, 7, 8 war/warfare: baseline of warfare, 20—21; cyber strategy in peacetime and during war, 17, 22-27, 179-80n35; diplomatic, economic, and financial war between Russia and U.S., 20; information super iority and, 18, 23, 27; information warfare as modern method of, 17-18; military and nonmilitary
measure for conduct of warfare, 2, 17, 20—22; nonmilitary mea sure for resolving conflict, 25-27; ratio of military to nonmilitary measures, 21—22; shding scale of conflict and boundaries of war and peace, xiii, 21, 30, 163 Wasserman Schultz, Debbie, 94, 117 weapons facilities, explosions at, 61-62 WikiLeaks: French 2017 election case study, 122-23; U.S. 2016 election case study, 86-87,91,93 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), 7, 8 X-Agent, 29, 83 X-Tunnel, 29, 83, 133 YouTube, 78,79, 95
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CONTENTS List ofIllustrations. Preface Acknowledgments List ofAbbreviations. xi xiii xv xvii Introduction. 1 The Questions This Book Answers 3 Main Criteria for Case Selection. 4 Ldentifying the Cases This Book Analyzes. 6 Methodology and Data Collection 9 1. The Role of Cyber Operations and Forces in Russia’s Understanding of Warfare: A Foundation for Subsequent Frameworks. Russia’s Strategic Outlook. Russia’s View ofModern Warfare: Increased Application of Nonmilitary Measures. Russia’s Cyber Strategy: Cyber Operations as a Part ofInformation Warfare in Peacetime and during War_ Russia’s Cyber Strategy in Practice: Forces and Capabilities Conclusion. 17 17 20 22 27 30 2. Frameworks for Predicting and Analyzing Cyber Operations in the Context of Information Warfare 31 A Frameworkfor Identifying Factors Associated with the Initiation ofRussian Cyber Operations. 32 A Political Hack Map ofRussian Targets . 35 Russia’s CHAOS . 40 Conclusion . 41 vii
viii · Contents 3. Web War I: How a Bronze Soldier Triggered a New Era in Cyber Warfare 44 Factors in Estonia-Russia Relations Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations. Russia’s Information Warfare Activities. . Russia’s Interference in Estonia: Associated Factors and Mapping 44 45 the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS 52 The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaign. . —. 54 4. Blowing Up Its Own Trojan Horse in Europe: DDoS Attacks against Bulgaria’s Political Infrastructure, Assassinations, and Explosions .56 Factors in Bulgaria-Russia Relations and the Bulgarian Election Environment Potentially Associated with the Launch ofCyber Operations 57 Russia’s Information Warfare Activities . 60 QCA and Visualization ofRussia’s Cyber Attacks and Other Activities 68 The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaign. 5. The 2016 and 2020 U.S. Presidential Elections, or Why the Devil Wears Gucci, Not Prada . A Note on Standards ofEvidence . Factors in U.S.-Russia Relations and the U.S. Election Environment Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations. 71 74 75 76 Russia’s Lnformation Warfare Activities. . 77 Russia’s Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections: Associated Factors and Mapping the Campaign
Using CHAOS 90 Observations about Russia’s Information Warfare Playbook.92 The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaign. . 93 6. Phishing in Norway’s Nets in 2016: Where Sputnik Crashed and Burned Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch ofCyber Operations 96 96 Russia’s Lnformation Warfare Activities Russia’s Lnterference in Norway: Associated Factors and Mapping 97 the Lnformation Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information 102 Warfare Campaign. 102 7. How the Tiny Balkan Nation of Montenegro Withstood a Russian- Sponsored Coup . Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch ofCyber Operations 105 106
Contents ֊ ix Russia’s Information Warfare Activities . 106 Russia’s Interference in Montenegro: Associated Factors and Mapping the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS . 114 The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaign . 114 8. Trying to Trump En Marche! Russia’s Interference in the 2017 French Presidential Elections. 117 Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations. 118 Russia’s Information Warfare Activities. Russia’s Interference in the 2017 French Presidential Elections: Associated Factors and Mapping the Information Warfare 119 Campaign Using CHAOS. The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information 126 Warfare Campaign 9. The Hack of the Bundestag and Aiding AfD . 128 . 130 Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch ofCyber Operations Russia’s Information Warfare Activities . 131 131 Media Coverage and Social Activities: The Lisa Case Russia’s Interference in Germany: Associated Factors and Mapping 136 the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS. Germany’s Policy Response The Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information 139 141 Warfare Campaign. 143 10. Cross-Country Analysis and Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaigns. Cross-Country QCA
Analysis and Main Conclusions 145 145 Cross-Country Hack Map Analysis and Main Conclusions. 147 Cross-Country CHAOS Analysis and Main Conclusions . 149 Overall Effectiveness ofRussia’s Cyber Operations and Information Warfare Campaigns: Is Being the Top Villain Worth Iti. Main Takeaways ofthe Cross-Case Analysis and the Effectiveness ofRussia’s CHAOS 150 154 11. Policy Recommendations for Defending against Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 156 Improve Data Collection and Knowledge about the Different Information Warfare Activities That the Russian GovernmentSupports 156
x « Contents Address the C in CHAOS: How to Defend against Russia’s Most Likely Cyber Operations against Political Infrastructure. 158 Address the H in CHAOS: How to Enhance Resilience against Disinformation and Strategic Messaging Campaigns. 160 Address the AOS in CHAOS: How to Defend against Russia ’s Other Information Warfare Operations. 161 Final Thoughts about Russia’s Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West . 163 Notes . . -. Selected Bibliography. Index . 167 237 279
INDEX abbreviations, xvii—xviii Alternative for Germany (Alternative for Deutschland, AID), 131, 132-33, 136, 138-39, 142,144,150,155,229nl Anonymous (Bulgaria), 157 Anonymous Poland, 234n3 APT 28 (Fancy Bear or Sofacy): capabilities and focus of, 27, 29; GRU affiliation of, 27, 182n69; role in Bulgarian DDoS attacks, 64; role in Bundestag opera tions, 133—34,136,141, 143; role in DNC and DCCC operations, 81—87; role in French 2017 election operations, 123—24; role in Montenegrin phishing campaign, 222n42 APT 29 (Cozy Bear or Cozy Duke), 27, 28, 99, 182-83nn69-70 assassinations: destruction of democracies through, xiii; information warfare role of, 14, 164; poisoning attempt of Bulgarian arms dealers, 56-57, 59, 61, 65, 68, 70, 71, 161-62, 197n59; policy recommen dations to defend against, 161-62 Association Dialogue Franco-Russia, 120 Attack (Ataka), 60 attribution and evidence of cyber opera tions, 4—5, 7, 15; Bulgaria case study, 64, 71; Bundestag case study, 130, 133-34, 136, 141, 143; Estonia case study, 49—50, 190n40; French 2017 election case study, 123-24; Norway case study, 97, 99; U.S. 2016 election case study, 74, 75-76, 85-86,153 availability compromises/attacks: analysis and understanding of, 3, 145-47, 154, 163-64; Bulgaria case study, 62, 64; concept and objective of, 32-33; effec tiveness of, 164; Estonia case study, 33, 49; French 2017 election case study, 120; Montenegro case study, 110 Badin, Dmitri, 143 Balkan Federation of Russian Speaking Organizations (BaFRO), 108 ballistic missile defense (BMD), 19-20 Biden, Hunter, 161 Biden, Joseph, 75, 161
Bogacheva, Anna, 78 bots. See trolls, bots, and bloggers BSI (Federal Office for Information Security, Bundesamt for Sicherheit in der Informa tionstechnik), 134, 141, 142, 159 Bulgaria: airspace use by Russia, refusal to allow, 58-59, 72, 73; arms and ammu nition export business of, 56-57, 59, 61-62, 68, 69, 132, 199n70; attribution of operations, 64, 71; CHAOS visualiza tion of operations, 68, 70-71; cyber and 279
280 ' Index information warfare operations against, 149-50; cyber and information warfare operations in, 2, 60-68, 132; DDoS attack against political infrastructure, 7, 8, 56-57,60-61,62-64,68,70-71,147, 149,196ո40; effectiveness of cyber oper ations, 71-73,151, 155; explosions at weapons facilities, 61-62, 70, 71; factors in cyber operations initiation, 57-60, 71, 145—47; Hack Map, 63; media cover age related to events in, 60, 64-71, 72, 149-50,197nn58-60,197n62; NATO military forces and infrastructure in, 20; opposition to NATO membership in, 60; poisoning attempt of arms dealers, 56-57, 59, 61,65, 68, 70,71, 161-62, 197n59; pro-Russian political parties in, 59-60; QCA factors, 71, 145—47; relationship with Russia, 56, 57-60, 71-73,104 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), 59-60, 65-67, 72,197n62 Bundestag: approval for information war fare against, 133; attribution of opera tions against, 130, 133-34, 136, 141, 143; CHAOS visualization of operations, 139-41; cyber and information warfare operations against, 7, 8, 130, 131-36, 149-50; effectiveness of cyber opera tions against, 143-44,152,153,155; factors potentially associated with cyber operations initiation, 131, 139, 145-47; Hack Map, 135; leaks of data stolen from, 134; malware operations against, 133-34; media coverage related to elec tions, 136-39, 140, 144; media coverage related to events in, 149—50; objectives of information warfare activities against, 136, 143-44; QCA factors, 139,145-47 case studies: criteria for selection, 4—6, 169—70n21; data collection, 5-6, 9-10, 173n25; definitions, 13-14; hypotheses,
12; identification of candidate cases and selection of cases, 6-9, 170n22; literature review, 9, 10, 12, 14-15, 173n25; meth odology, xiii-xiv, 9-15, 31-43 Catalonian independence referendum, 7 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 6, 170n22 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), report of cyber operations, 5 CHAOS (Cyber, Hype, and Associated Operations): aggregation of all cases and conclusions about cyber operations, 149-50, 154-55; Bulgaria case study, 68, 70-71; Bundestag case study, 139^41; categories of, 40-41; development of, 15, 40-41; Estonia case study, 41, 42, 52-54; French 2017 election case study, 126—28; Montenegro case study, 114, 115; Norway case study, 102, 103; recommendations to address, 158-62; U.S. 2016 election case study, 90-92; visualization of infor mation warfare activities with, 15, 32, 40-41,42, 43 Christian Democratic Union (ChristlichDemokratische Union, CDU), 131, 133, 136, 138 Christian Social Union (Chrisdich-Soziale Union, CSU), 133 CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and avail ability) triad, 3, 32-33. See also specific categories Citizens for European Development of Bul garia (Grazhdani za evropeiysko razvitie na Bulgariya, GERB), 58, 65-67, 71, 72, 197n62 civilian hackers, 27, 30 Clapper, James, 85 Clinton presidential campaign and Hillary Clinton: attribution of operations against, 74, 75-76, 85-86; breach of computer systems of, 1-2, 81-85; dissemination of documents and emails related to, 1, 74; effectiveness of cyber operations against, 93-95; leaks of documents from, 86—87, 91, 93, 134; media coverage related to
leaked documents, 86—92,
Index ■ 123, 21 Inni 16—117; record of Clinton toward Russia, 76-77 CloudFlare, 64 cognitive component. See psychological component and operations Comey, James, 12, 76-77 computer emergency readiness teams (CERTs), 14-15, 54, 55, 64 computers and computer infrastructure: cyber effects of operations against, 38—39; information warfare role of destruction of capabilities of, 13, 25; offensive opera tions on, 38—39; operations against U.S. 2016 election infrastructure, 74; purposes of cyber weapons against, 38-39; Russian operations on U.S.-based computer servers, 74, 78—80 Concord Management and Consulting LLC, 78 Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 9,55 confidentiality compromises/attacks: anal ysis and understanding of, 3, 145-47, 149, 153, 154, 163-64; Bundestag case study, 100, 133; concept and objective of, 32—33; effectiveness of, 164; French 2017 election, 120; French 2017 election case study, 32; Norway case study, 99, 100; U.S. 2016 election case study, 85, 86—87, 93, 100 Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE, NATO), 55 country characteristics, xiv, 3, 33—35 coup d’état: attempted coup against Monte negro government, 108-9, 114; destruc tion of democracies through, xiii; failed U.S. coup, 167nl (preface); information warfare role of, 14, 164; policy recom mendations to defend against, 161-62 Crimea: annexation by Russia, 58, 72, 76, 154; French response to annexation of, 118—19; sanctions on Russia related to annexation of, 73, 76, 96—97, 109, 118, 119,131; Trump recognition of peninsula as part of Russia, 77 281 CrowdStrike, 14, 85, 92-93
cyber activities, definition of, 13 Cyber and Information Space Command, 142 cyber attack, definition of, 13 cyber campaigns, definition of, 13 cyber intrusion, definition of, 13 Cyber Kill Chain model, 9, 12, 83, 174n36 cyber operations: analysis and research for understanding of, 3-4,156-58; attribution and evidence of, 4—5, 7, 15; capabilities and forces for, 17, 27—30, 176nl, 182—83nn69—70; categorization of, 38-39, 186nl2; conditions associated with employment of types of, 3; defini tion of, 13; destruction of democracies through, xiii, 1-3; factors in initiation of, xiv, 11, 12, 14, 33-35; as foreign policy tool, xiii, 1—3; information warfare role of, 13, 25-27, 163-64; offensive operations, 29, 38-39; patterns in and defense against, xiv, 2, 12, 31, 164; pat terns in and understanding information warfare playbook, 12, 92-93; prevalence of, 2; proactive countermeasures against, xiv; purposes of cyber weapons, 38-39; tactics, techniques, and procedures for, 2, 12,14—15, 25-27,156-58; types of and capabilities for, 3, 32-33, 169nl 1 ; understanding of, 3, 163 cyber-blurring, 129 cybersecurity/information security: defini tion of, 13; German strategy for, 141-42; literature review of, 14-15; mandatory awareness and incident response training, 158-59, 164; resources and research to bolster policies, 153-54; threats in Rus sian doctrine, 23, 24 cyberspace, 180n36 Czech Republic, 8 Daniel, Michael, 94-95 data collection and analysis: availability of data, 5-6; case studies research and analysis, 9-Ю, 173n25; media coverage
282 - Index in CHAOS framework, 32, 40—41; rec ommendation to improve data collection, 156-58,164 DC Leaks/DCleaks.com, 85, 86-87, 122,134 Décodex project, 129 DefCon hacker conference, 9 Defending Digital Campaigns (DDC), 159 defense against information warfare activ ities: analysis and research for develop ment of, 3-4, 156-58; assessment of potential threats to NATO countries and policies to deter and mitigate Russian activities against, 151,153,233n2; holistic defense recommendations, 158-60, 234—35n7; information about hackers methods and development of, 14—15; patterns in cyber operations and develop ment of measures for, xiv, 2, 12, 31, 33-35, 43, 164; policy recommendations for, 16, 156-62; policy to detect, prevent, and mitigate intrusions, xiii, 3, 43 democracy and democratic systems, under mining integrity of, xiii, 1-3, 74, 93, 95, 128, 164 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), 74, 81—85, 87, 88 Democratic Front (DF), 106, 107—8, 109, 112-14, 116, 155 Democratic National Committee (DNC): attribution of operations against, 85-86; cyber operations against, 1-2, 7, 74, 81-85, 141; effectiveness of cyber opera tions against, 93-95, 117, 151; leaks of documents from, 86-87, 91, 93, 134; media coverage related to leaked doc uments, 86-92, 123, 21 Inni 16-117; resignation of chairwoman of, 94, 117 Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), 108, 109, 110, 112-14 denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks: Bulgarian political infrastructure as target of, 7, 8, 56-57, 60-61,62-64, 68, 70-71, 147, 149, 196n40; disputed issue between Russia and targeted state and
initiation of, 12; effectiveness of, 151; Estonia as target of, 2,6,7, 8,41,42,44,47-50, 149, 189n34; Macron presidential cam paign attacks, 120; Montenegro as target of, 7, 8, 149; Montenegro case study, 110, 221n41; objectives of, 39, 149; psychological effects of, 39; technical effects of, 39 disinformation: cyber effects of operations, 39; destruction of democracies through, xiii, 3; dissemination of related to Macron, 119,122-28,129; dissemination of related to U.S. 2016 election, 74, 87—90; dis semination tactics and activities, 25—27; divisive and misleading information to influence the minds of the adversary, 1, 3, 21, 23, 25,34,78-81, 90,162, 164, 206nn60-61; election disinformation planting and dissemination through social media, 77, 90, 205n52; German policies to counter disinformation on social media, 143; information warfare role of, 13, 14, 25; policy recommenda tions to address and remove, 160-61, 164; research on, 14; spread via social media, 3, 74 Djukanovic, Milo, 109, 114 Eastern Bloc states, former: Estonia case study, 35; factors in cyber operations ini tiation, 146-47, 154; fàctors in initiation of cyber operations, 34—35 economic/financial activities: Bulgaria case study, 57-59, 70, 71; Clinton presidency and removal of sanctions, 77; Estonia case study, 35, 41, 42, 46—47, 53; events related to information warfare campaigns, 32, 41, 42; factors in cyber operations initiation, xiv, 11, 34; information war fare role of, 25—27, 164; Montenegro case study, 109-10, 114; resilience against Russian sanctions, 162; sanctions against Russia by U.S. and
other Western nations, 76, 95; sanctions and block ades as nonmilitary measures, 26-27;
Index ‘ 283 sanctions between Russia and France, 118, 119; sanctions between Russia and Germany, 131; sanctions between Russia and Montenegro, 109, 116; sanctions between Russia and Norway, 96-97,102, 162; sanctions on Russia related to cyber intrusion, 130, 143; Trump presidency and removal of sanctions, 77 effectiveness of cyber operations and infor mation warfare campaigns: analysis and understanding of, xiii, 4, 158; Bulgaria case study, 71-73, 151; Bundestag case study, 143-44,152,153,155; against Clinton presidential campaign and Hil lary Clinton, 93-95; against Democratic National Committee (DNC), 93-95, 117, 151; Estonia case study, 54-55, 151, 155; French 2017 election case study, 117-18, 128-29,152, 153, 155; against Macron presidential campaign and Emmanuel Macron, 117-18, 155; Montenegro case study, 114, 116, 152, 153, 155; Norway case study, 102, 104, 152, 155; objectives of activities and, 164; summary of overall effectiveness, 150-54; U.S. 2016 election case study, 93-95,117,152 Egypt, 118 Election Assistance Commission (EAC), 159 elections: cyber and information warfare operations against, 1-3, 39; DDoS oper ation objectives against, 39; interagency agency exercises for protection of, 159; online platforms for interaction between candidates and voters, 157; pro-Russian candidates and initiation of cyber oper ations, 33, 34, 59-60,107-8,119,131, 155, 164; suspected Russian cyber opera tions against, 7, 8; technical and psycho logical effects of cyber operations against, 39; types of cyber operations against, xiii, 39, 164; undermining trust in and
integ rity of democratic systems, xiii, 1—3, 74, 93, 95, 128, 164. See also Clinton presi dential campaign and Hillary Clinton electoral infrastructure (political IT infra structure): Bulgaria case study, 62-64, 196n40; concept and components of, 36, 37; election systems as critical infrastruc ture, 37; Montenegro case study, 110, 111, 22In37, 221n41; operations against U.S. 2016 election infrastructure, 74; targeting of, 147—48; technical effects of cyber operations against, 39 electrical grids, cyber operations against, 7,29 electronic warfare, 13, 25 emleaks (En Marche Leaks), 122, 134 Estonia: attribution of operations, 49-50, 190n40; CHAOS visualization of operations, 41, 42, 52—54; cyber and information warfare operations against, 149-50; DDoS attacks against, 2, 6, 7, 8, 41,42, 44,47-50, 149, 189n34; DDoS operation objectives, 39; effectiveness of cyber operations, 54—55, 151, 155; factors in cyber operations initiation, 33, 34, 35,44-45, 52, 54,145-47; Hack Map, 48; information warfare activities, 45—52; media coverage related to events in, 34,35,41, 42,45, 50-54,191n47; QCA factors, 33, 35, 52, 54,145-47; relationship with Russia, 33, 44-45; statue relocation by, 2, 34, 39, 44-45, 46, 55, 155 explosions at weapons facilities, 61—62, 70,71 Facebook: anti-Macron messages on, 122; hacked material and anti-Clinton mes sages on, 1; identification and prevention of malicious and inauthentic use of, 95; IRA activities to target U.S. population, 78, 79—80; IRA promotion of rallies on, 81; Lisa case on, 139; Russian advertise ments on, 79, 80, 206nn60-61 facilitating
infrastructure (political IT infra structure): Bundestag case study, 133-34, 135; concept and components of, 36, 37; French 2017 election case study, 120—21;
284 index Norway case study, 97-99; targeting of, 37, 147-48, 163; United States 2016 election case study, 81-85 Farage, Nigel, 126 Federal Agency of Government Communi cations and Information (FAPSI), 28 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 1,5, 94-95,141, 159 Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informa tionstechnik, BSI), 134,141,142,159 Federal Security Service (Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB), 5, 27-28 FireEye, 14, 85 Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, SVR), 27-28 4chan, 79,122,157 France: agreement to build warships for Russia, 118; cyber and information warfare operations against, 8; media in, 129; preparations for potential Russian interference in elections, 117-18, 129; pro-Russian political party in, 119; relationship with Russia, 118—19, 120; Russian cultural center in, 119; Russian financial support for FN party, 119; TV5 Monde, cyber operation against, 7, 8 French 2017 election: attribution of opera tions against, 123-24; CHAOS visual ization of operations, 126-28; cyber and information warfare operations against, 2, 7, 8, 117-18,119-26,149-50; effec tiveness of cyber operations, 117—18, 128-29, 152, 153, 155; factors poten tially associated with cyber operations initiation, 118—19, 128, 145—47; leaks of documents related to, 117, 119, 122—28, 129, 134; media coverage after the election, 126, 228n59; media coverage related to events in, 123, 124—28, 129, 149-50; preparations for potential Rus sian interference in, 117—18, 129; QCA factors, 128, 145-47; voter suppression efforts in, 122.
See aho Macron presiden tial campaign and Emmanuel Macron gas exports and South Stream pipeline, 58, 59, 68, 72, 73 Gasprom, 58 Gauland, Alexander, 132 Gebrev, Emilian, 61, 71, 161-62, 197n59 General Directorate for Civil Registration and Administrative Services (Grazhdanska registratsiya i administrativno obsluzhvane, GRAO), 62, 64 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD), 182-83n70 geopolitics: criteria for case study selection, 5-6, 169—70n21; cyber operations initia tion and, xiv, 3,12,33—35,145^47; global environment and the strategic oudook of Russia, 17—20; indicators to monitor and detect Russian intrusions, 156-57 Georgia, 8 Gerasimov, Valery, 20, 21-22, 26-27 Germany: cyber and information warfare operations against, 6, 8; cyber defense center in, 142; ethnic Russians in, 132, 144; immigration and refugee policies in, 131, 136, 138-39, 144; Lisa case in, 138—39, 144, 162; policies to prevent further Russian cyber operations, 141— 43; preparations for potential Russian interference in elections, 142-43; pro Russian political parties in, 131, 132-33, 136,138-39, 142,144,155,164; relationship with Russia, 131; response to information warfare operations against, 130; Russian influence in 2017 elections, 131-32, 133; warnings to Russia about election interference, 142-43. See aho Bundestag Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (Glavnoye Upravleniye, GRU): attribu tion of cyber operations to, 5; capabili ties and focus of, 27, 28—29; poisoning attempt of arms dealers by, 56—57, 59, 61,65,68,70, 71,161-62, 197n59; role in French 2017
election operations, 123—24; trial of GRU officer, 161; U.S. 2016 election operations of, 81-87, 153
Index Group of 8 (G-8) summit, 76 Guccifer 2.0, 85, 86-87,91,199nl Hack Map/heat map: aggregation of all cases, 38, 147-48; color scale on, 38; identification of political infrastructure targets, xiv, 15, 31-32, 35-38, 43; values on, 38 hackers: civilian, 27, 30; competition between, 27; forces and capabilities of, 27-30, 182—83nn69-70; publication of methods of, 14—15 Hollande, Francois, 118-19 indicators of compromise (loCs), 15,156-57 information environment, 180n36 information security. See cybersecurity/ information security information space, 22 information sphere (political IT infrastruc ture): concept and components of, 36, 37-38; targeting of, 4, 147-48 information superiority, 18, 23, 27 information warfare: components of, 13, 22, 25-27,163-64; concept and defini tion of, xiii, 1,13, 22—23; cyber strat egy in peacetime and during war, 17, 22-27, 179—80n35; integration of hacks with media campaigns, 93; as modern method of warfare, 17—18; objectives of activities, xiii, 1-3, 13, 18, 23, 25, 154-55, 158, 163-64; operational level of, 22-23; patterns in cyber operations and understanding information warfare playbook, 12, 92-93, 164; terminology for, 179—80n35. See ako defense against information warfare activities information warfare campaigns/operations: analysis and research for understanding of, 3-4, 156-58; approval for, 77, 85, 133, 164—65; continuous monitoring and assessment of, 160, 164; continuous process of, 164; definition of, 14, 23; divisive and misleading information to influence the minds of the adversary, 1, 285 3, 21,23,25, 34, 78-81, 90,162,164,
206nn60-61; integration and potential interaction of activities in, xiv, 154—55; proactive countermeasures against, xiv Instagram: hacked material and anti Clinton messages on, 1; IRA activities to target U.S. population, 78, 79-80, 205n55 Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, 120 integrity compromises/attacks: analysis and understanding of, 3, 145-47; Bundestag case study, 133; concept and objective of, 32—33; Estonia case study, 49; French 2017 election case study, 120; U.S. 2016 election case study, 93 intelligence and counterintelligence activi ties, 13, 25 Internet Research Agency (Agenstvo Inter net Issledovaniy, IRA), 27, 78—81, 88, 93, 94, 95, 206nn60-61,21Խ115 January 6 riots, 167nl (preface) Johnson, Jeh, 85 Krylova, Alexandra, 78 Labor (Trud), 65-67, 68, 69, 197n60, 197n62 Lavrov, Sergey, 18-19, 20, 109-10, 139 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 119 Le Pen, Marine, 119, 122-23, 124, 126 Left (Die Linke), 132 Lisa case, 138-39, 144, 162 Lockheed Martin, Cyber Kill Chain model, 9,12, 83, 174n36 Macron presidential campaign and Emman uel Macron: attribution of operations against, 123-24; congratulations from foreign leaders after election of, 126; cyber and information warfare operations against, 2, 7, 8, 117-18,119-26; DDoS attacks against, 120; election of and effectiveness of cyber operations, 117—18,
286 ' Index 155; handshake battler with Trump, 228n59; leaks of documents from, 117, 119, 122-28, 129, 134; media coverage after die election, 126, 228n59; media coverage related to, 123, 124—28, 129; political party of, 224nl; position on Russia policy, 119; spear-phishing attacks against, 2, 120 Main Intelligence Directorate. See Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (Glavnoye Upravleniye, GRU) Malaysian flight MH-17 downing, 131 Malofeev, Konstantin, 61, 132 malware, 133-34 Marin, Angel, 59-60 media literacy curricula, 161, 162, 164 media/Russian state-sponsored media: Bul garia case study, 60, 64-71, 72, 149-50, 197nn58-60, 197n62; Bundestag case study, 136—39, 140, 144, 149—50; data collection and analysis on media coverage in CHAOS framework, 32, 40-41; databases and data collection on Russian strategic messaging in, 157; dissemi nation of election process or outcome through, 37—38; divisive and misleading information dissemination through, 25, 34, 162, 164; Estonia case study, 34, 35,41,42,45, 50-54,191n47; factors in initiation of cyber operations, 11, 34, 35; French 2017 election case study, 123, 124-28,129, 149-50; influence in disinformation activities, 14; inte gration of hacks with media campaigns, 93; journalists who cover Russian cyber operations, 9—10; Montenegro case study, 110, 112—14, 115, 149-50; Norway case study, 99-102, 103, 216-17nn25-26; policy recommendations to address and remove disinformation in, 160-61; quan tity of and spike in media coverage, 34, 35; strategic messaging campaigns in, 14, 32, 34,40-41,149-50, 152,160-61, 162, 164; U.S.
2016 election case study, 86-92,123,149-50,21 Inni 16-117 Merkel, Angela, 46, 130, 131, 133, 136, 138,139,142,150,155 Midzhur, 61-62 military activities: Estonia case study, 35, 41, 42; events related to information warfare campaigns, 32, 41, 42; factors in cyber operations initiation, xiv, 3, 11, 34; Norway case study, 97 Mimikatz, 133 Montenegro: access to ports, refusal of, 106; CHAOS visualization of operations, 114, 115; coup d’etat attempt in, 108-9, 114; cyber and information warfare operations against, 105, 106-14, 149-50; DDoS attacks against, 7, 8, 110, 149, 221n41; effectiveness of cyber operations, 114, 116, 152, 153, 155; election administra tion and information infrastructure in, 110, 111, 221n37, 221n41; factors potentially associated with cyber opera tions initiation, 106, 114, 145-47; Hack Map, 111; media coverage related to events in, 110,112-14, 115,149-50; NATO membership of, 105, 106, 107, 114,155,169-70n21,217nl; phishing campaign against parliament, 222n42; pro-Russian political parties in, 107—8, 155, 164; QCA factors, 114, 145-47; relationship with Russia, 106; Russian use of ports in, 106; tourism industry in, 109-10 Mueller, Robert, 20ІПІ0 Naryshkin, Sergey, 60 Nashi (Ours) movement, 45—46, 47, 49 National Front party (FN), 119 National Security Agency (NSA), report of cyber operations, 5 National Security Council (NSC), 94—95 NATO and NATO countries: assessment of potential threats to and policies to deter and mitigate Russian activities against, 151, 153, 233n2; assistance to Estonia from, 55; Brussels headquarters, cyber operations against,
7, 8; Cooperative
Index « 287 Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD СОЕ), 55; country-specific characteristics and types of operations against, 3; criteria for case study selection, 5—6, 169—70n21; cyber and information warfare operations against, 8, 154; cyber operations initiation and disputed issue between Russia and, 12; cyber operations initiation and membership status, xiv, 3, 146-47; expansion of as security threat to Russia, 19—20, 107; global environ ment and likelihood of conflict, 18—20; military exercises near Russia’s borders, 20; Montenegro membership in, 105, 106, 107, 114, 155, 169-70n21, 217nl; opposition to NATO membership of Bulgaria, 60; Russian policies toward, 2; targeting political IT infrastructure of, 1-3, 4, 8, 34-35 NATO-Russia Council, 76 Netherlands, The, 8 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 7, 25, 28,105,108,120,141-42, 157 Nord Stream pipeline, 131 Norway: attempted cyber intrusion into Labor Party, 96, 97-99, 215-16nl5; attribution of operations against, 97, 99; CHAOS visualization of operations, 102, 103; cyber and information warfare operations against, 97—101, 149-50; cyber operation against army and intelli gence services, 7, 8, 96, 99; effectiveness of cyber operations, 102, 104, 152, 155; factors potentially associated with cyber operations initiation, 96—97, 102, 145-47; Hack Map, 98; Labor Party, attempted cyber intrusion into, 7, 8; marines stationed on base in, 97; media coverage related to events in, 99—102, 103, 216-17nn25-26; NATO founding country status of, 96; QCA factors, 102, 145—47; relationship with Russia, 96-97, 102, 104, 162
NotPetya, 8, 29 nuclear forces and deterrence, 19-20 Obama, Barrack, 94, 95 Olympic doping scandal, 76 Olympic Games, 8 Open Campaign (ОС), 157 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 7, 8 Palo Alto Networks, 14 Pastebin, 122—23 peace/peacetime: cyber strategy in peace time and during war, 17, 22-27, 17980n35; sliding scale of conflict and bound aries of war and peace, xiii, 21, 30, 163 Pegida, 132 Petya, NotPetya, 8, 29 phishing campaigns: data exfiltration and leaks related to, 39; Macron presidential campaign spear-phishing attacks, 2, 120; Montenegro case study, 222n42; Norway case study spear-phishing attacks, 99; objectives of, 39; psychological effects of, 39; United States 2016 election opera tions, 82, 83 Plevneliev, Rosen, 64-65 Podesta, John, 81, 82, 86, 88 poisoning attempt, 56-57, 59, 61, 65, 68, 70,71,197n59 Poland: NATO military forces and infra structure in, 20; Warsaw stock exchange, cyber operation against, 7, 8 Poland, cyber operation against, 8 political attribution, 4—5 political IT infrastructure: categories of, 35-38; conditions associated with employment of types of cyber operations against, 3; definition of, 4; factors in initiation of cyber attacks against, xiv, 11, 12, 33-35, 154; identification of targeted elements, xiv, 15, 31—32, 35—38, 40-41; patterns in cyber operations and devel opment of measures to defend, xiv, 2, 12, 31, 43; patterns in cyber operations and understanding information warfare playbook, 12, 92—93, 164; state and local management of, 94—95; targeting of,
288 Index 37-38, 147-48, 163; targeting of NATO and post-Soviet countries, 1-3, 4, 34—35; types of cyber operations against, xiii, 39, 164; vulnerabilities of, 2-3. See abo specific categories political parties: facilitating infrastructure role of, 37; pro-Russian political parties, 33, 34; pro-Russian political parties in Germany, 131,132-33, 136,138-39, 142, 144, 155, 164; pro-Russian political party in Bulgaria, 59-60; pro-Russian political party in France, 119; proRussian political party in Montenegro, 107-8, 164; targeting of, 38, 154, 16364; transparency on financial sources for, 157 political/diplomatic activities: Bulgaria case study, 57—59, 71; Bundestag case study, 132-33; Estonia case study, 35, 41, 42, 46, 53; events related to information warfare campaigns, 32, 41, 42; factors in cyber operations initiation, xiv, 3, 11, 12, 33; information warfare role of, 25-27; Montenegro case study, 106-9, 114; political and diplomatic pressure as nonmilitary measure, 26-27; U.S. 2016 election case study, 74, 78 Powell, Colin, 86 process-tracing method, xiv, 9, 11-12, 40 Proofpoint, 123 propaganda, 23,34, 74 Protection of War Graves Act, 45 protests: Bulgaria case study, 59-60, 70, 71, 72; destruction of democracies through, xiii; Estonia case study, 45-46, 53, 55; information warfare role of, 14, 27, 162, 164; recommendations for response to, 162; Russian protests against Putin gov ernment, 77; U.S. 2016 election rallies, 80-81,91 psychological component and operations: GRU operations, 29; information warfare role of, 13, 22, 25; objectives and cyber effects of, 22, 32,
38-39, 154; preference for, 93; techniques to influence the minds of the adversary, 21; threats in Russian doctrine, 23, 24 psychological war, definition of, 180n39 Putin, Vladimir: approval for information warfare operations from, 77, 85,133, 164-65; disapproval of U.S. policies toward Russia by, 76; feelings of toward Clinton, 76—77; FSB reporting to, 27—28; involvement in Estonia, 46, 50, 53; Munich Security Conference speech by, 18; policy toward and relationship with Trump, 77; preference for Trump . by, 77; Russian protests against govern ment of, 77; warnings to about election interference from, 94, 142 Pyeong Chang Olympic Games, 8 qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): aggregation of all cases, 145-47; aggre gation of all cases and conclusions about factors related to initiation of operations, 154; application in case study methods, xiii-xiv, 9, 15, 31, 32—35, 43; Bulgaria case study, 71, 145-47; Bundestag case study, 139, 145—17; Estonia case study, 33,34, 35, 52, 54,145-47; factors identification and application of process, 10—12, 33-35; French 2017 election case study, 128, 145-47; Montenegro case study, 114, 145—47; Norway case study, 102, 145 —47; U.S. 2016 election case study, 92,145—17 regime-change focus of conflicts, 19 Rinehart, William, 86 Roshka, Georgiy Petrovich, 123 Rostec, 68 RT: Bulgaria case study, 65, 67; Clinton campaign and DNC coverage by, 87-88, 21 lnl 16; Lisa case coverage, 138-39; Macron campaign coverage by, 124, 129 RT Deutsch, 138-39 Russia: Clinton criticism of elections in, 77; cybersecurity threats to, 23, 24; diplo matic,
economic, and financial war
Index ՝ 289 between U.S. and, 20; diplomatic facil ities, closing of U.S.—based, 95; expan sionist policies and ambitions of, 20; financial support for French FN party, 119; forces and capabilities for cyber operations, 27—30,182—83nn69—70; foreign policy concepts of, 18; French agreement to build warships for, 118; gas exports and South Stream pipeline, 58, 59, 68, 72, 73; human rights violations in, 77, 131; military and nonmilitary activities to erode social cohesion, 1—3, 25-27; NATO expansion of as security threat to, 19—20, 107; policies toward NATO and NATO countries, 2; relation ship with Bulgaria, 56, 57-60, 71-73, 104; relationship with Estonia, 33, 44-Л5; relationship with France, 118—19, 120; relationship with Germany, 131; relationship with Montenegro, 106; rela tionship with Norway, 96-97, 102, 104, 162; reputation as first-class cyber power, 153-54; strategic oudookof, 17-20; warnings to about election interference from, 94,142-43 Russian Diary (Ruski Dnevnik), 65, 66, 67,197ոո58-59 Russian Orthodox Church, 108,112,120,157 sanctions: Clinton presidency and removal of, 77; information warfare role of block ades and, 26-27,164; related to Crimean annexation, 73, 76, 96-97, 109, 118, 119, 131; resilience against Russian, 162; between Russia and France, 118, 119; between Russia and Germany, 131; between Russia and Montenegro, 109, 116; between Russia and Norway, 96—97, 102, 162; against Russia by U.S. and other Western nations, 76, 95; on Russia related to cyber intrusion, 130, 143; on Russia related to war in Ukraine, 76; Trump presidency and removal of, 77
Sandworm, 27, 29, 182n69 Schmidt, Anke, 214nl Schroeder, Gerhard, 131 Schwartzenegger, Arnold, 167nl (preface) Serbian Orthodox Church, 108 Siderov, Volen, 60 Singhammer, Johannes, 133 Skobelev, Mikhail, 57 SNA News, 138 social activities: Bulgaria case study, 59—60, 70, 71, 72; Estonia case study, 35, 41, 42, 45-46, 53; events related to information warfare campaigns, 32, 41, 42; factors in cyber operations initiation, xiv, 3, 11, 33; U.S. 2016 election case study, 74, 78-81, 91 social media: activities and influence in French election, 117, 119, 122-23; activities and influence in Norway, 100; data collection on Russian government use of platforms, 157; disinformation spread via, 3, 74; dissemination of elec tion process or outcome through, 37—38; election disinformation planting and dissemination through, 77, 90, 205n52; exploitation of platforms, 74, 78-80; German policies on accuracy of informa tion on, 142; German policies to counter disinformation on, 143; hacked material and anti-Clinton messages on, 1, 79-80, 90; hacked material and anti-Macron messages on, 122—23, 129; identifica tion and prevention of malicious and inauthentic use of, 95; impersonation of French citizens on, 122; impersonation of U.S. citizens on, 74, 78—81, 206n60; IRA activities, data on, 88, 95, 21 Ini 15; IRA activities to target U.S. population, 78-81, 94, 205n52, 205n55, 206nn6061; IRA promotion of rallies on, 81; Lisa case on, 138-39, 144, 162; pro-AfD and Bundestag election information on, 138; racial issues and topics on, 79; Russian activities to denigrate democracy on, 93; Russian
advertisements on, 77, 79, 80, 206nn60-61; Russian operations on U.S.-based computer servers, 78-80;
290 ■ Index strategic messaging campaigns in, 164. See aho trolls, bots, and bloggers South Stream pipeline, 58, 59, 68, 72, 73 Soviet Union states, former: cyber and information warfare operations against, 2, 12; Estonia case study, 35; factors in initiation of cyber operations, 34—35 spear-phishing attacks. See phishing cam paigns Sputnik Deutschland, 136-38, 150 Sputnik France, 124—26,128,129 Sputnik International, Norway case study, 100-102, 216-17n26 Sputnik News·. Bulgaria case study, 65, 67; Lisa case coverage, 138-39; Norway case study, 99-100; ownership of, 88; U.S. 2016 election case study, 87—90, 91, 92, 123, 21ІПІ17 Sputnik Norge, 100, 102,104, 216n25 Sputnik Serbija, 112-14 Syria: Bulgarian airspace to transport cargo to, 58-59, 72, 73; Bulgarian export of ammunition to, 62; Le Pen support for Russia policy in, 119; Macron position on Russia policy in, 119; Montenegrin ports, refosal to allow access on way to, 106; naval fleet deployment to, 97; punishment of, 20; Russian involvement in and support for Al-Assad, 76 technical attribution, 4—5 technical component and operations: GRU operations, 29; objectives and cyber effects of, 22, 32, 38-39, 154; threats in Russian doctrine, 23, 24 ThreatConnect, 123 Trend Micro, 123, 182n69, 222n42 trolls, bots, and bloggers: activities and influence in Bulgaria, 65; activities and influence in French election, 117, 119, 122-23; activities and influence in Norway, 100; disinformation spread by, 40; election disinformation planting and dissemination through, 77, 78—80, 90, 205n52; German agreement among parties to not use,
142; IRA activities, data on, 88,21 lnl 15; number of Russianlinked Twitter accounts, 80 Trump, Donald: Access Hollywood video tape of, 86; allegations of collusion with Russia, 76,20ІПІ0; election of and effec tiveness of cyber operations, 117, 155; handshake batder with Macron, 228n59; media coverage related to, 88-90, 91, 21 lnl 17; policy toward and relationship with Putin, 77; preference of Putin for election of, 77 Twitter: hacked material and anti-Clinton messages on, 1; hacked material and anti-Macron messages on, 122—23; identification and prevention of mali cious and inauthentic use of, 95; IRA activities to target U.S. population, 78, 79-80, 205n52; IRA promotion of rallies on, 81 ; pro-AfD and Bundestag election information on, 138; Russian-linked automated accounts on, 80 Ukraine: corruption related to Biden in, 75; election interference by, 76; electrical grids, cyber operations against, 7, 8, 29; European military support for as provo cation to Russia, 20; Le Pen support for Russia policy in, 119; Macron position on Russia policy in, 119; Russian foreign policy toward and conflict in, 76, 131; sanctions on Russia related to war in, 76. See aho Crimea United Kingdom: Brexit referendum, 7, 8; suspected Russian cyber operations against, 7, 8 United Russia political party, 132 United States 2016 election: approval for information warfare against, 77, 85; attri bution of operations against, 74, 75—76, 85-86, 153; CHAOS visualization of operations, 90-92; cyber and informa tion warfare operations against, 1-2,
Index ՝ 291 7, 8,74-75, 77-90,149-50,199nl; effectiveness of cyber operations, 93-95, 117, 152; factors potentially associated with cyber operations initiation, 76-77, 92, 145—47; Hack Map, 84, 85; leaks of documents related to, 86-87, 91, 93, 134; media coverage and tensions after election, 81, 90; media coverage related to Clinton and DNC documents, 86—92, 123, 21 Inni 16-117; media coverage related to events in, 149-50; objectives of information warfare activities against, 74, 78—81, 85; operations against voter databases and software systems, 7, 81-85; QCA factors, 92, 145—47; response to information warfare operations against, 94—95; standards of evidence related to, 75-76, 20ІПІ0; uncertainty about out come of, 93; warnings to Russia about election interference, 94. See abo Clinton presidential campaign and Hillary Clinton United States (U.S.): cyber operations against 2018 midterm elections, 6, 8, 153—54; cyber operations against 2020 elections, 75, 95, 153-54, 160-61; diplomatic, economic, and financial war between Russia and, 20; failed coup d’etat on January 6, 167nl (preface); global environment and likelihood of conflict, 18—20 Vahrushev, Viktor, 20 VMZ-Sopot, 62 voter databases, 7, 81-85 voter suppression, 79, 122, 136 Warsaw stock exchange, cyber operation against, 7, 8 war/warfare: baseline of warfare, 20—21; cyber strategy in peacetime and during war, 17, 22-27, 179-80n35; diplomatic, economic, and financial war between Russia and U.S., 20; information super iority and, 18, 23, 27; information warfare as modern method of, 17-18; military and nonmilitary
measure for conduct of warfare, 2, 17, 20—22; nonmilitary mea sure for resolving conflict, 25-27; ratio of military to nonmilitary measures, 21—22; shding scale of conflict and boundaries of war and peace, xiii, 21, 30, 163 Wasserman Schultz, Debbie, 94, 117 weapons facilities, explosions at, 61-62 WikiLeaks: French 2017 election case study, 122-23; U.S. 2016 election case study, 86-87,91,93 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), 7, 8 X-Agent, 29, 83 X-Tunnel, 29, 83, 133 YouTube, 78,79, 95 |
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| spelling | Lilly, Bilyana Verfasser (DE-588)1241790612 aut Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west Bilyana Lilly Annapolis, Maryland Naval Institute Press [2022] xviii, 291 Seiten Diagramme 23,5 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Geschichte 2007-2020 gnd rswk-swf Information warfare (DE-588)4461975-3 gnd rswk-swf Desinformation (DE-588)4252093-9 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Information warfare / Russia (Federation) / History / 21st century Cyberspace operations (Military science) / Russia (Federation) Hacking / Russia (Federation) / Political aspects Disinformation / Russia (Federation) HISTORY / Military / Strategy COMPUTERS / Security / General Western countries / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / Western countries Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Information warfare (DE-588)4461975-3 s Desinformation (DE-588)4252093-9 s Geschichte 2007-2020 z DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-68247-747-2 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033792085&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033792085&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Register // Gemischte Register |
| spellingShingle | Lilly, Bilyana Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west Information warfare (DE-588)4461975-3 gnd Desinformation (DE-588)4252093-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4461975-3 (DE-588)4252093-9 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west |
| title_auth | Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west |
| title_exact_search | Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west |
| title_full | Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west Bilyana Lilly |
| title_fullStr | Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west Bilyana Lilly |
| title_full_unstemmed | Russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west Bilyana Lilly |
| title_short | Russian information warfare |
| title_sort | russian information warfare assault on democracies in the cyber wild west |
| title_sub | assault on democracies in the cyber wild west |
| topic | Information warfare (DE-588)4461975-3 gnd Desinformation (DE-588)4252093-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Information warfare Desinformation Russland |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033792085&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033792085&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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