Moral hazard: does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders?

Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF's role should be

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Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2002
Schriftenreihe:Economic Issues No. 28
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Zusammenfassung:Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF's role should be
Beschreibung:"This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000"--page iii. - Mode of access: World Wide Web. - Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002
"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."--Pref
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (v, 15 Seiten)
ISBN:9781451935219
1451935218
ISSN:1020-5098

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