Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision:
We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there i...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2014
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 14/90 |
| Online-Zugang: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (61 p) |
| ISBN: | 1498338550 9781498338554 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:13:35Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:45Z |
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| spelling | Tressel, Thierry Verfasser aut Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision Tressel, Thierry Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2014 1 Online-Ressource (61 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 14/90 We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles Online-Ausg Verdier, Thierry Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/21364-9781498338554/21364-9781498338554/21364-9781498338554.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Tressel, Thierry Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision |
| title | Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision |
| title_auth | Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision |
| title_exact_search | Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision |
| title_full | Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision Tressel, Thierry |
| title_fullStr | Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision Tressel, Thierry |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision Tressel, Thierry |
| title_short | Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision |
| title_sort | optimal prudential regulation of banks and the political economy of supervision |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/21364-9781498338554/21364-9781498338554/21364-9781498338554.xml |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tresselthierry optimalprudentialregulationofbanksandthepoliticaleconomyofsupervision AT verdierthierry optimalprudentialregulationofbanksandthepoliticaleconomyofsupervision |