Votingon the ""Optimal"" Size of Government:

Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the "economic model of politics" proposes a public choice approach, which does not rely on social welfare functions. With it, a country's overall budget can be derive...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Olters, Jan-Peter (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2000
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 00/174
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Zusammenfassung:Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the "economic model of politics" proposes a public choice approach, which does not rely on social welfare functions. With it, a country's overall budget can be derived endogenously, electoral fluctuations explained on the basis of changes to the individuals' income and wealth, and political behavior described in terms of the individuals' decisions regarding votes, abstentions, and party membership. The model suggests that a country's wealth distribution is a crucial variable affecting its economic stability and the government's size relative to output
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
ISBN:145185868X
9781451858686

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