Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge:
Is it desirable that central banks be more transparent in the communication of sensible information when agents have diverse private information? In practice, there exists some consensus about the benefits of acting in this way. However, other studies warn that increasing the precision of public inf...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2010
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 10/91 |
| Online-Zugang: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Is it desirable that central banks be more transparent in the communication of sensible information when agents have diverse private information? In practice, there exists some consensus about the benefits of acting in this way. However, other studies warn that increasing the precision of public information may raise the volatility of some aggregate variables - in particular, the price level - due to the disproportionate influence that it exerts on agents'' decisions, and that this, in turn, will have negative effects on welfare. This paper studies the welfare effects of varying levels of transparency in a model of price-setting under monopolistic competition and imperfect common knowledge. Our results indicate that more precise public information never leads to a reduction of welfare in this framework. We find that the beneficial effects of decreased imperfect common knowledge due to a more precise common signal always compensates the potential rise in aggregate volatility. Moreover, we show that, in contrast to what has previously been assumed, the variability of the aggregate price level has no detrimental welfare effects in this model |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (26 p) |
| ISBN: | 1451982577 9781451982572 |
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| spelling | Roca, Mauro Verfasser aut Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge Roca, Mauro Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2010 1 Online-Ressource (26 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 10/91 Is it desirable that central banks be more transparent in the communication of sensible information when agents have diverse private information? In practice, there exists some consensus about the benefits of acting in this way. However, other studies warn that increasing the precision of public information may raise the volatility of some aggregate variables - in particular, the price level - due to the disproportionate influence that it exerts on agents'' decisions, and that this, in turn, will have negative effects on welfare. This paper studies the welfare effects of varying levels of transparency in a model of price-setting under monopolistic competition and imperfect common knowledge. Our results indicate that more precise public information never leads to a reduction of welfare in this framework. We find that the beneficial effects of decreased imperfect common knowledge due to a more precise common signal always compensates the potential rise in aggregate volatility. Moreover, we show that, in contrast to what has previously been assumed, the variability of the aggregate price level has no detrimental welfare effects in this model Online-Ausg http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10808-9781451982572/10808-9781451982572/10808-9781451982572.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Roca, Mauro Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge |
| title | Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge |
| title_auth | Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge |
| title_exact_search | Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge |
| title_full | Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge Roca, Mauro |
| title_fullStr | Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge Roca, Mauro |
| title_full_unstemmed | Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge Roca, Mauro |
| title_short | Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge |
| title_sort | transparency and monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10808-9781451982572/10808-9781451982572/10808-9781451982572.xml |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT rocamauro transparencyandmonetarypolicywithimperfectcommonknowledge |