Verfügbarkeit: Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System

Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System:

Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from t...

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1. Verfasser:	Stehn, Sven Jari (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2009
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/124
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in good times. Net-contributing Länder (paying into the transfer system), in contrast, have ensured fiscal sustainability through spending adjustments; they have also been less pro-cyclical. Panel vector auto-regressions confirm these findings
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
ISBN:	1451872712 9781451872712

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spelling	Stehn, Sven Jari Verfasser aut Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System Stehn, Sven Jari Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2009 1 Online-Ressource (29 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/124 Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in good times. Net-contributing Länder (paying into the transfer system), in contrast, have ensured fiscal sustainability through spending adjustments; they have also been less pro-cyclical. Panel vector auto-regressions confirm these findings Online-Ausg Fedelino, Annalisa Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10210-9781451872712/10210-9781451872712/10210-9781451872712.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Stehn, Sven Jari Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System
title	Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System
title_auth	Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System
title_exact_search	Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System
title_exact_search_txtP	Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System
title_full	Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System Stehn, Sven Jari
title_fullStr	Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System Stehn, Sven Jari
title_full_unstemmed	Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System Stehn, Sven Jari
title_short	Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System
title_sort	fiscal incentive effects of the german equalization system
url	http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10210-9781451872712/10210-9781451872712/10210-9781451872712.xml
work_keys_str_mv	AT stehnsvenjari fiscalincentiveeffectsofthegermanequalizationsystem AT fedelinoannalisa fiscalincentiveeffectsofthegermanequalizationsystem

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