Who Disciplines Bank Managers?:
We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a ''laboratory setting'' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipl...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2009
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 09/272 |
| Online-Zugang: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a ''laboratory setting'' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders'' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (45 p) |
| ISBN: | 1451874170 9781451874174 |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:13:26Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:35Z |
| institution | BVB |
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| record_format | marc |
| series2 | IMF Working Papers |
| spelling | Maechler, Andrea M. Verfasser aut Who Disciplines Bank Managers? Maechler, Andrea M Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2009 1 Online-Ressource (45 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/272 We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a ''laboratory setting'' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders'' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance Online-Ausg Cihák, Martin Sonstige oth Schaeck, Klaus Sonstige oth Stolz, Stéphanie Marie Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10607-9781451874174/10607-9781451874174/10607-9781451874174.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Maechler, Andrea M. Who Disciplines Bank Managers? |
| title | Who Disciplines Bank Managers? |
| title_auth | Who Disciplines Bank Managers? |
| title_exact_search | Who Disciplines Bank Managers? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Who Disciplines Bank Managers? |
| title_full | Who Disciplines Bank Managers? Maechler, Andrea M |
| title_fullStr | Who Disciplines Bank Managers? Maechler, Andrea M |
| title_full_unstemmed | Who Disciplines Bank Managers? Maechler, Andrea M |
| title_short | Who Disciplines Bank Managers? |
| title_sort | who disciplines bank managers |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10607-9781451874174/10607-9781451874174/10607-9781451874174.xml |
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