Verfügbarkeit: Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints

Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints:

We study the welfare properties of an economy where both monetary and fiscal policy follow simple rules, and where a subset of agents is borrowing constrained. The optimized fiscal rule is far more aggressive than automatic stabilizers, and stabilizes the income of borrowingconstrained agents, rathe...

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1. Verfasser:	Kumhof, Michael (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2009
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/286
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	We study the welfare properties of an economy where both monetary and fiscal policy follow simple rules, and where a subset of agents is borrowing constrained. The optimized fiscal rule is far more aggressive than automatic stabilizers, and stabilizes the income of borrowingconstrained agents, rather than output. The optimized monetary rule features super-inertia and a very low coefficient on inflation, which minimizes real wage volatility. The welfare gains of optimizing the fiscal rule are far larger than the welfare gains of optimizing the monetary rule. The preferred fiscal instruments are government spending and transfers targeted to borrowing-constrained agents
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (39 p)
ISBN:	1451874316 9781451874310

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spelling	Kumhof, Michael Verfasser aut Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints Kumhof, Michael Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2009 1 Online-Ressource (39 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/286 We study the welfare properties of an economy where both monetary and fiscal policy follow simple rules, and where a subset of agents is borrowing constrained. The optimized fiscal rule is far more aggressive than automatic stabilizers, and stabilizes the income of borrowingconstrained agents, rather than output. The optimized monetary rule features super-inertia and a very low coefficient on inflation, which minimizes real wage volatility. The welfare gains of optimizing the fiscal rule are far larger than the welfare gains of optimizing the monetary rule. The preferred fiscal instruments are government spending and transfers targeted to borrowing-constrained agents Online-Ausg Bi, Huixin Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10615-9781451874310/10615-9781451874310/10615-9781451874310.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Kumhof, Michael Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints
title	Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints
title_auth	Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints
title_exact_search	Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints
title_exact_search_txtP	Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints
title_full	Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints Kumhof, Michael
title_fullStr	Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints Kumhof, Michael
title_full_unstemmed	Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints Kumhof, Michael
title_short	Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints
title_sort	jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules under borrowing constraints
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