What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail: An Analysis of Rent Capture
This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constrai...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2006
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 06/146 |
| Online-Zugang: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (35 p) |
| ISBN: | 145186406X 9781451864069 |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:13:26Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:34Z |
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| record_format | marc |
| series2 | IMF Working Papers |
| spelling | Paul, Elisabeth Verfasser aut What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture Paul, Elisabeth Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2006 1 Online-Ressource (35 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 06/146 This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes Online-Ausg Dabla-Norris, Era Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07907-9781451864069/07907-9781451864069/07907-9781451864069.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Paul, Elisabeth What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture |
| title | What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture |
| title_auth | What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture |
| title_exact_search | What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture |
| title_exact_search_txtP | What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture |
| title_full | What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture Paul, Elisabeth |
| title_fullStr | What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture Paul, Elisabeth |
| title_full_unstemmed | What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail An Analysis of Rent Capture Paul, Elisabeth |
| title_short | What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail |
| title_sort | what transparency can do when incentives fail an analysis of rent capture |
| title_sub | An Analysis of Rent Capture |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07907-9781451864069/07907-9781451864069/07907-9781451864069.xml |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT paulelisabeth whattransparencycandowhenincentivesfailananalysisofrentcapture AT dablanorrisera whattransparencycandowhenincentivesfailananalysisofrentcapture |