Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation: A Geo-Political Model
We derive non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NE) importer and exporter petroleum excise taxes given full within-group tax coordination, but no coordination between groups, assuming that importers do not produce and exporters do not consume petroleum, and petroleum consumption causes a global external...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2008
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 08/35 |
| Online-Zugang: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | We derive non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NE) importer and exporter petroleum excise taxes given full within-group tax coordination, but no coordination between groups, assuming that importers do not produce and exporters do not consume petroleum, and petroleum consumption causes a global externality. The aggregate NE tax is found to consist of an externality component and an optimal tariff component, and exceeds the standard Pigou tax. The environmental component in isolation is however less than the Pigou tax. With Stackelberg tax setting, the leader''s tax is higher than in the Ne, and the follower''s tax lower, and the overall tax higher. We show that importers prefer to set a tax instead of an import quota, since exporters'' optimal response to a quota is a higher tax. An optimal cap-and-trade scheme will thus fare worse than an optimal tax scheme for importers, and will imply greater petroleum consumption and carbon emissions. When exporters behave as a cartel satisfying demand at a fixed export price, exporters'' optimal tax is higher, while importers tax rule is Pigouvian. Exporters then gain at the expense of importers |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (23 p) |
| ISBN: | 1451868979 9781451868975 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:13:25Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 1451868979 9781451868975 |
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| record_format | marc |
| series2 | IMF Working Papers |
| spelling | Strand, Jon Verfasser aut Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model Strand, Jon Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2008 1 Online-Ressource (23 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 08/35 We derive non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NE) importer and exporter petroleum excise taxes given full within-group tax coordination, but no coordination between groups, assuming that importers do not produce and exporters do not consume petroleum, and petroleum consumption causes a global externality. The aggregate NE tax is found to consist of an externality component and an optimal tariff component, and exceeds the standard Pigou tax. The environmental component in isolation is however less than the Pigou tax. With Stackelberg tax setting, the leader''s tax is higher than in the Ne, and the follower''s tax lower, and the overall tax higher. We show that importers prefer to set a tax instead of an import quota, since exporters'' optimal response to a quota is a higher tax. An optimal cap-and-trade scheme will thus fare worse than an optimal tax scheme for importers, and will imply greater petroleum consumption and carbon emissions. When exporters behave as a cartel satisfying demand at a fixed export price, exporters'' optimal tax is higher, while importers tax rule is Pigouvian. Exporters then gain at the expense of importers Online-Ausg http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/09002-9781451868975/09002-9781451868975/09002-9781451868975.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Strand, Jon Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model |
| title | Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model |
| title_auth | Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model |
| title_exact_search | Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model |
| title_full | Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model Strand, Jon |
| title_fullStr | Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model Strand, Jon |
| title_full_unstemmed | Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation A Geo-Political Model Strand, Jon |
| title_short | Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation |
| title_sort | importer and producer petroleum taxation a geo political model |
| title_sub | A Geo-Political Model |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/09002-9781451868975/09002-9781451868975/09002-9781451868975.xml |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT strandjon importerandproducerpetroleumtaxationageopoliticalmodel |