Imperfect Central Bank Communication: Information Versus Distraction

Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. Ther...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Orphanides, Athanasios (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2008
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 08/60
Online-Zugang:UBW01
UEI01
LCO01
SBR01
UER01
SBG01
UBG01
FAN01
UBT01
FKE01
UBY01
UBA01
FLA01
UBM01
UPA01
UBR01
FHA01
FNU01
BSB01
TUM01
Volltext
Zusammenfassung:Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. There is a risk that the central bank can distract the public; this means that the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public''s understanding to the extent that it ""crowds out"" a role for communicating imperfect information
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (31 p)
ISBN:1451869223
9781451869224

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Fernleihe Bestellen Achtung: Nicht im THWS-Bestand! Volltext öffnen