Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto:
Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more p...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2001
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 01/208 |
| Online Access: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Summary: | Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (30 p) |
| ISBN: | 1451874707 9781451874709 |
Staff View
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| spelling | Baqir, Reza Verfasser aut Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto Baqir, Reza Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2001 1 Online-Ressource (30 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 01/208 Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers Online-Ausg http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Baqir, Reza Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto |
| title | Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto |
| title_auth | Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto |
| title_exact_search | Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto |
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| title_full | Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto Baqir, Reza |
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| title_full_unstemmed | Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto Baqir, Reza |
| title_short | Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto |
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