Verfügbarkeit: Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto

Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto:

Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more p...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser:	Baqir, Reza (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2001
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 01/208
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
ISBN:	1451874707 9781451874709

Internformat

MARC


LEADER	00000nmm a2200000 cb4500
001	BV048348340
003	DE-604
005	00000000000000.0
007	cr\|uuu---uuuuu
008	220713s2001 \|\|\|\| o\|\|u\| \|\|\|\|\|\|eng d
020			\|a 1451874707 \|c 15.00 USD \|9 1-451-87470-7
020			\|a 9781451874709 \|c 15.00 USD \|9 978-1-451-87470-9
035			\|a (ZDB-1-IMF)845881159
035			\|a (OCoLC)1337138146
035			\|a (DE-599)BVBBV048348340
040			\|a DE-604 \|b ger
041	0		\|a eng
049			\|a DE-20 \|a DE-824 \|a DE-70 \|a DE-155 \|a DE-29 \|a DE-22 \|a DE-473 \|a DE-1102 \|a DE-703 \|a DE-859 \|a DE-706 \|a DE-384 \|a DE-860 \|a DE-19 \|a DE-739 \|a DE-355 \|a DE-Aug4 \|a DE-1049 \|a DE-12 \|a DE-91
100	1		\|a Baqir, Reza \|e Verfasser \|4 aut
245	1	0	\|a Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto \|c Baqir, Reza
264		1	\|a Washington, D.C \|b International Monetary Fund \|c 2001
300			\|a 1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
336			\|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|b c \|2 rdamedia
338			\|b cr \|2 rdacarrier
490	0		\|a IMF Working Papers \|v Working Paper No. 01/208
520	3		\|a Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers
533			\|a Online-Ausg
856	4	0	\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|x Verlag \|z URL des Erstveröffentlichers \|3 Volltext
912			\|a ZDB-1-IMF
999			\|a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033727608
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UBW01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UEI01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l LCO01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l SBR01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UER01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l SBG01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UBG01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l FAN01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UBT01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l FKE01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UBY01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UBA01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l FLA01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UBM01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UPA01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l UBR01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l FHA01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l FNU01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l BSB01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext
966	e		\|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml \|l TUM01 \|p ZDB-1-IMF \|x Verlag \|3 Volltext

Datensatz im Suchindex

_version_	1804184200187740160
adam_txt
any_adam_object
any_adam_object_boolean
author	Baqir, Reza
author_facet	Baqir, Reza
author_role	aut
author_sort	Baqir, Reza
author_variant	r b rb
building	Verbundindex
bvnumber	BV048348340
collection	ZDB-1-IMF
ctrlnum	(ZDB-1-IMF)845881159 (OCoLC)1337138146 (DE-599)BVBBV048348340
format	Electronic eBook
fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>05019nmm a2200577 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048348340</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr\|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220713s2001 \|\|\|\| o\|\|u\| \|\|\|\|\|\|eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1451874707</subfield><subfield code="c">15.00 USD</subfield><subfield code="9">1-451-87470-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781451874709</subfield><subfield code="c">15.00 USD</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-451-87470-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-IMF)845881159</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1337138146</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV048348340</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-70</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-155</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-22</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1102</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-860</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Aug4</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1049</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Baqir, Reza</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto</subfield><subfield code="c">Baqir, Reza</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">International Monetary Fund</subfield><subfield code="c">2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (30 p)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">IMF Working Papers</subfield><subfield code="v">Working Paper No. 01/208</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ausg</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033727608</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UBW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UEI01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">LCO01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">SBR01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UER01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">SBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">FAN01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UBT01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">FKE01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UBY01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UBA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">FLA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UBM01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UPA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">UBR01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">FHA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">FNU01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml</subfield><subfield code="l">TUM01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-IMF</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
id	DE-604.BV048348340
illustrated	Not Illustrated
index_date	2024-07-03T20:13:25Z
indexdate	2024-07-10T09:35:33Z
institution	BVB
isbn	1451874707 9781451874709
language	English
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033727608
oclc_num	1337138146
open_access_boolean
owner	DE-20 DE-824 DE-70 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-1102 DE-703 DE-859 DE-706 DE-384 DE-860 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-Aug4 DE-1049 DE-12 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM
owner_facet	DE-20 DE-824 DE-70 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-1102 DE-703 DE-859 DE-706 DE-384 DE-860 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-Aug4 DE-1049 DE-12 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM
physical	1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
psigel	ZDB-1-IMF
publishDate	2001
publishDateSearch	2001
publishDateSort	2001
publisher	International Monetary Fund
record_format	marc
series2	IMF Working Papers
spelling	Baqir, Reza Verfasser aut Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto Baqir, Reza Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2001 1 Online-Ressource (30 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 01/208 Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers Online-Ausg http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Baqir, Reza Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
title	Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
title_auth	Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
title_exact_search	Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
title_exact_search_txtP	Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
title_full	Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto Baqir, Reza
title_fullStr	Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto Baqir, Reza
title_full_unstemmed	Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto Baqir, Reza
title_short	Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
title_sort	government spending legislature size and the executive veto
url	http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709/02896-9781451874709.xml
work_keys_str_mv	AT baqirreza governmentspendinglegislaturesizeandtheexecutiveveto

Verfügbarkeit

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Fernleihe Bestellen Achtung: Nicht im THWS-Bestand! Volltext öffnen

MARC

Datensatz im Suchindex

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Ähnliche Einträge