Revenue Forecasts As Performance Targets:

Budget revenue forecasts should be best estimates of expected receipts. Often they are not. This paper analyzes the rationale for overstated revenue forecasts and derives conditions for intentional biases. A theoretical model demonstrates that overstated revenue forecasts can be the result of the go...

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1. Verfasser: Danninger, Stephan (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2005
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 05/14
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Zusammenfassung:Budget revenue forecasts should be best estimates of expected receipts. Often they are not. This paper analyzes the rationale for overstated revenue forecasts and derives conditions for intentional biases. A theoretical model demonstrates that overstated revenue forecasts can be the result of the government''s attempt to boost unobserved revenue collection effort. If positive forecast errors are costly and undermine public credibility of budget expenditure plans, the reverse outcome is possible and governments may understate revenue forecasts. A case study for Azerbaijan is presented in support of the former incentive motive
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
ISBN:1451860331
9781451860337

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