Verfügbarkeit: Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance

Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance:

Is aggressive monetary policy response to inflation feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance? We find that if nominal interest rates are allowed to respond to government debt, even aggressive rules that satisfy the Taylor principle can produce unique equilibria. However, resulting inf...

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1. Verfasser:	Kumhof, Michael (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2007
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 07/271
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	Is aggressive monetary policy response to inflation feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance? We find that if nominal interest rates are allowed to respond to government debt, even aggressive rules that satisfy the Taylor principle can produce unique equilibria. However, resulting inflation is extremely volatile and zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is frequently violated. Within the set of feasible rules the optimal response to inflation is highly negative, and more aggressive inflation fighting is inferior from a welfare point of view. The welfare gain from responding to fiscal variables is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (25 p)
ISBN:	1451868340 9781451868340

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spelling	Kumhof, Michael Verfasser aut Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance Kumhof, Michael Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2007 1 Online-Ressource (25 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 07/271 Is aggressive monetary policy response to inflation feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance? We find that if nominal interest rates are allowed to respond to government debt, even aggressive rules that satisfy the Taylor principle can produce unique equilibria. However, resulting inflation is extremely volatile and zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is frequently violated. Within the set of feasible rules the optimal response to inflation is highly negative, and more aggressive inflation fighting is inferior from a welfare point of view. The welfare gain from responding to fiscal variables is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance Online-Ausg Nunes, Ricardo Sonstige oth Yakadina, Irina Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/08836-9781451868340/08836-9781451868340/08836-9781451868340.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Kumhof, Michael Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance
title	Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance
title_auth	Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance
title_exact_search	Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance
title_exact_search_txtP	Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance
title_full	Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance Kumhof, Michael
title_fullStr	Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance Kumhof, Michael
title_full_unstemmed	Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance Kumhof, Michael
title_short	Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance
title_sort	simple monetary rules under fiscal dominance
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