Verfügbarkeit: The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures

The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence

This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to res...

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1. Verfasser:	Fredriksson, Per G. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2003
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 03/172
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to resist legal reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency and eliminate corruption. The analysis predicts that in politically unstable regimes, the institutions necessary to monitor and enforce compliance are weak. In such countries, corruption is more pervasive and the compliance with regulations is low. The empirical results support the predictions of the model
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (33 p)
ISBN:	1451858590 9781451858594

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spelling	Fredriksson, Per G. Verfasser aut The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence Fredriksson, Per G Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2003 1 Online-Ressource (33 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 03/172 This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to resist legal reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency and eliminate corruption. The analysis predicts that in politically unstable regimes, the institutions necessary to monitor and enforce compliance are weak. In such countries, corruption is more pervasive and the compliance with regulations is low. The empirical results support the predictions of the model Online-Ausg Damania, Richard Sonstige oth Mani, Muthukumara Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Fredriksson, Per G. The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence
title	The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence
title_auth	The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence
title_exact_search	The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence
title_exact_search_txtP	The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence
title_full	The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence Fredriksson, Per G
title_fullStr	The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence Fredriksson, Per G
title_full_unstemmed	The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence Fredriksson, Per G
title_short	The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures
title_sort	the persistence of corruption and regulatory compliance failures theory and evidence
title_sub	Theory and Evidence
url	http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
work_keys_str_mv	AT fredrikssonperg thepersistenceofcorruptionandregulatorycompliancefailurestheoryandevidence AT damaniarichard thepersistenceofcorruptionandregulatorycompliancefailurestheoryandevidence AT manimuthukumara thepersistenceofcorruptionandregulatorycompliancefailurestheoryandevidence

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MARC

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