A Model of the Lender of Last Resort:

This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort. It provides an analytical basis for "too big too fail" and a rationale for "constructive ambiguity". Key results are that if contagion (moral hazard) is the main concern, the Central Bank (CB) will have an excessive (littl...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Huang, Haizhou (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 1999
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 99/39
Online-Zugang:UBW01
UEI01
LCO01
SBR01
UER01
SBG01
UBG01
FAN01
UBT01
FKE01
UBY01
UBA01
FLA01
UBM01
UPA01
UBR01
FHA01
FNU01
BSB01
TUM01
URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Zusammenfassung:This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort. It provides an analytical basis for "too big too fail" and a rationale for "constructive ambiguity". Key results are that if contagion (moral hazard) is the main concern, the Central Bank (CB) will have an excessive (little) incentive to rescue banks and the resulting equilibrium risk level is high (low). When both contagion and moral hazard are jointly analyzed, the CB's incentives to rescue are only slightly weaker than with contagion alone. The CB's optimal policy may be non-monotonic in bank size
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (33 p)
ISBN:1451845812
9781451845815

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Fernleihe Bestellen Achtung: Nicht im THWS-Bestand! Volltext öffnen