Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability:
This paper proposes a signaling model that offers a new perspective on why governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing and delay debt stabilization. In our model, dependable-but not fully credible-governments have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling effect on credit ratin...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
1999
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 99/86 |
| Online-Zugang: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper proposes a signaling model that offers a new perspective on why governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing and delay debt stabilization. In our model, dependable-but not fully credible-governments have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling effect on credit ratings is larger (that is, when a sufficiently large stock of debt has been accumulated). At this point, they may deviate from tax smoothing not to be mimicked by weak governments. The model predicts that primary balances and debt stocks are complementary inputs in the credit rating function as tests on Italian, Irish, Belgian, and Danish data show |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (38 p) |
| ISBN: | 1451850867 9781451850864 |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:13:23Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:31Z |
| institution | BVB |
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| spelling | Prati, Alessandro Verfasser aut Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability Prati, Alessandro Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 1999 1 Online-Ressource (38 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 99/86 This paper proposes a signaling model that offers a new perspective on why governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing and delay debt stabilization. In our model, dependable-but not fully credible-governments have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling effect on credit ratings is larger (that is, when a sufficiently large stock of debt has been accumulated). At this point, they may deviate from tax smoothing not to be mimicked by weak governments. The model predicts that primary balances and debt stocks are complementary inputs in the credit rating function as tests on Italian, Irish, Belgian, and Danish data show Online-Ausg Drudi, Francesco Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Prati, Alessandro Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability |
| title | Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability |
| title_auth | Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability |
| title_exact_search | Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability |
| title_full | Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability Prati, Alessandro |
| title_fullStr | Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability Prati, Alessandro |
| title_full_unstemmed | Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability Prati, Alessandro |
| title_short | Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability |
| title_sort | signaling fiscal regime sustainability |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pratialessandro signalingfiscalregimesustainability AT drudifrancesco signalingfiscalregimesustainability |