To ""B"" or Not to ""B"": A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R&D sector. On the other hand, the e...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Xie, Danyang (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2000
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 00/189
Online-Zugang:UBW01
UEI01
LCO01
SBR01
UER01
SBG01
UBG01
FAN01
UBT01
FKE01
UBY01
UBA01
FLA01
UBM01
UPA01
UBR01
FHA01
FNU01
BSB01
TUM01
Volltext
Zusammenfassung:This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R&D sector. On the other hand, the enhanced competition for the equipment improves efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Should monopolies protected by intellectual property rights be broken up? The answer is "no" in a Romer-type growth model, but there is sufficient reason to believe that the answer could be "yes" in a model advocated by Jones (1995)
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (18 p)
ISBN:1451859600
9781451859607

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Fernleihe Bestellen Achtung: Nicht im THWS-Bestand! Volltext öffnen