Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs:

When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients'' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2002
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 02/115
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Zusammenfassung:When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients'' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipients'' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients'' preferences are not observable, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may however lead to further distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of ""aid rationing
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
ISBN:1451853874
9781451853872

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