Verfügbarkeit: Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies

Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies:

Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on ""fiscal councils"" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a s...

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1. Verfasser:	Debrun, Xavier (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/173
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on ""fiscal councils"" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing ""commitment technologies"" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
ISBN:	1462313329 9781462313327

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spelling	Debrun, Xavier Verfasser aut Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies Debrun, Xavier Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011 1 Online-Ressource (15 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/173 Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on ""fiscal councils"" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing ""commitment technologies"" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline Online-Ausg http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Debrun, Xavier Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
title	Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
title_auth	Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
title_exact_search	Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
title_exact_search_txtP	Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
title_full	Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies Debrun, Xavier
title_fullStr	Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies Debrun, Xavier
title_full_unstemmed	Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies Debrun, Xavier
title_short	Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
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