The Problem that Wasn't: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently att...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2011
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 11/265 |
| Online-Zugang: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (28 p) |
| ISBN: | 146392464X 9781463924645 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:13:19Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:26Z |
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| spelling | Zettelmeyer, Jeromin Verfasser aut The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings Zettelmeyer, Jeromin Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011 1 Online-Ressource (28 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/265 Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use Online-Ausg Bi, Ran Sonstige oth Chamon, Marcos Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12297-9781463924645/12297-9781463924645/12297-9781463924645.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Zettelmeyer, Jeromin The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings |
| title | The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings |
| title_auth | The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings |
| title_exact_search | The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings |
| title_full | The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings Zettelmeyer, Jeromin |
| title_fullStr | The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings Zettelmeyer, Jeromin |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings Zettelmeyer, Jeromin |
| title_short | The Problem that Wasn't |
| title_sort | the problem that wasn t coordination failures in sovereign debt restructurings |
| title_sub | Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12297-9781463924645/12297-9781463924645/12297-9781463924645.xml |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT zettelmeyerjeromin theproblemthatwasntcoordinationfailuresinsovereigndebtrestructurings AT biran theproblemthatwasntcoordinationfailuresinsovereigndebtrestructurings AT chamonmarcos theproblemthatwasntcoordinationfailuresinsovereigndebtrestructurings |