Verfügbarkeit: The Problem that Wasn't

The Problem that Wasn't: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings

Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently att...

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1. Verfasser:	Zettelmeyer, Jeromin (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/265
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
ISBN:	146392464X 9781463924645

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spelling	Zettelmeyer, Jeromin Verfasser aut The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings Zettelmeyer, Jeromin Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011 1 Online-Ressource (28 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/265 Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use Online-Ausg Bi, Ran Sonstige oth Chamon, Marcos Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12297-9781463924645/12297-9781463924645/12297-9781463924645.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Zettelmeyer, Jeromin The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
title	The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
title_auth	The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
title_exact_search	The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
title_exact_search_txtP	The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
title_full	The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
title_fullStr	The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
title_full_unstemmed	The Problem that Wasn't Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
title_short	The Problem that Wasn't
title_sort	the problem that wasn t coordination failures in sovereign debt restructurings
title_sub	Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
url	http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12297-9781463924645/12297-9781463924645/12297-9781463924645.xml
work_keys_str_mv	AT zettelmeyerjeromin theproblemthatwasntcoordinationfailuresinsovereigndebtrestructurings AT biran theproblemthatwasntcoordinationfailuresinsovereigndebtrestructurings AT chamonmarcos theproblemthatwasntcoordinationfailuresinsovereigndebtrestructurings

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