Bank Competition and Financial Stability: A General Equilibrium Exposition
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relativel...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2011
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 11/295 |
| Online Access: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Summary: | We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (39 p) |
| ISBN: | 1463927290 9781463927295 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:13:18Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:25Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 1463927290 9781463927295 |
| language | English |
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| oclc_num | 1337116191 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-20 DE-824 DE-70 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-1102 DE-703 DE-859 DE-706 DE-384 DE-860 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-Aug4 DE-1049 DE-12 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (39 p) |
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| publishDate | 2011 |
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| publisher | International Monetary Fund |
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| spelling | Lucchetta, Marcella Verfasser aut Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition Lucchetta, Marcella Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011 1 Online-Ressource (39 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/295 We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy Online-Ausg De Nicoló, Gianni Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12369-9781463927295/12369-9781463927295/12369-9781463927295.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Lucchetta, Marcella Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition |
| title | Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition |
| title_auth | Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition |
| title_exact_search | Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition |
| title_full | Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition Lucchetta, Marcella |
| title_fullStr | Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition Lucchetta, Marcella |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition Lucchetta, Marcella |
| title_short | Bank Competition and Financial Stability |
| title_sort | bank competition and financial stability a general equilibrium exposition |
| title_sub | A General Equilibrium Exposition |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12369-9781463927295/12369-9781463927295/12369-9781463927295.xml |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lucchettamarcella bankcompetitionandfinancialstabilityageneralequilibriumexposition AT denicologianni bankcompetitionandfinancialstabilityageneralequilibriumexposition |