Verfügbarkeit: Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Bank Competition and Financial Stability: A General Equilibrium Exposition

We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relativel...

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1. Verfasser:	Lucchetta, Marcella (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/295
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (39 p)
ISBN:	1463927290 9781463927295

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spelling	Lucchetta, Marcella Verfasser aut Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition Lucchetta, Marcella Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011 1 Online-Ressource (39 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/295 We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy Online-Ausg De Nicoló, Gianni Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12369-9781463927295/12369-9781463927295/12369-9781463927295.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Lucchetta, Marcella Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition
title	Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition
title_auth	Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition
title_exact_search	Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition
title_exact_search_txtP	Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition
title_full	Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition Lucchetta, Marcella
title_fullStr	Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition Lucchetta, Marcella
title_full_unstemmed	Bank Competition and Financial Stability A General Equilibrium Exposition Lucchetta, Marcella
title_short	Bank Competition and Financial Stability
title_sort	bank competition and financial stability a general equilibrium exposition
title_sub	A General Equilibrium Exposition
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