Verfügbarkeit: Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy

Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy:

In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of the inve...

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1. Verfasser:	Caglio, Cecilia (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2013
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 13/37
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of the investors and may misreport the true cash flow. The SROs can deter a fraud by announcing an investigation and imposing a monetary penalty.The success of the investigation depends upon both the amount of resources devoted to monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring technologies. We show that when contracts are incomplete and investors do not have perfect information about the monitoring efficiency, competition among exchanges induces a race to the bottom in enforcement policy and a reduction in total welfare, compared to the case of a monopolist SRO
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (31 p)
ISBN:	1475516789 9781475516784

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spelling	Caglio, Cecilia Verfasser aut Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy Caglio, Cecilia Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2013 1 Online-Ressource (31 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 13/37 In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of the investors and may misreport the true cash flow. The SROs can deter a fraud by announcing an investigation and imposing a monetary penalty.The success of the investigation depends upon both the amount of resources devoted to monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring technologies. We show that when contracts are incomplete and investors do not have perfect information about the monitoring efficiency, competition among exchanges induces a race to the bottom in enforcement policy and a reduction in total welfare, compared to the case of a monopolist SRO Online-Ausg Pescatori, Andrea Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/20259-9781475516784/20259-9781475516784/20259-9781475516784.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle	Caglio, Cecilia Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy
title	Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy
title_auth	Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy
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title_exact_search_txtP	Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy
title_full	Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy Caglio, Cecilia
title_fullStr	Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy Caglio, Cecilia
title_full_unstemmed	Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy Caglio, Cecilia
title_short	Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy
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