Verfügbarkeit: Bailouts and Systemic Insurance

Bailouts and Systemic Insurance:

We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard-increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank's success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government's commi...

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1. Verfasser:	Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2013
Schriftenreihe:	IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 13/233
Online-Zugang:	UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard-increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank's success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government's commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently and so reduce bank risk taking. This systemic insurance effect will be relatively more important when bailout rents are low and the risk of contagion (upon a bank failure) is high. The optimal policy may then be not to try to avoid bailouts, but to make them "effective": associated with lower rents
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
ISBN:	1475514743 9781475514742

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spelling	Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni Verfasser aut Bailouts and Systemic Insurance Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2013 1 Online-Ressource (28 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 13/233 We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard-increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank's success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government's commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently and so reduce bank risk taking. This systemic insurance effect will be relatively more important when bailout rents are low and the risk of contagion (upon a bank failure) is high. The optimal policy may then be not to try to avoid bailouts, but to make them "effective": associated with lower rents Online-Ausg Ratnovski, Lev Sonstige oth http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/20891-9781475514742/20891-9781475514742/20891-9781475514742.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
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title	Bailouts and Systemic Insurance
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