Public epistemic authority: normative institutional design for EU law
Jedes Gericht beansprucht Autorität. Normwissenschaftler beurteilen die Legitimität dieser Ansprüche. Johann Moritz Laux betrachtet diese Aufgabe von einem neuen Blickwinkel, indem er auf Mechanismen der kollektiven Intelligenz zurückgreift und die Verlässlichkeit der Gerichte als Entscheidungsträge...
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| Sprache: | English |
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[2022]
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| Schriftenreihe: | Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft
42 |
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| Zusammenfassung: | Jedes Gericht beansprucht Autorität. Normwissenschaftler beurteilen die Legitimität dieser Ansprüche. Johann Moritz Laux betrachtet diese Aufgabe von einem neuen Blickwinkel, indem er auf Mechanismen der kollektiven Intelligenz zurückgreift und die Verlässlichkeit der Gerichte als Entscheidungsträger mit der anderer Regierungszweige vergleicht |
| Beschreibung: | XV, 466 Seiten 23.2 cm x 15.5 cm, 378 g |
| ISBN: | 9783161600692 316160069X |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Public epistemic authority |b normative institutional design for EU law |c Johann Moritz Laux |
| 264 | 1 | |a Tübingen |b Mohr Siebeck |c [2022] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c © 2022 | |
| 300 | |a XV, 466 Seiten |c 23.2 cm x 15.5 cm, 378 g | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft |v 42 | |
| 502 | |b Dissertation |c Universität Hamburg |d 2019 | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a Jedes Gericht beansprucht Autorität. Normwissenschaftler beurteilen die Legitimität dieser Ansprüche. Johann Moritz Laux betrachtet diese Aufgabe von einem neuen Blickwinkel, indem er auf Mechanismen der kollektiven Intelligenz zurückgreift und die Verlässlichkeit der Gerichte als Entscheidungsträger mit der anderer Regierungszweige vergleicht | |
| 610 | 2 | 7 | |a Europäischer Gerichtshof |0 (DE-588)5103273-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Gerichtsbarkeit |0 (DE-588)4020342-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Autorität |0 (DE-588)4003990-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Legitimation |0 (DE-588)4114382-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | |a Wisdom of the Crowds | ||
| 653 | |a Cognitive Diversity | ||
| 653 | |a Democracy | ||
| 653 | |a Legitimacy | ||
| 653 | |a Collective Intelligence | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804184172957270016 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENT
OVERVIEW
PREFACE
............................................................................................................
VII
CONTENTS
.........................................................................................................
XI
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
.........................................................................................
XVII
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................................
1
PART
I:
THEORY
...............................................................................
27
CHAPTER
ONE:
THE
NORMATIVE
FRAMEWORK
OF
PUBLIC
EPISTEMIC
AUTHORITY
35
1.
THE
CONDITIONS
OF
UNCERTAINTY
AND
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
...................
38
2.
THE
BENCHMARK
PROBLEMS
OF
NORMATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
.............
44
3.
THE
DIFFICULTY
WITH
JUDICIAL
EPISTEMIC
DEFERENCE
................................
51
4.
TOWARDS
THE
INCLUSION
OF
TRUTH
................................................................
54
5.
THE
FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY
AND
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
.............................
59
6.
THE
BASIC
FRAMEWORK
............................................................................
62
7.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
67
CHAPTER
TWO:
TESTING
AUTHORITY
FOR
LEGITIMACY
.........................................
68
1.
THE
INPUT:
ELEMENTS
OF
AUTHORITY
............................................................
71
2.
THE
OUTPUT:
ELEMENTS
OF
LEGITIMACY
......................................................
83
3.
THE
SERVICE
CONCEPTION
OF
AUTHORITY
......................................................
89
4.
THE
EPISTEMIC
DIMENSION
OF
CONSENT
AND
PUBLIC
REASON
...................
104
5.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PROCEDURALIST
SOLUTION
...................................................
114
6.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
120
CHAPTER
THREE:
MECHANISMS
OF
COLLECTIVE
WISDOM
...................................
122
1.
THE
CONCEPT
OF
EPISTEMIC
RELIABILITY
...................................................
123
2.
STATISTICAL
AGGREGATION
AND
THE
CJT
......................................................
129
3.
LIMITATIONS
AND
EXTENSIONS
OF
THE
CJT
...................................................
138
4.
EVOLUTIONARY
AGGREGATION
AND
COURTS
OF
MANY
MINDS
..........................
152
5.
AGGREGATION
AND
DELIBERATION
...............................................................
158
6.
PERSPECTIVAL
AGGREGATION
AND
THE
DTA
...................................................
165
7.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
177
X
CONTENT
OVERVIEW
PART
II:
APPLICATION
......................................................................
179
CHAPTER
FOUR:
THE
ROLE
OF
THE
COURT
.........................................................
186
1.
APPLYING
THE
CONCEPTUAL
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.........................................
188
2.
FACT-CHECKING
I:
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
...................................................
199
3.
JUDICIAL
PROBLEM-SOLVING:
THE
PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLE
...................
222
4.
FACT-CHECKING
II:
THE
FACTUAL
BASIS
OF
A
CASE
......................................
240
5.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
263
CHAPTER
FIVE:
THE
PEOPLE
AT
THE
COURT
......................................................
265
1.
APPLYING
THE
BEHAVIORAL
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.........................................
267
2.
THE
COURT
S
LIMITS
OF
JURISDICTION
.........................................................
287
3.
THE
COURT
S
LIMITS
OF
DISCRETION
............................................................
295
4.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
320
CHAPTER
SIX:
THE
DESIGN
OF
THE
COURT
.........................................................
322
1.
APPLYING
THE
COMPARATIVE
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
......................................
323
2.
REALLOCATING
AUTHORITY
............................................................................
340
3.
INSTITUTIONAL
REDESIGN
...............................................................................
353
4.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
361
PART
III:
RECONCILIATION
.................................................................
363
CHAPTER
SEVEN:
NORMATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
FOR
EU
LAW
...................
364
1.
CALIBRATING
THE
INTENSITY
OF
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
.........................................
366
2.
THREE
PRINCIPLES
FOR
JUDICIAL
REASONING
................................................
369
3.
DEFENDING
EPISTEMIC
RELIABILITY
AS
A
BENCHMARK
................................
386
4.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
406
CONCLUSION
....................................................................................
407
BIBLIOGRAPHY
..................................................................................................
415
TABLE
OF
CASES
...............................................................................................
457
OTHER
DOCUMENTS
CITED
...............................................................................
465
CONTENTS
PREFACE
...........................................................................................................
VII
CONTENT
OVERVIEW
........................................................................................
IX
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
........................................................................................
XVII
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................................
1
PARTI:
THEORY
..............................................................................
27
CHAPTER
ONE:
THE
NORMATIVE
FRAMEWORK
OF
PUBLIC
EPISTEMIC
AUTHORITY
35
1.
THE
CONDITIONS
OF
UNCERTAINTY
AND
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
...................
38
A.
UNCERTAINTY
...........................................................................................
40
B.
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
............................................................................
42
2.
THE
BENCHMARK
PROBLEMS
OF
NORMATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
.............
44
A.
THE
IDEAL
OF
PUBLIC
REASON
...............................................................
46
B.
THE
METHODOLOGICAL
THESIS
AND
THE
BRACKETING
OF
DISAGREEMENT
.
.
47
C.
THE
SPECIAL
BENCHMARK
PROBLEM
FOR
JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS
.............
49
3.
THE
DIFFICULTY
WITH
JUDICIAL
EPISTEMIC
DEFERENCE
................................
51
A.
INTELLECTUAL
DUE
PROCESS
.....................................................................
51
B.
THE
TWO-HAT
SOLUTION
FOR
JUDICIAL
COMPETENCE
................................
53
4.
TOWARDS
THE
INCLUSION
OF
TRUTH
...............................................................
54
A.
THE
RETREAT
TO
REASONABLENESS
.........................................................
54
B.
SOME
REHABILITATION
FOR
TRUTH
............................................................
56
5.
THE
FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY
AND
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
.............................
59
6.
THE
BASIC
FRAMEWORK
............................................................................
62
A.
EXPERTISE
AND
PUBLIC
OFFICE
...............................................................
63
B.
AUTHORITY
S
COMPENSATORY
ROLE
.........................................................
65
C.
THE
THREE
TESTS
OF
LEGITIMACY
.........................................................
67
7.
CONCLUSION
..............................................................................................
67
CHAPTER
TWO:
TESTING
AUTHORITY
FOR
LEGITIMACY
.........................................
68
1.
THE
INPUT:
ELEMENTS
OF
AUTHORITY
............................................................
71
A.
CONTENT-INDEPENDENCE
........................................................................
71
XII
CONTENTS
B.
DE
FACTO
AUTHORITY
...............................................................................
72
C.
DE
JURE
AUTHORITY
...............................................................................
74
D.
THE
LAW
S
AUTHORITY
.........................................................................
76
E.
EPISTEMIC
AUTHORITY
............................................................................
80
F.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
83
2.
THE
OUTPUT:
ELEMENTS
OF
LEGITIMACY
......................................................
83
A.
SUBSTANTIVE
AND
PROCEDURAL
ACCOUNTS
................................................
84
B.
DEMOCRATIC
INSTRUMENTALISM
...............................................................
86
3.
THE
SERVICE
CONCEPTION
OF
AUTHORITY
......................................................
89
A.
THE
DEPENDENCE
THESIS
......................................................................
92
B.
THE
NORMAL
JUSTIFICATION
THESIS
.........................................................
94
C.
THE
PRE-EMPTION
THESIS
......................................................................
97
D.
THE
INDEPENDENCE
CONDITION
............................................................
99
E.
EXPERTISE
OR
COORDINATION?
...............................................................
100
F.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
104
4.
THE
EPISTEMIC
DIMENSION
OF
CONSENT
AND
PUBLIC
REASON
...................
104
A.
CONSENT
THEORY
..................................................................................
106
B.
PUBLIC
REASON
......................................................................................
108
5.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PROCEDURALIST
SOLUTION
...................................................
114
A.
EPISTEMIC
DEMOCRACY
.........................................................................
114
B.
EPISTEMIC
PROCEDURALISM
...................................................................
118
6.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
120
CHAPTER
THREE:
MECHANISMS
OF
COLLECTIVE
WISDOM
....................................
122
1.
THE
CONCEPT
OF
EPISTEMIC
RELIABILITY
...................................................
123
A.
THE
JUROR
MODEL
..................................................................................
124
B.
COLLECTIVE
EPISTEMIC
COMPETENCE
......................................................
126
2.
STATISTICAL
AGGREGATION
AND
THE
CJT
......................................................
129
A.
THE
LAW
OF
LARGE
NUMBERS
...............................................................
130
B.
CONDORCET
S
COMPETENCE
ASSUMPTION
................................................
131
C.
CONDORCET
S
INDEPENDENCE
ASSUMPTION
............................................
132
D.
CONDORCET
S
SINCERITY
ASSUMPTION
......................................................
135
E.
THE
RESULTS
OBTAINED
BY
THE
CJT
......................................................
136
F.
THE
MIRACLE
OF
AGGREGATION
...............................................................
137
G.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
138
3.
LIMITATIONS
AND
EXTENSIONS
OF
THE
CJT
...................................................
138
A.
REVISITING
THE
COMPETENCE
ASSUMPTION
............................................
139
B.
THE
CONDORCET
PARADOX
....................................................................
142
C.
THE
DISJUNCTION
PROBLEM
.................................................................
144
D.
THE
DOCTRINAL
PARADOX
.......................................................................
145
CONTENTS
XIII
E.
REVISITING
THE
INDEPENDENCE
ASSUMPTION
.........................................
146
F.
THE
BEST
RESPONDER
COROLLARY
............................................................
149
G.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
151
4.
EVOLUTIONARY
AGGREGATION
AND
COURTS
OF
MANY
MINDS
.........................
152
A.
TRADITIONALISM
AND
COSMOPOLITANISM
...............................................
154
B.
POPULISM
...............................................................................................
156
5.
AGGREGATION
AND
DELIBERATION
...............................................................
158
A.
THE
DRAWBACKS
OF
DELIBERATION
.........................................................
160
B.
THE
BENEFITS
OF
DELIBERATION
...............................................................
162
6.
PERSPECTIVAL
AGGREGATION
AND
THE
DTA
...................................................
165
A.
THE
DIVERSITY
TRUMPS
ABILITY
THEOREM
............................................
167
B.
THE
DIVERSITY
TRUMPS
HOMOGENEITY
THEOREM
................................
168
C.
APPLYING
THE
THEOREMS
.....................................................................
169
D.
COMPARING
THE
DTA
AND
THE
CJT
......................................................
171
E.
THE
PROBLEM
WITH
PREFERENCE
DIVERSITY
............................................
173
F.
REVISITING
THE
APPLICABILITY
OF
THE
DTA
............................................
174
G.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
177
7.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
177
PART
II:
APPLICATION
......................................................................
179
CHAPTER
FOUR:
THE
ROLE
OF
THE
COURT
.........................................................
186
1.
APPLYING
THE
CONCEPTUAL
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.........................................
188
A.
CLASSIFYING
THE
COURT
S
JURISDICTION
..................................................
188
B.
THE
CONTINUING
INFLUENCE
OF
THE
INITIAL
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
....
194
C.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
198
2.
FACT-CHECKING
I:
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
..................................................
199
A.
NO
FRILLS
TEXTUALISM
.........................................................................
200
B.
ORIGINALISM
AND
TELEOLOGICAL
REASONING
.........................................
203
C.
THE
COURT
S
REASONING
STYLE
............................................................
210
D.
THE
COURT
S
CONSTITUTIONAL
REASONING
............................................
215
E.
THE
COURT
S
INTERPRETATION
OF
TECHNICAL
WORDS
................................
219
F.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
222
3.
JUDICIAL
PROBLEM-SOLVING:
THE
PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLE
...................
222
A.
PROPORTIONALITY
AS
A
PROBLEM-SOLVING
TOOL
......................................
223
B.
THE
STRUCTURE
OF
BALANCING
...............................................................
225
C.
POLICY
CHOICE
UNDER
PROPORTIONALITY
...............................................
235
D.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
238
4.
FACT-CHECKING
II:
THE
FACTUAL
BASIS
OF
A
CASE
......................................
240
A.
COMPLEXITY
AND
THE
COURT
AS
CATALYST
............................................
242
XIV
CONTENTS
B.
COMPLEXITY
AND
THE
COURT
AS
A
WATCHDOG
......................................
246
C.
COMPLEX
SCIENTIFIC
AND
ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENTS
...........................
254
D.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
263
5.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
263
CHAPTER
FIVE:
THE
PEOPLE
AT
THE
COURT
......................................................
265
1.
APPLYING
THE
BEHAVIORAL
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.........................................
267
A.
BEHAVIORAL
THEORIES
OF
JUDGMENT
AND
DECISION-MAKING
................
267
B.
THEORIES
OF
JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR
............................................................
271
C.
THE
BLACK
BOX
PROBLEM
......................................................................
284
D.
THE
GRAVE
MISTAKES
APPROACH
.........................................................
285
2.
THE
COURT
S
LIMITS
OF
JURISDICTION
.........................................................
287
A.
THE
VIEW
FROM
LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
......................................................
288
B.
THE
VIEW
FROM
SOCIAL
SCIENCE
............................................................
292
3.
THE
COURT
S
LIMITS
OF
DISCRETION
............................................................
295
A.
VARIATION
IN
THE
STRICTNESS
OF
THE
PROPORTIONALITY
TEST
......................
295
B.
THE
RARITY
OF
EXPERTS
APPOINTMENTS
................................................
304
C.
THE
LONELY
LIFE
OF
THE
IN-HOUSE
EXPERT
.........................................
318
4.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
320
CHAPTER
SIX:
THE
DESIGN
OF
THE
COURT
.........................................................
322
1.
APPLYING
THE
COMPARATIVE
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
......................................
323
A.
JUDICIAL
SELECTION
AND
COGNITIVE
DIVERSITY
......................................
323
B.
JUDICIAL
CHAMBERS
AND
STATISTICAL
AGGREGATION
................................
333
C.
JUDICIAL
DISSENT
AND
MAJORITY
RULE
...................................................
336
2.
REALLOCATING
AUTHORITY
............................................................................
340
A.
THE
EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONAL
LANDSCAPE
............................................
341
B.
TOWARDS
AN
EPISTEMIC
PRINCIPLE
OF
DEFERENCE
...................................
348
3.
INSTITUTIONAL
REDESIGN
...............................................................................
353
A.
THE
INFLUENCE
OF
THE
INDIVIDUALIST
PARADIGM
ON
RECENT
REFORMS
.
.
353
B.
INTRODUCING
NON-LAWYERS
TO
THE
BENCH?
.........................................
355
C.
INCREASING
THE
RECOURSE
TO
EXPERTS?
...................................................
359
4.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
361
PART
III:
RECONCILIATION
.................................................................
363
CHAPTER
SEVEN:
NORMATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
FOR
EU
LAW
...................
364
1.
CALIBRATING
THE
INTENSITY
OF
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
.........................................
366
2.
THREE
PRINCIPLES
FOR
JUDICIAL
REASONING
................................................
369
A.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PRINCIPLE
OF
DEMOCRATIC
RESTRAINT
.............................
372
CONTENTS
XV
B.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PRINCIPLE
OF
TECHNOCRATIC
DEFERENCE
.........................
376
C.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PRINCIPLE
OF
JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM
...................................
380
D.
APPLICABILITY
TO
MEMBER
STATE
INSTITUTIONS
......................................
385
E.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
............................................................................
386
3.
DEFENDING
EPISTEMIC
RELIABILITY
AS
A
BENCHMARK
................................
386
A.
THE
OBJECTION
FROM
EPISTEMOLOGY
...................................................
387
B.
THE
IDENTIFIABILITY
OBJECTION
...............................................................
392
C.
THE
OBJECTION
FROM
METHODOLOGY
......................................................
402
D.
THE
OBJECTION
FROM
UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
................................
404
4.
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................
406
CONCLUSION
...................................................................................
407
BIBLIOGRAPHY
..................................................................................................
415
TABLE
OF
CASES
..............................................................................................
457
OTHER
DOCUMENTS
CITED
...............................................................................
465
|
| adam_txt |
CONTENT
OVERVIEW
PREFACE
.
VII
CONTENTS
.
XI
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
.
XVII
INTRODUCTION
.
1
PART
I:
THEORY
.
27
CHAPTER
ONE:
THE
NORMATIVE
FRAMEWORK
OF
PUBLIC
EPISTEMIC
AUTHORITY
35
1.
THE
CONDITIONS
OF
UNCERTAINTY
AND
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
.
38
2.
THE
BENCHMARK
PROBLEMS
OF
NORMATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
.
44
3.
THE
DIFFICULTY
WITH
JUDICIAL
EPISTEMIC
DEFERENCE
.
51
4.
TOWARDS
THE
INCLUSION
OF
TRUTH
.
54
5.
THE
FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY
AND
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
.
59
6.
THE
BASIC
FRAMEWORK
.
62
7.
CONCLUSION
.
67
CHAPTER
TWO:
TESTING
AUTHORITY
FOR
LEGITIMACY
.
68
1.
THE
INPUT:
ELEMENTS
OF
AUTHORITY
.
71
2.
THE
OUTPUT:
ELEMENTS
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
83
3.
THE
SERVICE
CONCEPTION
OF
AUTHORITY
.
89
4.
THE
EPISTEMIC
DIMENSION
OF
CONSENT
AND
PUBLIC
REASON
.
104
5.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PROCEDURALIST
SOLUTION
.
114
6.
CONCLUSION
.
120
CHAPTER
THREE:
MECHANISMS
OF
COLLECTIVE
WISDOM
.
122
1.
THE
CONCEPT
OF
EPISTEMIC
RELIABILITY
.
123
2.
STATISTICAL
AGGREGATION
AND
THE
CJT
.
129
3.
LIMITATIONS
AND
EXTENSIONS
OF
THE
CJT
.
138
4.
EVOLUTIONARY
AGGREGATION
AND
COURTS
OF
MANY
MINDS
.
152
5.
AGGREGATION
AND
DELIBERATION
.
158
6.
PERSPECTIVAL
AGGREGATION
AND
THE
DTA
.
165
7.
CONCLUSION
.
177
X
CONTENT
OVERVIEW
PART
II:
APPLICATION
.
179
CHAPTER
FOUR:
THE
ROLE
OF
THE
COURT
.
186
1.
APPLYING
THE
CONCEPTUAL
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
188
2.
FACT-CHECKING
I:
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
.
199
3.
JUDICIAL
PROBLEM-SOLVING:
THE
PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLE
.
222
4.
FACT-CHECKING
II:
THE
FACTUAL
BASIS
OF
A
CASE
.
240
5.
CONCLUSION
.
263
CHAPTER
FIVE:
THE
PEOPLE
AT
THE
COURT
.
265
1.
APPLYING
THE
BEHAVIORAL
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
267
2.
THE
COURT
'
S
LIMITS
OF
JURISDICTION
.
287
3.
THE
COURT
'
S
LIMITS
OF
DISCRETION
.
295
4.
CONCLUSION
.
320
CHAPTER
SIX:
THE
DESIGN
OF
THE
COURT
.
322
1.
APPLYING
THE
COMPARATIVE
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
323
2.
REALLOCATING
AUTHORITY
.
340
3.
INSTITUTIONAL
REDESIGN
.
353
4.
CONCLUSION
.
361
PART
III:
RECONCILIATION
.
363
CHAPTER
SEVEN:
NORMATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
FOR
EU
LAW
.
364
1.
CALIBRATING
THE
INTENSITY
OF
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
.
366
2.
THREE
PRINCIPLES
FOR
JUDICIAL
REASONING
.
369
3.
DEFENDING
EPISTEMIC
RELIABILITY
AS
A
BENCHMARK
.
386
4.
CONCLUSION
.
406
CONCLUSION
.
407
BIBLIOGRAPHY
.
415
TABLE
OF
CASES
.
457
OTHER
DOCUMENTS
CITED
.
465
CONTENTS
PREFACE
.
VII
CONTENT
OVERVIEW
.
IX
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
.
XVII
INTRODUCTION
.
1
PARTI:
THEORY
.
27
CHAPTER
ONE:
THE
NORMATIVE
FRAMEWORK
OF
PUBLIC
EPISTEMIC
AUTHORITY
35
1.
THE
CONDITIONS
OF
UNCERTAINTY
AND
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
.
38
A.
UNCERTAINTY
.
40
B.
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
.
42
2.
THE
BENCHMARK
PROBLEMS
OF
NORMATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
.
44
A.
THE
IDEAL
OF
PUBLIC
REASON
.
46
B.
THE
METHODOLOGICAL
THESIS
AND
THE
BRACKETING
OF
DISAGREEMENT
.
.
47
C.
THE
SPECIAL
BENCHMARK
PROBLEM
FOR
JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS
.
49
3.
THE
DIFFICULTY
WITH
JUDICIAL
EPISTEMIC
DEFERENCE
.
51
A.
INTELLECTUAL
DUE
PROCESS
.
51
B.
THE
TWO-HAT
SOLUTION
FOR
JUDICIAL
COMPETENCE
.
53
4.
TOWARDS
THE
INCLUSION
OF
TRUTH
.
54
A.
THE
RETREAT
TO
REASONABLENESS
.
54
B.
SOME
REHABILITATION
FOR
TRUTH
.
56
5.
THE
FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY
AND
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
.
59
6.
THE
BASIC
FRAMEWORK
.
62
A.
EXPERTISE
AND
PUBLIC
OFFICE
.
63
B.
AUTHORITY
'
S
COMPENSATORY
ROLE
.
65
C.
THE
THREE
TESTS
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
67
7.
CONCLUSION
.
67
CHAPTER
TWO:
TESTING
AUTHORITY
FOR
LEGITIMACY
.
68
1.
THE
INPUT:
ELEMENTS
OF
AUTHORITY
.
71
A.
CONTENT-INDEPENDENCE
.
71
XII
CONTENTS
B.
DE
FACTO
AUTHORITY
.
72
C.
DE
JURE
AUTHORITY
.
74
D.
THE
LAW
'
S
AUTHORITY
.
76
E.
EPISTEMIC
AUTHORITY
.
80
F.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
83
2.
THE
OUTPUT:
ELEMENTS
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
83
A.
SUBSTANTIVE
AND
PROCEDURAL
ACCOUNTS
.
84
B.
DEMOCRATIC
INSTRUMENTALISM
.
86
3.
THE
SERVICE
CONCEPTION
OF
AUTHORITY
.
89
A.
THE
DEPENDENCE
THESIS
.
92
B.
THE
NORMAL
JUSTIFICATION
THESIS
.
94
C.
THE
PRE-EMPTION
THESIS
.
97
D.
THE
INDEPENDENCE
CONDITION
.
99
E.
EXPERTISE
OR
COORDINATION?
.
100
F.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
104
4.
THE
EPISTEMIC
DIMENSION
OF
CONSENT
AND
PUBLIC
REASON
.
104
A.
CONSENT
THEORY
.
106
B.
PUBLIC
REASON
.
108
5.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PROCEDURALIST
SOLUTION
.
114
A.
EPISTEMIC
DEMOCRACY
.
114
B.
EPISTEMIC
PROCEDURALISM
.
118
6.
CONCLUSION
.
120
CHAPTER
THREE:
MECHANISMS
OF
COLLECTIVE
WISDOM
.
122
1.
THE
CONCEPT
OF
EPISTEMIC
RELIABILITY
.
123
A.
THE
JUROR
MODEL
.
124
B.
COLLECTIVE
EPISTEMIC
COMPETENCE
.
126
2.
STATISTICAL
AGGREGATION
AND
THE
CJT
.
129
A.
THE
LAW
OF
LARGE
NUMBERS
.
130
B.
CONDORCET
'
S
COMPETENCE
ASSUMPTION
.
131
C.
CONDORCET
'
S
INDEPENDENCE
ASSUMPTION
.
132
D.
CONDORCET
'
S
SINCERITY
ASSUMPTION
.
135
E.
THE
RESULTS
OBTAINED
BY
THE
CJT
.
136
F.
THE
MIRACLE
OF
AGGREGATION
.
137
G.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
138
3.
LIMITATIONS
AND
EXTENSIONS
OF
THE
CJT
.
138
A.
REVISITING
THE
COMPETENCE
ASSUMPTION
.
139
B.
THE
CONDORCET
PARADOX
.
142
C.
THE
DISJUNCTION
PROBLEM
.
144
D.
THE
DOCTRINAL
PARADOX
.
145
CONTENTS
XIII
E.
REVISITING
THE
INDEPENDENCE
ASSUMPTION
.
146
F.
THE
BEST
RESPONDER
COROLLARY
.
149
G.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
151
4.
EVOLUTIONARY
AGGREGATION
AND
COURTS
OF
MANY
MINDS
.
152
A.
TRADITIONALISM
AND
COSMOPOLITANISM
.
154
B.
POPULISM
.
156
5.
AGGREGATION
AND
DELIBERATION
.
158
A.
THE
DRAWBACKS
OF
DELIBERATION
.
160
B.
THE
BENEFITS
OF
DELIBERATION
.
162
6.
PERSPECTIVAL
AGGREGATION
AND
THE
DTA
.
165
A.
THE
DIVERSITY
TRUMPS
ABILITY
THEOREM
.
167
B.
THE
DIVERSITY
TRUMPS
HOMOGENEITY
THEOREM
.
168
C.
APPLYING
THE
THEOREMS
.
169
D.
COMPARING
THE
DTA
AND
THE
CJT
.
171
E.
THE
PROBLEM
WITH
PREFERENCE
DIVERSITY
.
173
F.
REVISITING
THE
APPLICABILITY
OF
THE
DTA
.
174
G.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
177
7.
CONCLUSION
.
177
PART
II:
APPLICATION
.
179
CHAPTER
FOUR:
THE
ROLE
OF
THE
COURT
.
186
1.
APPLYING
THE
CONCEPTUAL
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
188
A.
CLASSIFYING
THE
COURT
'
S
JURISDICTION
.
188
B.
THE
CONTINUING
INFLUENCE
OF
THE
INITIAL
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
.
194
C.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
198
2.
FACT-CHECKING
I:
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
.
199
A.
'
NO
FRILLS
'
TEXTUALISM
.
200
B.
ORIGINALISM
AND
TELEOLOGICAL
REASONING
.
203
C.
THE
COURT
'
S
REASONING
STYLE
.
210
D.
THE
COURT
'
S
CONSTITUTIONAL
REASONING
.
215
E.
THE
COURT
'
S
INTERPRETATION
OF
TECHNICAL
WORDS
.
219
F.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
222
3.
JUDICIAL
PROBLEM-SOLVING:
THE
PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLE
.
222
A.
PROPORTIONALITY
AS
A
PROBLEM-SOLVING
TOOL
.
223
B.
THE
STRUCTURE
OF
BALANCING
.
225
C.
POLICY
CHOICE
UNDER
PROPORTIONALITY
.
235
D.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
238
4.
FACT-CHECKING
II:
THE
FACTUAL
BASIS
OF
A
CASE
.
240
A.
COMPLEXITY
AND
THE
COURT
AS
'
CATALYST
'
.
242
XIV
CONTENTS
B.
COMPLEXITY
AND
THE
COURT
AS
A
'
WATCHDOG
'
.
246
C.
COMPLEX
SCIENTIFIC
AND
ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENTS
.
254
D.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
263
5.
CONCLUSION
.
263
CHAPTER
FIVE:
THE
PEOPLE
AT
THE
COURT
.
265
1.
APPLYING
THE
BEHAVIORAL
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
267
A.
BEHAVIORAL
THEORIES
OF
JUDGMENT
AND
DECISION-MAKING
.
267
B.
THEORIES
OF
JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR
.
271
C.
THE
BLACK
BOX
PROBLEM
.
284
D.
THE
GRAVE
MISTAKES
APPROACH
.
285
2.
THE
COURT
'
S
LIMITS
OF
JURISDICTION
.
287
A.
THE
VIEW
FROM
LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
.
288
B.
THE
VIEW
FROM
SOCIAL
SCIENCE
.
292
3.
THE
COURT
'
S
LIMITS
OF
DISCRETION
.
295
A.
VARIATION
IN
THE
STRICTNESS
OF
THE
PROPORTIONALITY
TEST
.
295
B.
THE
RARITY
OF
EXPERTS
'
APPOINTMENTS
.
304
C.
THE
LONELY
LIFE
OF
THE
IN-HOUSE
EXPERT
.
318
4.
CONCLUSION
.
320
CHAPTER
SIX:
THE
DESIGN
OF
THE
COURT
.
322
1.
APPLYING
THE
COMPARATIVE
TEST
OF
LEGITIMACY
.
323
A.
JUDICIAL
SELECTION
AND
COGNITIVE
DIVERSITY
.
323
B.
JUDICIAL
CHAMBERS
AND
STATISTICAL
AGGREGATION
.
333
C.
JUDICIAL
DISSENT
AND
MAJORITY
RULE
.
336
2.
REALLOCATING
AUTHORITY
.
340
A.
THE
EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONAL
LANDSCAPE
.
341
B.
TOWARDS
AN
EPISTEMIC
PRINCIPLE
OF
DEFERENCE
.
348
3.
INSTITUTIONAL
REDESIGN
.
353
A.
THE
INFLUENCE
OF
THE
INDIVIDUALIST
PARADIGM
ON
RECENT
REFORMS
.
.
353
B.
INTRODUCING
NON-LAWYERS
TO
THE
BENCH?
.
355
C.
INCREASING
THE
RECOURSE
TO
EXPERTS?
.
359
4.
CONCLUSION
.
361
PART
III:
RECONCILIATION
.
363
CHAPTER
SEVEN:
NORMATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
FOR
EU
LAW
.
364
1.
CALIBRATING
THE
INTENSITY
OF
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
.
366
2.
THREE
PRINCIPLES
FOR
JUDICIAL
REASONING
.
369
A.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PRINCIPLE
OF
DEMOCRATIC
RESTRAINT
.
372
CONTENTS
XV
B.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PRINCIPLE
OF
TECHNOCRATIC
DEFERENCE
.
376
C.
THE
EPISTEMIC
PRINCIPLE
OF
JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM
.
380
D.
APPLICABILITY
TO
MEMBER
STATE
INSTITUTIONS
.
385
E.
INTERIM
CONCLUSION
.
386
3.
DEFENDING
EPISTEMIC
RELIABILITY
AS
A
BENCHMARK
.
386
A.
THE
OBJECTION
FROM
EPISTEMOLOGY
.
387
B.
THE
IDENTIFIABILITY
OBJECTION
.
392
C.
THE
OBJECTION
FROM
METHODOLOGY
.
402
D.
THE
OBJECTION
FROM
UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
.
404
4.
CONCLUSION
.
406
CONCLUSION
.
407
BIBLIOGRAPHY
.
415
TABLE
OF
CASES
.
457
OTHER
DOCUMENTS
CITED
.
465 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Laux, Johann 1984- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1261993233 |
| author_facet | Laux, Johann 1984- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Laux, Johann 1984- |
| author_variant | j l jl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048317709 |
| classification_rvk | PI 3050 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1335401076 (DE-599)DNB1250596327 |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| discipline_str_mv | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | Thesis Book |
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Normwissenschaftler beurteilen die Legitimität dieser Ansprüche. 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| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| id | DE-604.BV048317709 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:11:07Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:07Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)10165783-3 |
| isbn | 9783161600692 316160069X |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033697138 |
| oclc_num | 1335401076 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-20 DE-188 DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-20 DE-188 DE-11 |
| physical | XV, 466 Seiten 23.2 cm x 15.5 cm, 378 g |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Mohr Siebeck |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft |
| series2 | Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft |
| spelling | Laux, Johann 1984- Verfasser (DE-588)1261993233 aut Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law Johann Moritz Laux Tübingen Mohr Siebeck [2022] © 2022 XV, 466 Seiten 23.2 cm x 15.5 cm, 378 g txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft 42 Dissertation Universität Hamburg 2019 Jedes Gericht beansprucht Autorität. Normwissenschaftler beurteilen die Legitimität dieser Ansprüche. Johann Moritz Laux betrachtet diese Aufgabe von einem neuen Blickwinkel, indem er auf Mechanismen der kollektiven Intelligenz zurückgreift und die Verlässlichkeit der Gerichte als Entscheidungsträger mit der anderer Regierungszweige vergleicht Europäischer Gerichtshof (DE-588)5103273-9 gnd rswk-swf Gerichtsbarkeit (DE-588)4020342-6 gnd rswk-swf Autorität (DE-588)4003990-0 gnd rswk-swf Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd rswk-swf Wisdom of the Crowds Cognitive Diversity Democracy Legitimacy Collective Intelligence Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Europäischer Gerichtshof (DE-588)5103273-9 b Gerichtsbarkeit (DE-588)4020342-6 s Autorität (DE-588)4003990-0 s Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 s DE-604 Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG (DE-588)10165783-3 pbl Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-3-16-160257-3 Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft 42 (DE-604)BV019625319 42 X:MVB text/html http://deposit.dnb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=b25f075ef786498a8ce69f53af99ef4f&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm Inhaltstext DNB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033697138&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p vlb 20220129 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#vlb |
| spellingShingle | Laux, Johann 1984- Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft Europäischer Gerichtshof (DE-588)5103273-9 gnd Gerichtsbarkeit (DE-588)4020342-6 gnd Autorität (DE-588)4003990-0 gnd Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5103273-9 (DE-588)4020342-6 (DE-588)4003990-0 (DE-588)4114382-6 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law |
| title_auth | Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law |
| title_exact_search | Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law |
| title_full | Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law Johann Moritz Laux |
| title_fullStr | Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law Johann Moritz Laux |
| title_full_unstemmed | Public epistemic authority normative institutional design for EU law Johann Moritz Laux |
| title_short | Public epistemic authority |
| title_sort | public epistemic authority normative institutional design for eu law |
| title_sub | normative institutional design for EU law |
| topic | Europäischer Gerichtshof (DE-588)5103273-9 gnd Gerichtsbarkeit (DE-588)4020342-6 gnd Autorität (DE-588)4003990-0 gnd Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Europäischer Gerichtshof Gerichtsbarkeit Autorität Legitimation Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://deposit.dnb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=b25f075ef786498a8ce69f53af99ef4f&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033697138&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV019625319 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lauxjohann publicepistemicauthoritynormativeinstitutionaldesignforeulaw AT mohrsiebeckgmbhcokg publicepistemicauthoritynormativeinstitutionaldesignforeulaw |