Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance: Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 1...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2018
|
| Schriftenreihe: | World Bank E-Library Archive
|
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size. Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries, and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor Productivity of up to 0.8 percent |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (66 Seiten) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-8363 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048273872 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220609s2018 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1596/1813-9450-8363 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM011147946 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1334051068 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM011147946 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-19 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-706 |a DE-29 |a DE-M347 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-20 |a DE-739 |a DE-1043 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Bachas, Pierre |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance |b Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |c Bachas, Pierre |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2018 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (66 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a World Bank E-Library Archive | |
| 520 | |a This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size. Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries, and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor Productivity of up to 0.8 percent | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Bachas, Pierre |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Jaef, Roberto N. Fattal |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Jensen, Anders |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Bachas, Pierre |t Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance: Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |d Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2018 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8363 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033654067 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1812671818848272384 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Bachas, Pierre |
| author_facet | Bachas, Pierre |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Bachas, Pierre |
| author_variant | p b pb |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048273872 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM011147946 (OCoLC)1334051068 (DE-599)GBVNLM011147946 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-8363 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048273872</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220609s2018 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1596/1813-9450-8363</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)NLM011147946</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1334051068</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM011147946</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bachas, Pierre</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance</subfield><subfield code="b">Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications</subfield><subfield code="c">Bachas, Pierre</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (66 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">World Bank E-Library Archive</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size. Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries, and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor Productivity of up to 0.8 percent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bachas, Pierre</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Jaef, Roberto N. Fattal</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Jensen, Anders</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="a">Bachas, Pierre</subfield><subfield code="t">Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance: Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications</subfield><subfield code="d">Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8363</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033654067</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048273872 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:00:10Z |
| indexdate | 2024-10-12T04:02:37Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033654067 |
| oclc_num | 1334051068 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (66 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publishDateSearch | 2018 |
| publishDateSort | 2018 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | World Bank E-Library Archive |
| spellingShingle | Bachas, Pierre Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
| title | Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
| title_auth | Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
| title_exact_search | Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
| title_full | Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications Bachas, Pierre |
| title_fullStr | Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications Bachas, Pierre |
| title_full_unstemmed | Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications Bachas, Pierre |
| title_short | Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance |
| title_sort | size dependent tax enforcement and compliance global evidence and aggregate implications |
| title_sub | Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8363 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bachaspierre sizedependenttaxenforcementandcomplianceglobalevidenceandaggregateimplications AT jaefrobertonfattal sizedependenttaxenforcementandcomplianceglobalevidenceandaggregateimplications AT jensenanders sizedependenttaxenforcementandcomplianceglobalevidenceandaggregateimplications |