Pyramid Capitalism: Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt
This paper uses an original database of 469 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt to explore the economic effects of close state-business relations. Previous research has shown that political connections are lucrative. The paper addresses several questions raised by this rese...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2015
|
| Schriftenreihe: | World Bank E-Library Archive
|
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper uses an original database of 469 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt to explore the economic effects of close state-business relations. Previous research has shown that political connections are lucrative. The paper addresses several questions raised by this research. Do connected firms receive favorable regulatory treatment? They do: connected firms are more likely to benefit from trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and regulatory enforcement. Does regulatory capture account for the high value of connected firms? In the sample, regulatory capture as revealed by energy subsidies and trade protection account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. Do politically connected firms hurt aggregate growth? The paper identifies the growth effects of the entry of politically connected firms by comparing detailed 4-digit sectors where they entered, between 1996 and 2006, and sectors that remained unconnected. The entry of connected firms into new, modern, and previously unconnected sectors slows aggregate employment growth and skews the distribution of employment toward less productive, smaller firms |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (41 p) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-7354 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048269687 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220609s2015 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1596/1813-9450-7354 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010469508 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1334048374 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM010469508 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-19 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-706 |a DE-29 |a DE-M347 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-20 |a DE-739 |a DE-1043 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Diwan, Ishac |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Pyramid Capitalism |b Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |c Diwan, Ishac |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2015 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (41 p) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a World Bank E-Library Archive | |
| 520 | |a This paper uses an original database of 469 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt to explore the economic effects of close state-business relations. Previous research has shown that political connections are lucrative. The paper addresses several questions raised by this research. Do connected firms receive favorable regulatory treatment? They do: connected firms are more likely to benefit from trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and regulatory enforcement. Does regulatory capture account for the high value of connected firms? In the sample, regulatory capture as revealed by energy subsidies and trade protection account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. Do politically connected firms hurt aggregate growth? The paper identifies the growth effects of the entry of politically connected firms by comparing detailed 4-digit sectors where they entered, between 1996 and 2006, and sectors that remained unconnected. The entry of connected firms into new, modern, and previously unconnected sectors slows aggregate employment growth and skews the distribution of employment toward less productive, smaller firms | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Keefer, Philip |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Schiffbauer, Marc |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Diwan, Ishac |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Diwan, Ishac |t Pyramid Capitalism: Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |d Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7354 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033649882 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1812671777955905536 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Diwan, Ishac |
| author_facet | Diwan, Ishac |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Diwan, Ishac |
| author_variant | i d id |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048269687 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010469508 (OCoLC)1334048374 (DE-599)GBVNLM010469508 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-7354 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048269687</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220609s2015 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1596/1813-9450-7354</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010469508</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1334048374</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM010469508</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Diwan, Ishac</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Pyramid Capitalism</subfield><subfield code="b">Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt</subfield><subfield code="c">Diwan, Ishac</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (41 p)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">World Bank E-Library Archive</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper uses an original database of 469 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt to explore the economic effects of close state-business relations. Previous research has shown that political connections are lucrative. The paper addresses several questions raised by this research. Do connected firms receive favorable regulatory treatment? They do: connected firms are more likely to benefit from trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and regulatory enforcement. Does regulatory capture account for the high value of connected firms? In the sample, regulatory capture as revealed by energy subsidies and trade protection account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. Do politically connected firms hurt aggregate growth? The paper identifies the growth effects of the entry of politically connected firms by comparing detailed 4-digit sectors where they entered, between 1996 and 2006, and sectors that remained unconnected. The entry of connected firms into new, modern, and previously unconnected sectors slows aggregate employment growth and skews the distribution of employment toward less productive, smaller firms</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Keefer, Philip</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Schiffbauer, Marc</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Diwan, Ishac</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="a">Diwan, Ishac</subfield><subfield code="t">Pyramid Capitalism: Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt</subfield><subfield code="d">Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7354</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033649882</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048269687 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:00:01Z |
| indexdate | 2024-10-12T04:01:58Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033649882 |
| oclc_num | 1334048374 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (41 p) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publishDateSearch | 2015 |
| publishDateSort | 2015 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | World Bank E-Library Archive |
| spellingShingle | Diwan, Ishac Pyramid Capitalism Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
| title | Pyramid Capitalism Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
| title_auth | Pyramid Capitalism Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
| title_exact_search | Pyramid Capitalism Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Pyramid Capitalism Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
| title_full | Pyramid Capitalism Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt Diwan, Ishac |
| title_fullStr | Pyramid Capitalism Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt Diwan, Ishac |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pyramid Capitalism Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt Diwan, Ishac |
| title_short | Pyramid Capitalism |
| title_sort | pyramid capitalism political connections regulation and firm productivity in egypt |
| title_sub | Political Connections, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7354 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT diwanishac pyramidcapitalismpoliticalconnectionsregulationandfirmproductivityinegypt AT keeferphilip pyramidcapitalismpoliticalconnectionsregulationandfirmproductivityinegypt AT schiffbauermarc pyramidcapitalismpoliticalconnectionsregulationandfirmproductivityinegypt |