The Logic of the CAP: Politics or Economics?

This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperativ...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Henning, Christian H.C.A (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C The World Bank 2008
Schriftenreihe:Other papers
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource
DOI:10.1596/28181