Financial (Dis-)Information: Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico
An audit study was conducted in peri-urban Mexico to understand the quality of information and products offered to low-income potential customers. Trained auditors visited multiple financial institutions seeking credit and savings products. Consistent with Gabaix and Laibson (2006), staff voluntaril...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2014
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | An audit study was conducted in peri-urban Mexico to understand the quality of information and products offered to low-income potential customers. Trained auditors visited multiple financial institutions seeking credit and savings products. Consistent with Gabaix and Laibson (2006), staff voluntarily provides little information about avoidable fees, especially to auditors trained to reveal little knowledge about the market. In addition, clients are almost never offered the cheapest product, most likely because staff is incentivized to offer more expensive products that are thus more profitable to the institution. This suggests that disclosure and transparency policies may be ineffective if they undermine the commercial interest of financial institutions |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (26 p) |
DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-6902 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T19:59:54Z |
indexdate | 2024-10-12T04:01:20Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646529 |
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physical | 1 Online-Ressource (26 p) |
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spellingShingle | Giné, Xavier Financial (Dis-)Information Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico |
title | Financial (Dis-)Information Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico |
title_auth | Financial (Dis-)Information Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico |
title_exact_search | Financial (Dis-)Information Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico |
title_exact_search_txtP | Financial (Dis-)Information Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico |
title_full | Financial (Dis-)Information Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico Xavier Giné |
title_fullStr | Financial (Dis-)Information Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico Xavier Giné |
title_full_unstemmed | Financial (Dis-)Information Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico Xavier Giné |
title_short | Financial (Dis-)Information |
title_sort | financial dis information evidence from an audit study in mexico |
title_sub | Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico |
url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6902 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ginexavier financialdisinformationevidencefromanauditstudyinmexico AT cuellarcristinamartinez financialdisinformationevidencefromanauditstudyinmexico AT mazerrafaelkeenan financialdisinformationevidencefromanauditstudyinmexico |