Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions
The paper examines the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. The authors develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in le...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2013
|
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The paper examines the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. The authors develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. They test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992-2011, finding broad support for our predictions |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (29 p) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-6646 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure |b Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions |c Moore, Alexander |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2013 | |
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| 520 | |a The paper examines the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. The authors develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. They test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992-2011, finding broad support for our predictions | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Moore, Alexander |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Dethier, Jean-Jacques |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Straub, Stéphane |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Moore, Alexander |a Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6646 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646268 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-6646 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV048266074 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:59:53Z |
| indexdate | 2025-02-20T07:19:09Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646268 |
| oclc_num | 1334042134 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (29 p) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Moore, Alexander Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions |
| title | Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions |
| title_auth | Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions |
| title_exact_search | Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions |
| title_full | Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions Moore, Alexander |
| title_fullStr | Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions Moore, Alexander |
| title_full_unstemmed | Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions Moore, Alexander |
| title_short | Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure |
| title_sort | regulation renegotiation and capital structure theory and evidence from latin american transport concessions |
| title_sub | Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6646 |
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