Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting:
This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater threat of competition) are less likely to have a cred...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2013
|
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater threat of competition) are less likely to have a credit bureau, presumably because banks are less willing to share proprietary information when the threat of market entry is high. In addition, a credit bureau is significantly less likely to emerge in economies characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. The authors argue that the reason for this finding is that large banks stand to lose more monopoly rents from sharing their extensive information with smaller players. In contrast, the data show no significant relationship between bank competition or concentration and the emergence of a public credit registry, where banks' participation is mandatory. The results highlight that policies designed to promote the voluntary creation of a credit bureau need to take into account banks' incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (35 p) |
DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-6442 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV048265877 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 220609s2013 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
024 | 7 | |a 10.1596/1813-9450-6442 |2 doi | |
035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010335331 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)1075132741 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM010335331 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-19 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-706 |a DE-29 |a DE-M347 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-20 |a DE-739 |a DE-1043 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 | ||
100 | 1 | |a Bruhn, Miriam |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |c Miriam Bruhn |
264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2013 | |
300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (35 p) | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | |a This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater threat of competition) are less likely to have a credit bureau, presumably because banks are less willing to share proprietary information when the threat of market entry is high. In addition, a credit bureau is significantly less likely to emerge in economies characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. The authors argue that the reason for this finding is that large banks stand to lose more monopoly rents from sharing their extensive information with smaller players. In contrast, the data show no significant relationship between bank competition or concentration and the emergence of a public credit registry, where banks' participation is mandatory. The results highlight that policies designed to promote the voluntary creation of a credit bureau need to take into account banks' incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information | ||
700 | 1 | |a Kanz, Martin |4 oth | |
700 | 1 | |a Bruhn, Miriam |4 oth | |
700 | 1 | |a Farazi, Subika |4 oth | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Bruhn, Miriam |a Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6442 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646071 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1812671731435831296 |
---|---|
adam_text | |
adam_txt | |
any_adam_object | |
any_adam_object_boolean | |
author | Bruhn, Miriam |
author_facet | Bruhn, Miriam |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Bruhn, Miriam |
author_variant | m b mb |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV048265877 |
collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010335331 (OCoLC)1075132741 (DE-599)GBVNLM010335331 |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-6442 |
format | Electronic eBook |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048265877</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220609s2013 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1596/1813-9450-6442</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010335331</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1075132741</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM010335331</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bruhn, Miriam</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting</subfield><subfield code="c">Miriam Bruhn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2013</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (35 p)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater threat of competition) are less likely to have a credit bureau, presumably because banks are less willing to share proprietary information when the threat of market entry is high. In addition, a credit bureau is significantly less likely to emerge in economies characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. The authors argue that the reason for this finding is that large banks stand to lose more monopoly rents from sharing their extensive information with smaller players. In contrast, the data show no significant relationship between bank competition or concentration and the emergence of a public credit registry, where banks' participation is mandatory. The results highlight that policies designed to promote the voluntary creation of a credit bureau need to take into account banks' incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Kanz, Martin</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bruhn, Miriam</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Farazi, Subika</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Bruhn, Miriam</subfield><subfield code="a">Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6442</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646071</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV048265877 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T19:59:53Z |
indexdate | 2024-10-12T04:01:14Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646071 |
oclc_num | 1075132741 |
open_access_boolean | 1 |
owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (35 p) |
psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
publishDate | 2013 |
publishDateSearch | 2013 |
publishDateSort | 2013 |
publisher | The World Bank |
record_format | marc |
spellingShingle | Bruhn, Miriam Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
title | Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
title_auth | Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
title_exact_search | Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
title_exact_search_txtP | Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
title_full | Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting Miriam Bruhn |
title_fullStr | Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting Miriam Bruhn |
title_full_unstemmed | Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting Miriam Bruhn |
title_short | Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
title_sort | bank competition concentration and credit reporting |
url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6442 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT bruhnmiriam bankcompetitionconcentrationandcreditreporting AT kanzmartin bankcompetitionconcentrationandcreditreporting AT farazisubika bankcompetitionconcentrationandcreditreporting |