Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije?:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Sanski Most [Bosnia and Herzegovina]
Fondacija Centar za javno pravo
2018
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 |
| Beschreibung: | Government authority in contemporary parliamentary democracies is based on the principle of the division of power, which ensures that none of the three branches of authority extend beyond the constitutionally established barriers, at the expense of other branches of authority. Such a functioning of government authority is ensured by the mechanism which is referred to as 'brakes and equilibrium', with the help of which the legislative, executive and judicial powers are controlled and limited by one another. One constitutional brake is the institution of incompatibility of state functions with other public functions and professional activities. Due to the central position in the system of state authority, the position of the head of state is particularly significant. The achieved constitutional standard is the absolute incompatibility of the function of the head of state with other public functions and professional activities. This protects not only the principle of dividing the authority, but also the integrity of the bearer of the function. The great attention of the comparative constitutional theory is drawn to the incompatibility of the head of state and the head of the political party. In theory, one attitude prevails that the head of state should be banned to exercise the function of the head of the party by constitution, so as not to jeopardize the position of the parliament and the government. The starting point of this work is that being the head of state and the head of the political party at the same time, by itself, does not pose a threat to the division of authority, if the constitution is respected |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource(1 p. 17) |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? |c Dejan A. Milić |
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| author | Milić, Dejan A. |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:59:35Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:33:25Z |
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| spelling | Milić, Dejan A. Verfasser aut Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? Dejan A. Milić Sanski Most [Bosnia and Herzegovina] Fondacija Centar za javno pravo 2018 Frankfurt M. CEEOL 2018 1 Online-Ressource(1 p. 17) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Government authority in contemporary parliamentary democracies is based on the principle of the division of power, which ensures that none of the three branches of authority extend beyond the constitutionally established barriers, at the expense of other branches of authority. Such a functioning of government authority is ensured by the mechanism which is referred to as 'brakes and equilibrium', with the help of which the legislative, executive and judicial powers are controlled and limited by one another. One constitutional brake is the institution of incompatibility of state functions with other public functions and professional activities. Due to the central position in the system of state authority, the position of the head of state is particularly significant. The achieved constitutional standard is the absolute incompatibility of the function of the head of state with other public functions and professional activities. This protects not only the principle of dividing the authority, but also the integrity of the bearer of the function. The great attention of the comparative constitutional theory is drawn to the incompatibility of the head of state and the head of the political party. In theory, one attitude prevails that the head of state should be banned to exercise the function of the head of the party by constitution, so as not to jeopardize the position of the parliament and the government. The starting point of this work is that being the head of state and the head of the political party at the same time, by itself, does not pose a threat to the division of authority, if the constitution is respected Constitutional Law Governance Public Law Government/Political systems |
| spellingShingle | Milić, Dejan A. Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? Constitutional Law Governance Public Law Government/Political systems |
| title | Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? |
| title_auth | Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? |
| title_exact_search | Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? |
| title_full | Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? Dejan A. Milić |
| title_fullStr | Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? Dejan A. Milić |
| title_full_unstemmed | Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? Dejan A. Milić |
| title_short | Da li su inkompatibilne funkcije šefa države i predsednika političke stranke - ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srbije? |
| title_sort | da li su inkompatibilne funkcije sefa drzave i predsednika politicke stranke ustavnopravni polozaj predsednika republike srbije |
| topic | Constitutional Law Governance Public Law Government/Political systems |
| topic_facet | Constitutional Law Governance Public Law Government/Political systems |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT milicdejana dalisuinkompatibilnefunkcijesefadrzaveipredsednikapolitickestrankeustavnopravnipolozajpredsednikarepublikesrbije |