EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2:
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Riga [Latvia]
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
2017
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 |
| Beschreibung: | Robotic activity is highly dynamic. The online discussion about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics shows sharp changes in focus and intensity. The current reporting period August-October has been comparatively free of large-scale, politically motivated robotic interventions. In contrast, the period March-July stands out as one in which content was heavily promoted online. Political actors use bot accounts in the social media space to manipulate public opinion about regional geopolitics. According to our estimate, such accounts produced 5-15% of the activity about the NATO presence in Latvia and Estonia in the period March-July 2017. Bot-generated messages differ depending on the target audience. Messages aimed at the West suggested that Russian exercises pale in comparison with NATO operations. Messages targeted to the domestic audience rarely mentioned the Russian exercises. Russian-language bots create roughly 70% of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. Overall, 60% of active Russian-language accounts seem to be automated. In comparison, 39% of accounts tweeting in English are bots. They created 52% of all English-language messages in the period August-October. Our data suggest Twitter is less effective at removing automatically generated Russian content than it is for English material. Nonetheless, we have seen improvement in social media policing by the platform. A 'cleaner' social media is good not only for individual users, but also for businesses. Pressure should continue in order to ensure further improvements |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource(1 p. 6) |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048262037 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220609s2017 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-45-CGR)ceeol661395 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1334027203 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV048262037 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 084 | |a OST |q DE-12 |2 fid | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 |c Specified No Author |
| 264 | 1 | |a Riga [Latvia] |b NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence |c 2017 | |
| 264 | 2 | |a Frankfurt M. |b CEEOL |c 2017 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource(1 p. 6) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Robotic activity is highly dynamic. The online discussion about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics shows sharp changes in focus and intensity. The current reporting period August-October has been comparatively free of large-scale, politically motivated robotic interventions. In contrast, the period March-July stands out as one in which content was heavily promoted online. Political actors use bot accounts in the social media space to manipulate public opinion about regional geopolitics. According to our estimate, such accounts produced 5-15% of the activity about the NATO presence in Latvia and Estonia in the period March-July 2017. Bot-generated messages differ depending on the target audience. Messages aimed at the West suggested that Russian exercises pale in comparison with NATO operations. Messages targeted to the domestic audience rarely mentioned the Russian exercises. Russian-language bots create roughly 70% of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. Overall, 60% of active Russian-language accounts seem to be automated. In comparison, 39% of accounts tweeting in English are bots. They created 52% of all English-language messages in the period August-October. Our data suggest Twitter is less effective at removing automatically generated Russian content than it is for English material. Nonetheless, we have seen improvement in social media policing by the platform. A 'cleaner' social media is good not only for individual users, but also for businesses. Pressure should continue in order to ensure further improvements | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Politics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Media studies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Geography, Regional studies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Communication studies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International relations/trade | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Security and defense | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Social psychology and group interaction | |
| 650 | 4 | |a ICT Information and Communications Technologies | |
| 912 | |a ZDB-45-CGR | ||
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 940 | 1 | |q BSB_OE_CEEOL | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033642240 | ||
| 966 | e | |u https://www.ceeol.com/search/gray-literature-detail?id=661395 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-45-CGR |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804184065686896640 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048262037 |
| collection | ZDB-45-CGR |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-45-CGR)ceeol661395 (OCoLC)1334027203 (DE-599)BVBBV048262037 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02919nmm a2200421zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048262037</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220609s2017 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-45-CGR)ceeol661395</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1334027203</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV048262037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">OST</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2</subfield><subfield code="c">Specified No Author</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Riga [Latvia]</subfield><subfield code="b">NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence</subfield><subfield code="c">2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Frankfurt M.</subfield><subfield code="b">CEEOL</subfield><subfield code="c">2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource(1 p. 6)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Robotic activity is highly dynamic. The online discussion about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics shows sharp changes in focus and intensity. The current reporting period August-October has been comparatively free of large-scale, politically motivated robotic interventions. In contrast, the period March-July stands out as one in which content was heavily promoted online. Political actors use bot accounts in the social media space to manipulate public opinion about regional geopolitics. According to our estimate, such accounts produced 5-15% of the activity about the NATO presence in Latvia and Estonia in the period March-July 2017. Bot-generated messages differ depending on the target audience. Messages aimed at the West suggested that Russian exercises pale in comparison with NATO operations. Messages targeted to the domestic audience rarely mentioned the Russian exercises. Russian-language bots create roughly 70% of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. Overall, 60% of active Russian-language accounts seem to be automated. In comparison, 39% of accounts tweeting in English are bots. They created 52% of all English-language messages in the period August-October. Our data suggest Twitter is less effective at removing automatically generated Russian content than it is for English material. Nonetheless, we have seen improvement in social media policing by the platform. A 'cleaner' social media is good not only for individual users, but also for businesses. Pressure should continue in order to ensure further improvements</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Politics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Media studies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geography, Regional studies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Communication studies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">International relations/trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Security and defense</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Social psychology and group interaction</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">ICT Information and Communications Technologies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-45-CGR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">BSB_OE_CEEOL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033642240</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.ceeol.com/search/gray-literature-detail?id=661395</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-45-CGR</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048262037 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:59:35Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:33:25Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033642240 |
| oclc_num | 1334027203 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource(1 p. 6) |
| psigel | ZDB-45-CGR BSB_OE_CEEOL |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateSearch | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 Specified No Author Riga [Latvia] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 2017 Frankfurt M. CEEOL 2017 1 Online-Ressource(1 p. 6) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Robotic activity is highly dynamic. The online discussion about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics shows sharp changes in focus and intensity. The current reporting period August-October has been comparatively free of large-scale, politically motivated robotic interventions. In contrast, the period March-July stands out as one in which content was heavily promoted online. Political actors use bot accounts in the social media space to manipulate public opinion about regional geopolitics. According to our estimate, such accounts produced 5-15% of the activity about the NATO presence in Latvia and Estonia in the period March-July 2017. Bot-generated messages differ depending on the target audience. Messages aimed at the West suggested that Russian exercises pale in comparison with NATO operations. Messages targeted to the domestic audience rarely mentioned the Russian exercises. Russian-language bots create roughly 70% of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. Overall, 60% of active Russian-language accounts seem to be automated. In comparison, 39% of accounts tweeting in English are bots. They created 52% of all English-language messages in the period August-October. Our data suggest Twitter is less effective at removing automatically generated Russian content than it is for English material. Nonetheless, we have seen improvement in social media policing by the platform. A 'cleaner' social media is good not only for individual users, but also for businesses. Pressure should continue in order to ensure further improvements Politics Media studies Geography, Regional studies Communication studies International relations/trade Security and defense Social psychology and group interaction ICT Information and Communications Technologies |
| spellingShingle | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 Politics Media studies Geography, Regional studies Communication studies International relations/trade Security and defense Social psychology and group interaction ICT Information and Communications Technologies |
| title | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 |
| title_auth | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 |
| title_exact_search | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 |
| title_exact_search_txtP | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 |
| title_full | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 Specified No Author |
| title_fullStr | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 Specified No Author |
| title_full_unstemmed | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 Specified No Author |
| title_short | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 2017/2 |
| title_sort | executive summary robotrolling 2017 2 |
| topic | Politics Media studies Geography, Regional studies Communication studies International relations/trade Security and defense Social psychology and group interaction ICT Information and Communications Technologies |
| topic_facet | Politics Media studies Geography, Regional studies Communication studies International relations/trade Security and defense Social psychology and group interaction ICT Information and Communications Technologies |