Monetary unions: institutions and policies
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| Language: | English |
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Springer
[2022]
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| Series: | Springer texts in business and economics
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| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | xxv, 443 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9783030932312 |
| ISSN: | 2192-4333 |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Public Economics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Macroeconomics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International economic relations | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economics | |
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| adam_text | Contents Part I 1 2 Monetary Issues Monetary Unions: Between International Trade and National Sovereignty............................... 1.1 Monetary Sovereignty........................................................................ 1.1.1 The Circulation of Currency.............................................. 1.1.2 Monetary Unions................................................................ 1.1.3 Monetary Sovereignty in Monetary Unions...................... 1.1.4 Monetary Unions in History .............................................. 1.2 Currencies, Foreign Exchange andInternational Payments............ 1.2.1 Currency Plurality and External Constraints..................... 1.2.2 Monetary Union and the External Constraint................... 1.2.3 Currency Area and Monetary Union: What Is the Difference? ......................................................................... 1.3 The Rules of the Game of a Monetary Union................................. 1.3.1 International Monetary Systems........................................ 1.3.2 Multi-National Monetary Union as an International Monetary System................................................................ 1.4 Conclusion.......................................................................................... References...................................................................................................... Why a Monetary Union?................................................................. 2.1 Assessing a Monetary Union........................................................... 2.1.1
Methodological Preliminaries............................................. 2.1.2 The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas............................ 2.1.3 Subsequent Contributions................................................... 2.1.4 Monetary Union, Expectations, and Credibility................ 2.2 The Membership of a Monetary Union........................................... 2.2.1 Why Joining a Monetary Union? . ...................................... 2.2.2 Why Accepting a New Entrant?........................................ 2.2.3 The Special Case of Dollarization...................................... З 4 4 6 10 11 17 17 23 28 30 30 32 36 36 39 40 40 41 44 50 55 56 58 59 xix
Contents XX 2.3 Changes Induced by a Monetary Union........................................ 2.3.1 Microeconomic Effects..................................................... 2.3.2 Macroeconomic Effects................................................... 2.3.3 Financial Effects............................................................... 2.4 Conclusion..................................................................................... References................................................................................................ 3 4 Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Lessons from Simple Models....................................................................... 3.1 Monetary Policy............................................................................. 3.1.1 Monetary Policy in a Unified Economy......................... 3.1.2 Monetary Instruments..................................................... 3.2 Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union.......................................... 3.2.1 Preference Functions of the Central Bank....................... 3.2.2 Heterogeneity and Monetary Policy................................ 3.2.3 Monetary Policy and Nominal Rigidities in the Monetary Union................................................ 90 3.2.4 Taylor Rule and Indicators of Misalignment.................... 3.2.5 Misalignment Indicators in the European Case............... 3.3 A Simple Model of Monetary Union............................................. 3.3.1 A Monetary Union............................................................ 3.3.2 Central Bank
Preferences................................................ 3.3.3 The Monetary Policy Decision............................. 3.4 Traded Goods, Terms of Trade and Monetary Policy ................... 3.4.1 With a Union-Wide Loss Function.................................. 3.4.2 With a Summation Loss Function ................................... 3.4.3 With Asymmetry ......................................... 3.5 Non-conventional Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union ............ 3.5.1 From Conventional to Non-conventional Policy............. 3.5.2 Non-conventional Policy in Monetary Union................. 3.6 Conclusion..................................................................................... References................................................................................................ Institutions and Monetary Policy......................................................... 4.1 Rule or Discretion in a Monetary Union....................................... 4.1.1 Expectations and Monetary Policy in a Simple Economy........................................ 123 4.1.2 Rule or Discretion?.......................................................... 4.1.3 Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union with Direct Negotiation........................................................ 4.1.4 A Variant with Asymmetric Anchoring.......................... 4.2 Central Bank Independence............................................................ 4.2.1 What Is Meant by Independence?................................... 4.2.2 Central Bank Independence in a Monetary Union........... 4.2.3
Delegation in a Monetary Union...................................... 60 61 63 69 71 73 77 79 79 81 84 85 88 91 93 96 96 97 99 102 103 104 105 106 106 108 Ill 119 121 122 124 128 130 134 135 136 137
Contents xxi The Collegiality of the Monetary Decision................... .................. 4.3.1 The Monetary Policy Committee...................................... 4.3.2 The Monetary Policy Committee in a Monetary Union..................................................................... 146 4.4 Communication and Accountability........................................... 4.4.1 Between Transparency and Opacity.................................. 4.4.2 Accountability.................................................................... 4.5Financial Crises and the Lender-of-Last-Resort Function.................... 4.6 Conclusion................................................................ References...................................................................................................... 4.3 Part II 5 6 144 144 151 151 154 156 158 163 Fiscal Issues Government Deficits, Transfers and Debts............................................ 5.1 Government Deficits and Public Debts in a Monetary Union........ 5.1.1 The Budget Constraint of a Member State of a Monetary Union................................................... 169 5.1.2 The Constraint of the Federal Treasury.............................. 5.1.3 Central Bank Accounts....................................................... 5.1.4 Public Accounts and Monetary Union............................... 5.1.5 Budget Constraints in Real Terms..................................... 5.2 The Sustainability of Public Debts in a Monetary Union.............. 5.2.1 The Sustainability of a Member Country’s Debt.............. 5.2.2
Sustainability of the Federal Treasury Debt...................... 5.2.3 The Consolidated Sustainability of a MonetaryUnion ... 5.3 Debt Sustainability and Sovereign Default in a Monetary Union...................................................................................... 182 5.3.1 Default and Renegotiation of the Public Debt................... 5.3.2 Budget Constraints Including Default Possibility............. 5.3.3 Sovereign Default in a Monetary Union........................... 5.4 Market and Institutional Disciplines ............................................... 5.4.1 Market Discipline................................................................ 5.4.2 Institutional Discipline in a Monetary Union................... 5.4.3 Separating Disciplines?..................................................... 5.5 Conclusion.......................................................................................... References...................................................................................................... Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union........................................................ 6.1 Fiscal Effects in a Monetary Union................................................. 6.1.1 The International Effects of Fiscal Impulses.................... 6.1.2 Cross-Border Effects of Fiscal Impulses in Monetary Union................................................... 199 6.2 Stabilization Policies in a Monetary Union..................................... 6.2.1 The Functions of Fiscal Policy........................................... 6.2.2 The Conduct of
Fiscal Policies........................................... 167 168 171 172 173 175 178 178 180 181 183 183 185 187 188 190 193 194 195 197 198 198 201 201 204
xxii Contents Fiscal Impulses and Transmission Mechanisms in a Monetary Union.......................................................... 205 6.3.1 Fiscal Multipliers.............................. 6.3.2 The Macroeconomic Impact of Fiscal Policies................ 6.3.3 Macroeconomic Stabilization and Transfers................... 6.4 Fiscal Policies and External Balances........................................... 6.4.1 Fiscal Devaluations........................ 6.4.2 National Fiscal Policies and Tax Competition................. 6.5 Fiscal Rules.................................................................................... 6.5.1 The Properties of a “Good” Fiscal Rule........................... 6.5.2 Types of Rules................................................................. 6.5.3 Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union................................... 6.6 Conclusion..................................................................................... References................................................................................................ •* 206 208 218 220 220 223 225 225 226 228 230 230 The Policy Mix........................................................................................ 7.1 The Policy Mix in a Monetary Union........................................... 7.1.1 Is an Optimal Monetary Union Possible?........................ Ί. 1.2 Is Insulation Within a Monetary Union Possible? ........... 7.1.3 The Issue of Dominant Policy .......................................... 7.1.4 The Policy Trilemma of a Monetary Union..................... 7.2 Lessons
from a Simple Model....................................................... 7.2.1 Modelling the Policy Mix................................... 7.2.2 Institutional Options......................................................... 7.2.3 Calculation of Expected Losses........................................ 7.2.4 Comparison of Options..................................................... 7.3 Conclusion............................................................... References............................... 233 234 234 237 239 242 243 243 245 246 251 253 271 6.3 7 Part ІП Toward an Ever Closer Union 8 Structural Adjustments and Reforms ................................................. 275 8.1 Understanding Structural Reforms................................................ 276 8.1.1 Market Reforms.............................................................. 279 8.1.2 Public Sector Reforms..................................................... 281 8.1.3 Structural Reforms and External Constraints................. 282 8.1.4 The Macroeconomic Impact of Structural Reforms....... 287 8.1.5 Structural Reforms and Macroeconomic Policy............. 288 8.2 The Challenge of Structural Reforms in a Monetary Union........... 289 8.2.1 External Constraint in a Monetary Union............ 289 8.2.2 The Macroeconomics of Structural Reforms in a Monetary Union................................................ 291 8.3 Implementing Structural Reforms................................................. 293 8.3.1 National Structural Reforms............................................ 294 8.3.2 Multi-National
Structural Reforms.................................. 295
Contents xxiii A Simple Model for Structural Reforms in a Monetary Union .... 8.4.1 Demand and Monopolistic Competition............................ 8.4.2 Labour Markets................................................................... 8.4.3 The Structural Configuration of Monetary Union............. 8.4.4 Equilibria.............................................................................. 8.4.5 Domestic Structural Reforms and the External Balance.................................................................. 305 8.4.6 Structural Reforms at the Union Level.............................. 8.4.7 Additional Remarks............................................................ 8.5 Conclusion.......................................................................................... References...................................................................................................... 297 298 299 301 302 9 Fiscal Union................................................................................................. 9.1 What Is a Fiscal Union?..................................................................... 9.1.1 Why a Fiscal Union?.......................................................... 9.1.2 Fiscal Union Between Integration and Differentiation ... 9.1.3 Sovereignty and Fiscal Union............................................. 9.1.4 International Transfers........................................................ 9.1.5 Policy Dominance . .............................................................. 9.2 International Fiscal
Cooperation....................................................... 9.3 Fiscal Federalism................................................................................ 9.3.1 Macroeconomic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism................ 9.3.2 Fiscal Federalism in Practice.............................................. 9.4 Fiscal Federalism or Inter-Governmental Cooperation?................. 9.5 Opportunistic Behaviour and Fiscal Union..................................... 9.6 Fiscal Unionand Public Debt................................................ 9.6.1 Mutualization of Public Debt............................................. 9.6.2 The Economics of Mutual Bonds....................................... 9.6.3 Implementing Mutual Bonds............................................... 9.7 Assessing a Fiscal Union ................................................................. 9.7.1 Financial Solvency .............................................................. 9.7.2 Economic Cohesion............................................................ 9.7.3 Political Consensus................................................... 9.7.4 Creating a Fiscal Union...................................................... 9.8 Conclusion.......................................................................................... References...................................................................................................... 319 320 320 321 322 323 323 324 327 328 329 332 334 339 339 340 345 347 347 349 350 351 353 354 10 Banking
Union............................................................................................. 10.1 Why a Banking Union?..................................................................... 10.2 Banking Fragility................................................................................ 10.2.1 Bank Failures and the Notion of Lender of Last Resort.................................................................... 359 10.2.2 Banking Panics and Deposit Insurance............................. 10.3 Banking Regulation............................................................................ 355 356 359 8.4 313 313 314 316 360 361
xxiv 11 Contents 10.4 Banking Integration in a Monetary Union.................................... 10.4.1 The Stability of the Payment System in a Monetary Union............................ 10.4.2 International Finance and Monetary Union.................... 10.4.3 Structural Heterogeneity and Banking Fragility............. 10.4.4 Banking Panics in a Monetary Union.............................. 10.4.5 Home Bias....................................................................... 10.4.6 The Triangle of Financial Impossibility in a Monetary Union................................................ 10.5 Banking Union and Regulation..................................................... 10.5.1 Going Beyond Banking Sovereignty............................. 10.5.2 Supervision.................................................................... 10.5.3 Resolution....................................................................... 10.5.4 Deposit Insurance........................................................... 10.6 Establishing a Banking Union....................................................... 10.6.1 Regulatory Federalism or Cooperation.......................... 10.6.2 The Banking Union Between Integration and Subsidiarity....................................................... 10.6.3 Banking Union Politics................................................... 10.7 Banking Union and Central Banking............................................. 10.7.1 Banking Union and Monetary Policy.............................. 10.7.2 The Role of the Central Bank in Supervision................ 10.7.3
The Role of the Central Bank in Resolving the Crisis .... 10.7.4 The Role of the Central Bank in Deposit Insurance...... 10.7.5 Monetary Policy Versus Macroprudential Policy?......... 10.8 Conclusion....................................................... References................................................................................................. 380 382 384 384 386 387 389 389 391 393 The Fate of a Monetary Union ............................................................ 11.1 Creating a Monetary Union........................................................... 11.1.1 Why Creating a Monetary Union?................................... 11.1.2 When and How Forming a Monetary Union?.................. 11.2 The Transformation of a Monetary Union.................................... 11.2.1 Economic Transformation................................................ 11.2.2 Social Transformation...................................................... 11.2.3 Institutional Transformation........................................... 11.2.4 The American Example................................................... 11.3 Joining a Monetary Union............................................................. 11.4 Exiting a Monetary Union............................................................ 11.4.1 Causes of Exit from a Monetary Union.......................... 11.4.2 The Consequences of Exit................................................ 11.4.3 How to Leave?................................................................. 395 396 396 399 405 406 408 409 410 412 414 414 416 420 364 365
366 368 369 370 372 373 373 375 375 378 379 379
Contents 12 xxv 11.5 Death of a Monetary Union.............................................................. 11.5.1 The Causes of the End of a Monetary Union.................... 11.5.2 How a Monetary Union Ends............................................ 11.5.3 Post-monetary Union for Member Countries.................. 11.6 Conclusion.......................................................................................... References...................................................................................................... 422 422 424 424 425 427 General Conclusion ................................................................................... 12.1 What Have We Learned?................................................................... 12.2 Monetary Union, a Total Economic Fact......................................... 12.3 Collective Choices in a Monetary Union......................................... 12.4 Monetary Union and Politics: Between Sovereignty and Cooperation..................................................................... 438 References...................................................................................................... 429 429 432 434 440 Index....................................................................................................................... 441
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Contents Part I 1 2 Monetary Issues Monetary Unions: Between International Trade and National Sovereignty. 1.1 Monetary Sovereignty. 1.1.1 The Circulation of Currency. 1.1.2 Monetary Unions. 1.1.3 Monetary Sovereignty in Monetary Unions. 1.1.4 Monetary Unions in History . 1.2 Currencies, Foreign Exchange andInternational Payments. 1.2.1 Currency Plurality and External Constraints. 1.2.2 Monetary Union and the External Constraint. 1.2.3 Currency Area and Monetary Union: What Is the Difference? . 1.3 The Rules of the Game of a Monetary Union. 1.3.1 International Monetary Systems. 1.3.2 Multi-National Monetary Union as an International Monetary System. 1.4 Conclusion. References. Why a Monetary Union?. 2.1 Assessing a Monetary Union. 2.1.1
Methodological Preliminaries. 2.1.2 The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas. 2.1.3 Subsequent Contributions. 2.1.4 Monetary Union, Expectations, and Credibility. 2.2 The Membership of a Monetary Union. 2.2.1 Why Joining a Monetary Union? . . 2.2.2 Why Accepting a New Entrant?. 2.2.3 The Special Case of Dollarization. З 4 4 6 10 11 17 17 23 28 30 30 32 36 36 39 40 40 41 44 50 55 56 58 59 xix
Contents XX 2.3 Changes Induced by a Monetary Union. 2.3.1 Microeconomic Effects. 2.3.2 Macroeconomic Effects. 2.3.3 Financial Effects. 2.4 Conclusion. References. 3 4 Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Lessons from Simple Models. 3.1 Monetary Policy. 3.1.1 Monetary Policy in a Unified Economy. 3.1.2 Monetary Instruments. 3.2 Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union. 3.2.1 Preference Functions of the Central Bank. 3.2.2 Heterogeneity and Monetary Policy. 3.2.3 Monetary Policy and Nominal Rigidities in the Monetary Union. 90 3.2.4 Taylor Rule and Indicators of Misalignment. 3.2.5 Misalignment Indicators in the European Case. 3.3 A Simple Model of Monetary Union. 3.3.1 A Monetary Union. 3.3.2 Central Bank
Preferences. 3.3.3 The Monetary Policy Decision. 3.4 Traded Goods, Terms of Trade and Monetary Policy . 3.4.1 With a Union-Wide Loss Function. 3.4.2 With a Summation Loss Function . 3.4.3 With Asymmetry . 3.5 Non-conventional Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union . 3.5.1 From Conventional to Non-conventional Policy. 3.5.2 Non-conventional Policy in Monetary Union. 3.6 Conclusion. References. Institutions and Monetary Policy. 4.1 Rule or Discretion in a Monetary Union. 4.1.1 Expectations and Monetary Policy in a Simple Economy. 123 4.1.2 Rule or Discretion?. 4.1.3 Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union with Direct Negotiation. 4.1.4 A Variant with Asymmetric Anchoring. 4.2 Central Bank Independence. 4.2.1 What Is Meant by Independence?. 4.2.2 Central Bank Independence in a Monetary Union. 4.2.3
Delegation in a Monetary Union. 60 61 63 69 71 73 77 79 79 81 84 85 88 91 93 96 96 97 99 102 103 104 105 106 106 108 Ill 119 121 122 124 128 130 134 135 136 137
Contents xxi The Collegiality of the Monetary Decision. . 4.3.1 The Monetary Policy Committee. 4.3.2 The Monetary Policy Committee in a Monetary Union. 146 4.4 Communication and Accountability. 4.4.1 Between Transparency and Opacity. 4.4.2 Accountability. 4.5Financial Crises and the Lender-of-Last-Resort Function. 4.6 Conclusion. References. 4.3 Part II 5 6 144 144 151 151 154 156 158 163 Fiscal Issues Government Deficits, Transfers and Debts. 5.1 Government Deficits and Public Debts in a Monetary Union. 5.1.1 The Budget Constraint of a Member State of a Monetary Union. 169 5.1.2 The Constraint of the Federal Treasury. 5.1.3 Central Bank Accounts. 5.1.4 Public Accounts and Monetary Union. 5.1.5 Budget Constraints in Real Terms. 5.2 The Sustainability of Public Debts in a Monetary Union. 5.2.1 The Sustainability of a Member Country’s Debt. 5.2.2
Sustainability of the Federal Treasury Debt. 5.2.3 The Consolidated Sustainability of a MonetaryUnion . 5.3 Debt Sustainability and Sovereign Default in a Monetary Union. 182 5.3.1 Default and Renegotiation of the Public Debt. 5.3.2 Budget Constraints Including Default Possibility. 5.3.3 Sovereign Default in a Monetary Union. 5.4 Market and Institutional Disciplines . 5.4.1 Market Discipline. 5.4.2 Institutional Discipline in a Monetary Union. 5.4.3 Separating Disciplines?. 5.5 Conclusion. References. Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union. 6.1 Fiscal Effects in a Monetary Union. 6.1.1 The International Effects of Fiscal Impulses. 6.1.2 Cross-Border Effects of Fiscal Impulses in Monetary Union. 199 6.2 Stabilization Policies in a Monetary Union. 6.2.1 The Functions of Fiscal Policy. 6.2.2 The Conduct of
Fiscal Policies. 167 168 171 172 173 175 178 178 180 181 183 183 185 187 188 190 193 194 195 197 198 198 201 201 204
xxii Contents Fiscal Impulses and Transmission Mechanisms in a Monetary Union. 205 6.3.1 Fiscal Multipliers. 6.3.2 The Macroeconomic Impact of Fiscal Policies. 6.3.3 Macroeconomic Stabilization and Transfers. 6.4 Fiscal Policies and External Balances. 6.4.1 Fiscal Devaluations. 6.4.2 National Fiscal Policies and Tax Competition. 6.5 Fiscal Rules. 6.5.1 The Properties of a “Good” Fiscal Rule. 6.5.2 Types of Rules. 6.5.3 Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union. 6.6 Conclusion. References. •* 206 208 218 220 220 223 225 225 226 228 230 230 The Policy Mix. 7.1 The Policy Mix in a Monetary Union. 7.1.1 Is an Optimal Monetary Union Possible?. Ί. 1.2 Is Insulation Within a Monetary Union Possible? . 7.1.3 The Issue of Dominant Policy . 7.1.4 The Policy Trilemma of a Monetary Union. 7.2 Lessons
from a Simple Model. 7.2.1 Modelling the Policy Mix. 7.2.2 Institutional Options. 7.2.3 Calculation of Expected Losses. 7.2.4 Comparison of Options. 7.3 Conclusion. References. 233 234 234 237 239 242 243 243 245 246 251 253 271 6.3 7 Part ІП Toward an Ever Closer Union 8 Structural Adjustments and Reforms . 275 8.1 Understanding Structural Reforms. 276 8.1.1 Market Reforms. 279 8.1.2 Public Sector Reforms. 281 8.1.3 Structural Reforms and External Constraints. 282 8.1.4 The Macroeconomic Impact of Structural Reforms. 287 8.1.5 Structural Reforms and Macroeconomic Policy. 288 8.2 The Challenge of Structural Reforms in a Monetary Union. 289 8.2.1 External Constraint in a Monetary Union. 289 8.2.2 The Macroeconomics of Structural Reforms in a Monetary Union. 291 8.3 Implementing Structural Reforms. 293 8.3.1 National Structural Reforms. 294 8.3.2 Multi-National
Structural Reforms. 295
Contents xxiii A Simple Model for Structural Reforms in a Monetary Union . 8.4.1 Demand and Monopolistic Competition. 8.4.2 Labour Markets. 8.4.3 The Structural Configuration of Monetary Union. 8.4.4 Equilibria. 8.4.5 Domestic Structural Reforms and the External Balance. 305 8.4.6 Structural Reforms at the Union Level. 8.4.7 Additional Remarks. 8.5 Conclusion. References. 297 298 299 301 302 9 Fiscal Union. 9.1 What Is a Fiscal Union?. 9.1.1 Why a Fiscal Union?. 9.1.2 Fiscal Union Between Integration and Differentiation . 9.1.3 Sovereignty and Fiscal Union. 9.1.4 International Transfers. 9.1.5 Policy Dominance . . 9.2 International Fiscal
Cooperation. 9.3 Fiscal Federalism. 9.3.1 Macroeconomic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism. 9.3.2 Fiscal Federalism in Practice. 9.4 Fiscal Federalism or Inter-Governmental Cooperation?. 9.5 Opportunistic Behaviour and Fiscal Union. 9.6 Fiscal Unionand Public Debt. 9.6.1 Mutualization of Public Debt. 9.6.2 The Economics of Mutual Bonds. 9.6.3 Implementing Mutual Bonds. 9.7 Assessing a Fiscal Union . 9.7.1 Financial Solvency . 9.7.2 Economic Cohesion. 9.7.3 Political Consensus. 9.7.4 Creating a Fiscal Union. 9.8 Conclusion. References. 319 320 320 321 322 323 323 324 327 328 329 332 334 339 339 340 345 347 347 349 350 351 353 354 10 Banking
Union. 10.1 Why a Banking Union?. 10.2 Banking Fragility. 10.2.1 Bank Failures and the Notion of Lender of Last Resort. 359 10.2.2 Banking Panics and Deposit Insurance. 10.3 Banking Regulation. 355 356 359 8.4 313 313 314 316 360 361
xxiv 11 Contents 10.4 Banking Integration in a Monetary Union. 10.4.1 The Stability of the Payment System in a Monetary Union. 10.4.2 International Finance and Monetary Union. 10.4.3 Structural Heterogeneity and Banking Fragility. 10.4.4 Banking Panics in a Monetary Union. 10.4.5 Home Bias. 10.4.6 The Triangle of Financial Impossibility in a Monetary Union. 10.5 Banking Union and Regulation. 10.5.1 Going Beyond Banking Sovereignty. 10.5.2 Supervision. 10.5.3 Resolution. 10.5.4 Deposit Insurance. 10.6 Establishing a Banking Union. 10.6.1 Regulatory Federalism or Cooperation. 10.6.2 The Banking Union Between Integration and Subsidiarity. 10.6.3 Banking Union Politics. 10.7 Banking Union and Central Banking. 10.7.1 Banking Union and Monetary Policy. 10.7.2 The Role of the Central Bank in Supervision. 10.7.3
The Role of the Central Bank in Resolving the Crisis . 10.7.4 The Role of the Central Bank in Deposit Insurance. 10.7.5 Monetary Policy Versus Macroprudential Policy?. 10.8 Conclusion. References. 380 382 384 384 386 387 389 389 391 393 The Fate of a Monetary Union . 11.1 Creating a Monetary Union. 11.1.1 Why Creating a Monetary Union?. 11.1.2 When and How Forming a Monetary Union?. 11.2 The Transformation of a Monetary Union. 11.2.1 Economic Transformation. 11.2.2 Social Transformation. 11.2.3 Institutional Transformation. 11.2.4 The American Example. 11.3 Joining a Monetary Union. 11.4 Exiting a Monetary Union. 11.4.1 Causes of Exit from a Monetary Union. 11.4.2 The Consequences of Exit. 11.4.3 How to Leave?. 395 396 396 399 405 406 408 409 410 412 414 414 416 420 364 365
366 368 369 370 372 373 373 375 375 378 379 379
Contents 12 xxv 11.5 Death of a Monetary Union. 11.5.1 The Causes of the End of a Monetary Union. 11.5.2 How a Monetary Union Ends. 11.5.3 Post-monetary Union for Member Countries. 11.6 Conclusion. References. 422 422 424 424 425 427 General Conclusion . 12.1 What Have We Learned?. 12.2 Monetary Union, a Total Economic Fact. 12.3 Collective Choices in a Monetary Union. 12.4 Monetary Union and Politics: Between Sovereignty and Cooperation. 438 References. 429 429 432 434 440 Index. 441 |
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| id | DE-604.BV048255442 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:58:16Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:33:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783030932312 |
| issn | 2192-4333 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033635689 |
| oclc_num | 1335396736 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-384 DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-384 DE-11 |
| physical | xxv, 443 Seiten Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Springer texts in business and economics |
| spelling | Kempf, Hubert 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)129292672 aut Monetary unions institutions and policies Hubert Kempf Cham Springer [2022] xxv, 443 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Springer texts in business and economics 2192-4333 Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics International Economics Political Economy and Economic Systems Public Economics Macroeconomics International economic relations Economics Finance, Public Währungsunion (DE-588)4188829-7 gnd rswk-swf Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd rswk-swf Währungsunion (DE-588)4188829-7 s Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-3-030-93232-9 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033635689&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Kempf, Hubert 1953- Monetary unions institutions and policies Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics International Economics Political Economy and Economic Systems Public Economics Macroeconomics International economic relations Economics Finance, Public Währungsunion (DE-588)4188829-7 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4188829-7 (DE-588)4019902-2 |
| title | Monetary unions institutions and policies |
| title_auth | Monetary unions institutions and policies |
| title_exact_search | Monetary unions institutions and policies |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Monetary unions institutions and policies |
| title_full | Monetary unions institutions and policies Hubert Kempf |
| title_fullStr | Monetary unions institutions and policies Hubert Kempf |
| title_full_unstemmed | Monetary unions institutions and policies Hubert Kempf |
| title_short | Monetary unions |
| title_sort | monetary unions institutions and policies |
| title_sub | institutions and policies |
| topic | Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics International Economics Political Economy and Economic Systems Public Economics Macroeconomics International economic relations Economics Finance, Public Währungsunion (DE-588)4188829-7 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics International Economics Political Economy and Economic Systems Public Economics Macroeconomics International economic relations Economics Finance, Public Währungsunion Geldpolitik |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033635689&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kempfhubert monetaryunionsinstitutionsandpolicies |