Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability:
"The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. Both sides are mutually vulnerable to retaliation, and thus have no incentive to strike first. Yet the United States has develope...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
RAND Corporation
[2022]
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| Schriftenreihe: | Research reports
RR-A1094-1 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext Literaturverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. Both sides are mutually vulnerable to retaliation, and thus have no incentive to strike first. Yet the United States has developed significant prompt counterforce capabilities that Moscow fears could be used for a first strike. These threat perceptions have become a significant source of instability in recent years. The authors examine the historical origins of this dynamic and its impact on bilateral stability. They also evaluate possible policy changes that could mitigate that impact. The authors identify significant consequences for the United States that could arise from Russia's growing concerns about its ability to retaliate, such as Moscow's development of a suite of novel capabilities to address this issue and the potential crisis instability resulting from use-them-or-lose-them fears. Although these negative consequences are significant, they should be weighed against the benefits provided by current U.S. posture that are documented by the authors. The report outlines self-restraint measures--that the United States and Russia could take either together or unilaterally but in coordination--that would provide a degree of reassurance about the parties' lack of intention to execute a preemptive counterforce strike by complicating the ability to carry out such a strike on short notice. These modest steps could mitigate the negative consequences of current approaches without any dramatic changes in force structure, posture, or even employment policy. The stabilizing effect of these steps, however, could be significant."--Publisher's description |
| Beschreibung: | xiii, 72 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9781977407054 |
| DOI: | 10.7249/RRA1094-1 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Introduction -- A brief history -- Defining the problem -- U.S. policy considerations -- Possible policy changes -- Conclusion | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. Both sides are mutually vulnerable to retaliation, and thus have no incentive to strike first. Yet the United States has developed significant prompt counterforce capabilities that Moscow fears could be used for a first strike. These threat perceptions have become a significant source of instability in recent years. The authors examine the historical origins of this dynamic and its impact on bilateral stability. They also evaluate possible policy changes that could mitigate that impact. The authors identify significant consequences for the United States that could arise from Russia's growing concerns about its ability to retaliate, such as Moscow's development of a suite of novel capabilities to address this issue and the potential crisis instability resulting from use-them-or-lose-them fears. Although these negative consequences are significant, they should be weighed against the benefits provided by current U.S. posture that are documented by the authors. The report outlines self-restraint measures--that the United States and Russia could take either together or unilaterally but in coordination--that would provide a degree of reassurance about the parties' lack of intention to execute a preemptive counterforce strike by complicating the ability to carry out such a strike on short notice. These modest steps could mitigate the negative consequences of current approaches without any dramatic changes in force structure, posture, or even employment policy. The stabilizing effect of these steps, however, could be significant."--Publisher's description | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | References Akhmerov, D. E., E. N. Akhmerov, and Μ. G. Valeev, “Uyazvimosť kontseptsii neyadernogo razoruzheniya strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii,” Vestnik Akademii voennykh nauk, No. 1, 2016, pp. 37-41. Anderson, Justin, “Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War (Cont.),” Arms Control Wonk, blog post, May 11, 2016. As of October 1, 2020: https://www.armscontroIwonk.com/archiveZ1201365/ nuclear-weapons-and-the-laws-of-war-cont/ Andryushin, I. A., A. K. Chernyshev, and Yu. A. Yudin, Ukroshchenie yadra: Stranitsy istoriiyadernogo oruzhiya iyadernoi infrastruktury SSSR, Sarov, Russia: Tipografiya «Krasnyi Oktyabr’», 2003. Anin [Antonov], Anatoly, “Vliyanie strategicheskikh nastupatel’nykh vooruzhenii v neyadernom osnashchenii nastrategicheskuyu stabilnost’,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, No. 6, 2011, pp. 45-55. Anin [Antonov], Anatoly, “Pro Ssha—podryvayushchii doverie potentsial,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, No. 3, 2012, pp. 12-19. Arbatov, Alexei G., and Vladimir Dvorkin, “The Impact of MIRVs and Counterforce Targeting on the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship,” in Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason, eds-, The Lure and Pitfalls ofMIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2016, pp. 55-93. Arbatov, Alexei G., Vladimir Z. Dvorkin, and Sergei K. Oznobishchev, eds., Rossiya i dilemmy yadernogo razoruzheniya, Moscow, Russia: Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012. Blair, Bruce G., “De-Alerting Strategic Nuclear Forces,” in Harold A.
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66 Mitigating Challenges to U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Blair, Bruce G., with Jessica Sleigh and Emma Clare Foley, The End ofNuclear Warfighting: Moving to a Deterrence-Only Posture: An Alternative U. S. Nuclear Posture Review, Princeton, N.J.: Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2018. Boitsov, Markell, “Terminologiya v voennoi doktrine,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, October 31, 2014. As of October 1, 2020: https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2014-10-31/10_doctrina.html Brezkun, S. T., Meeh ili vesyl Yadernyifaktor vprobleme voiny i mira, Sarov, Russia: FGUP «RFYaTs-VNIIEF», 2016. Brown, Seyom, “The New Nuclear MADness,” Survival, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2020. Buchan, Glenn, David Μ. Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1231-AF, 2003. As of May 20, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1231.html Burenok, V. Μ., and Yu. A. Pechatnov, “O kriterial’nykh osnovakh yadernogo sderzhivaniya,” Vooruzheniya i ekonomika, No. 1, 2013, pp. 21-30. Burr, William, “The ‘Launch on Warning’ Nuclear Strategy and Its Insider Critics,” National Security Archive webpage, June 11, 2019. As of October 1, 2020: https.7/nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2019-06-ll/ launch-warning-nuclear-strategy-its-insider-critics Burutin, A. G., G. N. Vinokurov, V. Μ. Loborev, S. F. Pertsev, and Yu. A, Podkorytov, “Kontseptsiya nepriemlemogo ushcherba: genezis, osnovnye prichiny transformatsii, sovremennoe sostoyanie,” Vooruzhenie. Politika. Konversiya,
No. 4, 2010, pp. 3-8. “D. Rogozin: SShA za pervye chasy voiny mogut unichtozhiť 90% raket RF,” ÄBÅiJune 28, 2013. Dunlap, Charles J., Jr., “Taming Shiva: Applying International Law to Nuclear Operations,” Air Force Law Review, Vol. 42, 1997, pp. 157—171. As of October 1, 2020: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?referer= httpsredir=l article=5202 context=faculty_scholarship Dvorkin, Vladimir, and Aleksei Produkin, Povesť о 4 TsNII MO iyadernoi sderzhivanii, Yubileinyi, Russia: PTSM, 2009. Enthoven, Alain C., and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961—1969, New York: Harper Row, 1971. Freedman, Lawrence, and Jeffrey Michaels, The Evolution ofNuclear Strategy, 4th ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Gaddis, John, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal ofAmerican National Security Policy During the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
References 67 Gaddis, John, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, Spring 1986, pp. 99-142. Gavin, Francis J., Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012. Geist, Edward, Armageddon Insurance: Civil Defense in the United States and Soviet Union, 1945-1991, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2019. Geist, Edward, and Dara Massicot, “Understanding Putin’s Nuclear ‘Superweapons,’” SAIS Review ofInternational Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2019, pp. 103-117. Glaser, Charles L., Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. Glaser, Charles L., and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy Toward China,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer 2016, pp. 49-98. Green, Brendan Rittenhouse, and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2017, pp. 606-641. Grönlund, Lisbeth, and David C. Wright, “Depressed Trajectory SLBMs: A Technical Evaluation and Arms Control Possibilities,” Science Global Security, Vol. 3, Nos. 1-2, 1992, pp. 101-159. Harvey, John R., “Assessing the Risks of a Nuclear ‘No First Use’ Policy,” War on the Rocks, July 5, 2019. As of July 28, 2020: https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/ assessing-the-risks-of-a-nuclear֊no-first-use-policy/ Hersman, Rebecca, William Caplan, and Bert Thompson, “Bad Idea: De-Alert U.S. ICBMs,”
DefenseSCO, December 14, 2017. As of October 1, 2020: https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-de-alert-u-s-icbms/ Hines, John, Ellis Μ. Mishulovich, and John F. Shulle, Soviet Intentions 19651985, Vol. 1, An Analytical Comparison of U.S.-Soviet Assessments During the Cold War, McLean, Va.: BDM Federal, 1995. Jervis, Robert, The Illogic ofAmerican Nuclear Strategy, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. Kahn, Hermann, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. Kaplan, Fred, The Wizards ofArmageddon, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. Kaplan, Fred, The Bomb, New York: Simon Schuster, 2020. Kaplan, Lawrence, Ronald Landa, and Edward Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.
68 Mitigating Challenges to U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Kaufmann, William, The McNamara Strategy, New York: Harper Row, 1964. Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink, and Jeffrey Edmonds, Russian Strategyfor Escalation Management: Evolution ofKey Concepts, Washington, D.C.: CNA, April 2020. Kokoshin, A. A., “Asimmetrichnyi otvet norner odin,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 27, 2007. As of October 3, 2019: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2007-07-27/4_otvet.html Kokoshin, A. A., ed., Vliyanie tekhnologicheskikh faktorov na parametry ugroz natsional’noi i mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti, voennykh konfliktov i strategicheskoi stabilnosti, Moscow, Russia: Izdateľstvo MGU, 2017. Kovalev, V. I., “Yadernoe oruzhie i sreda bezopasnosti Rossii v XXI veke,” Strategicheskaya stabiľnosť, No. 3, 2014, pp. 14-22. Kozyulin, Vadim, “Soedinennye Shtaty na puti к strategicheskoi neuyazvimosti,” Russian International Affairs Council webpage, July 1, 2020. As of October 1, 2020: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ soedinennye-shtaty-na-puti-k-strategicheskoy-neuyazvimosti/ Krasnoslobodtsev, V. P., A. V. Raskin, S. S. Savel’ev, and O. S. Kupach, “Analiz vozmozhnosti po realizatsii SShA kontseptsii bystrogo global’nogo udara,” Strategicheskaya stabiľnosť, No. 2, 2014, pp. 67-79. Krepon, Michael, and Travis Wheeler, “Introduction,” The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2016, pp. 13-17. Kristensen, Hans Μ., and Matt Korda, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 76, No. 2, 2020b.
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References 71 Pronin, Aleksandr, “Gonka za globalnym prevoskhodstvom,” Rossiiskoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 4, April 2013, pp. 55-58. “Putin: Rossii nel’zya isklyuchat’ opasnost’ naneseniya obezoruzhivayushchego udara,” Vzglyad, June 19, 2013. As of October 1, 2020: https://vz.rU/news/2013/6/19/637894.html Ramoshkina, N. P., “Shirokomashtabnaya PRO SShA: Na puti к sozdaniyu ‘pol’notsennoi’ protivoraketnoi oborony,” Strategicheskaya stabilnosť, No. 2, 2018, pp. 12—21. Ravenal, Earl C., “Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 26-43. Richard, Theodore, “Nuclear Weapons Targeting: The Evolution of Law and U.S. Policy,” Military Law Review, Vol. 224, No. 4, 2016, pp. 862-974. Rogov, S., V. Esin, and P. Zolotarev, “Eksperty predlagayut kompleks mer doveriya po strategicheskim vooruzheniyam,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 2, 2004. Rogov, S., V. Esin, and P. Zolotaryov, Ό kachestvennoi transformatsii rossiisko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii v strategicheskoi oblasti,” Rossiiskii sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam (RSMD) Rabochaya tetrad , No. 7, 2013. Rogov, S., P. Zolotarev, V. Kuznetsov, and V. Esin, “Strategicheskayastabilnost’ i yadernoe razoruzhenie vXXI veke,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, November 16, 2012. Russian Ministry of Defense, “Nepriemlemyi ushcherb,” webpage, undated. As of October 1, 2020: http://dictionary.mil.ru/dictionary/Terminy-RVSN/item/141687/ Sagan, Scott D., “The Case for No First Use,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2009, pp. 163—182. “SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust: Conference #2 of the
Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S. and Russian Policymakers and Scholars Held at Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia 6-9 May 1994,” transcript, excerpt of May 7, Morning Session, National Security Archive, undated. As of October 1, 2020: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nukevault/ebb285/doc03.PDF Shapley, Deborah, Promise and Power: The Life and Times ofRobert McNamara, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993. Siver, S. V, V. D. Roldugin, and N. N. Tatsyshin, “Metodicheskii podkhod к analizu boevoi ustoichivosti perspektivno! gruppirovki RVSN v usloviyakh vliyaniya faktorov neopredelennogo kharaktera,” Strategicheskaya stabiľnosť, No. 3, 2018, pp. 22-25.
72 Mitigating Challenges to U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Sterlin, A. E., A. A. Protasov, and S. V. Kreidin, “Sovremennye kontseptsii i silovykh instrumentov strategicheskogo sderzhivaniya,” Voennaya mysl’. No. 8, 2019. As of October 17, 2019: https://vm.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/203864/ Terriff, Terry, The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. Tetrais, Bruno, “The Trouble with No First Use,” in “Forum: The Case for No First Use: An Exchange,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, October-November 2009, pp. 23-26. Tomilenko, Ekaterina, “Opasnym kursom,” Krasnaya zvezda, October 11, 2016. As of October 1, 2020: http://archive.redstar.ru/index.php/component/k2/item/30774-opasnym-kursom United States and Soviet Union, Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, June 1, 1990, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library website, undated. As of October 1, 2020: https://bush411ibrary.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/1938 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010. As of October 1, 2010: https://dod.defense.gOv/Portals/l/features/defenseReviews/NPR/ 2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C., Washington, D.C., June 12, 2013. As of October 1, 2020: http://fas.org/man/eprint/employ.pdf U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, Washington, D.C., February 2018. As of May 4, 2020:
https://media.defense.gOv/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-l/-l/l/ 2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF U.S. Department of State, Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America Before the International Court of Justice, June 10, 1994. As of October 1, 2020: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/93/8770.pdf U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” fact sheet, December 1, 2020 “V Genshtabe rasskazali о tselyakh sozdaniya amerikanskoi sistemy PRO,” RIA-Novosti, April 24, 2019. As of October 1, 2020: https://ria.ru/20190424/1553009169.html?in=t Wolfe, Johnny, “Statement of Vice Admiral Johnny Wolf, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, on FY 2022 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defense Activities,” before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., May 12, 2021. Г--------- ■---------Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
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References Akhmerov, D. E., E. N. Akhmerov, and Μ. G. Valeev, “Uyazvimosť kontseptsii neyadernogo razoruzheniya strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii,” Vestnik Akademii voennykh nauk, No. 1, 2016, pp. 37-41. Anderson, Justin, “Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War (Cont.),” Arms Control Wonk, blog post, May 11, 2016. As of October 1, 2020: https://www.armscontroIwonk.com/archiveZ1201365/ nuclear-weapons-and-the-laws-of-war-cont/ Andryushin, I. A., A. K. Chernyshev, and Yu. A. Yudin, Ukroshchenie yadra: Stranitsy istoriiyadernogo oruzhiya iyadernoi infrastruktury SSSR, Sarov, Russia: Tipografiya «Krasnyi Oktyabr’», 2003. Anin [Antonov], Anatoly, “Vliyanie strategicheskikh nastupatel’nykh vooruzhenii v neyadernom osnashchenii nastrategicheskuyu stabilnost’,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, No. 6, 2011, pp. 45-55. Anin [Antonov], Anatoly, “Pro Ssha—podryvayushchii doverie potentsial,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, No. 3, 2012, pp. 12-19. Arbatov, Alexei G., and Vladimir Dvorkin, “The Impact of MIRVs and Counterforce Targeting on the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship,” in Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason, eds-, The Lure and Pitfalls ofMIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2016, pp. 55-93. Arbatov, Alexei G., Vladimir Z. Dvorkin, and Sergei K. Oznobishchev, eds., Rossiya i dilemmy yadernogo razoruzheniya, Moscow, Russia: Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012. Blair, Bruce G., “De-Alerting Strategic Nuclear Forces,” in Harold A.
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66 Mitigating Challenges to U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Blair, Bruce G., with Jessica Sleigh and Emma Clare Foley, The End ofNuclear Warfighting: Moving to a Deterrence-Only Posture: An Alternative U. S. Nuclear Posture Review, Princeton, N.J.: Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2018. Boitsov, Markell, “Terminologiya v voennoi doktrine,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, October 31, 2014. As of October 1, 2020: https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2014-10-31/10_doctrina.html Brezkun, S. T., Meeh ili vesyl Yadernyifaktor vprobleme voiny i mira, Sarov, Russia: FGUP «RFYaTs-VNIIEF», 2016. Brown, Seyom, “The New Nuclear MADness,” Survival, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2020. Buchan, Glenn, David Μ. Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1231-AF, 2003. As of May 20, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1231.html Burenok, V. Μ., and Yu. A. Pechatnov, “O kriterial’nykh osnovakh yadernogo sderzhivaniya,” Vooruzheniya i ekonomika, No. 1, 2013, pp. 21-30. Burr, William, “The ‘Launch on Warning’ Nuclear Strategy and Its Insider Critics,” National Security Archive webpage, June 11, 2019. As of October 1, 2020: https.7/nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2019-06-ll/ launch-warning-nuclear-strategy-its-insider-critics Burutin, A. G., G. N. Vinokurov, V. Μ. Loborev, S. F. Pertsev, and Yu. A, Podkorytov, “Kontseptsiya nepriemlemogo ushcherba: genezis, osnovnye prichiny transformatsii, sovremennoe sostoyanie,” Vooruzhenie. Politika. Konversiya,
No. 4, 2010, pp. 3-8. “D. Rogozin: SShA za pervye chasy voiny mogut unichtozhiť 90% raket RF,” ÄBÅiJune 28, 2013. Dunlap, Charles J., Jr., “Taming Shiva: Applying International Law to Nuclear Operations,” Air Force Law Review, Vol. 42, 1997, pp. 157—171. As of October 1, 2020: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?referer= httpsredir=l article=5202 context=faculty_scholarship Dvorkin, Vladimir, and Aleksei Produkin, Povesť о 4 TsNII MO iyadernoi sderzhivanii, Yubileinyi, Russia: PTSM, 2009. Enthoven, Alain C., and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961—1969, New York: Harper Row, 1971. Freedman, Lawrence, and Jeffrey Michaels, The Evolution ofNuclear Strategy, 4th ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Gaddis, John, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal ofAmerican National Security Policy During the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
References 67 Gaddis, John, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, Spring 1986, pp. 99-142. Gavin, Francis J., Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012. Geist, Edward, Armageddon Insurance: Civil Defense in the United States and Soviet Union, 1945-1991, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2019. Geist, Edward, and Dara Massicot, “Understanding Putin’s Nuclear ‘Superweapons,’” SAIS Review ofInternational Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2019, pp. 103-117. Glaser, Charles L., Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. Glaser, Charles L., and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy Toward China,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer 2016, pp. 49-98. Green, Brendan Rittenhouse, and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2017, pp. 606-641. Grönlund, Lisbeth, and David C. Wright, “Depressed Trajectory SLBMs: A Technical Evaluation and Arms Control Possibilities,” Science Global Security, Vol. 3, Nos. 1-2, 1992, pp. 101-159. Harvey, John R., “Assessing the Risks of a Nuclear ‘No First Use’ Policy,” War on the Rocks, July 5, 2019. As of July 28, 2020: https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/ assessing-the-risks-of-a-nuclear֊no-first-use-policy/ Hersman, Rebecca, William Caplan, and Bert Thompson, “Bad Idea: De-Alert U.S. ICBMs,”
DefenseSCO, December 14, 2017. As of October 1, 2020: https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-de-alert-u-s-icbms/ Hines, John, Ellis Μ. Mishulovich, and John F. Shulle, Soviet Intentions 19651985, Vol. 1, An Analytical Comparison of U.S.-Soviet Assessments During the Cold War, McLean, Va.: BDM Federal, 1995. Jervis, Robert, The Illogic ofAmerican Nuclear Strategy, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. Kahn, Hermann, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. Kaplan, Fred, The Wizards ofArmageddon, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. Kaplan, Fred, The Bomb, New York: Simon Schuster, 2020. Kaplan, Lawrence, Ronald Landa, and Edward Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.
68 Mitigating Challenges to U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Kaufmann, William, The McNamara Strategy, New York: Harper Row, 1964. Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink, and Jeffrey Edmonds, Russian Strategyfor Escalation Management: Evolution ofKey Concepts, Washington, D.C.: CNA, April 2020. Kokoshin, A. A., “Asimmetrichnyi otvet norner odin,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 27, 2007. As of October 3, 2019: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2007-07-27/4_otvet.html Kokoshin, A. A., ed., Vliyanie tekhnologicheskikh faktorov na parametry ugroz natsional’noi i mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti, voennykh konfliktov i strategicheskoi stabilnosti, Moscow, Russia: Izdateľstvo MGU, 2017. Kovalev, V. I., “Yadernoe oruzhie i sreda bezopasnosti Rossii v XXI veke,” Strategicheskaya stabiľnosť, No. 3, 2014, pp. 14-22. Kozyulin, Vadim, “Soedinennye Shtaty na puti к strategicheskoi neuyazvimosti,” Russian International Affairs Council webpage, July 1, 2020. As of October 1, 2020: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ soedinennye-shtaty-na-puti-k-strategicheskoy-neuyazvimosti/ Krasnoslobodtsev, V. P., A. V. Raskin, S. S. Savel’ev, and O. S. Kupach, “Analiz vozmozhnosti po realizatsii SShA kontseptsii bystrogo global’nogo udara,” Strategicheskaya stabiľnosť, No. 2, 2014, pp. 67-79. Krepon, Michael, and Travis Wheeler, “Introduction,” The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2016, pp. 13-17. Kristensen, Hans Μ., and Matt Korda, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 76, No. 2, 2020b.
Kristensen, Hans Μ., and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists, Vol. 76, No. 1, 2020b, pp. 46—60. Kristensen, Hans Μ., Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists and The Natural Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper No. 7, April 2009. Lewis, Jeffrey, “Minimum Deterrence,” Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3, July/August 2008, pp. 38-41. Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4, Spring 2017, pp. 9-49. Lilly, Bilyana, Russian Foreign Policy Toward Missile Defense: Actors, Motivations, and Influence, Washington, D.C.: Lexington Books, 2014.
References 69 Long, Austin, Deterrence—From Cold War to Long War: Lessonsfrom Six Decades of RAND Research, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-636-OSD/AF, 2008. As of May 21, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG636.html Long, Austin, “Red Glare: The Origin and Implications of Russia’s ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons,” War on the Rocks, March 26, 2018. As of October 1, 2020: https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/ red-glare-the-origin-and-implications-of-russias-new-nuclear-weapons/ Long, Austin, and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal ofStrategic Studies, Vol. 38, Nos. 1-2, 2015, pp. 38-73. Mazarr, Michael J., “Beyond Counterforce,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1990, pp. 147-162. McDonnell, Timothy P., “Diplomatic Wallop”: Nixon and the Return of Counterforce, Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2018-3, April 6, 2018. As of October 1, 2020: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3157775 Miles, Aaron R., Implementing the Hedge Strategy in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Livermore, Calif: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research, January 17, 2019. As of October 1, 2020: https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/NPR_hedge_planning_final.pdf Mosher, David E., Lowell H. Schwartz, David R. Howell, and Lynn E. Davis, Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and U.S-Russian Relations, Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, MR-1666-NSRD, 2003. As of December 2, 2020:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1666.html Mozzhorin, Yu., Tak eto bylo: Memuary Yu. A. Mozzhorina, Moscow, Russia: ZAO Mezhdunarodnaya Programma Obrazovaniya, 2000. National Security Council, “Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” National Security Decision Memorandum 242, to Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 17, 1974. As of May 20, 2021: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdm-nixon/nsdm_242.pdf Office of General Counsel, Department ofDefense Law of War Manual, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2015. As of October 1, 2020: https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/law-of-war-manual-june-2015.pdf Office of Inspector General, Evaluation ofNuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) Sustainment, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, June 15, 2018. As of October 1, 2020: https://media.defense.gOv/2018/Jun/28/2001937172/-l/-l/l/ DODIG-2018-127.PDF
70 Mitigating Challenges to U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Panda, Ankit, ‘“No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations webpage, backgrounder, July 17, 2018. As of July 28, 2020: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons Payne, Keith B., “Strategic Hubris,” in “Forum: The Case for No First Use: An Exchange,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, October—November 2009, pp. 28-31. Payne, Keith B., and James Schlesinger, “Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 33, No. 1, February 2014. Pechatnov, Yu. A., “Analiz otechestvennykh i zarubezhnykh podkhodov к formirovaniyu kontseptsii i mekhanizma sderzhivaniya ot razvyazyvaniya voennoi agressii,” Vooruzheniya i ekonomika, No. 3, 2010. Pechatnov, Yu. A., “Teoriya sderzhivaniya: genezis,” Vooruzheniya i ekonomika, No. 2, 2016. Pifer, Steven, Missile Defense in Europe: Cooperation or Contention? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Arms Control Series Paper #8, May 2012. PIR-Tsentr, “Yadernyi ushcherb,” Yadernoe nerasprostranenine: Kratkaya entsiklopediya, undated. As of October 17, 2019: http://www.pircenter.org/sections/247-yadernyj-uscherb Podvig, Pavel, “Russia and Military Uses of Space,” in Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, eds., Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space, Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. As of October 1, 2020: https://www.amacad.org/publication/ russian-and-chinese-responses-us-military-plans-space/section/3 Podvig, Pavel, “The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the
1970s—A Research Note,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1, Summer 2008, pp. 118-138. Poznikhir, Viktor, speech given at the 8th Moscow International Security Conference, April 23, 2019. As of October 1, 2020: http://miI.ru/mcis/news/more.htm?id=12120794@cmsArticle President of Russia, Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, February 5, 2010. As of October 1, 2020: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/461 President of Russia, “Poslanie prezidenta federalnomu sobraniyu,” March 1, 2018. As of October 1, 2020: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 President of Russia, “Interview with Al Arabiya, Sky News Arabia and RT Arabic,” October 13, 2019. As of October 17, 2019: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61792
References 71 Pronin, Aleksandr, “Gonka za globalnym prevoskhodstvom,” Rossiiskoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 4, April 2013, pp. 55-58. “Putin: Rossii nel’zya isklyuchat’ opasnost’ naneseniya obezoruzhivayushchego udara,” Vzglyad, June 19, 2013. As of October 1, 2020: https://vz.rU/news/2013/6/19/637894.html Ramoshkina, N. P., “Shirokomashtabnaya PRO SShA: Na puti к sozdaniyu ‘pol’notsennoi’ protivoraketnoi oborony,” Strategicheskaya stabilnosť, No. 2, 2018, pp. 12—21. Ravenal, Earl C., “Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 26-43. Richard, Theodore, “Nuclear Weapons Targeting: The Evolution of Law and U.S. Policy,” Military Law Review, Vol. 224, No. 4, 2016, pp. 862-974. Rogov, S., V. Esin, and P. Zolotarev, “Eksperty predlagayut kompleks mer doveriya po strategicheskim vooruzheniyam,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 2, 2004. Rogov, S., V. Esin, and P. Zolotaryov, Ό kachestvennoi transformatsii rossiisko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii v strategicheskoi oblasti,” Rossiiskii sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam (RSMD) Rabochaya tetrad', No. 7, 2013. Rogov, S., P. Zolotarev, V. Kuznetsov, and V. Esin, “Strategicheskayastabilnost’ i yadernoe razoruzhenie vXXI veke,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, November 16, 2012. Russian Ministry of Defense, “Nepriemlemyi ushcherb,” webpage, undated. As of October 1, 2020: http://dictionary.mil.ru/dictionary/Terminy-RVSN/item/141687/ Sagan, Scott D., “The Case for No First Use,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2009, pp. 163—182. “SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust: Conference #2 of the
Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S. and Russian Policymakers and Scholars Held at Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia 6-9 May 1994,” transcript, excerpt of May 7, Morning Session, National Security Archive, undated. As of October 1, 2020: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nukevault/ebb285/doc03.PDF Shapley, Deborah, Promise and Power: The Life and Times ofRobert McNamara, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993. Siver, S. V, V. D. Roldugin, and N. N. Tatsyshin, “Metodicheskii podkhod к analizu boevoi ustoichivosti perspektivno! gruppirovki RVSN v usloviyakh vliyaniya faktorov neopredelennogo kharaktera,” Strategicheskaya stabiľnosť, No. 3, 2018, pp. 22-25.
72 Mitigating Challenges to U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Sterlin, A. E., A. A. Protasov, and S. V. Kreidin, “Sovremennye kontseptsii i silovykh instrumentov strategicheskogo sderzhivaniya,” Voennaya mysl’. No. 8, 2019. As of October 17, 2019: https://vm.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/203864/ Terriff, Terry, The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. Tetrais, Bruno, “The Trouble with No First Use,” in “Forum: The Case for No First Use: An Exchange,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, October-November 2009, pp. 23-26. Tomilenko, Ekaterina, “Opasnym kursom,” Krasnaya zvezda, October 11, 2016. As of October 1, 2020: http://archive.redstar.ru/index.php/component/k2/item/30774-opasnym-kursom United States and Soviet Union, Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, June 1, 1990, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library website, undated. As of October 1, 2020: https://bush411ibrary.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/1938 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010. As of October 1, 2010: https://dod.defense.gOv/Portals/l/features/defenseReviews/NPR/ 2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C., Washington, D.C., June 12, 2013. As of October 1, 2020: http://fas.org/man/eprint/employ.pdf U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, Washington, D.C., February 2018. As of May 4, 2020:
https://media.defense.gOv/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-l/-l/l/ 2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF U.S. Department of State, Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America Before the International Court of Justice, June 10, 1994. As of October 1, 2020: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/93/8770.pdf U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” fact sheet, December 1, 2020 “V Genshtabe rasskazali о tselyakh sozdaniya amerikanskoi sistemy PRO,” RIA-Novosti, April 24, 2019. As of October 1, 2020: https://ria.ru/20190424/1553009169.html?in=t Wolfe, Johnny, “Statement of Vice Admiral Johnny Wolf, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, on FY 2022 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defense Activities,” before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., May 12, 2021. Г--------- ■---------Bayerische Staatsbibliothek |
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| author | Charap, Samuel 1980- |
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| author_facet | Charap, Samuel 1980- |
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| author_sort | Charap, Samuel 1980- |
| author_variant | s c sc |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048244607 |
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| contents | Introduction -- A brief history -- Defining the problem -- U.S. policy considerations -- Possible policy changes -- Conclusion |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1344241929 (DE-599)BVBBV048244607 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.7249/RRA1094-1 |
| format | Book |
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Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="246" ind1="1" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Mitigating challenges to US-Russia strategic stability</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="246" ind1="1" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Mitigating challenges to United States-Russia strategic stability</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Santa Monica, Calif.</subfield><subfield code="b">RAND Corporation</subfield><subfield code="c">[2022]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xiii, 72 Seiten</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Research reports</subfield><subfield code="v">RR-A1094-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Introduction -- A brief history -- Defining the problem -- U.S. policy considerations -- Possible policy changes -- Conclusion</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. 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| geographic | Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Russland USA |
| id | DE-604.BV048244607 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:55:27Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:32:57Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)1209307138 |
| isbn | 9781977407054 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033625017 |
| oclc_num | 1344241929 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-706 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-706 |
| physical | xiii, 72 Seiten |
| psigel | ebook BSB_NED_20230424 |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | RAND Corporation |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Research reports |
| spelling | Charap, Samuel 1980- Verfasser (DE-588)1140057758 aut Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson Mitigating challenges to US-Russia strategic stability Mitigating challenges to United States-Russia strategic stability Santa Monica, Calif. RAND Corporation [2022] xiii, 72 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Research reports RR-A1094-1 Introduction -- A brief history -- Defining the problem -- U.S. policy considerations -- Possible policy changes -- Conclusion "The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. Both sides are mutually vulnerable to retaliation, and thus have no incentive to strike first. Yet the United States has developed significant prompt counterforce capabilities that Moscow fears could be used for a first strike. These threat perceptions have become a significant source of instability in recent years. The authors examine the historical origins of this dynamic and its impact on bilateral stability. They also evaluate possible policy changes that could mitigate that impact. The authors identify significant consequences for the United States that could arise from Russia's growing concerns about its ability to retaliate, such as Moscow's development of a suite of novel capabilities to address this issue and the potential crisis instability resulting from use-them-or-lose-them fears. Although these negative consequences are significant, they should be weighed against the benefits provided by current U.S. posture that are documented by the authors. The report outlines self-restraint measures--that the United States and Russia could take either together or unilaterally but in coordination--that would provide a degree of reassurance about the parties' lack of intention to execute a preemptive counterforce strike by complicating the ability to carry out such a strike on short notice. These modest steps could mitigate the negative consequences of current approaches without any dramatic changes in force structure, posture, or even employment policy. The stabilizing effect of these steps, however, could be significant."--Publisher's description Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Bedrohungsvorstellung (DE-588)7668529-9 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Deterrence (Strategy) Strategic planning / Russia (Federation) Strategic planning / United States United States / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / United States Dissuasion (Stratégie) Planification stratégique / Russie Planification stratégique / États-Unis États-Unis / Relations extérieures / Russie Diplomatic relations Strategic planning Russia (Federation) United States USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s Bedrohungsvorstellung (DE-588)7668529-9 s DE-604 Drennan, John Sonstige (DE-588)1203094132 oth Griffith, Luke Sonstige oth Geist, Edward Sonstige (DE-588)1152015281 oth Carlson, Brian G. Sonstige (DE-588)117037025X oth International Security and Defense Policy Center (DE-588)1209307138 isb Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1094-1 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033625017&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Charap, Samuel 1980- Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Introduction -- A brief history -- Defining the problem -- U.S. policy considerations -- Possible policy changes -- Conclusion Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Bedrohungsvorstellung (DE-588)7668529-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4000230-5 (DE-588)7668529-9 (DE-588)4076899-5 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_alt | Mitigating challenges to US-Russia strategic stability Mitigating challenges to United States-Russia strategic stability |
| title_auth | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_exact_search | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_full | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson |
| title_fullStr | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson |
| title_short | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_sort | mitigating challenges to u s russia strategic stability |
| topic | Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Bedrohungsvorstellung (DE-588)7668529-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Abschreckung Bedrohungsvorstellung Russland USA |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1094-1 http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033625017&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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