M&a and Corporate Consolidation: A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Singapore
Springer Singapore Pte. Limited
2020
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | HWR01 |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (519 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9789811566752 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048224499 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220516s2020 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9789811566752 |9 978-981-1566-75-2 | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-30-PQE)EBC6395761 | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-30-PAD)EBC6395761 | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-89-EBL)EBL6395761 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1225556785 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV048224499 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-2070s | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 658.162 | |
| 084 | |a QP 450 |0 (DE-625)141892: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Wang, Fengrong |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a M&a and Corporate Consolidation |b A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| 264 | 1 | |a Singapore |b Springer Singapore Pte. Limited |c 2020 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2021 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (519 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Questions -- 1.2 Definitions of Key Concepts -- 1.3 Research Framework and Contents -- 1.4 New Findings and Significance of the Project -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Government Competition, M& -- A, and Corporate Consolidation: A General Analysis -- 2.1 Economic Transition and Government Competition -- 2.1.1 Government Behaviors in Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.1 The Connotation of Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.2 The Paths and Features of China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.3 The Role of the Government in China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.2 Government Competition and the Measurement of Government Competitiveness in the Economic Transition Period -- 2.1.2.1 Types of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.2 Means of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.3 Measurement of Government Competitiveness -- 2.2 M& -- A and Its Corporate Consolidation Effects -- 2.2.1 Value Creation and Impact Factors of M& -- A -- 2.2.1.1 Studies on Value Creation of M& -- A -- 2.2.1.2 Studies on the Impact Factors of M& -- A Performance -- 2.2.2 Corporate Consolidation and Its Impact Mechanism -- 2.2.2.1 An Interpretation of the Basic Theory of Corporate Consolidation -- 2.2.2.2 Different Perspectives for the Analysis of M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation -- 2.3 M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation from the Perspective of Government Competition: A New Analysis Framework -- 2.3.1 The Existence of M& -- A Wave in China: A Survey Based on Government Behaviors -- 2.3.2 Occurrence of M& -- A: Theoretical Model and Empirical Analysis -- 2.3.3 M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation Mechanism Under Local Government Competition, the Key Section of the Book -- 2.3.4 Measurement of M& -- A Performance Under Government Competition -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: M& | |
| 505 | 8 | |a A Waves in China: A Survey from the Government Behavior Perspective -- 3.1 Existence of M& -- A Waves in China and the Macro Motivations for the Waves -- 3.1.1 Empirical Study and Description of China's M& -- A Waves -- 3.1.1.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis -- 3.1.1.2 Data Sources and Descriptions -- 3.1.1.3 Empirical Test -- 3.1.1.4 Analysis of the Cyclical Characteristics of the M& -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.1.5 Measurement of Cycles -- 3.1.1.6 Descriptive Analysis of M& -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.2 Analysis of Motivations for China's Waves of M& -- A -- 3.1.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 3.1.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for China's M& -- A Waves -- 3.2 Privatization of Local SOEs from the Perspective of Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1 Motivations for Government to Transfer Their Control Rights of Enterprises -- 3.2.1.1 Relevant Studies on the Government's Motivations for Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1.2 Analysis of the Motivations of Government Control Rights Transfer from the Perspective of Regional Public Governance -- 3.2.1.3 Hypotheses of the Motivation for the Local Governments' SOE Control Rights Transfer in China -- 3.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.2.1 Obtaining and Screening Samples -- 3.2.2.2 Empirical Study Method and Descriptive Statistics of Data -- 3.2.2.3 Empirical Test of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.3 The "Connectivity" of Local SOEs with the Central SOEs: From the Perspective of Local Government Competition -- 3.3.1 "Connectivity" of Local SOEs and the Central SOEs: Progress and Current State -- 3.3.2 Transfer of Control Rights from Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: A Game Theoretic Model Analysis -- 3.3.2.1 Model Hypotheses -- 3.3.2.2 Model Derivation | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3.3.2.3 Analysis of Factors Affecting Equity Transfer from the Local SOE to the Central SOE -- 3.3.3 Transfer of Control Rights from the Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: Empirical Test of Local Government Competitive Effects -- 3.3.3.1 Study Samples -- 3.3.3.2 Model and Variables -- 3.3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 3.3.4 Regression Analysis -- 3.4 Reverse Takeovers: From the Perspective of Local Government Intervention -- 3.4.1 Current State of RTOs in China -- 3.4.1.1 Background Conditions for RTOs -- 3.4.1.2 Characteristics of RTOs in China -- 3.4.2 Analysis of the Motivations for RTOs in the Transition Period -- 3.4.2.1 Motivations from the Enterprises -- 3.4.2.2 Motivations from the Government -- 3.4.3 Empirical Studies on Government Intervention and the Probability of Local RTOs -- 3.4.3.1 Hypotheses -- 3.4.3.2 Research Design -- 3.4.3.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 3.4.3.4 Empirical Results -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: The Mechanism of M& -- A Under the Impact of Local Government Competition: Models and Empirical Studies -- 4.1 The Game Theoretic Model of M& -- A Incorporating Government Behaviors -- 4.1.1 General Models of M& -- A Game -- 4.1.1.1 Hypotheses -- 4.1.1.2 The Game Process and Results -- 4.1.2 The Real Option Framework of M& -- A -- 4.1.3 M& -- A Model Incorporating Government Intervention -- 4.1.3.1 Building Theory and Model -- 4.1.3.2 Model Analysis -- 4.1.3.3 Summary -- 4.2 The Endogenous M& -- A Model of SOEs Under the Influence of Local Government Competition -- 4.2.1 Basic Models -- 4.2.1.1 Basic Hypotheses -- 4.2.1.2 Achievement of Cross-Regional M& -- A Promoted by Scale Effects -- 4.2.1.3 Result of Cross-Regional M& -- A: Oligopoly -- 4.2.2 Model Improvement I: Why Is It Difficult to Realize Cross-Regional M& -- A? -- 4.2.2.1 Description of Model Improvement | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 4.2.2.2 Failure in Cross-Regional M& -- A: The Control Rights Benefits as Stumbling Blocks -- 4.2.3 Model Improvement II: Why Intra-Regional M& -- A Flourish? -- 4.2.3.1 Description of Model Improvement -- 4.2.3.2 Intra-Regional M& -- A Prevail: Large Enterprises Built with Administrative Powers -- 4.3 The Impact Mechanism of Tax Competition Among Local Governments on M& -- A -- 4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Tax Competition on M& -- A -- 4.3.2 Empirical Studies of the Impact of Tax Competition on M& -- A -- 4.3.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 4.3.2.2 Research Design -- 4.3.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 4.3.2.4 Robustness Test -- 4.4 The Impact Mechanism of Local Government Expenditure Competition on M& -- A -- 4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M& -- A -- 4.4.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M& -- A -- 4.4.2.1 Variable Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.4.2.2 Econometric Model Regression Results and Analysis -- 4.5 The Impact Mechanism of Local Governments' Institutional Competition on M& -- A -- 4.5.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M& -- A -- 4.5.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M& -- A -- 4.5.2.1 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.5.2.2 Variable Definition and Models -- 4.5.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- Bibliography -- Chapter 5: Corporate M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation Under Government Competition: Regional Specialization and Industrial Agglomeration -- 5.1 Government Competition and Convergence of Regional Industrial Structure Based on an Extended Yardstick Competition Model -- 5.1.1 Questions Raised and Literature Review | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.1.2 Intra-Governmental Yardstick Competition and the Types of Competition -- 5.1.2.1 Extended Yardstick Competition and Convergence of Industrial Structure -- 5.1.2.2 Main Types of Yardstick Competition and Industrial Structure Convergence -- 5.1.3 Research Design -- 5.1.3.1 Sources of Data -- 5.1.3.2 Delimitation of the Economic Zones -- 5.1.3.3 Variable Design -- 5.1.3.4 Multiple Regression Model Design -- 5.1.4 Empirical Studies Results and Analysis -- 5.1.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Variables in each Economic Zone -- 5.1.4.2 Multiple Regression Results and Analysis -- 5.2 Empirical Study on the Impact of Local Government Competitions on Regional Specialization -- 5.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 5.2.1.1 Incentive Structure and Competitive Behaviors of Local Governments -- 5.2.1.2 Local Government Competitions and Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2 Variables and Data -- 5.2.2.1 Measurement of Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2.2 Depiction of Local Governments' Attracting Mobile Factors -- 5.2.2.3 Measurement of Local protectionism -- 5.2.2.4 Other Variables and Their Measurement -- 5.2.3 Econometric Model and Result Analysis -- 5.2.3.1 Basic Model and Results -- 5.2.3.2 Robustness Test -- 5.2.3.3 Discussions by Region -- 5.2.3.4 Discussion by Period -- 5.3 Industrial Paths of SOE M& -- A: Market Structure Effects and Industrial Structure Effects -- 5.3.1 Questions and Literature Review -- 5.3.2 Theoretical Model Analysis and Research Hypotheses -- 5.3.2.1 Definition of M& -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.2 Path Selection of M& -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.3 Industrial Selection of Intra-Industry M& -- A and Its Impact on Market Structure -- 5.3.2.4 The Choice of Inter-Industry M& -- A Path: Industrial Effects and Industrial Innovations -- 5.3.3 Research Design -- 5.3.3.1 Sample Selection | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.3.3.2 Operational Performance Measurement Index | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Consolidation and merger of corporations | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Mergers and Acquisitions |0 (DE-588)4205916-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Mergers and Acquisitions |0 (DE-588)4205916-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Wang, Fengrong |t M&a and Corporate Consolidation |d Singapore : Springer Singapore Pte. Limited,c2020 |z 9789811566745 |
| 912 | |a ZDB-30-PQE | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033605232 | ||
| 966 | e | |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/hwr/detail.action?docID=6395761 |l HWR01 |p ZDB-30-PQE |q HWR_PDA_PQE |x Aggregator |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804184006660456448 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Wang, Fengrong |
| author_facet | Wang, Fengrong |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Wang, Fengrong |
| author_variant | f w fw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048224499 |
| classification_rvk | QP 450 |
| collection | ZDB-30-PQE |
| contents | Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Questions -- 1.2 Definitions of Key Concepts -- 1.3 Research Framework and Contents -- 1.4 New Findings and Significance of the Project -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Government Competition, M& -- A, and Corporate Consolidation: A General Analysis -- 2.1 Economic Transition and Government Competition -- 2.1.1 Government Behaviors in Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.1 The Connotation of Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.2 The Paths and Features of China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.3 The Role of the Government in China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.2 Government Competition and the Measurement of Government Competitiveness in the Economic Transition Period -- 2.1.2.1 Types of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.2 Means of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.3 Measurement of Government Competitiveness -- 2.2 M& -- A and Its Corporate Consolidation Effects -- 2.2.1 Value Creation and Impact Factors of M& -- A -- 2.2.1.1 Studies on Value Creation of M& -- A -- 2.2.1.2 Studies on the Impact Factors of M& -- A Performance -- 2.2.2 Corporate Consolidation and Its Impact Mechanism -- 2.2.2.1 An Interpretation of the Basic Theory of Corporate Consolidation -- 2.2.2.2 Different Perspectives for the Analysis of M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation -- 2.3 M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation from the Perspective of Government Competition: A New Analysis Framework -- 2.3.1 The Existence of M& -- A Wave in China: A Survey Based on Government Behaviors -- 2.3.2 Occurrence of M& -- A: Theoretical Model and Empirical Analysis -- 2.3.3 M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation Mechanism Under Local Government Competition, the Key Section of the Book -- 2.3.4 Measurement of M& -- A Performance Under Government Competition -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: M& A Waves in China: A Survey from the Government Behavior Perspective -- 3.1 Existence of M& -- A Waves in China and the Macro Motivations for the Waves -- 3.1.1 Empirical Study and Description of China's M& -- A Waves -- 3.1.1.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis -- 3.1.1.2 Data Sources and Descriptions -- 3.1.1.3 Empirical Test -- 3.1.1.4 Analysis of the Cyclical Characteristics of the M& -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.1.5 Measurement of Cycles -- 3.1.1.6 Descriptive Analysis of M& -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.2 Analysis of Motivations for China's Waves of M& -- A -- 3.1.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 3.1.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for China's M& -- A Waves -- 3.2 Privatization of Local SOEs from the Perspective of Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1 Motivations for Government to Transfer Their Control Rights of Enterprises -- 3.2.1.1 Relevant Studies on the Government's Motivations for Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1.2 Analysis of the Motivations of Government Control Rights Transfer from the Perspective of Regional Public Governance -- 3.2.1.3 Hypotheses of the Motivation for the Local Governments' SOE Control Rights Transfer in China -- 3.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.2.1 Obtaining and Screening Samples -- 3.2.2.2 Empirical Study Method and Descriptive Statistics of Data -- 3.2.2.3 Empirical Test of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.3 The "Connectivity" of Local SOEs with the Central SOEs: From the Perspective of Local Government Competition -- 3.3.1 "Connectivity" of Local SOEs and the Central SOEs: Progress and Current State -- 3.3.2 Transfer of Control Rights from Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: A Game Theoretic Model Analysis -- 3.3.2.1 Model Hypotheses -- 3.3.2.2 Model Derivation 3.3.2.3 Analysis of Factors Affecting Equity Transfer from the Local SOE to the Central SOE -- 3.3.3 Transfer of Control Rights from the Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: Empirical Test of Local Government Competitive Effects -- 3.3.3.1 Study Samples -- 3.3.3.2 Model and Variables -- 3.3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 3.3.4 Regression Analysis -- 3.4 Reverse Takeovers: From the Perspective of Local Government Intervention -- 3.4.1 Current State of RTOs in China -- 3.4.1.1 Background Conditions for RTOs -- 3.4.1.2 Characteristics of RTOs in China -- 3.4.2 Analysis of the Motivations for RTOs in the Transition Period -- 3.4.2.1 Motivations from the Enterprises -- 3.4.2.2 Motivations from the Government -- 3.4.3 Empirical Studies on Government Intervention and the Probability of Local RTOs -- 3.4.3.1 Hypotheses -- 3.4.3.2 Research Design -- 3.4.3.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 3.4.3.4 Empirical Results -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: The Mechanism of M& -- A Under the Impact of Local Government Competition: Models and Empirical Studies -- 4.1 The Game Theoretic Model of M& -- A Incorporating Government Behaviors -- 4.1.1 General Models of M& -- A Game -- 4.1.1.1 Hypotheses -- 4.1.1.2 The Game Process and Results -- 4.1.2 The Real Option Framework of M& -- A -- 4.1.3 M& -- A Model Incorporating Government Intervention -- 4.1.3.1 Building Theory and Model -- 4.1.3.2 Model Analysis -- 4.1.3.3 Summary -- 4.2 The Endogenous M& -- A Model of SOEs Under the Influence of Local Government Competition -- 4.2.1 Basic Models -- 4.2.1.1 Basic Hypotheses -- 4.2.1.2 Achievement of Cross-Regional M& -- A Promoted by Scale Effects -- 4.2.1.3 Result of Cross-Regional M& -- A: Oligopoly -- 4.2.2 Model Improvement I: Why Is It Difficult to Realize Cross-Regional M& -- A? -- 4.2.2.1 Description of Model Improvement 4.2.2.2 Failure in Cross-Regional M& -- A: The Control Rights Benefits as Stumbling Blocks -- 4.2.3 Model Improvement II: Why Intra-Regional M& -- A Flourish? -- 4.2.3.1 Description of Model Improvement -- 4.2.3.2 Intra-Regional M& -- A Prevail: Large Enterprises Built with Administrative Powers -- 4.3 The Impact Mechanism of Tax Competition Among Local Governments on M& -- A -- 4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Tax Competition on M& -- A -- 4.3.2 Empirical Studies of the Impact of Tax Competition on M& -- A -- 4.3.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 4.3.2.2 Research Design -- 4.3.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 4.3.2.4 Robustness Test -- 4.4 The Impact Mechanism of Local Government Expenditure Competition on M& -- A -- 4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M& -- A -- 4.4.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M& -- A -- 4.4.2.1 Variable Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.4.2.2 Econometric Model Regression Results and Analysis -- 4.5 The Impact Mechanism of Local Governments' Institutional Competition on M& -- A -- 4.5.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M& -- A -- 4.5.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M& -- A -- 4.5.2.1 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.5.2.2 Variable Definition and Models -- 4.5.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- Bibliography -- Chapter 5: Corporate M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation Under Government Competition: Regional Specialization and Industrial Agglomeration -- 5.1 Government Competition and Convergence of Regional Industrial Structure Based on an Extended Yardstick Competition Model -- 5.1.1 Questions Raised and Literature Review 5.1.2 Intra-Governmental Yardstick Competition and the Types of Competition -- 5.1.2.1 Extended Yardstick Competition and Convergence of Industrial Structure -- 5.1.2.2 Main Types of Yardstick Competition and Industrial Structure Convergence -- 5.1.3 Research Design -- 5.1.3.1 Sources of Data -- 5.1.3.2 Delimitation of the Economic Zones -- 5.1.3.3 Variable Design -- 5.1.3.4 Multiple Regression Model Design -- 5.1.4 Empirical Studies Results and Analysis -- 5.1.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Variables in each Economic Zone -- 5.1.4.2 Multiple Regression Results and Analysis -- 5.2 Empirical Study on the Impact of Local Government Competitions on Regional Specialization -- 5.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 5.2.1.1 Incentive Structure and Competitive Behaviors of Local Governments -- 5.2.1.2 Local Government Competitions and Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2 Variables and Data -- 5.2.2.1 Measurement of Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2.2 Depiction of Local Governments' Attracting Mobile Factors -- 5.2.2.3 Measurement of Local protectionism -- 5.2.2.4 Other Variables and Their Measurement -- 5.2.3 Econometric Model and Result Analysis -- 5.2.3.1 Basic Model and Results -- 5.2.3.2 Robustness Test -- 5.2.3.3 Discussions by Region -- 5.2.3.4 Discussion by Period -- 5.3 Industrial Paths of SOE M& -- A: Market Structure Effects and Industrial Structure Effects -- 5.3.1 Questions and Literature Review -- 5.3.2 Theoretical Model Analysis and Research Hypotheses -- 5.3.2.1 Definition of M& -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.2 Path Selection of M& -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.3 Industrial Selection of Intra-Industry M& -- A and Its Impact on Market Structure -- 5.3.2.4 The Choice of Inter-Industry M& -- A Path: Industrial Effects and Industrial Innovations -- 5.3.3 Research Design -- 5.3.3.1 Sample Selection 5.3.3.2 Operational Performance Measurement Index |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-30-PQE)EBC6395761 (ZDB-30-PAD)EBC6395761 (ZDB-89-EBL)EBL6395761 (OCoLC)1225556785 (DE-599)BVBBV048224499 |
| dewey-full | 658.162 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.162 |
| dewey-search | 658.162 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.162 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>11284nmm a2200493zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048224499</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220516s2020 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9789811566752</subfield><subfield code="9">978-981-1566-75-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-30-PQE)EBC6395761</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-30-PAD)EBC6395761</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-89-EBL)EBL6395761</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1225556785</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV048224499</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-2070s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">658.162</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QP 450</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141892:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wang, Fengrong</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">M&a and Corporate Consolidation</subfield><subfield code="b">A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Singapore</subfield><subfield code="b">Springer Singapore Pte. Limited</subfield><subfield code="c">2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">©2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (519 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Questions -- 1.2 Definitions of Key Concepts -- 1.3 Research Framework and Contents -- 1.4 New Findings and Significance of the Project -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Government Competition, M&amp -- A, and Corporate Consolidation: A General Analysis -- 2.1 Economic Transition and Government Competition -- 2.1.1 Government Behaviors in Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.1 The Connotation of Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.2 The Paths and Features of China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.3 The Role of the Government in China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.2 Government Competition and the Measurement of Government Competitiveness in the Economic Transition Period -- 2.1.2.1 Types of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.2 Means of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.3 Measurement of Government Competitiveness -- 2.2 M&amp -- A and Its Corporate Consolidation Effects -- 2.2.1 Value Creation and Impact Factors of M&amp -- A -- 2.2.1.1 Studies on Value Creation of M&amp -- A -- 2.2.1.2 Studies on the Impact Factors of M&amp -- A Performance -- 2.2.2 Corporate Consolidation and Its Impact Mechanism -- 2.2.2.1 An Interpretation of the Basic Theory of Corporate Consolidation -- 2.2.2.2 Different Perspectives for the Analysis of M&amp -- A and Corporate Consolidation -- 2.3 M&amp -- A and Corporate Consolidation from the Perspective of Government Competition: A New Analysis Framework -- 2.3.1 The Existence of M&amp -- A Wave in China: A Survey Based on Government Behaviors -- 2.3.2 Occurrence of M&amp -- A: Theoretical Model and Empirical Analysis -- 2.3.3 M&amp -- A and Corporate Consolidation Mechanism Under Local Government Competition, the Key Section of the Book -- 2.3.4 Measurement of M&amp -- A Performance Under Government Competition -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: M&amp</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">A Waves in China: A Survey from the Government Behavior Perspective -- 3.1 Existence of M&amp -- A Waves in China and the Macro Motivations for the Waves -- 3.1.1 Empirical Study and Description of China's M&amp -- A Waves -- 3.1.1.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis -- 3.1.1.2 Data Sources and Descriptions -- 3.1.1.3 Empirical Test -- 3.1.1.4 Analysis of the Cyclical Characteristics of the M&amp -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.1.5 Measurement of Cycles -- 3.1.1.6 Descriptive Analysis of M&amp -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.2 Analysis of Motivations for China's Waves of M&amp -- A -- 3.1.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 3.1.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for China's M&amp -- A Waves -- 3.2 Privatization of Local SOEs from the Perspective of Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1 Motivations for Government to Transfer Their Control Rights of Enterprises -- 3.2.1.1 Relevant Studies on the Government's Motivations for Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1.2 Analysis of the Motivations of Government Control Rights Transfer from the Perspective of Regional Public Governance -- 3.2.1.3 Hypotheses of the Motivation for the Local Governments' SOE Control Rights Transfer in China -- 3.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.2.1 Obtaining and Screening Samples -- 3.2.2.2 Empirical Study Method and Descriptive Statistics of Data -- 3.2.2.3 Empirical Test of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.3 The "Connectivity" of Local SOEs with the Central SOEs: From the Perspective of Local Government Competition -- 3.3.1 "Connectivity" of Local SOEs and the Central SOEs: Progress and Current State -- 3.3.2 Transfer of Control Rights from Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: A Game Theoretic Model Analysis -- 3.3.2.1 Model Hypotheses -- 3.3.2.2 Model Derivation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3.3.2.3 Analysis of Factors Affecting Equity Transfer from the Local SOE to the Central SOE -- 3.3.3 Transfer of Control Rights from the Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: Empirical Test of Local Government Competitive Effects -- 3.3.3.1 Study Samples -- 3.3.3.2 Model and Variables -- 3.3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 3.3.4 Regression Analysis -- 3.4 Reverse Takeovers: From the Perspective of Local Government Intervention -- 3.4.1 Current State of RTOs in China -- 3.4.1.1 Background Conditions for RTOs -- 3.4.1.2 Characteristics of RTOs in China -- 3.4.2 Analysis of the Motivations for RTOs in the Transition Period -- 3.4.2.1 Motivations from the Enterprises -- 3.4.2.2 Motivations from the Government -- 3.4.3 Empirical Studies on Government Intervention and the Probability of Local RTOs -- 3.4.3.1 Hypotheses -- 3.4.3.2 Research Design -- 3.4.3.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 3.4.3.4 Empirical Results -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: The Mechanism of M&amp -- A Under the Impact of Local Government Competition: Models and Empirical Studies -- 4.1 The Game Theoretic Model of M&amp -- A Incorporating Government Behaviors -- 4.1.1 General Models of M&amp -- A Game -- 4.1.1.1 Hypotheses -- 4.1.1.2 The Game Process and Results -- 4.1.2 The Real Option Framework of M&amp -- A -- 4.1.3 M&amp -- A Model Incorporating Government Intervention -- 4.1.3.1 Building Theory and Model -- 4.1.3.2 Model Analysis -- 4.1.3.3 Summary -- 4.2 The Endogenous M&amp -- A Model of SOEs Under the Influence of Local Government Competition -- 4.2.1 Basic Models -- 4.2.1.1 Basic Hypotheses -- 4.2.1.2 Achievement of Cross-Regional M&amp -- A Promoted by Scale Effects -- 4.2.1.3 Result of Cross-Regional M&amp -- A: Oligopoly -- 4.2.2 Model Improvement I: Why Is It Difficult to Realize Cross-Regional M&amp -- A? -- 4.2.2.1 Description of Model Improvement</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">4.2.2.2 Failure in Cross-Regional M&amp -- A: The Control Rights Benefits as Stumbling Blocks -- 4.2.3 Model Improvement II: Why Intra-Regional M&amp -- A Flourish? -- 4.2.3.1 Description of Model Improvement -- 4.2.3.2 Intra-Regional M&amp -- A Prevail: Large Enterprises Built with Administrative Powers -- 4.3 The Impact Mechanism of Tax Competition Among Local Governments on M&amp -- A -- 4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Tax Competition on M&amp -- A -- 4.3.2 Empirical Studies of the Impact of Tax Competition on M&amp -- A -- 4.3.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 4.3.2.2 Research Design -- 4.3.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 4.3.2.4 Robustness Test -- 4.4 The Impact Mechanism of Local Government Expenditure Competition on M&amp -- A -- 4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M&amp -- A -- 4.4.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M&amp -- A -- 4.4.2.1 Variable Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.4.2.2 Econometric Model Regression Results and Analysis -- 4.5 The Impact Mechanism of Local Governments' Institutional Competition on M&amp -- A -- 4.5.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M&amp -- A -- 4.5.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M&amp -- A -- 4.5.2.1 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.5.2.2 Variable Definition and Models -- 4.5.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- Bibliography -- Chapter 5: Corporate M&amp -- A and Corporate Consolidation Under Government Competition: Regional Specialization and Industrial Agglomeration -- 5.1 Government Competition and Convergence of Regional Industrial Structure Based on an Extended Yardstick Competition Model -- 5.1.1 Questions Raised and Literature Review</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5.1.2 Intra-Governmental Yardstick Competition and the Types of Competition -- 5.1.2.1 Extended Yardstick Competition and Convergence of Industrial Structure -- 5.1.2.2 Main Types of Yardstick Competition and Industrial Structure Convergence -- 5.1.3 Research Design -- 5.1.3.1 Sources of Data -- 5.1.3.2 Delimitation of the Economic Zones -- 5.1.3.3 Variable Design -- 5.1.3.4 Multiple Regression Model Design -- 5.1.4 Empirical Studies Results and Analysis -- 5.1.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Variables in each Economic Zone -- 5.1.4.2 Multiple Regression Results and Analysis -- 5.2 Empirical Study on the Impact of Local Government Competitions on Regional Specialization -- 5.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 5.2.1.1 Incentive Structure and Competitive Behaviors of Local Governments -- 5.2.1.2 Local Government Competitions and Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2 Variables and Data -- 5.2.2.1 Measurement of Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2.2 Depiction of Local Governments' Attracting Mobile Factors -- 5.2.2.3 Measurement of Local protectionism -- 5.2.2.4 Other Variables and Their Measurement -- 5.2.3 Econometric Model and Result Analysis -- 5.2.3.1 Basic Model and Results -- 5.2.3.2 Robustness Test -- 5.2.3.3 Discussions by Region -- 5.2.3.4 Discussion by Period -- 5.3 Industrial Paths of SOE M&amp -- A: Market Structure Effects and Industrial Structure Effects -- 5.3.1 Questions and Literature Review -- 5.3.2 Theoretical Model Analysis and Research Hypotheses -- 5.3.2.1 Definition of M&amp -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.2 Path Selection of M&amp -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.3 Industrial Selection of Intra-Industry M&amp -- A and Its Impact on Market Structure -- 5.3.2.4 The Choice of Inter-Industry M&amp -- A Path: Industrial Effects and Industrial Innovations -- 5.3.3 Research Design -- 5.3.3.1 Sample Selection</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5.3.3.2 Operational Performance Measurement Index</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Consolidation and merger of corporations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Mergers and Acquisitions</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4205916-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Mergers and Acquisitions</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4205916-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="a">Wang, Fengrong</subfield><subfield code="t">M&a and Corporate Consolidation</subfield><subfield code="d">Singapore : Springer Singapore Pte. Limited,c2020</subfield><subfield code="z">9789811566745</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-30-PQE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033605232</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/hwr/detail.action?docID=6395761</subfield><subfield code="l">HWR01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-30-PQE</subfield><subfield code="q">HWR_PDA_PQE</subfield><subfield code="x">Aggregator</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048224499 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:50:39Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:32:29Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789811566752 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033605232 |
| oclc_num | 1225556785 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-2070s |
| owner_facet | DE-2070s |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (519 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-30-PQE ZDB-30-PQE HWR_PDA_PQE |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSearch | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Springer Singapore Pte. Limited |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Wang, Fengrong Verfasser aut M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior Singapore Springer Singapore Pte. Limited 2020 ©2021 1 Online-Ressource (519 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Questions -- 1.2 Definitions of Key Concepts -- 1.3 Research Framework and Contents -- 1.4 New Findings and Significance of the Project -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Government Competition, M& -- A, and Corporate Consolidation: A General Analysis -- 2.1 Economic Transition and Government Competition -- 2.1.1 Government Behaviors in Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.1 The Connotation of Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.2 The Paths and Features of China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.3 The Role of the Government in China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.2 Government Competition and the Measurement of Government Competitiveness in the Economic Transition Period -- 2.1.2.1 Types of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.2 Means of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.3 Measurement of Government Competitiveness -- 2.2 M& -- A and Its Corporate Consolidation Effects -- 2.2.1 Value Creation and Impact Factors of M& -- A -- 2.2.1.1 Studies on Value Creation of M& -- A -- 2.2.1.2 Studies on the Impact Factors of M& -- A Performance -- 2.2.2 Corporate Consolidation and Its Impact Mechanism -- 2.2.2.1 An Interpretation of the Basic Theory of Corporate Consolidation -- 2.2.2.2 Different Perspectives for the Analysis of M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation -- 2.3 M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation from the Perspective of Government Competition: A New Analysis Framework -- 2.3.1 The Existence of M& -- A Wave in China: A Survey Based on Government Behaviors -- 2.3.2 Occurrence of M& -- A: Theoretical Model and Empirical Analysis -- 2.3.3 M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation Mechanism Under Local Government Competition, the Key Section of the Book -- 2.3.4 Measurement of M& -- A Performance Under Government Competition -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: M& A Waves in China: A Survey from the Government Behavior Perspective -- 3.1 Existence of M& -- A Waves in China and the Macro Motivations for the Waves -- 3.1.1 Empirical Study and Description of China's M& -- A Waves -- 3.1.1.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis -- 3.1.1.2 Data Sources and Descriptions -- 3.1.1.3 Empirical Test -- 3.1.1.4 Analysis of the Cyclical Characteristics of the M& -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.1.5 Measurement of Cycles -- 3.1.1.6 Descriptive Analysis of M& -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.2 Analysis of Motivations for China's Waves of M& -- A -- 3.1.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 3.1.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for China's M& -- A Waves -- 3.2 Privatization of Local SOEs from the Perspective of Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1 Motivations for Government to Transfer Their Control Rights of Enterprises -- 3.2.1.1 Relevant Studies on the Government's Motivations for Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1.2 Analysis of the Motivations of Government Control Rights Transfer from the Perspective of Regional Public Governance -- 3.2.1.3 Hypotheses of the Motivation for the Local Governments' SOE Control Rights Transfer in China -- 3.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.2.1 Obtaining and Screening Samples -- 3.2.2.2 Empirical Study Method and Descriptive Statistics of Data -- 3.2.2.3 Empirical Test of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.3 The "Connectivity" of Local SOEs with the Central SOEs: From the Perspective of Local Government Competition -- 3.3.1 "Connectivity" of Local SOEs and the Central SOEs: Progress and Current State -- 3.3.2 Transfer of Control Rights from Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: A Game Theoretic Model Analysis -- 3.3.2.1 Model Hypotheses -- 3.3.2.2 Model Derivation 3.3.2.3 Analysis of Factors Affecting Equity Transfer from the Local SOE to the Central SOE -- 3.3.3 Transfer of Control Rights from the Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: Empirical Test of Local Government Competitive Effects -- 3.3.3.1 Study Samples -- 3.3.3.2 Model and Variables -- 3.3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 3.3.4 Regression Analysis -- 3.4 Reverse Takeovers: From the Perspective of Local Government Intervention -- 3.4.1 Current State of RTOs in China -- 3.4.1.1 Background Conditions for RTOs -- 3.4.1.2 Characteristics of RTOs in China -- 3.4.2 Analysis of the Motivations for RTOs in the Transition Period -- 3.4.2.1 Motivations from the Enterprises -- 3.4.2.2 Motivations from the Government -- 3.4.3 Empirical Studies on Government Intervention and the Probability of Local RTOs -- 3.4.3.1 Hypotheses -- 3.4.3.2 Research Design -- 3.4.3.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 3.4.3.4 Empirical Results -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: The Mechanism of M& -- A Under the Impact of Local Government Competition: Models and Empirical Studies -- 4.1 The Game Theoretic Model of M& -- A Incorporating Government Behaviors -- 4.1.1 General Models of M& -- A Game -- 4.1.1.1 Hypotheses -- 4.1.1.2 The Game Process and Results -- 4.1.2 The Real Option Framework of M& -- A -- 4.1.3 M& -- A Model Incorporating Government Intervention -- 4.1.3.1 Building Theory and Model -- 4.1.3.2 Model Analysis -- 4.1.3.3 Summary -- 4.2 The Endogenous M& -- A Model of SOEs Under the Influence of Local Government Competition -- 4.2.1 Basic Models -- 4.2.1.1 Basic Hypotheses -- 4.2.1.2 Achievement of Cross-Regional M& -- A Promoted by Scale Effects -- 4.2.1.3 Result of Cross-Regional M& -- A: Oligopoly -- 4.2.2 Model Improvement I: Why Is It Difficult to Realize Cross-Regional M& -- A? -- 4.2.2.1 Description of Model Improvement 4.2.2.2 Failure in Cross-Regional M& -- A: The Control Rights Benefits as Stumbling Blocks -- 4.2.3 Model Improvement II: Why Intra-Regional M& -- A Flourish? -- 4.2.3.1 Description of Model Improvement -- 4.2.3.2 Intra-Regional M& -- A Prevail: Large Enterprises Built with Administrative Powers -- 4.3 The Impact Mechanism of Tax Competition Among Local Governments on M& -- A -- 4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Tax Competition on M& -- A -- 4.3.2 Empirical Studies of the Impact of Tax Competition on M& -- A -- 4.3.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 4.3.2.2 Research Design -- 4.3.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 4.3.2.4 Robustness Test -- 4.4 The Impact Mechanism of Local Government Expenditure Competition on M& -- A -- 4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M& -- A -- 4.4.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M& -- A -- 4.4.2.1 Variable Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.4.2.2 Econometric Model Regression Results and Analysis -- 4.5 The Impact Mechanism of Local Governments' Institutional Competition on M& -- A -- 4.5.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M& -- A -- 4.5.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M& -- A -- 4.5.2.1 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.5.2.2 Variable Definition and Models -- 4.5.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- Bibliography -- Chapter 5: Corporate M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation Under Government Competition: Regional Specialization and Industrial Agglomeration -- 5.1 Government Competition and Convergence of Regional Industrial Structure Based on an Extended Yardstick Competition Model -- 5.1.1 Questions Raised and Literature Review 5.1.2 Intra-Governmental Yardstick Competition and the Types of Competition -- 5.1.2.1 Extended Yardstick Competition and Convergence of Industrial Structure -- 5.1.2.2 Main Types of Yardstick Competition and Industrial Structure Convergence -- 5.1.3 Research Design -- 5.1.3.1 Sources of Data -- 5.1.3.2 Delimitation of the Economic Zones -- 5.1.3.3 Variable Design -- 5.1.3.4 Multiple Regression Model Design -- 5.1.4 Empirical Studies Results and Analysis -- 5.1.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Variables in each Economic Zone -- 5.1.4.2 Multiple Regression Results and Analysis -- 5.2 Empirical Study on the Impact of Local Government Competitions on Regional Specialization -- 5.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 5.2.1.1 Incentive Structure and Competitive Behaviors of Local Governments -- 5.2.1.2 Local Government Competitions and Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2 Variables and Data -- 5.2.2.1 Measurement of Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2.2 Depiction of Local Governments' Attracting Mobile Factors -- 5.2.2.3 Measurement of Local protectionism -- 5.2.2.4 Other Variables and Their Measurement -- 5.2.3 Econometric Model and Result Analysis -- 5.2.3.1 Basic Model and Results -- 5.2.3.2 Robustness Test -- 5.2.3.3 Discussions by Region -- 5.2.3.4 Discussion by Period -- 5.3 Industrial Paths of SOE M& -- A: Market Structure Effects and Industrial Structure Effects -- 5.3.1 Questions and Literature Review -- 5.3.2 Theoretical Model Analysis and Research Hypotheses -- 5.3.2.1 Definition of M& -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.2 Path Selection of M& -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.3 Industrial Selection of Intra-Industry M& -- A and Its Impact on Market Structure -- 5.3.2.4 The Choice of Inter-Industry M& -- A Path: Industrial Effects and Industrial Innovations -- 5.3.3 Research Design -- 5.3.3.1 Sample Selection 5.3.3.2 Operational Performance Measurement Index Consolidation and merger of corporations Mergers and Acquisitions (DE-588)4205916-1 gnd rswk-swf Mergers and Acquisitions (DE-588)4205916-1 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Wang, Fengrong M&a and Corporate Consolidation Singapore : Springer Singapore Pte. Limited,c2020 9789811566745 |
| spellingShingle | Wang, Fengrong M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Questions -- 1.2 Definitions of Key Concepts -- 1.3 Research Framework and Contents -- 1.4 New Findings and Significance of the Project -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Government Competition, M& -- A, and Corporate Consolidation: A General Analysis -- 2.1 Economic Transition and Government Competition -- 2.1.1 Government Behaviors in Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.1 The Connotation of Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.2 The Paths and Features of China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.1.3 The Role of the Government in China's Economic Transition -- 2.1.2 Government Competition and the Measurement of Government Competitiveness in the Economic Transition Period -- 2.1.2.1 Types of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.2 Means of Government Competition -- 2.1.2.3 Measurement of Government Competitiveness -- 2.2 M& -- A and Its Corporate Consolidation Effects -- 2.2.1 Value Creation and Impact Factors of M& -- A -- 2.2.1.1 Studies on Value Creation of M& -- A -- 2.2.1.2 Studies on the Impact Factors of M& -- A Performance -- 2.2.2 Corporate Consolidation and Its Impact Mechanism -- 2.2.2.1 An Interpretation of the Basic Theory of Corporate Consolidation -- 2.2.2.2 Different Perspectives for the Analysis of M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation -- 2.3 M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation from the Perspective of Government Competition: A New Analysis Framework -- 2.3.1 The Existence of M& -- A Wave in China: A Survey Based on Government Behaviors -- 2.3.2 Occurrence of M& -- A: Theoretical Model and Empirical Analysis -- 2.3.3 M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation Mechanism Under Local Government Competition, the Key Section of the Book -- 2.3.4 Measurement of M& -- A Performance Under Government Competition -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: M& A Waves in China: A Survey from the Government Behavior Perspective -- 3.1 Existence of M& -- A Waves in China and the Macro Motivations for the Waves -- 3.1.1 Empirical Study and Description of China's M& -- A Waves -- 3.1.1.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis -- 3.1.1.2 Data Sources and Descriptions -- 3.1.1.3 Empirical Test -- 3.1.1.4 Analysis of the Cyclical Characteristics of the M& -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.1.5 Measurement of Cycles -- 3.1.1.6 Descriptive Analysis of M& -- A Waves in China -- 3.1.2 Analysis of Motivations for China's Waves of M& -- A -- 3.1.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 3.1.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for China's M& -- A Waves -- 3.2 Privatization of Local SOEs from the Perspective of Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1 Motivations for Government to Transfer Their Control Rights of Enterprises -- 3.2.1.1 Relevant Studies on the Government's Motivations for Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.1.2 Analysis of the Motivations of Government Control Rights Transfer from the Perspective of Regional Public Governance -- 3.2.1.3 Hypotheses of the Motivation for the Local Governments' SOE Control Rights Transfer in China -- 3.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.2.2.1 Obtaining and Screening Samples -- 3.2.2.2 Empirical Study Method and Descriptive Statistics of Data -- 3.2.2.3 Empirical Test of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer -- 3.3 The "Connectivity" of Local SOEs with the Central SOEs: From the Perspective of Local Government Competition -- 3.3.1 "Connectivity" of Local SOEs and the Central SOEs: Progress and Current State -- 3.3.2 Transfer of Control Rights from Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: A Game Theoretic Model Analysis -- 3.3.2.1 Model Hypotheses -- 3.3.2.2 Model Derivation 3.3.2.3 Analysis of Factors Affecting Equity Transfer from the Local SOE to the Central SOE -- 3.3.3 Transfer of Control Rights from the Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: Empirical Test of Local Government Competitive Effects -- 3.3.3.1 Study Samples -- 3.3.3.2 Model and Variables -- 3.3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 3.3.4 Regression Analysis -- 3.4 Reverse Takeovers: From the Perspective of Local Government Intervention -- 3.4.1 Current State of RTOs in China -- 3.4.1.1 Background Conditions for RTOs -- 3.4.1.2 Characteristics of RTOs in China -- 3.4.2 Analysis of the Motivations for RTOs in the Transition Period -- 3.4.2.1 Motivations from the Enterprises -- 3.4.2.2 Motivations from the Government -- 3.4.3 Empirical Studies on Government Intervention and the Probability of Local RTOs -- 3.4.3.1 Hypotheses -- 3.4.3.2 Research Design -- 3.4.3.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 3.4.3.4 Empirical Results -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: The Mechanism of M& -- A Under the Impact of Local Government Competition: Models and Empirical Studies -- 4.1 The Game Theoretic Model of M& -- A Incorporating Government Behaviors -- 4.1.1 General Models of M& -- A Game -- 4.1.1.1 Hypotheses -- 4.1.1.2 The Game Process and Results -- 4.1.2 The Real Option Framework of M& -- A -- 4.1.3 M& -- A Model Incorporating Government Intervention -- 4.1.3.1 Building Theory and Model -- 4.1.3.2 Model Analysis -- 4.1.3.3 Summary -- 4.2 The Endogenous M& -- A Model of SOEs Under the Influence of Local Government Competition -- 4.2.1 Basic Models -- 4.2.1.1 Basic Hypotheses -- 4.2.1.2 Achievement of Cross-Regional M& -- A Promoted by Scale Effects -- 4.2.1.3 Result of Cross-Regional M& -- A: Oligopoly -- 4.2.2 Model Improvement I: Why Is It Difficult to Realize Cross-Regional M& -- A? -- 4.2.2.1 Description of Model Improvement 4.2.2.2 Failure in Cross-Regional M& -- A: The Control Rights Benefits as Stumbling Blocks -- 4.2.3 Model Improvement II: Why Intra-Regional M& -- A Flourish? -- 4.2.3.1 Description of Model Improvement -- 4.2.3.2 Intra-Regional M& -- A Prevail: Large Enterprises Built with Administrative Powers -- 4.3 The Impact Mechanism of Tax Competition Among Local Governments on M& -- A -- 4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Tax Competition on M& -- A -- 4.3.2 Empirical Studies of the Impact of Tax Competition on M& -- A -- 4.3.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 4.3.2.2 Research Design -- 4.3.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- 4.3.2.4 Robustness Test -- 4.4 The Impact Mechanism of Local Government Expenditure Competition on M& -- A -- 4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M& -- A -- 4.4.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M& -- A -- 4.4.2.1 Variable Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.4.2.2 Econometric Model Regression Results and Analysis -- 4.5 The Impact Mechanism of Local Governments' Institutional Competition on M& -- A -- 4.5.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M& -- A -- 4.5.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M& -- A -- 4.5.2.1 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis -- 4.5.2.2 Variable Definition and Models -- 4.5.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis -- Bibliography -- Chapter 5: Corporate M& -- A and Corporate Consolidation Under Government Competition: Regional Specialization and Industrial Agglomeration -- 5.1 Government Competition and Convergence of Regional Industrial Structure Based on an Extended Yardstick Competition Model -- 5.1.1 Questions Raised and Literature Review 5.1.2 Intra-Governmental Yardstick Competition and the Types of Competition -- 5.1.2.1 Extended Yardstick Competition and Convergence of Industrial Structure -- 5.1.2.2 Main Types of Yardstick Competition and Industrial Structure Convergence -- 5.1.3 Research Design -- 5.1.3.1 Sources of Data -- 5.1.3.2 Delimitation of the Economic Zones -- 5.1.3.3 Variable Design -- 5.1.3.4 Multiple Regression Model Design -- 5.1.4 Empirical Studies Results and Analysis -- 5.1.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Variables in each Economic Zone -- 5.1.4.2 Multiple Regression Results and Analysis -- 5.2 Empirical Study on the Impact of Local Government Competitions on Regional Specialization -- 5.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses -- 5.2.1.1 Incentive Structure and Competitive Behaviors of Local Governments -- 5.2.1.2 Local Government Competitions and Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2 Variables and Data -- 5.2.2.1 Measurement of Regional Specialization -- 5.2.2.2 Depiction of Local Governments' Attracting Mobile Factors -- 5.2.2.3 Measurement of Local protectionism -- 5.2.2.4 Other Variables and Their Measurement -- 5.2.3 Econometric Model and Result Analysis -- 5.2.3.1 Basic Model and Results -- 5.2.3.2 Robustness Test -- 5.2.3.3 Discussions by Region -- 5.2.3.4 Discussion by Period -- 5.3 Industrial Paths of SOE M& -- A: Market Structure Effects and Industrial Structure Effects -- 5.3.1 Questions and Literature Review -- 5.3.2 Theoretical Model Analysis and Research Hypotheses -- 5.3.2.1 Definition of M& -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.2 Path Selection of M& -- A Modes -- 5.3.2.3 Industrial Selection of Intra-Industry M& -- A and Its Impact on Market Structure -- 5.3.2.4 The Choice of Inter-Industry M& -- A Path: Industrial Effects and Industrial Innovations -- 5.3.3 Research Design -- 5.3.3.1 Sample Selection 5.3.3.2 Operational Performance Measurement Index Consolidation and merger of corporations Mergers and Acquisitions (DE-588)4205916-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4205916-1 |
| title | M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| title_auth | M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| title_exact_search | M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| title_exact_search_txtP | M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| title_full | M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| title_fullStr | M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| title_full_unstemmed | M&a and Corporate Consolidation A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| title_short | M&a and Corporate Consolidation |
| title_sort | m a and corporate consolidation a study of the role of competitive government behavior |
| title_sub | A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior |
| topic | Consolidation and merger of corporations Mergers and Acquisitions (DE-588)4205916-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Consolidation and merger of corporations Mergers and Acquisitions |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wangfengrong maandcorporateconsolidationastudyoftheroleofcompetitivegovernmentbehavior |