The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I: From Policy to Regulation
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
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Cham
Springer International Publishing AG
2020
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (822 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9783030347437 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I |b From Policy to Regulation |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Boxes -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction: The Concept of Shadow Banking -- 1.2 An Industry with Many Faces -- 1.3 Demarcation Lines and Characteristics -- 1.4 Even If We Do Everything Right, There Is Still a Lot We have to Live With -- 1.5 Unintentional Ignorance or Worse When Defining Demarcation Lines? -- 1.6 Demarcation Lines of Shadow Banking Revisited -- 2: The Typology of Shadow Banking -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Institutional Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 2.2.1 The Funding Flows or the Dynamics of Shadow Credit Intermediation -- 2.2.2 Historical Evolution and Categorization of Shadow Banking Activities -- 2.2.2.1 Changing Business Models in the Financial Sector -- 2.2.2.2 Ex Cathedra: Capital Relief Transactions -- 2.3 The Investors in the Shadow Banking Market Before the Crisis -- 2.4 The Emerging Structure of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5 The Size and Design of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5.1 The Credit Intermediation Process -- 2.5.2 The Shadow Banking System Dissected -- 2.6 Temporary Conclusions -- 2.7 The Implications of a Market-Based Financial System -- 2.8 The Linkage of the Different National Shadow Banking Systems Based on Fund Flows -- 2.9 An Alternative Model to Defining the Shadow Banking Industry -- 2.9.1 Introduction -- 2.9.2 Shadow Banking as Nontraditional Intermediation -- 2.9.3 The Findings of the Alternative Model -- 2.9.3.1 Size of the Core and Noncore Liabilities -- 2.9.3.2 Growth Rates and Variability of Those Liabilities -- 2.9.3.3 Comparison with the FSB Analysis and Methodology -- 2.9.3.4 Conclusions -- 2.10 More Variation of Shadow Banking Definitions Under Way -- 3: Financial Intermediation: A Further Analysis -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Risk-Stripping Through Securitization and the Need for 'Safe' Assets | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3.2.1 The Securitization Machine -- 3.2.2 Risk Dynamics in the Securitization Process and Regulatory Oversight -- 3.2.3 The Long-Term Financing Needs of the EU -- 3.2.4 Regulatory Dynamics Regarding Securitization -- 3.2.4.1 The 2012-2013 Proposal of the Basel Committee -- 3.2.5 The 2014 (Final) Revisions to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.1 Shortcomings in the Basel II Framework -- 3.2.5.2 Key Areas of Adjustment -- 3.2.5.3 Hierarchy and Different Approaches -- 3.2.5.4 Improvements to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.5 Extensive Review of the 2014 Changes51 -- 3.2.5.6 Summarized: The New BCBS Securitization Rules -- 3.2.6 Recent Securitization Policy Revisions and Regulation -- 3.2.6.1 The 2016 Update to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.6.2 The European STS Regulation -- 3.2.6.3 STS Regulation Analysis -- 3.2.6.4 SME Securitization and Financing -- 3.2.6.5 So Now What: Securitization, Global Regulatory Reform and Attempted Revival in Europe -- 3.2.6.6 Secondary EU Regulation Regarding Securitization -- Homogeneity of Underlying Exposures -- Risk Retention and Related Matters -- Disclosure Requirements, Operational Standards and Access Conditions for All Securitizations -- Content and Format of the STS Notification -- Third-Party Firms Providing STS Verification Services -- Adjustments Related to Lower Capital Requirements -- 3.2.6.7 Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Solvency II -- 3.2.6.8 Multijurisdictional Securitization in the New Era -- 3.3 Does Securitization Concentrate Uncertainty? -- 3.3.1 Introduction -- 3.3.2 Regulatory Capital in Case of Different Tranches of Seniority -- 3.3.3 The Illusion of Risk-Free in (Re)-securitizations -- 3.3.4 Tranching Riskiness, Uncertainty and Its Implications -- 3.4 Comparative Securitization Regulation Post-2008 Crisis -- 3.5 Securitization Regulation in the US. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3.5.1 Capital Charges and Basel III Implementation -- 3.5.2 Due Diligence Requirements -- 3.6 Collateral Intermediation -- 3.6.1 How Does It Work? -- 3.6.2 Risk Analysis for Collateral Intermediation Activities250 -- 3.7 What Policy Direction to Take? -- 3.8 Regulating Risk as the Central Policy Objective -- 3.9 Policy Implications and Demand-Supply Dynamics -- 3.10 The Way Forward for Securitization -- 4: Securities Lending and Repos -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 An Overview of the Securities Lending Market -- 4.3 Positioning of the Repo and Securities Lending Market Within the Shadow Banking Industry -- 4.4 Financial Stability Risk -- 4.5 Improving Transparency: More (and Better) Data for Monitoring and Policy Design -- 4.6 Future Policy Dynamics -- 4.7 Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 4.8 A Lot Has Been Done But... -- 5: Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Systemic Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Economics of Central Clearing -- 5.3 Risk Mitigation and Management -- 5.4 Every Battle Has Two Sides: What with Those Derivatives That Aren't Centrally Cleared -- 5.5 Does a Central Clearing Party Reduce Counterparty or Systemic Risk? -- 5.6 The Need for Additional Collateral: An Issue? -- 5.7 Who Benefits from Central Clearing? -- 5.8 Do CCPs Transmit Financial Stress? -- 5.9 Non-centrally Cleared Derivatives and Securities Financing Transactions Revisited -- 5.9.1 The Philosophies Behind Haircuts -- 5.9.2 Haircuts for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.3 Haircuts for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 5.9.4 The Methodologies for Calculating Haircuts -- 5.9.5 Effective Numerical Floors on Haircuts -- 5.9.5.1 Floors for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.5.2 Floors for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.9.6 Application of Haircut Floors to Non-bank to Non-bank Transactions -- 5.9.7 Implementation of These Standards -- 5.10 Did We Create New SIFIs Through CCP Regulation? -- 5.11 Substantive Priorities for the Years Ahead -- 5.11.1 Improving Resilience of CCPs -- 5.11.2 Recovery Planning for CCPs -- 5.11.3 Resolvability of CCPs -- 5.11.4 Interdependency and Contagion Analysis -- 5.11.5 Liquidity Is Key for Central Clearing of Derivatives -- 5.11.6 Interoperability of CCPs -- 5.11.7 Consistency Across Jurisdictions -- 5.11.8 Changing Market Structures and Conditions Due to Incoming Regulation -- 5.11.9 Reduction of Large Bank Exposure to CCPs (and Other Counterparties) -- 5.12 The Long Road Traveled and Not Yet There -- 5.12.1 Introduction -- 5.12.2 The Long Road Traveled Regarding CCPs -- 5.12.3 CCP Interdependency -- 5.12.4 CCP Stress Tests -- 5.12.5 Is There an Optimal Structure to a CCP's Waterfall and Default Fund? -- 6: Identifying Non-bank, Non-insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Factors for the Identification of NBNI Financial Entities -- 6.3 Finance Companies -- 6.4 Market Intermediaries and Broker-Dealers -- 6.5 Investment Funds -- 7: The Policy Train Chasing Shadow Banking -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Strengthening Regulation and Oversight -- 7.2.1 Mitigate the Spillover Effect Between the Regular Banking and the Shadow Banking System -- 7.2.2 Introduce Risk-Sensitive Capital Requirements for Banks' Investments in the Equity of Funds -- 7.2.2.1 Hierarchy of Approaches -- 7.2.2.2 Leverage Adjustment -- 7.2.3 Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures -- 7.2.4 Reduce the Susceptibility of Money Market Funds (MMFs) to 'Runs' -- 7.2.5 Aligning the Incentives Associated with Intermediation | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 7.2.6 Dampen Financial Stability Risks and Procyclical Incentives Associated with Securities Financing Transactions Such as Repos and Securities Lending -- 7.2.7 Assessing and Mitigating Systemic Risks Posed by Other Shadow Banking Entities and Activities -- 7.3 The Overall Policy Framework -- 7.3.1 Management of Collective Investment Vehicles (CIVs) with Features That Make Them Susceptible to Runs , -- 7.3.2 Loan Provision That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding -- 7.3.3 Intermediation of Market Activities That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding or on Secured Funding of Client Assets -- 7.3.4 Facilitation of Credit Creation -- 7.3.5 Securitization-Based Credit Intermediation and Funding of Financial Entities -- 7.4 The Seven Economics of Shadow Banking (and Their Respective Policies) -- 8: From Policy to Regulation -- 8.1 The Different Policy Layers -- 8.2 Economics and Policy of Shadow Banking: Is Puzzling the Pieces Together the Right Macroprudential Approach -- 8.3 The Ongoing Assumption of Safe Assets -- 8.4 The History of Shadow Banking -- 8.5 The Role of Regulation in the Birth and Emergence of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.1 Introduction -- 8.5.2 Deregulation and Regulatory Arbitrage -- 8.5.3 Capital Arbitrage -- 8.5.4 Shadow Banking as a Regulated Political Economy -- 8.5.5 Backtesting Shadow Banking Against the Ex Post Crisis Experience -- 8.5.6 Regulation Versus Market Forces -- 8.5.7 Further Reflection on the Business of Credit Intermediation -- 8.5.8 Contagion and the International Transmission Channels -- 8.5.9 Regulation Drives the Design and Capabilities of the Financial Services Industry -- 8.5.10 Regulation and the Short- and Long-Term Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.11 Lessons for Those That Claim That 'Market-Based Finance' Is an Adequate Alternative to Banking-Based Finance | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 8.6 Regulating the Shadow Banking Industry | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Nonbank financial institutions | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Nijs, Luc |t The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I |d Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2020 |z 9783030347420 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Nijs, Luc |
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| contents | Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Boxes -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction: The Concept of Shadow Banking -- 1.2 An Industry with Many Faces -- 1.3 Demarcation Lines and Characteristics -- 1.4 Even If We Do Everything Right, There Is Still a Lot We have to Live With -- 1.5 Unintentional Ignorance or Worse When Defining Demarcation Lines? -- 1.6 Demarcation Lines of Shadow Banking Revisited -- 2: The Typology of Shadow Banking -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Institutional Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 2.2.1 The Funding Flows or the Dynamics of Shadow Credit Intermediation -- 2.2.2 Historical Evolution and Categorization of Shadow Banking Activities -- 2.2.2.1 Changing Business Models in the Financial Sector -- 2.2.2.2 Ex Cathedra: Capital Relief Transactions -- 2.3 The Investors in the Shadow Banking Market Before the Crisis -- 2.4 The Emerging Structure of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5 The Size and Design of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5.1 The Credit Intermediation Process -- 2.5.2 The Shadow Banking System Dissected -- 2.6 Temporary Conclusions -- 2.7 The Implications of a Market-Based Financial System -- 2.8 The Linkage of the Different National Shadow Banking Systems Based on Fund Flows -- 2.9 An Alternative Model to Defining the Shadow Banking Industry -- 2.9.1 Introduction -- 2.9.2 Shadow Banking as Nontraditional Intermediation -- 2.9.3 The Findings of the Alternative Model -- 2.9.3.1 Size of the Core and Noncore Liabilities -- 2.9.3.2 Growth Rates and Variability of Those Liabilities -- 2.9.3.3 Comparison with the FSB Analysis and Methodology -- 2.9.3.4 Conclusions -- 2.10 More Variation of Shadow Banking Definitions Under Way -- 3: Financial Intermediation: A Further Analysis -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Risk-Stripping Through Securitization and the Need for 'Safe' Assets 3.2.1 The Securitization Machine -- 3.2.2 Risk Dynamics in the Securitization Process and Regulatory Oversight -- 3.2.3 The Long-Term Financing Needs of the EU -- 3.2.4 Regulatory Dynamics Regarding Securitization -- 3.2.4.1 The 2012-2013 Proposal of the Basel Committee -- 3.2.5 The 2014 (Final) Revisions to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.1 Shortcomings in the Basel II Framework -- 3.2.5.2 Key Areas of Adjustment -- 3.2.5.3 Hierarchy and Different Approaches -- 3.2.5.4 Improvements to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.5 Extensive Review of the 2014 Changes51 -- 3.2.5.6 Summarized: The New BCBS Securitization Rules -- 3.2.6 Recent Securitization Policy Revisions and Regulation -- 3.2.6.1 The 2016 Update to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.6.2 The European STS Regulation -- 3.2.6.3 STS Regulation Analysis -- 3.2.6.4 SME Securitization and Financing -- 3.2.6.5 So Now What: Securitization, Global Regulatory Reform and Attempted Revival in Europe -- 3.2.6.6 Secondary EU Regulation Regarding Securitization -- Homogeneity of Underlying Exposures -- Risk Retention and Related Matters -- Disclosure Requirements, Operational Standards and Access Conditions for All Securitizations -- Content and Format of the STS Notification -- Third-Party Firms Providing STS Verification Services -- Adjustments Related to Lower Capital Requirements -- 3.2.6.7 Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Solvency II -- 3.2.6.8 Multijurisdictional Securitization in the New Era -- 3.3 Does Securitization Concentrate Uncertainty? -- 3.3.1 Introduction -- 3.3.2 Regulatory Capital in Case of Different Tranches of Seniority -- 3.3.3 The Illusion of Risk-Free in (Re)-securitizations -- 3.3.4 Tranching Riskiness, Uncertainty and Its Implications -- 3.4 Comparative Securitization Regulation Post-2008 Crisis -- 3.5 Securitization Regulation in the US. 3.5.1 Capital Charges and Basel III Implementation -- 3.5.2 Due Diligence Requirements -- 3.6 Collateral Intermediation -- 3.6.1 How Does It Work? -- 3.6.2 Risk Analysis for Collateral Intermediation Activities250 -- 3.7 What Policy Direction to Take? -- 3.8 Regulating Risk as the Central Policy Objective -- 3.9 Policy Implications and Demand-Supply Dynamics -- 3.10 The Way Forward for Securitization -- 4: Securities Lending and Repos -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 An Overview of the Securities Lending Market -- 4.3 Positioning of the Repo and Securities Lending Market Within the Shadow Banking Industry -- 4.4 Financial Stability Risk -- 4.5 Improving Transparency: More (and Better) Data for Monitoring and Policy Design -- 4.6 Future Policy Dynamics -- 4.7 Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 4.8 A Lot Has Been Done But... -- 5: Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Systemic Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Economics of Central Clearing -- 5.3 Risk Mitigation and Management -- 5.4 Every Battle Has Two Sides: What with Those Derivatives That Aren't Centrally Cleared -- 5.5 Does a Central Clearing Party Reduce Counterparty or Systemic Risk? -- 5.6 The Need for Additional Collateral: An Issue? -- 5.7 Who Benefits from Central Clearing? -- 5.8 Do CCPs Transmit Financial Stress? -- 5.9 Non-centrally Cleared Derivatives and Securities Financing Transactions Revisited -- 5.9.1 The Philosophies Behind Haircuts -- 5.9.2 Haircuts for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.3 Haircuts for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 5.9.4 The Methodologies for Calculating Haircuts -- 5.9.5 Effective Numerical Floors on Haircuts -- 5.9.5.1 Floors for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.5.2 Floors for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions 5.9.6 Application of Haircut Floors to Non-bank to Non-bank Transactions -- 5.9.7 Implementation of These Standards -- 5.10 Did We Create New SIFIs Through CCP Regulation? -- 5.11 Substantive Priorities for the Years Ahead -- 5.11.1 Improving Resilience of CCPs -- 5.11.2 Recovery Planning for CCPs -- 5.11.3 Resolvability of CCPs -- 5.11.4 Interdependency and Contagion Analysis -- 5.11.5 Liquidity Is Key for Central Clearing of Derivatives -- 5.11.6 Interoperability of CCPs -- 5.11.7 Consistency Across Jurisdictions -- 5.11.8 Changing Market Structures and Conditions Due to Incoming Regulation -- 5.11.9 Reduction of Large Bank Exposure to CCPs (and Other Counterparties) -- 5.12 The Long Road Traveled and Not Yet There -- 5.12.1 Introduction -- 5.12.2 The Long Road Traveled Regarding CCPs -- 5.12.3 CCP Interdependency -- 5.12.4 CCP Stress Tests -- 5.12.5 Is There an Optimal Structure to a CCP's Waterfall and Default Fund? -- 6: Identifying Non-bank, Non-insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Factors for the Identification of NBNI Financial Entities -- 6.3 Finance Companies -- 6.4 Market Intermediaries and Broker-Dealers -- 6.5 Investment Funds -- 7: The Policy Train Chasing Shadow Banking -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Strengthening Regulation and Oversight -- 7.2.1 Mitigate the Spillover Effect Between the Regular Banking and the Shadow Banking System -- 7.2.2 Introduce Risk-Sensitive Capital Requirements for Banks' Investments in the Equity of Funds -- 7.2.2.1 Hierarchy of Approaches -- 7.2.2.2 Leverage Adjustment -- 7.2.3 Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures -- 7.2.4 Reduce the Susceptibility of Money Market Funds (MMFs) to 'Runs' -- 7.2.5 Aligning the Incentives Associated with Intermediation 7.2.6 Dampen Financial Stability Risks and Procyclical Incentives Associated with Securities Financing Transactions Such as Repos and Securities Lending -- 7.2.7 Assessing and Mitigating Systemic Risks Posed by Other Shadow Banking Entities and Activities -- 7.3 The Overall Policy Framework -- 7.3.1 Management of Collective Investment Vehicles (CIVs) with Features That Make Them Susceptible to Runs , -- 7.3.2 Loan Provision That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding -- 7.3.3 Intermediation of Market Activities That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding or on Secured Funding of Client Assets -- 7.3.4 Facilitation of Credit Creation -- 7.3.5 Securitization-Based Credit Intermediation and Funding of Financial Entities -- 7.4 The Seven Economics of Shadow Banking (and Their Respective Policies) -- 8: From Policy to Regulation -- 8.1 The Different Policy Layers -- 8.2 Economics and Policy of Shadow Banking: Is Puzzling the Pieces Together the Right Macroprudential Approach -- 8.3 The Ongoing Assumption of Safe Assets -- 8.4 The History of Shadow Banking -- 8.5 The Role of Regulation in the Birth and Emergence of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.1 Introduction -- 8.5.2 Deregulation and Regulatory Arbitrage -- 8.5.3 Capital Arbitrage -- 8.5.4 Shadow Banking as a Regulated Political Economy -- 8.5.5 Backtesting Shadow Banking Against the Ex Post Crisis Experience -- 8.5.6 Regulation Versus Market Forces -- 8.5.7 Further Reflection on the Business of Credit Intermediation -- 8.5.8 Contagion and the International Transmission Channels -- 8.5.9 Regulation Drives the Design and Capabilities of the Financial Services Industry -- 8.5.10 Regulation and the Short- and Long-Term Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.11 Lessons for Those That Claim That 'Market-Based Finance' Is an Adequate Alternative to Banking-Based Finance 8.6 Regulating the Shadow Banking Industry |
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| dewey-full | 332.1 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 332 - Financial economics |
| dewey-raw | 332.1 |
| dewey-search | 332.1 |
| dewey-sort | 3332.1 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>10705nmm a2200421zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048222924</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220516s2020 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783030347437</subfield><subfield code="9">978-3-030-34743-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-30-PQE)EBC6245737</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-30-PAD)EBC6245737</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-89-EBL)EBL6245737</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1163941428</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV048222924</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">332.1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nijs, Luc</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I</subfield><subfield code="b">From Policy to Regulation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cham</subfield><subfield code="b">Springer International Publishing AG</subfield><subfield code="c">2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">©2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (822 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Boxes -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction: The Concept of Shadow Banking -- 1.2 An Industry with Many Faces -- 1.3 Demarcation Lines and Characteristics -- 1.4 Even If We Do Everything Right, There Is Still a Lot We have to Live With -- 1.5 Unintentional Ignorance or Worse When Defining Demarcation Lines? -- 1.6 Demarcation Lines of Shadow Banking Revisited -- 2: The Typology of Shadow Banking -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Institutional Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 2.2.1 The Funding Flows or the Dynamics of Shadow Credit Intermediation -- 2.2.2 Historical Evolution and Categorization of Shadow Banking Activities -- 2.2.2.1 Changing Business Models in the Financial Sector -- 2.2.2.2 Ex Cathedra: Capital Relief Transactions -- 2.3 The Investors in the Shadow Banking Market Before the Crisis -- 2.4 The Emerging Structure of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5 The Size and Design of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5.1 The Credit Intermediation Process -- 2.5.2 The Shadow Banking System Dissected -- 2.6 Temporary Conclusions -- 2.7 The Implications of a Market-Based Financial System -- 2.8 The Linkage of the Different National Shadow Banking Systems Based on Fund Flows -- 2.9 An Alternative Model to Defining the Shadow Banking Industry -- 2.9.1 Introduction -- 2.9.2 Shadow Banking as Nontraditional Intermediation -- 2.9.3 The Findings of the Alternative Model -- 2.9.3.1 Size of the Core and Noncore Liabilities -- 2.9.3.2 Growth Rates and Variability of Those Liabilities -- 2.9.3.3 Comparison with the FSB Analysis and Methodology -- 2.9.3.4 Conclusions -- 2.10 More Variation of Shadow Banking Definitions Under Way -- 3: Financial Intermediation: A Further Analysis -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Risk-Stripping Through Securitization and the Need for 'Safe' Assets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3.2.1 The Securitization Machine -- 3.2.2 Risk Dynamics in the Securitization Process and Regulatory Oversight -- 3.2.3 The Long-Term Financing Needs of the EU -- 3.2.4 Regulatory Dynamics Regarding Securitization -- 3.2.4.1 The 2012-2013 Proposal of the Basel Committee -- 3.2.5 The 2014 (Final) Revisions to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.1 Shortcomings in the Basel II Framework -- 3.2.5.2 Key Areas of Adjustment -- 3.2.5.3 Hierarchy and Different Approaches -- 3.2.5.4 Improvements to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.5 Extensive Review of the 2014 Changes51 -- 3.2.5.6 Summarized: The New BCBS Securitization Rules -- 3.2.6 Recent Securitization Policy Revisions and Regulation -- 3.2.6.1 The 2016 Update to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.6.2 The European STS Regulation -- 3.2.6.3 STS Regulation Analysis -- 3.2.6.4 SME Securitization and Financing -- 3.2.6.5 So Now What: Securitization, Global Regulatory Reform and Attempted Revival in Europe -- 3.2.6.6 Secondary EU Regulation Regarding Securitization -- Homogeneity of Underlying Exposures -- Risk Retention and Related Matters -- Disclosure Requirements, Operational Standards and Access Conditions for All Securitizations -- Content and Format of the STS Notification -- Third-Party Firms Providing STS Verification Services -- Adjustments Related to Lower Capital Requirements -- 3.2.6.7 Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Solvency II -- 3.2.6.8 Multijurisdictional Securitization in the New Era -- 3.3 Does Securitization Concentrate Uncertainty? -- 3.3.1 Introduction -- 3.3.2 Regulatory Capital in Case of Different Tranches of Seniority -- 3.3.3 The Illusion of Risk-Free in (Re)-securitizations -- 3.3.4 Tranching Riskiness, Uncertainty and Its Implications -- 3.4 Comparative Securitization Regulation Post-2008 Crisis -- 3.5 Securitization Regulation in the US.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3.5.1 Capital Charges and Basel III Implementation -- 3.5.2 Due Diligence Requirements -- 3.6 Collateral Intermediation -- 3.6.1 How Does It Work? -- 3.6.2 Risk Analysis for Collateral Intermediation Activities250 -- 3.7 What Policy Direction to Take? -- 3.8 Regulating Risk as the Central Policy Objective -- 3.9 Policy Implications and Demand-Supply Dynamics -- 3.10 The Way Forward for Securitization -- 4: Securities Lending and Repos -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 An Overview of the Securities Lending Market -- 4.3 Positioning of the Repo and Securities Lending Market Within the Shadow Banking Industry -- 4.4 Financial Stability Risk -- 4.5 Improving Transparency: More (and Better) Data for Monitoring and Policy Design -- 4.6 Future Policy Dynamics -- 4.7 Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 4.8 A Lot Has Been Done But... -- 5: Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Systemic Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Economics of Central Clearing -- 5.3 Risk Mitigation and Management -- 5.4 Every Battle Has Two Sides: What with Those Derivatives That Aren't Centrally Cleared -- 5.5 Does a Central Clearing Party Reduce Counterparty or Systemic Risk? -- 5.6 The Need for Additional Collateral: An Issue? -- 5.7 Who Benefits from Central Clearing? -- 5.8 Do CCPs Transmit Financial Stress? -- 5.9 Non-centrally Cleared Derivatives and Securities Financing Transactions Revisited -- 5.9.1 The Philosophies Behind Haircuts -- 5.9.2 Haircuts for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.3 Haircuts for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 5.9.4 The Methodologies for Calculating Haircuts -- 5.9.5 Effective Numerical Floors on Haircuts -- 5.9.5.1 Floors for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.5.2 Floors for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5.9.6 Application of Haircut Floors to Non-bank to Non-bank Transactions -- 5.9.7 Implementation of These Standards -- 5.10 Did We Create New SIFIs Through CCP Regulation? -- 5.11 Substantive Priorities for the Years Ahead -- 5.11.1 Improving Resilience of CCPs -- 5.11.2 Recovery Planning for CCPs -- 5.11.3 Resolvability of CCPs -- 5.11.4 Interdependency and Contagion Analysis -- 5.11.5 Liquidity Is Key for Central Clearing of Derivatives -- 5.11.6 Interoperability of CCPs -- 5.11.7 Consistency Across Jurisdictions -- 5.11.8 Changing Market Structures and Conditions Due to Incoming Regulation -- 5.11.9 Reduction of Large Bank Exposure to CCPs (and Other Counterparties) -- 5.12 The Long Road Traveled and Not Yet There -- 5.12.1 Introduction -- 5.12.2 The Long Road Traveled Regarding CCPs -- 5.12.3 CCP Interdependency -- 5.12.4 CCP Stress Tests -- 5.12.5 Is There an Optimal Structure to a CCP's Waterfall and Default Fund? -- 6: Identifying Non-bank, Non-insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Factors for the Identification of NBNI Financial Entities -- 6.3 Finance Companies -- 6.4 Market Intermediaries and Broker-Dealers -- 6.5 Investment Funds -- 7: The Policy Train Chasing Shadow Banking -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Strengthening Regulation and Oversight -- 7.2.1 Mitigate the Spillover Effect Between the Regular Banking and the Shadow Banking System -- 7.2.2 Introduce Risk-Sensitive Capital Requirements for Banks' Investments in the Equity of Funds -- 7.2.2.1 Hierarchy of Approaches -- 7.2.2.2 Leverage Adjustment -- 7.2.3 Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures -- 7.2.4 Reduce the Susceptibility of Money Market Funds (MMFs) to 'Runs' -- 7.2.5 Aligning the Incentives Associated with Intermediation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">7.2.6 Dampen Financial Stability Risks and Procyclical Incentives Associated with Securities Financing Transactions Such as Repos and Securities Lending -- 7.2.7 Assessing and Mitigating Systemic Risks Posed by Other Shadow Banking Entities and Activities -- 7.3 The Overall Policy Framework -- 7.3.1 Management of Collective Investment Vehicles (CIVs) with Features That Make Them Susceptible to Runs , -- 7.3.2 Loan Provision That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding -- 7.3.3 Intermediation of Market Activities That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding or on Secured Funding of Client Assets -- 7.3.4 Facilitation of Credit Creation -- 7.3.5 Securitization-Based Credit Intermediation and Funding of Financial Entities -- 7.4 The Seven Economics of Shadow Banking (and Their Respective Policies) -- 8: From Policy to Regulation -- 8.1 The Different Policy Layers -- 8.2 Economics and Policy of Shadow Banking: Is Puzzling the Pieces Together the Right Macroprudential Approach -- 8.3 The Ongoing Assumption of Safe Assets -- 8.4 The History of Shadow Banking -- 8.5 The Role of Regulation in the Birth and Emergence of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.1 Introduction -- 8.5.2 Deregulation and Regulatory Arbitrage -- 8.5.3 Capital Arbitrage -- 8.5.4 Shadow Banking as a Regulated Political Economy -- 8.5.5 Backtesting Shadow Banking Against the Ex Post Crisis Experience -- 8.5.6 Regulation Versus Market Forces -- 8.5.7 Further Reflection on the Business of Credit Intermediation -- 8.5.8 Contagion and the International Transmission Channels -- 8.5.9 Regulation Drives the Design and Capabilities of the Financial Services Industry -- 8.5.10 Regulation and the Short- and Long-Term Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.11 Lessons for Those That Claim That 'Market-Based Finance' Is an Adequate Alternative to Banking-Based Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">8.6 Regulating the Shadow Banking Industry</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nonbank financial institutions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="a">Nijs, Luc</subfield><subfield code="t">The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I</subfield><subfield code="d">Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2020</subfield><subfield code="z">9783030347420</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-30-PQE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033603657</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048222924 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:50:37Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:32:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783030347437 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033603657 |
| oclc_num | 1163941428 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (822 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-30-PQE |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSearch | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Springer International Publishing AG |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Nijs, Luc Verfasser aut The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation Cham Springer International Publishing AG 2020 ©2020 1 Online-Ressource (822 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Boxes -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction: The Concept of Shadow Banking -- 1.2 An Industry with Many Faces -- 1.3 Demarcation Lines and Characteristics -- 1.4 Even If We Do Everything Right, There Is Still a Lot We have to Live With -- 1.5 Unintentional Ignorance or Worse When Defining Demarcation Lines? -- 1.6 Demarcation Lines of Shadow Banking Revisited -- 2: The Typology of Shadow Banking -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Institutional Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 2.2.1 The Funding Flows or the Dynamics of Shadow Credit Intermediation -- 2.2.2 Historical Evolution and Categorization of Shadow Banking Activities -- 2.2.2.1 Changing Business Models in the Financial Sector -- 2.2.2.2 Ex Cathedra: Capital Relief Transactions -- 2.3 The Investors in the Shadow Banking Market Before the Crisis -- 2.4 The Emerging Structure of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5 The Size and Design of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5.1 The Credit Intermediation Process -- 2.5.2 The Shadow Banking System Dissected -- 2.6 Temporary Conclusions -- 2.7 The Implications of a Market-Based Financial System -- 2.8 The Linkage of the Different National Shadow Banking Systems Based on Fund Flows -- 2.9 An Alternative Model to Defining the Shadow Banking Industry -- 2.9.1 Introduction -- 2.9.2 Shadow Banking as Nontraditional Intermediation -- 2.9.3 The Findings of the Alternative Model -- 2.9.3.1 Size of the Core and Noncore Liabilities -- 2.9.3.2 Growth Rates and Variability of Those Liabilities -- 2.9.3.3 Comparison with the FSB Analysis and Methodology -- 2.9.3.4 Conclusions -- 2.10 More Variation of Shadow Banking Definitions Under Way -- 3: Financial Intermediation: A Further Analysis -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Risk-Stripping Through Securitization and the Need for 'Safe' Assets 3.2.1 The Securitization Machine -- 3.2.2 Risk Dynamics in the Securitization Process and Regulatory Oversight -- 3.2.3 The Long-Term Financing Needs of the EU -- 3.2.4 Regulatory Dynamics Regarding Securitization -- 3.2.4.1 The 2012-2013 Proposal of the Basel Committee -- 3.2.5 The 2014 (Final) Revisions to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.1 Shortcomings in the Basel II Framework -- 3.2.5.2 Key Areas of Adjustment -- 3.2.5.3 Hierarchy and Different Approaches -- 3.2.5.4 Improvements to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.5 Extensive Review of the 2014 Changes51 -- 3.2.5.6 Summarized: The New BCBS Securitization Rules -- 3.2.6 Recent Securitization Policy Revisions and Regulation -- 3.2.6.1 The 2016 Update to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.6.2 The European STS Regulation -- 3.2.6.3 STS Regulation Analysis -- 3.2.6.4 SME Securitization and Financing -- 3.2.6.5 So Now What: Securitization, Global Regulatory Reform and Attempted Revival in Europe -- 3.2.6.6 Secondary EU Regulation Regarding Securitization -- Homogeneity of Underlying Exposures -- Risk Retention and Related Matters -- Disclosure Requirements, Operational Standards and Access Conditions for All Securitizations -- Content and Format of the STS Notification -- Third-Party Firms Providing STS Verification Services -- Adjustments Related to Lower Capital Requirements -- 3.2.6.7 Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Solvency II -- 3.2.6.8 Multijurisdictional Securitization in the New Era -- 3.3 Does Securitization Concentrate Uncertainty? -- 3.3.1 Introduction -- 3.3.2 Regulatory Capital in Case of Different Tranches of Seniority -- 3.3.3 The Illusion of Risk-Free in (Re)-securitizations -- 3.3.4 Tranching Riskiness, Uncertainty and Its Implications -- 3.4 Comparative Securitization Regulation Post-2008 Crisis -- 3.5 Securitization Regulation in the US. 3.5.1 Capital Charges and Basel III Implementation -- 3.5.2 Due Diligence Requirements -- 3.6 Collateral Intermediation -- 3.6.1 How Does It Work? -- 3.6.2 Risk Analysis for Collateral Intermediation Activities250 -- 3.7 What Policy Direction to Take? -- 3.8 Regulating Risk as the Central Policy Objective -- 3.9 Policy Implications and Demand-Supply Dynamics -- 3.10 The Way Forward for Securitization -- 4: Securities Lending and Repos -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 An Overview of the Securities Lending Market -- 4.3 Positioning of the Repo and Securities Lending Market Within the Shadow Banking Industry -- 4.4 Financial Stability Risk -- 4.5 Improving Transparency: More (and Better) Data for Monitoring and Policy Design -- 4.6 Future Policy Dynamics -- 4.7 Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 4.8 A Lot Has Been Done But... -- 5: Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Systemic Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Economics of Central Clearing -- 5.3 Risk Mitigation and Management -- 5.4 Every Battle Has Two Sides: What with Those Derivatives That Aren't Centrally Cleared -- 5.5 Does a Central Clearing Party Reduce Counterparty or Systemic Risk? -- 5.6 The Need for Additional Collateral: An Issue? -- 5.7 Who Benefits from Central Clearing? -- 5.8 Do CCPs Transmit Financial Stress? -- 5.9 Non-centrally Cleared Derivatives and Securities Financing Transactions Revisited -- 5.9.1 The Philosophies Behind Haircuts -- 5.9.2 Haircuts for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.3 Haircuts for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 5.9.4 The Methodologies for Calculating Haircuts -- 5.9.5 Effective Numerical Floors on Haircuts -- 5.9.5.1 Floors for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.5.2 Floors for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions 5.9.6 Application of Haircut Floors to Non-bank to Non-bank Transactions -- 5.9.7 Implementation of These Standards -- 5.10 Did We Create New SIFIs Through CCP Regulation? -- 5.11 Substantive Priorities for the Years Ahead -- 5.11.1 Improving Resilience of CCPs -- 5.11.2 Recovery Planning for CCPs -- 5.11.3 Resolvability of CCPs -- 5.11.4 Interdependency and Contagion Analysis -- 5.11.5 Liquidity Is Key for Central Clearing of Derivatives -- 5.11.6 Interoperability of CCPs -- 5.11.7 Consistency Across Jurisdictions -- 5.11.8 Changing Market Structures and Conditions Due to Incoming Regulation -- 5.11.9 Reduction of Large Bank Exposure to CCPs (and Other Counterparties) -- 5.12 The Long Road Traveled and Not Yet There -- 5.12.1 Introduction -- 5.12.2 The Long Road Traveled Regarding CCPs -- 5.12.3 CCP Interdependency -- 5.12.4 CCP Stress Tests -- 5.12.5 Is There an Optimal Structure to a CCP's Waterfall and Default Fund? -- 6: Identifying Non-bank, Non-insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Factors for the Identification of NBNI Financial Entities -- 6.3 Finance Companies -- 6.4 Market Intermediaries and Broker-Dealers -- 6.5 Investment Funds -- 7: The Policy Train Chasing Shadow Banking -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Strengthening Regulation and Oversight -- 7.2.1 Mitigate the Spillover Effect Between the Regular Banking and the Shadow Banking System -- 7.2.2 Introduce Risk-Sensitive Capital Requirements for Banks' Investments in the Equity of Funds -- 7.2.2.1 Hierarchy of Approaches -- 7.2.2.2 Leverage Adjustment -- 7.2.3 Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures -- 7.2.4 Reduce the Susceptibility of Money Market Funds (MMFs) to 'Runs' -- 7.2.5 Aligning the Incentives Associated with Intermediation 7.2.6 Dampen Financial Stability Risks and Procyclical Incentives Associated with Securities Financing Transactions Such as Repos and Securities Lending -- 7.2.7 Assessing and Mitigating Systemic Risks Posed by Other Shadow Banking Entities and Activities -- 7.3 The Overall Policy Framework -- 7.3.1 Management of Collective Investment Vehicles (CIVs) with Features That Make Them Susceptible to Runs , -- 7.3.2 Loan Provision That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding -- 7.3.3 Intermediation of Market Activities That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding or on Secured Funding of Client Assets -- 7.3.4 Facilitation of Credit Creation -- 7.3.5 Securitization-Based Credit Intermediation and Funding of Financial Entities -- 7.4 The Seven Economics of Shadow Banking (and Their Respective Policies) -- 8: From Policy to Regulation -- 8.1 The Different Policy Layers -- 8.2 Economics and Policy of Shadow Banking: Is Puzzling the Pieces Together the Right Macroprudential Approach -- 8.3 The Ongoing Assumption of Safe Assets -- 8.4 The History of Shadow Banking -- 8.5 The Role of Regulation in the Birth and Emergence of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.1 Introduction -- 8.5.2 Deregulation and Regulatory Arbitrage -- 8.5.3 Capital Arbitrage -- 8.5.4 Shadow Banking as a Regulated Political Economy -- 8.5.5 Backtesting Shadow Banking Against the Ex Post Crisis Experience -- 8.5.6 Regulation Versus Market Forces -- 8.5.7 Further Reflection on the Business of Credit Intermediation -- 8.5.8 Contagion and the International Transmission Channels -- 8.5.9 Regulation Drives the Design and Capabilities of the Financial Services Industry -- 8.5.10 Regulation and the Short- and Long-Term Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.11 Lessons for Those That Claim That 'Market-Based Finance' Is an Adequate Alternative to Banking-Based Finance 8.6 Regulating the Shadow Banking Industry Nonbank financial institutions Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Nijs, Luc The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2020 9783030347420 |
| spellingShingle | Nijs, Luc The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Boxes -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction: The Concept of Shadow Banking -- 1.2 An Industry with Many Faces -- 1.3 Demarcation Lines and Characteristics -- 1.4 Even If We Do Everything Right, There Is Still a Lot We have to Live With -- 1.5 Unintentional Ignorance or Worse When Defining Demarcation Lines? -- 1.6 Demarcation Lines of Shadow Banking Revisited -- 2: The Typology of Shadow Banking -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Institutional Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 2.2.1 The Funding Flows or the Dynamics of Shadow Credit Intermediation -- 2.2.2 Historical Evolution and Categorization of Shadow Banking Activities -- 2.2.2.1 Changing Business Models in the Financial Sector -- 2.2.2.2 Ex Cathedra: Capital Relief Transactions -- 2.3 The Investors in the Shadow Banking Market Before the Crisis -- 2.4 The Emerging Structure of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5 The Size and Design of the Shadow Banking Market -- 2.5.1 The Credit Intermediation Process -- 2.5.2 The Shadow Banking System Dissected -- 2.6 Temporary Conclusions -- 2.7 The Implications of a Market-Based Financial System -- 2.8 The Linkage of the Different National Shadow Banking Systems Based on Fund Flows -- 2.9 An Alternative Model to Defining the Shadow Banking Industry -- 2.9.1 Introduction -- 2.9.2 Shadow Banking as Nontraditional Intermediation -- 2.9.3 The Findings of the Alternative Model -- 2.9.3.1 Size of the Core and Noncore Liabilities -- 2.9.3.2 Growth Rates and Variability of Those Liabilities -- 2.9.3.3 Comparison with the FSB Analysis and Methodology -- 2.9.3.4 Conclusions -- 2.10 More Variation of Shadow Banking Definitions Under Way -- 3: Financial Intermediation: A Further Analysis -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Risk-Stripping Through Securitization and the Need for 'Safe' Assets 3.2.1 The Securitization Machine -- 3.2.2 Risk Dynamics in the Securitization Process and Regulatory Oversight -- 3.2.3 The Long-Term Financing Needs of the EU -- 3.2.4 Regulatory Dynamics Regarding Securitization -- 3.2.4.1 The 2012-2013 Proposal of the Basel Committee -- 3.2.5 The 2014 (Final) Revisions to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.1 Shortcomings in the Basel II Framework -- 3.2.5.2 Key Areas of Adjustment -- 3.2.5.3 Hierarchy and Different Approaches -- 3.2.5.4 Improvements to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.5.5 Extensive Review of the 2014 Changes51 -- 3.2.5.6 Summarized: The New BCBS Securitization Rules -- 3.2.6 Recent Securitization Policy Revisions and Regulation -- 3.2.6.1 The 2016 Update to the Securitization Framework -- 3.2.6.2 The European STS Regulation -- 3.2.6.3 STS Regulation Analysis -- 3.2.6.4 SME Securitization and Financing -- 3.2.6.5 So Now What: Securitization, Global Regulatory Reform and Attempted Revival in Europe -- 3.2.6.6 Secondary EU Regulation Regarding Securitization -- Homogeneity of Underlying Exposures -- Risk Retention and Related Matters -- Disclosure Requirements, Operational Standards and Access Conditions for All Securitizations -- Content and Format of the STS Notification -- Third-Party Firms Providing STS Verification Services -- Adjustments Related to Lower Capital Requirements -- 3.2.6.7 Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Solvency II -- 3.2.6.8 Multijurisdictional Securitization in the New Era -- 3.3 Does Securitization Concentrate Uncertainty? -- 3.3.1 Introduction -- 3.3.2 Regulatory Capital in Case of Different Tranches of Seniority -- 3.3.3 The Illusion of Risk-Free in (Re)-securitizations -- 3.3.4 Tranching Riskiness, Uncertainty and Its Implications -- 3.4 Comparative Securitization Regulation Post-2008 Crisis -- 3.5 Securitization Regulation in the US. 3.5.1 Capital Charges and Basel III Implementation -- 3.5.2 Due Diligence Requirements -- 3.6 Collateral Intermediation -- 3.6.1 How Does It Work? -- 3.6.2 Risk Analysis for Collateral Intermediation Activities250 -- 3.7 What Policy Direction to Take? -- 3.8 Regulating Risk as the Central Policy Objective -- 3.9 Policy Implications and Demand-Supply Dynamics -- 3.10 The Way Forward for Securitization -- 4: Securities Lending and Repos -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 An Overview of the Securities Lending Market -- 4.3 Positioning of the Repo and Securities Lending Market Within the Shadow Banking Industry -- 4.4 Financial Stability Risk -- 4.5 Improving Transparency: More (and Better) Data for Monitoring and Policy Design -- 4.6 Future Policy Dynamics -- 4.7 Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 4.8 A Lot Has Been Done But... -- 5: Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Systemic Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Economics of Central Clearing -- 5.3 Risk Mitigation and Management -- 5.4 Every Battle Has Two Sides: What with Those Derivatives That Aren't Centrally Cleared -- 5.5 Does a Central Clearing Party Reduce Counterparty or Systemic Risk? -- 5.6 The Need for Additional Collateral: An Issue? -- 5.7 Who Benefits from Central Clearing? -- 5.8 Do CCPs Transmit Financial Stress? -- 5.9 Non-centrally Cleared Derivatives and Securities Financing Transactions Revisited -- 5.9.1 The Philosophies Behind Haircuts -- 5.9.2 Haircuts for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.3 Haircuts for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions -- 5.9.4 The Methodologies for Calculating Haircuts -- 5.9.5 Effective Numerical Floors on Haircuts -- 5.9.5.1 Floors for OTC Derivatives -- 5.9.5.2 Floors for Non-centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions 5.9.6 Application of Haircut Floors to Non-bank to Non-bank Transactions -- 5.9.7 Implementation of These Standards -- 5.10 Did We Create New SIFIs Through CCP Regulation? -- 5.11 Substantive Priorities for the Years Ahead -- 5.11.1 Improving Resilience of CCPs -- 5.11.2 Recovery Planning for CCPs -- 5.11.3 Resolvability of CCPs -- 5.11.4 Interdependency and Contagion Analysis -- 5.11.5 Liquidity Is Key for Central Clearing of Derivatives -- 5.11.6 Interoperability of CCPs -- 5.11.7 Consistency Across Jurisdictions -- 5.11.8 Changing Market Structures and Conditions Due to Incoming Regulation -- 5.11.9 Reduction of Large Bank Exposure to CCPs (and Other Counterparties) -- 5.12 The Long Road Traveled and Not Yet There -- 5.12.1 Introduction -- 5.12.2 The Long Road Traveled Regarding CCPs -- 5.12.3 CCP Interdependency -- 5.12.4 CCP Stress Tests -- 5.12.5 Is There an Optimal Structure to a CCP's Waterfall and Default Fund? -- 6: Identifying Non-bank, Non-insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Factors for the Identification of NBNI Financial Entities -- 6.3 Finance Companies -- 6.4 Market Intermediaries and Broker-Dealers -- 6.5 Investment Funds -- 7: The Policy Train Chasing Shadow Banking -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Strengthening Regulation and Oversight -- 7.2.1 Mitigate the Spillover Effect Between the Regular Banking and the Shadow Banking System -- 7.2.2 Introduce Risk-Sensitive Capital Requirements for Banks' Investments in the Equity of Funds -- 7.2.2.1 Hierarchy of Approaches -- 7.2.2.2 Leverage Adjustment -- 7.2.3 Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures -- 7.2.4 Reduce the Susceptibility of Money Market Funds (MMFs) to 'Runs' -- 7.2.5 Aligning the Incentives Associated with Intermediation 7.2.6 Dampen Financial Stability Risks and Procyclical Incentives Associated with Securities Financing Transactions Such as Repos and Securities Lending -- 7.2.7 Assessing and Mitigating Systemic Risks Posed by Other Shadow Banking Entities and Activities -- 7.3 The Overall Policy Framework -- 7.3.1 Management of Collective Investment Vehicles (CIVs) with Features That Make Them Susceptible to Runs , -- 7.3.2 Loan Provision That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding -- 7.3.3 Intermediation of Market Activities That Is Dependent on Short-Term Funding or on Secured Funding of Client Assets -- 7.3.4 Facilitation of Credit Creation -- 7.3.5 Securitization-Based Credit Intermediation and Funding of Financial Entities -- 7.4 The Seven Economics of Shadow Banking (and Their Respective Policies) -- 8: From Policy to Regulation -- 8.1 The Different Policy Layers -- 8.2 Economics and Policy of Shadow Banking: Is Puzzling the Pieces Together the Right Macroprudential Approach -- 8.3 The Ongoing Assumption of Safe Assets -- 8.4 The History of Shadow Banking -- 8.5 The Role of Regulation in the Birth and Emergence of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.1 Introduction -- 8.5.2 Deregulation and Regulatory Arbitrage -- 8.5.3 Capital Arbitrage -- 8.5.4 Shadow Banking as a Regulated Political Economy -- 8.5.5 Backtesting Shadow Banking Against the Ex Post Crisis Experience -- 8.5.6 Regulation Versus Market Forces -- 8.5.7 Further Reflection on the Business of Credit Intermediation -- 8.5.8 Contagion and the International Transmission Channels -- 8.5.9 Regulation Drives the Design and Capabilities of the Financial Services Industry -- 8.5.10 Regulation and the Short- and Long-Term Dynamics of Shadow Banking -- 8.5.11 Lessons for Those That Claim That 'Market-Based Finance' Is an Adequate Alternative to Banking-Based Finance 8.6 Regulating the Shadow Banking Industry Nonbank financial institutions |
| title | The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation |
| title_auth | The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation |
| title_exact_search | The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation |
| title_full | The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation |
| title_fullStr | The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I From Policy to Regulation |
| title_short | The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking, Volume I |
| title_sort | the handbook of global shadow banking volume i from policy to regulation |
| title_sub | From Policy to Regulation |
| topic | Nonbank financial institutions |
| topic_facet | Nonbank financial institutions |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nijsluc thehandbookofglobalshadowbankingvolumeifrompolicytoregulation |