Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance: The Impact of Board Structure
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cham
Springer International Publishing AG
2020
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | HWR01 |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (335 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9783030485276 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance |b The Impact of Board Structure |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Corporate Governance -- Introduction -- Corporate Governance (CG) -- Defining Corporate Governance -- Narrow View of CG -- Broader View of CG -- The Importance of CG -- Enron -- Parmalat -- Palmer & -- Harvey -- HIH Insurance -- China Aviation Oil -- Satyam Computers -- Mehran Bank -- The Rationale for This Study -- References -- Chapter 2 Theories, Models and Mechanisms -- Theories of CG -- Agency Theory -- Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT) -- Stakeholder Theory -- Stewardship Theory -- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Approach -- Class and Managerial Hegemony -- Social Contract Theory (SCT) -- Legitimacy Theory -- CG Models -- Anglo-American Model -- The German Model -- The Japanese Model -- Corporate Governance in Pakistan -- Convergence of Corporate Governance Models -- CG Mechanisms -- Internal Mechanisms -- External Mechanisms -- Relationship Between Internal and External Mechanisms -- Landmark CG Developments -- The Cadbury Report -- The OECD Principles -- ASX Corporate Governance Council -- The King Reports (South Africa) -- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 (US) -- Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 3 Predictions of Corporate Governance Models -- Introduction -- Agency Perspective -- Resource Dependence Perspective (RDP) -- Stakeholder Perspective -- Multi Theory Approach -- Multi-theory Framework Adopted for This Research -- Selected Key Studies -- Hillman and Dalziel (2003) -- Nicholson and Kiel (2004) -- Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) -- Approach of This Research -- Predictions of Our Proposed Models -- Board Roles and Performance -- Monitoring Role and Firm Performance (Board Meetings) -- Resource-Dependence Role and Firm Performance (Board Size) | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Board Structure and Performance -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality (Board Leadership) -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Ownership Concentration -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 4 Research Design and Statistical Method -- Introduction -- Sample, Study Period, and Data Source -- Sample Firms -- Study Period -- Data Source -- Analytical Approach -- Reasons for Panel Data -- Types of Panel Data Analytic Models -- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) -- Fixed Effects Model (Least Squares Dummy Variable Model) -- Random Effects Models -- Panel Data Specification Tests -- Serial Correlation -- Heteroscedasticity -- Multicollinearity -- Endogeneity -- Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Dependent Variables-Performance Variables -- Tobin's Q (TQ) -- Return on Assets (ROA) -- Return on Equity (ROE) -- Control Variables -- Firm Size (FSIZE) -- Leverage (LEVRG) -- Firm Age (AGE) -- Sales Growth (GRO) -- Industry Dummies (INDUM) -- Moderating Variables -- The Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (CODE) -- Ownership Concentration (OWCENT) -- Mediating Variables -- Empirical Model -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Discussion -- Introduction -- Descriptive Statistics -- Distribution of Sample Firms by Characteristics -- Firm Performance Measures -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Board Size (BSIZE) -- Frequency of Board Meetings (BMETS) -- Board Structural Characteristics: Statistical Test of Pre- and Post-2012 Period Means -- Control Variables -- Firm Size -- Leverage Ratio -- Correlation Analysis | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Board Size and Board Meetings -- Ownership Concentration -- Control Variables -- Panel Data Specifications and Diagnostic Tests -- Pooled OLS vs. Random and Fixed Effects -- Random and Fixed Effects -- Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of Multicollinearity -- Breusch-Pagan/Cool-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity -- Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test -- Regression Analyses-Testing the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of Tobin's Q -- Effect of the Control Variables on Tobin's Q (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Mediation Effects of Board Size-Resource-Dependence Role (Model M3-Model M7) -- Direct Effects of the Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of TQ -- Effect of the Control Variables on TQ (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Meetings on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROA (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of SECP Revision on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Effect of Control Variables on ROE (Model M0) | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROE (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Implications of Table Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring of the Board on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROE (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Regression Results in Table for the Conceptual Framework -- Discussion -- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Direct Effects) -- Board Size and Firm Performance -- Board Independence and Firm Performance -- CEO Duality and Firm Performance -- Board Diversity and Firm Performance -- Board Committees and Firm Performance -- Audit Committee Independence and Firm Performance -- Mediation Effects of Board Roles on Firm Performance -- Moderating Effects of the SECP's Code on Firm Performance -- References -- Chapter 6 Summary and Implications of the Study -- Prelude -- Implications -- Contribution -- Application and Implications for Fellow Emerging Economies -- Results Within the Framework of PESTLE Analysis of Emerging Economies -- Limitations -- Avenues for Future Research -- References -- Appendices -- References -- Index | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporate governance | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Tabassum, Naeem |
| author_facet | Tabassum, Naeem |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Tabassum, Naeem |
| author_variant | n t nt |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048222916 |
| classification_rvk | QP 341 |
| collection | ZDB-30-PQE |
| contents | Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Corporate Governance -- Introduction -- Corporate Governance (CG) -- Defining Corporate Governance -- Narrow View of CG -- Broader View of CG -- The Importance of CG -- Enron -- Parmalat -- Palmer & -- Harvey -- HIH Insurance -- China Aviation Oil -- Satyam Computers -- Mehran Bank -- The Rationale for This Study -- References -- Chapter 2 Theories, Models and Mechanisms -- Theories of CG -- Agency Theory -- Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT) -- Stakeholder Theory -- Stewardship Theory -- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Approach -- Class and Managerial Hegemony -- Social Contract Theory (SCT) -- Legitimacy Theory -- CG Models -- Anglo-American Model -- The German Model -- The Japanese Model -- Corporate Governance in Pakistan -- Convergence of Corporate Governance Models -- CG Mechanisms -- Internal Mechanisms -- External Mechanisms -- Relationship Between Internal and External Mechanisms -- Landmark CG Developments -- The Cadbury Report -- The OECD Principles -- ASX Corporate Governance Council -- The King Reports (South Africa) -- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 (US) -- Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 3 Predictions of Corporate Governance Models -- Introduction -- Agency Perspective -- Resource Dependence Perspective (RDP) -- Stakeholder Perspective -- Multi Theory Approach -- Multi-theory Framework Adopted for This Research -- Selected Key Studies -- Hillman and Dalziel (2003) -- Nicholson and Kiel (2004) -- Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) -- Approach of This Research -- Predictions of Our Proposed Models -- Board Roles and Performance -- Monitoring Role and Firm Performance (Board Meetings) -- Resource-Dependence Role and Firm Performance (Board Size) Board Structure and Performance -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality (Board Leadership) -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Ownership Concentration -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 4 Research Design and Statistical Method -- Introduction -- Sample, Study Period, and Data Source -- Sample Firms -- Study Period -- Data Source -- Analytical Approach -- Reasons for Panel Data -- Types of Panel Data Analytic Models -- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) -- Fixed Effects Model (Least Squares Dummy Variable Model) -- Random Effects Models -- Panel Data Specification Tests -- Serial Correlation -- Heteroscedasticity -- Multicollinearity -- Endogeneity -- Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Dependent Variables-Performance Variables -- Tobin's Q (TQ) -- Return on Assets (ROA) -- Return on Equity (ROE) -- Control Variables -- Firm Size (FSIZE) -- Leverage (LEVRG) -- Firm Age (AGE) -- Sales Growth (GRO) -- Industry Dummies (INDUM) -- Moderating Variables -- The Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (CODE) -- Ownership Concentration (OWCENT) -- Mediating Variables -- Empirical Model -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Discussion -- Introduction -- Descriptive Statistics -- Distribution of Sample Firms by Characteristics -- Firm Performance Measures -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Board Size (BSIZE) -- Frequency of Board Meetings (BMETS) -- Board Structural Characteristics: Statistical Test of Pre- and Post-2012 Period Means -- Control Variables -- Firm Size -- Leverage Ratio -- Correlation Analysis Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Board Size and Board Meetings -- Ownership Concentration -- Control Variables -- Panel Data Specifications and Diagnostic Tests -- Pooled OLS vs. Random and Fixed Effects -- Random and Fixed Effects -- Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of Multicollinearity -- Breusch-Pagan/Cool-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity -- Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test -- Regression Analyses-Testing the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of Tobin's Q -- Effect of the Control Variables on Tobin's Q (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Mediation Effects of Board Size-Resource-Dependence Role (Model M3-Model M7) -- Direct Effects of the Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of TQ -- Effect of the Control Variables on TQ (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Meetings on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROA (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of SECP Revision on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Effect of Control Variables on ROE (Model M0) Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROE (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Implications of Table Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring of the Board on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROE (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Regression Results in Table for the Conceptual Framework -- Discussion -- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Direct Effects) -- Board Size and Firm Performance -- Board Independence and Firm Performance -- CEO Duality and Firm Performance -- Board Diversity and Firm Performance -- Board Committees and Firm Performance -- Audit Committee Independence and Firm Performance -- Mediation Effects of Board Roles on Firm Performance -- Moderating Effects of the SECP's Code on Firm Performance -- References -- Chapter 6 Summary and Implications of the Study -- Prelude -- Implications -- Contribution -- Application and Implications for Fellow Emerging Economies -- Results Within the Framework of PESTLE Analysis of Emerging Economies -- Limitations -- Avenues for Future Research -- References -- Appendices -- References -- Index |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-30-PQE)EBC6240742 (ZDB-30-PAD)EBC6240742 (ZDB-89-EBL)EBL6240742 (OCoLC)1162846066 (DE-599)BVBBV048222916 |
| dewey-full | 658.4 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.4 |
| dewey-search | 658.4 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.4 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Corporate Governance -- Introduction -- Corporate Governance (CG) -- Defining Corporate Governance -- Narrow View of CG -- Broader View of CG -- The Importance of CG -- Enron -- Parmalat -- Palmer &amp -- Harvey -- HIH Insurance -- China Aviation Oil -- Satyam Computers -- Mehran Bank -- The Rationale for This Study -- References -- Chapter 2 Theories, Models and Mechanisms -- Theories of CG -- Agency Theory -- Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT) -- Stakeholder Theory -- Stewardship Theory -- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Approach -- Class and Managerial Hegemony -- Social Contract Theory (SCT) -- Legitimacy Theory -- CG Models -- Anglo-American Model -- The German Model -- The Japanese Model -- Corporate Governance in Pakistan -- Convergence of Corporate Governance Models -- CG Mechanisms -- Internal Mechanisms -- External Mechanisms -- Relationship Between Internal and External Mechanisms -- Landmark CG Developments -- The Cadbury Report -- The OECD Principles -- ASX Corporate Governance Council -- The King Reports (South Africa) -- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 (US) -- Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 3 Predictions of Corporate Governance Models -- Introduction -- Agency Perspective -- Resource Dependence Perspective (RDP) -- Stakeholder Perspective -- Multi Theory Approach -- Multi-theory Framework Adopted for This Research -- Selected Key Studies -- Hillman and Dalziel (2003) -- Nicholson and Kiel (2004) -- Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) -- Approach of This Research -- Predictions of Our Proposed Models -- Board Roles and Performance -- Monitoring Role and Firm Performance (Board Meetings) -- Resource-Dependence Role and Firm Performance (Board Size)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Board Structure and Performance -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality (Board Leadership) -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Ownership Concentration -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 4 Research Design and Statistical Method -- Introduction -- Sample, Study Period, and Data Source -- Sample Firms -- Study Period -- Data Source -- Analytical Approach -- Reasons for Panel Data -- Types of Panel Data Analytic Models -- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) -- Fixed Effects Model (Least Squares Dummy Variable Model) -- Random Effects Models -- Panel Data Specification Tests -- Serial Correlation -- Heteroscedasticity -- Multicollinearity -- Endogeneity -- Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Dependent Variables-Performance Variables -- Tobin's Q (TQ) -- Return on Assets (ROA) -- Return on Equity (ROE) -- Control Variables -- Firm Size (FSIZE) -- Leverage (LEVRG) -- Firm Age (AGE) -- Sales Growth (GRO) -- Industry Dummies (INDUM) -- Moderating Variables -- The Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (CODE) -- Ownership Concentration (OWCENT) -- Mediating Variables -- Empirical Model -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Discussion -- Introduction -- Descriptive Statistics -- Distribution of Sample Firms by Characteristics -- Firm Performance Measures -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Board Size (BSIZE) -- Frequency of Board Meetings (BMETS) -- Board Structural Characteristics: Statistical Test of Pre- and Post-2012 Period Means -- Control Variables -- Firm Size -- Leverage Ratio -- Correlation Analysis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Board Size and Board Meetings -- Ownership Concentration -- Control Variables -- Panel Data Specifications and Diagnostic Tests -- Pooled OLS vs. Random and Fixed Effects -- Random and Fixed Effects -- Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of Multicollinearity -- Breusch-Pagan/Cool-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity -- Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test -- Regression Analyses-Testing the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of Tobin's Q -- Effect of the Control Variables on Tobin's Q (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Mediation Effects of Board Size-Resource-Dependence Role (Model M3-Model M7) -- Direct Effects of the Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of TQ -- Effect of the Control Variables on TQ (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Meetings on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROA (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of SECP Revision on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Effect of Control Variables on ROE (Model M0)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROE (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Implications of Table Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring of the Board on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROE (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Regression Results in Table for the Conceptual Framework -- Discussion -- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Direct Effects) -- Board Size and Firm Performance -- Board Independence and Firm Performance -- CEO Duality and Firm Performance -- Board Diversity and Firm Performance -- Board Committees and Firm Performance -- Audit Committee Independence and Firm Performance -- Mediation Effects of Board Roles on Firm Performance -- Moderating Effects of the SECP's Code on Firm Performance -- References -- Chapter 6 Summary and Implications of the Study -- Prelude -- Implications -- Contribution -- Application and Implications for Fellow Emerging Economies -- Results Within the Framework of PESTLE Analysis of Emerging Economies -- Limitations -- Avenues 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| id | DE-604.BV048222916 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:50:37Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:32:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783030485276 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033603649 |
| oclc_num | 1162846066 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-2070s |
| owner_facet | DE-2070s |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (335 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-30-PQE ZDB-30-PQE HWR_PDA_PQE |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSearch | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Springer International Publishing AG |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Tabassum, Naeem Verfasser aut Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure Cham Springer International Publishing AG 2020 ©2020 1 Online-Ressource (335 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Corporate Governance -- Introduction -- Corporate Governance (CG) -- Defining Corporate Governance -- Narrow View of CG -- Broader View of CG -- The Importance of CG -- Enron -- Parmalat -- Palmer & -- Harvey -- HIH Insurance -- China Aviation Oil -- Satyam Computers -- Mehran Bank -- The Rationale for This Study -- References -- Chapter 2 Theories, Models and Mechanisms -- Theories of CG -- Agency Theory -- Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT) -- Stakeholder Theory -- Stewardship Theory -- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Approach -- Class and Managerial Hegemony -- Social Contract Theory (SCT) -- Legitimacy Theory -- CG Models -- Anglo-American Model -- The German Model -- The Japanese Model -- Corporate Governance in Pakistan -- Convergence of Corporate Governance Models -- CG Mechanisms -- Internal Mechanisms -- External Mechanisms -- Relationship Between Internal and External Mechanisms -- Landmark CG Developments -- The Cadbury Report -- The OECD Principles -- ASX Corporate Governance Council -- The King Reports (South Africa) -- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 (US) -- Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 3 Predictions of Corporate Governance Models -- Introduction -- Agency Perspective -- Resource Dependence Perspective (RDP) -- Stakeholder Perspective -- Multi Theory Approach -- Multi-theory Framework Adopted for This Research -- Selected Key Studies -- Hillman and Dalziel (2003) -- Nicholson and Kiel (2004) -- Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) -- Approach of This Research -- Predictions of Our Proposed Models -- Board Roles and Performance -- Monitoring Role and Firm Performance (Board Meetings) -- Resource-Dependence Role and Firm Performance (Board Size) Board Structure and Performance -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality (Board Leadership) -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Ownership Concentration -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 4 Research Design and Statistical Method -- Introduction -- Sample, Study Period, and Data Source -- Sample Firms -- Study Period -- Data Source -- Analytical Approach -- Reasons for Panel Data -- Types of Panel Data Analytic Models -- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) -- Fixed Effects Model (Least Squares Dummy Variable Model) -- Random Effects Models -- Panel Data Specification Tests -- Serial Correlation -- Heteroscedasticity -- Multicollinearity -- Endogeneity -- Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Dependent Variables-Performance Variables -- Tobin's Q (TQ) -- Return on Assets (ROA) -- Return on Equity (ROE) -- Control Variables -- Firm Size (FSIZE) -- Leverage (LEVRG) -- Firm Age (AGE) -- Sales Growth (GRO) -- Industry Dummies (INDUM) -- Moderating Variables -- The Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (CODE) -- Ownership Concentration (OWCENT) -- Mediating Variables -- Empirical Model -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Discussion -- Introduction -- Descriptive Statistics -- Distribution of Sample Firms by Characteristics -- Firm Performance Measures -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Board Size (BSIZE) -- Frequency of Board Meetings (BMETS) -- Board Structural Characteristics: Statistical Test of Pre- and Post-2012 Period Means -- Control Variables -- Firm Size -- Leverage Ratio -- Correlation Analysis Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Board Size and Board Meetings -- Ownership Concentration -- Control Variables -- Panel Data Specifications and Diagnostic Tests -- Pooled OLS vs. Random and Fixed Effects -- Random and Fixed Effects -- Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of Multicollinearity -- Breusch-Pagan/Cool-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity -- Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test -- Regression Analyses-Testing the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of Tobin's Q -- Effect of the Control Variables on Tobin's Q (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Mediation Effects of Board Size-Resource-Dependence Role (Model M3-Model M7) -- Direct Effects of the Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of TQ -- Effect of the Control Variables on TQ (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Meetings on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROA (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of SECP Revision on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Effect of Control Variables on ROE (Model M0) Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROE (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Implications of Table Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring of the Board on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROE (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Regression Results in Table for the Conceptual Framework -- Discussion -- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Direct Effects) -- Board Size and Firm Performance -- Board Independence and Firm Performance -- CEO Duality and Firm Performance -- Board Diversity and Firm Performance -- Board Committees and Firm Performance -- Audit Committee Independence and Firm Performance -- Mediation Effects of Board Roles on Firm Performance -- Moderating Effects of the SECP's Code on Firm Performance -- References -- Chapter 6 Summary and Implications of the Study -- Prelude -- Implications -- Contribution -- Application and Implications for Fellow Emerging Economies -- Results Within the Framework of PESTLE Analysis of Emerging Economies -- Limitations -- Avenues for Future Research -- References -- Appendices -- References -- Index Corporate governance Singh, Satwinder Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Tabassum, Naeem Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2020 9783030485269 |
| spellingShingle | Tabassum, Naeem Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Corporate Governance -- Introduction -- Corporate Governance (CG) -- Defining Corporate Governance -- Narrow View of CG -- Broader View of CG -- The Importance of CG -- Enron -- Parmalat -- Palmer & -- Harvey -- HIH Insurance -- China Aviation Oil -- Satyam Computers -- Mehran Bank -- The Rationale for This Study -- References -- Chapter 2 Theories, Models and Mechanisms -- Theories of CG -- Agency Theory -- Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT) -- Stakeholder Theory -- Stewardship Theory -- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Approach -- Class and Managerial Hegemony -- Social Contract Theory (SCT) -- Legitimacy Theory -- CG Models -- Anglo-American Model -- The German Model -- The Japanese Model -- Corporate Governance in Pakistan -- Convergence of Corporate Governance Models -- CG Mechanisms -- Internal Mechanisms -- External Mechanisms -- Relationship Between Internal and External Mechanisms -- Landmark CG Developments -- The Cadbury Report -- The OECD Principles -- ASX Corporate Governance Council -- The King Reports (South Africa) -- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 (US) -- Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 3 Predictions of Corporate Governance Models -- Introduction -- Agency Perspective -- Resource Dependence Perspective (RDP) -- Stakeholder Perspective -- Multi Theory Approach -- Multi-theory Framework Adopted for This Research -- Selected Key Studies -- Hillman and Dalziel (2003) -- Nicholson and Kiel (2004) -- Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) -- Approach of This Research -- Predictions of Our Proposed Models -- Board Roles and Performance -- Monitoring Role and Firm Performance (Board Meetings) -- Resource-Dependence Role and Firm Performance (Board Size) Board Structure and Performance -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality (Board Leadership) -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Ownership Concentration -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 4 Research Design and Statistical Method -- Introduction -- Sample, Study Period, and Data Source -- Sample Firms -- Study Period -- Data Source -- Analytical Approach -- Reasons for Panel Data -- Types of Panel Data Analytic Models -- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) -- Fixed Effects Model (Least Squares Dummy Variable Model) -- Random Effects Models -- Panel Data Specification Tests -- Serial Correlation -- Heteroscedasticity -- Multicollinearity -- Endogeneity -- Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Dependent Variables-Performance Variables -- Tobin's Q (TQ) -- Return on Assets (ROA) -- Return on Equity (ROE) -- Control Variables -- Firm Size (FSIZE) -- Leverage (LEVRG) -- Firm Age (AGE) -- Sales Growth (GRO) -- Industry Dummies (INDUM) -- Moderating Variables -- The Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (CODE) -- Ownership Concentration (OWCENT) -- Mediating Variables -- Empirical Model -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Discussion -- Introduction -- Descriptive Statistics -- Distribution of Sample Firms by Characteristics -- Firm Performance Measures -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Board Size (BSIZE) -- Frequency of Board Meetings (BMETS) -- Board Structural Characteristics: Statistical Test of Pre- and Post-2012 Period Means -- Control Variables -- Firm Size -- Leverage Ratio -- Correlation Analysis Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Board Size and Board Meetings -- Ownership Concentration -- Control Variables -- Panel Data Specifications and Diagnostic Tests -- Pooled OLS vs. Random and Fixed Effects -- Random and Fixed Effects -- Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of Multicollinearity -- Breusch-Pagan/Cool-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity -- Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test -- Regression Analyses-Testing the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of Tobin's Q -- Effect of the Control Variables on Tobin's Q (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Mediation Effects of Board Size-Resource-Dependence Role (Model M3-Model M7) -- Direct Effects of the Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of TQ -- Effect of the Control Variables on TQ (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Meetings on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROA (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of SECP Revision on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Effect of Control Variables on ROE (Model M0) Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROE (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Implications of Table Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring of the Board on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROE (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Regression Results in Table for the Conceptual Framework -- Discussion -- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Direct Effects) -- Board Size and Firm Performance -- Board Independence and Firm Performance -- CEO Duality and Firm Performance -- Board Diversity and Firm Performance -- Board Committees and Firm Performance -- Audit Committee Independence and Firm Performance -- Mediation Effects of Board Roles on Firm Performance -- Moderating Effects of the SECP's Code on Firm Performance -- References -- Chapter 6 Summary and Implications of the Study -- Prelude -- Implications -- Contribution -- Application and Implications for Fellow Emerging Economies -- Results Within the Framework of PESTLE Analysis of Emerging Economies -- Limitations -- Avenues for Future Research -- References -- Appendices -- References -- Index Corporate governance |
| title | Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure |
| title_auth | Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure |
| title_exact_search | Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure |
| title_full | Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure |
| title_fullStr | Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance The Impact of Board Structure |
| title_short | Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance |
| title_sort | corporate governance and organisational performance the impact of board structure |
| title_sub | The Impact of Board Structure |
| topic | Corporate governance |
| topic_facet | Corporate governance |
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