Verfügbarkeit: Tyrants on Twitter

Tyrants on Twitter: protecting democracies from information warfare

""This book explains how Russia and China weaponize social media and how to protect Western democracies from information warfare. When Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram were first introduced to the public, their mission was simple: they were designed to help people become more conne...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser:	Sloss, David 1957- (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Stanford, California Stanford University Press [2022]
Schriftenreihe:	Stanford studies in law and politics
Schlagworte:	Politik Social Media Einflussnahme Russland Westliche Welt China Social media / Political aspects / Western countries Social media / Government policy / Western countries Social media / Law and legislation / Western countries Information warfare / Political aspects Information warfare / Russia (Federation) Information warfare / China Democracy / Western countries Social media / Law and legislation Social media / Political aspects Russia (Federation) Western countries
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Zusammenfassung:	""This book explains how Russia and China weaponize social media and how to protect Western democracies from information warfare. When Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram were first introduced to the public, their mission was simple: they were designed to help people become more connected to each other. Social media became a thriving digital space by giving its users the freedom to share whatever they wanted with their friends and followers. Unfortunately, these same digital tools are also easy to manipulate. As exemplified by Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, authoritarian states can exploit social media to interfere with democratic governance in open societies. Tyrants on Twitter is the first detailed analysis of how Chinese and Russian agents weaponize Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube to subvert the liberal international order. In addition to the 2016 U.S. election, David L. Sloss explores Russia's use of foreign influence operations to threaten democracies in Europe, as well as China's use of social media and other digital tools to meddle in Western democracies and buttress autocratic rulers around the world. Sloss calls for cooperation among democratic governments to create a new transnational system for regulating social media to protect Western democracies from information warfare. Drawing on his professional experience as an arms control negotiator, he outlines a novel system of transnational governance that Western democracies can enforce by harmonizing their domestic regulations. And drawing on his academic expertise in constitutional law, he explains why that system--if implemented by legislation in the United States--would be constitutionally defensible, despite likely First Amendment objections. With its critical examination of information warfare and its proposal for practical legislative solutions to fight back, this book is essential reading [...]."
Beschreibung:	Includes bibliographical references and index
Beschreibung:	xvii, 330 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme 24 cm
ISBN:	9781503628441

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Datensatz im Suchindex

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adam_text	CONTENTS Tables and Figures vii Preface ix Acknowledgments xv PART ONE - DIAGNOSIS 1 Information Warfare and Democratic Decay 2 Russian Information Warfare and U.S. Elections 24 3 Russian Influence Operations in Europe 47 4 China’s Global Information Operations 76 5 An Uneven Playing Field 113 3 PART TWO ֊ PRESCRIPTION 6 A Proposal for Transnational Regulation 145 7 Policy Analysis: Weighing Costs and Benefits 182 I The First Amendment 216 Glossary 253 Appendix: Proposed Statutory Text 257 Notes 259 Bibliography 287 Index 305 BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, BLOGS 89up. 2018. “Putin’s Brexit?: The Influence of Kremlin Media and Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum.” February, https://www.89up.org/russia-report Abrams, Stacey. 2020. “American Leadership Begins at Home: The Global Imperative to Rebuild Governance and Restore Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, May 1. 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American Civil Liberties Union, Real ID, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/ national-id/real-id Andersen, Ross. 2020. “The Panopticon Is Already Here.” The Atlantic, September. Anderson, Bonnie, et al. 2016. “From Warning to Wallpaper: Why the Brain Habituates to Security Warnings and What Can be Done about It.” Journal of Management Informa tion Systems 33(3): 713-4Յ· Aratani, Lauren. 2020. “Tsunami of Untruths: Trump Has Made 20,000 False or Misleading Claims.” The Guardian, July 13. Associated Press. 2019. “Trump Administration Takes Aim at Laws Allowing Undocumented Immigrants to Obtain Driver’s Licenses.” NBC News, December 31. Association for International Broadcasting. 2018. “RT Weekly TV Audience Grows.” April 3. https://aib.org.uk/rt-weekly-tv-audience-grows-by-more-than-a-third-now-ioo-mln -ipsos/ 288 BIBLIOGRAPHY Auchard, Eric, and Felix Bate. 2017. “French Candidate Macron Claims Massive Hack as Emails Leaked.” Reuters, May 5. 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U.S. Department of Justice. 2017. “DOJ Criminal Cases against Chinese during the Trump Administration.” https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/us/doj/. U.S. Department of Justice. 2020. “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyber space.” Press release, October 19. BIBLIOGRAPHY JOJ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2020. 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 11. United States of America v. Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, Affidavit in Support ofa Crimi nal Complaint (E.D. Va., September 28, 2018). United States of America v. Internet Research Agency et al., Indictment (D.D.C. Febru ary 16, 2018). United States of America v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al., Indictment (D.D.C. July 13, 2018). United States of America v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Konstantin Kilimnik, Superseding In dictment (D.D.C. June 8, 2018). 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United Kingdom, National Crime Agency. 2019· “Public Statement on NCA Investi gation Into Suspected EU Referendum Offences.” September 24. https://www .nationalcrimeagency .gov. uk/news/public-statement-on-nca-investigation-into -suspected-eu-referendum-offences United Nations Human Rights Council. 2020. “Cross-regional Statement on Hong Kong and Xinjiang.” June 30. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-human-rights -council-44-cross-regional-statement-on-hong-kong-and-xinjiang United Nations Human Rights Council. 2020. “Joint Statement Delivered by Permanent Mission of Cuba.” June 30. http://www.china-un.ch/eng/hom/t17938o4.htm United Nations Security Council, S.C. Res. 1373 (September 28, 2001). INDEX Note: page numbers followed by/and t refer to figures and tables respectively. Those followed by n refer to notes, with note number. ABC News, 56 Abrams v. United States (1919), 221 Aegis surveillance system, 109 Africa, increasing Chinese control over media in, 111 Alibaba, and Chinese efforts to domi nate cyberspace, 85 AI Jazeera, 209 Alliance for Democracy: agreement creating, 153,156, 205; goals of, 152; Nuclear Suppliers Group as model for, 152-53; potential expansion of mission to broader goals, 153; rea sons for necessity of, 153; regulatory harmony, as short-term goal, 152. See also Defending American De mocracy Act (DADA); transnational regulatory system Alliance for Democracy membership: addressing, in founding documents, 156; as carrot to induce nonmember reforms, 156; criteria for, 154-56; states eligible for, 156 Alliance for Securing Democracy, 48, 71 alt-right activists: and reusable politi cal disinformation bots, 63-64; in US, spread of disinformation about Macron, 59-60, 61-62 anonymous speech: First Amendment protection of, 177, 231; protection of, in transnational regulatory system, 177, 210-11, 231-32, 234. See also pseudonyms APT 28 (Fancy Bear; Pawn Storm): hacking of Macron campaign, 60, 61-62; as Russian intelligence unit, 60; ties to GRU, 62 Arab League, 138 Arab Spring and unregulated internet, 6, 137 Arab states: Chinese influence over internet policy in, 139; OSM in, 140-41; political division in, 138. See also digital authoritarianism in Arab states ЗОб INDEX Articles on State Responsibility, guidelines for identifying state agents, 161 ASIO. See Australian Security and Intelligence Organization Assange, Julian, 29 Australia, China’s aggressiveness toward, 80 Australian Security and Intelligence Organization (ASIO), ιοί Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 99,105, no authoritarian governments: decrease in Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 8-9, 8r, 9ƒ desire to push democratic states toward authori tarianism, 113; digital technology’s facilitation of, 134; increase in last ten years, 134. See also closed au tocracies; digital authoritarianism; electoral autocracies Authoritarian Interference Tracker, 71 authoritarian vs. democratic govern ments, global competition be tween, 4; high stakes of competi tion in, 11; information warfare as central to, 5-6 Azerbaijan, digital authoritarianism in, 134-35 Bahrain, digital authoritarianism in, 137-41 Baidu, and Chinese efforts to domi nate cyberspace, 85 Bakamo, study of Russian interference in 2017 French election, 63, 64-67, 65t, 68,199 Banks, Arron, 55-57 ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents, 16,145-46,159-65; appeal process for misclassified individuals, 161-62; benefits of, as greater than costs, 22-23; as costly and difficult to administer, 22; default application to Russian and Chinese nationals, 148,161,162,163,197; in Defending American Democracy Act (DADA), 216; effectiveness in reducing demo cratic decay, 198-201; effectiveness in reducing overt Chinese and Russian information warfare, 19498; exclusion of legal residents of Alliance states from, 161; exemption for benign state agents, 6,16,17, 145-46,163-65,194, 251; extending to other authoritarian states, issues hi, 159-60; and fictitious user ac counts, blocking of, 204; greater ef ficiency than content-focused regu lation, 17,18-19; and identification of state agents, 160-63; as ineffec tive without registration system, 193; as integral part of transnational regulatory system, 159; misclassifica tion of individuals, minimal impact of, 162-63; as necessarily imperfect, 22; as necessary for effectiveness, 6, 21,192; persons affected by, 192; review board for evaluating excep tions, powers granted to, 161-62, 164-65,173; vetting process for, 18. See also First Amendment, and ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents Barbados, increase in democracy, to Barnett, Randy, 218, 219 BC Project. See British Chinese (BC) Project BCRA. See Bipartisan Campaign Re form Act of 2002 Belt and Road Initiative (China), 88 INDEX Benkier, Yochai, 15 Bhagwat, Ashutosh, 218-19 Biden administration, and ban on TikTok and WeChat, 87,163 Bill of Rights, libertarian view of, 219 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA): and DADA dis claimer rules, 227-30; disclaimer and disclosure provisions in, 224-27 Black Lives Matter protests: and China’s criticism of US, 97; pohce gathering of data on, 209, 236; Russian spread of incendiary news stories about, 44-45 Bluman v. Federal Election Commission (2011), 250-51 Bolsonaro, Jair, io bots: definition of, 124,149; features of registration system to defeat, 149, 179-81,197-98, 204; good vs. bad, difficulty of distinguishing, 179-81; legitimate uses of, 149; and micro targeting of political messages, 124-25; as one type of fake social media account, 31; reusable pohtical disinformation bots, 63-64; right wing, on Polish Twitter, 121-22; in Russian information warfare, 149; in Russian interference in 2017 French presidential election, 6364, 66-67; in Russian interference in 2018 Swedish elections, 72; in Russian interference in Brexit vote, 53-54; in Russian interference in US 2016 election, 33-34; strategies for use of, 33-34; use by Arab states, 138; use to amplify social media messages, 124-25; use to spread disinformation, 149 Boumediene v. Bush (2008), 222 ЗО? Brazil, democratic decay, io, 118-19, 272Ո9 Breitbart News: dissemination of dis information, 15, 203; and US right wing media ecosystem, 67,126 Brexit referendum: anti-immigration sentiment and, 56; as defeat for lib eral internationalism, 48-49; and global polarization, 126-27; Putin’s pleasure in, 49, 58; results of, 48; Vote Leave’s use of disinformation in, 126; Vote Leave’s violation of spending cap in, 51 Brexit referendum, Russian influence on, 48-58; covert social media activity, 53-55; exposure of IRA social media accounts spreading pro-Brexit propaganda, 54-55; funding of pro-Brexit groups, 5557; likely impact of, 57-58; limited direct evidence of, 53-54; limited government investigation of, 49, 53, 55, 57; Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee report on, 55; RT and Sputnik in, 49-53, 57-58; studies on, 49, 53, 54-55; as threat to Uberal internationafism, 200 Breyer, Stephen, 218 Britain, China’s United Front opera tions in, 88-89 British Chinese (BC) Project, 88 Brown v. Socialist Workers ^4 Cam paign Committee (1982), 232, 234 Buckley v. Valeo (1976), 224-25, 232, 233-34, 236, 238 BuzzFeed News, 34 ByteDance, 86,163 California, law requiring disclaimers on bot messages, 180 Cambridge Analytica, 209 JO8 INDEX Cameron, David, 48, 50 Le Canard Enchaîné, 59 Capitol riot of January 6th, 2021: as greater threat than foreign social media influence, ix-x, 182-83; as inspired by Trump’s Big Lie, ix; as insurrection, ix CBS, 124 CCP. See Chinese Communist Party censorship online: in Arab states, 139; China and, 87, 89-90, 92, 95, 104-5, по, BL 132, tó2, 201; digital authoritarianism and, 85,114,13435,139; Open Technology Fund and, 163-64; Russia and, 131,132, 162; self-censorship in authoritarian states, 105,131,135,139,140 CGTN. See China Global Television Network Cheong, Ian Miles, 44-45 China: aggressive actions since 2020, 80; and Arab states’ internet, influ ence on, 139; cautious strategy under Deng Xiaoping, 80; diffi culty of using information warfare against, in-12; direct election inter ference by, 13; economic success of, as geopolitical challenge for US, 56; favorability rating, global decline in, in; fictitious user accounts cre ated by, 19; and smart city technol ogies, 85, 86; social credit system in, 132-33; state-run media, potential classification as benign state agents, 163-64; surveillance of citizens, as pervasive and sophisticated, 133; surveillance of social media, 1089; threat to Western interests, as often exaggerated, 80-81; under Xi Jinping, aggressiveness of, 80. See also Belt and Road Initiative; Hong Kong, China’s crackdown on; United Front System; United Front Work Department China, digital authoritarianism: block ing of Western social media, 90, 162; and 50 cent party, 90,131, 202; government control over telecom munications infrastructure, 130; and government manipulation of content, 131-32; government monitoring and suppression of dissent, 90,109,130; government’s covert posting of pro-government messages, 90,131,202; Great Fire wall and, 89-90,132; high level of restrictions in, 132; illusion of free discussion created in, 129-30,133; and impossibility of US informa tion operations in China, 133-34; and internet companies’ liability for violations, 131; public support of government despite, 133; and self-censorship, 105,131; social credit system and, 132-33. See also digital authoritarianism China, information operations: ag gressiveness of, under Xi Jinping, 80; alignment of global norms with authoritarian model as goal of, 76, 77-79, 81; broad range of tools in, 76, 79, 82, 89; and Chinese internet, technology, and communications companies, 84; and content delivery systems, control of, 82; content farms and, 102-3; control of communications infrastructure in global South, no; control of media, culture and narrative as goal of, 76; differences from Russian operations, 76, 82; dominance of Chinese message as goal of, 85; exploitation of openness of Western democracies, 99-100, in-12; and INDEX foreign media outlets, placement of Chinese-written stories in, 105-6; global ambitions of, 76; goals of, 80-81; hackers’ exposure of (2020), 109; and Hong Kong dissent, multi-media propaganda campaign against, 93; and huayuquan (dis course power), 76-77, 200-201; and internet as means of control ling population, 85; and minimiza tion of international human rights emphasis, 81; monitoring of citizens and Chinese diaspora, 86; posi tive image of China as goal of, 81, 82; range of actors involved in, 82; social media platforms and, 86-87; sophisticated propaganda opera tions of, 79; suppression of critics as goal of, 81; and surveillance technology, export to authoritarian regimes, 82, 85-86,106,107-8,109; use of intimidation, 79, 82. Ser also United Front system China, information operations in global South: control of commu nication channels, 106,109-12; control of infrastructure and hard ware, no; exporting of surveil lance technologies to authoritarian regimes, 106,107-8,109; power to crowd out unwanted messages, no; purchase and control of local media, по-п China, information warfare by: Face book and, 201; goals of, 4,15; as ideological war with liberalism and US, 81; positive business environ ment for Chinese companies as goal of, 81; as significant threat to US, 14; as threat to democracies worldwide, x; as warfare by political means, 14-15 ՅՕՏ China, meddling in democratic coun tries by, 99-106; election interfer ence, countries affected by, 99-100; election interference in Taiwan, 92, 100-103 China, social media foreign influence operations: coordination with other efforts, 93-94; covert operations, 91-99; and Covid-19, claims of su perior response vs. Western nations, 97, 98-99, 99í; and Covid-19, efforts to deflect blame for, 95-98; diplomat’s accounts and, 91; experi ence on domestic internet and, 89-90; and Hong Kong dissent, effort to discredit, 92-95; increase in, 92; increasing sophistication of, 98; overt operations, 90-91, 91í; poorly-developed fake personas in, 94; recent turn to Russian-style disinformation campaigns, 98; social media companies’ removal of fake accounts, 93; still-evolving strategies in, 89-99; targeting of specific audiences in, 97; use of fake accounts, 92, 93, 96,101,103; use of purchased or stolen ac counts, 94 China, state-run media in information operations: followers on Western social media, 90-91,91t, 97-98; government control of messaging in, 84; hostility to liberal demo cratic values, 84; as large and grow ing, 82-83; media outlets run by, 82-84; propaganda against Western democracies, 84 China Daily, 83,106 China Global Television Network (CGTN), 83, in China News Service, 83-84, 89 China Plus News, 83 ЗЮ INDEX China Radio International (CRI), 83, 106, по China Times, 102 China Times Media Group, 102 Chinese Communist Party (ССР), party committees controlling inter net, technology, and communica tions companies, 84. See also United Front Work Department Chua, Amy, 126 cigarette warning labels, effectiveness of, 193 Citizens United, v. Federal Election Commission (2010), 224-27, 233, 240-41, 243, 246 civil rights debate, as cause of polariza tion in U.S., 126 Clinton, Hillary, and Pizzagate scan dal, 123-24 Clinton, Hillary, and Russian interfer ence in 2OIÓ U.S. election: fake social media accounts’ attacks on Clinton, 33; hacking and dumping of damaging information about Clinton, 27-30; harm to Clinton campaign as goal of, 27, 34, 36, 38-43; responsibility for Clinton’s defeat, 26, 38-42,199 closed autocracies: decrease in Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 89, 8ř, 9/, increase in past ten years, 9-10, lofi as percentage of regimes, by region, 115-16, H5ř, in regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7 CloudWalk Technologies, 86 CNN, followers on Facebook and Twitter, 91í Cold War: characteristics vs. present conflict, 4-6; increase in democra cies, 8, 8t Colombia, as unsuitable for Alliance membership, 155 conservative media. See right-wing media Constitution, US, Madisonian vs. libertarian theory of, 218-22 constitutional construction: and departmentalism vs. judicial su premacy, 220-21; Madisonian vs. libertarian views on, 219-21; and popular constitutionalism, 220-21, 281Ш4 costs and benefits of transnational regulatory system: and contribu tion of foreign threats to democ racy decay, 182-83; costs imposed on social media companies, 21-22, 207-9; costs of ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian agents, as justified by benefits, 22-23; costs of registration regime, 201-9; effectiveness in reducing Chinese and Russian information warfare, 194-98; effectiveness in reducing democratic decay, 198201; and importance of democratic decay, 182-83, 201. See also privacy and anonymity in transnational regulatory system Covid-19: China’s claims of superior response vs. Western nations, 97, 98-99, 99t; China’s efforts to de flect blame for, 95-98; masking and social distancing, misinformation about, 126; mask mandates, 3 CRI. See China Radio International Crimea, Russian annexation of: inef fectiveness of sanctions against, 190-91; removal of EU sanctions as Russian goal, 47-48; and Sweden and Finland’s turn to NATO, 69 Croatia, democratic decay, 118-19, 272Ո9 Cruz, Ted, 45 INDEX Cuba, and China’s crackdown on Hong Kong, 77 Customs and Border Protection (СВР), US, collection of data on immigration activists, 209 Cyber Policy Center (Stanford Univer sity), 52 cyber troops, definition of, 12 cyborg accounts, features of registra tion system to defeat, 149,179-81 Czech Republic, democratic decay, 118-19, 272Ո9 DADA. See Defending American De mocracy Act data hashing, to protect social media registration data, 176-77, 207, 212 Dataminr, 209 dcleaks.com, and Russian election interference in 2016, 28, 29 DDoS. See Distributed Denial of Ser vice (DDoS) attacks Defending American Democracy Act (DADA): components of, 216; as enacting statute for transnational regulatory system, 216; proposed text for, 257-58; Trump’s influence on Republican Party and, 216. See also First Amendment democracies: desire to push nondemocratic states toward democ racy, 113; increase in Cold War and post-Cold War period, 8-9, 8t, 9f democracy: American, domestic disinformation as threat to, ix-x, xii, 182-83; worldwide, Chinese and Russian information warfare as threat to, x. See also electoral democracies; liberal democracies democratic decay, 7-11; countries with greatest amount of, 118; domestic use of OSM and, 11-13, 22,114, ЗИ 117-23,12oƒ factors influencing, 1112; origin in domestic sources, 199; quantitative measurement of, 11819; transnational regulatory system effectiveness in reducing, 198-201; Trump’s election and, 199 democratic institutions, erosion of faith in, as goal of Russian and Chinese disinformation, 4, 6, 26, 126,199 Democratic Party, Russian hacking into computers of, in 2016 election, 27-30 Deng Xiaoping, 80 Denmark, Russian hybrid warfare in, 71 digital authoritarianism: and advantage for authoritarian states in ideologi cal battle, 114-15; central features of, 134,135,139; and China’s exporting of surveillance technol ogy to authoritarian regimes, 82, 85-86,106,107-8,109; govern ment monitoring and suppression of dissent, 130,134-35,139-+0; illusion of free discussion created in, 129-30,131,133,135-36,137; and increased longevity of authoritarian regimes, 107-8,114,137,141; lack of clear laws, chilling effect of, 131,135; maintenance of public support de spite, 133,137; and self-censorship, 131,135,139,140; spread of Rus sian and Chinese models of, 134; in states of former Soviet Union, 134-37. See also China, digital authoritarianism in; Russia, digital authoritarianism in digital authoritarianism in Arab states, 137-41; central features of, 139; government monitoring and sup pression of dissent in, 139-40; and self-censorship, 139,140 312 INDEX digital technology, facilitation of au thoritarian government by, 134 disclaimer-only system, as impractical, 159,193,251-52 disclaimer-only system, three ver sions of, 248-50; disclaimers on all speech by Russian and Chinese accounts, 249-50; disclaimers on broad areas of speech by Russian and Chinese accounts, 248-49; disclaimers on “electoral speech” only, 248 disclaimer regime for electoral speech from nondemocratic countries, 16,146,148,156-59; as cosdy and administratively cumbersome, 19394; cost of, as justified by effec tiveness, 194; cost to social media companies, 207-8; in Defending American Democracy Act (DADA), 216; definition of “electoral speech” in, 157-58,208; and disclaimer as permanent part of message, 158; disclaimer design, 158; and electoral speech, definition of, 157-58, 208, 223; fake foreign national accounts and, 149,157,179,197,204; and First Amendment issues, 16; as inef fective without registration system, 193; narrow category of speech affected by, 192; noncontroversial benefits of, 192-93; sample dis claimer text, 156-57,192, 223; time constraints on, 230; types of mes sages requiring, 157-58, 208, 223. See also First Amendment, disclaimer regime and disclaimer regime for messages from bots or cyborg accounts, 149,180 disclaimers: evidence on effectiveness of, 193; and repetition suppression effect, 249 disinformation: definition of, 13, 123; vs. information warfare, 13; Trump as source of, 199. See also misinformation disinformation, domestic: difficulty of suppressing, 203; as threat to American democracy, ix-x, xii, 182-83; usefulness of transnational regulatory system in combating, 205. See also First Amendment disinformation campaigns: countries most subject to, 100; sowing doubt and confitsion as main goal of, 126 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks: Russia’s history of, 71; Swedish elections of 2018 and, 71 Doe v. Reed (2010), 232 donkey blogger case, 134-35 Dorsey, Jack, 7 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 213 Drudge Report, 124 Duterte, Rodrigo, 10 echo chamber effect, in French social media, 66-67, 68, 200 ECPA. See Electronic Communica tions Privacy Act Egypt, digital authoritarianism in, 137-41 89UP, study on RT and Sputnik influ ence on Brexit vote, 50-51,52 electioneering communication, defini tion of, in BCRA, 225-26 election interference: direct, by Rus sia and China, 13; vs. information warfare, 15-16; public opinion on importance of, 15. See also French presidential election of 2017, Russian interference in; Swedish elections of 2018, Russian interference in; entries under Russian election interference INDEX election of 2016. See Russian interfer ence in 2016 U.S. election election of 2020: alleged Democratic voter fraud in, ix, xi-xii; improved protections against information warfare in, 204. See also Russian election interference in 2020 electoral autocracies: increase in past ten years, 9-10,10/; as percentage of regimes, by region, 115-16, 115Г, in regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7-8 electoral democracies: decrease in past ten years, 9-10, io/; as percentage of regimes, by region, 115-16,115Հ in regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7-8 “electoral speech,” definition of, in disclaimer regime, 157-58, 208, 223 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 212 EMLEAKS, 61 Equifax data breach, and impostor accounts, 175 Erdogan, Recep, 10 European Union (EU): and anti information warfare measures, 75; General Data Protection Regula tion, 176; Russian desire to weaken, 47, 58, 74; sanctions against Russia for Crimea annexation, 47-48. See also Russia, foreign influence opera tions in Europe express advocacy vs. issue advocacy, 225 Facebook: ads, use in China’s informa tion operations, 96; ads as main source of revenue for, 108; and affective polarization, 128-29; and anonymous accounts, rules of, 211; banning of Trump, 114; blocking of Chinese content farms, 103; ЗІЗ blocking of fictitious user accounts, 195; and Brexit referendum, Rus sian interference in, 53; China’s blocking of, 90,162; and China’s fake accounts, removal of, 93; and China’s state-run media, follow ers of, 90-91, 91í; China’s use of purchased or stolen accounts, 94; Chinese content farms operating on, 102-3; Chinese diplomats’ ac counts on, 91; Chinese state media on, 200-201; detection of fake accounts, 43,178-79; and fictitious user accounts, inability to suppress, 19-20; and fictitious user accounts, number of, 19,195, 204; inadequate regulation by, 114; information warfare on, 3,5, 26; labeling of false claims by Trump, 187,193; in Myan mar’s genocidal campaign against Rohingya, 159; number of monthly users, 15; number of users in Poland, 121; popularity in Taiwan, 100; public vs. private accounts on, 167, 208; regulation of speech by, 184-85; removal of fake accounts in Arab states, 137; required personal information to open account, 168; Russian fictitious user accounts, 26; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 28,31,34-35,40,53, 186-87,191; and Russian interfer ence in Brexit vote, 52; and Russian interference in French presidential election of 2017, 60, 63; Russian purchases of accounts on, 34; in Taiwan, influence of Taiwanese vs. Chinese media on, 102; and TalkWalker, 63; as unelected regula tor of social media speech, 3; user data from, harvested by Cambridge Analytica, 209 ЗИ INDEX fake foreign national accounts: defini tion of, 148-49,178; disclaimer requirements and, 149,157,179, 197, 204; likely increase in, after implementation of transnational regulatory system, 178; transna tional regulatory system, features to defeat, 148-49,178-79,197 fake social media accounts: types of, 20; use by Arab states, 138. See also bots; fictitious user accounts; hacked accounts; impostor ac counts; rental accounts; Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, fake social media accounts in; stolen accounts Fancy Bear. See APT 28 FARA. See Foreign Agents Registra tion Act far-right in Europe, rise of, 68-69, 74, 200 FBI, and social media account registra tion data: access to, and potential for abuse, 213-14; security of, 176; verification of, 172-73, 206 FECA. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), disclosure and disclaimer requirements in, 224-25, 232 Ferrara, Emilio, 63-64 fictitious user accounts: ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents and, 204; blocking of, as goal of transnational regulatory system, 18, 20; as least costly type of fake account, 20; as most-used tool in information war fare, 195; number of, 19; as one type of fake social media account, 31; registration system and, 18, 20,147, 165,168-69,171,172,195; Russia’s frequent use of, 32֊33;Russian use of to interfere in 2016 U.S. election, 24, Յ2-ՅՅ; social media companies’ inability to suppress, 19,195 50 cent party, 90,131,202 Fillon, François, 58,59, 60, 68 Finland, Russian foreign influence operations in, 69, 70 FIOs. See foreign influence operations First Amendment: and anonymous speech, protection of, 177, 231; cat egories of speech not protected by, 241-42; central purpose of, Madi sonian vs. libertarian theories, 21819; corporations’ rights under, 227; goals promoted by, 244; libertarian view of, 221; and limits on govern ment power to regulate disinforma tion, x; Madisonian vs. libertarian interpretation of, 217; and necessity of speech regulation, Madisonian view on, 222; as not applicable to foreign citizens outside US, x, n, 222-23; and open marketplace of ideas, protection of, 240; and regu lation of internet speech, proper mix of public and private regulation in, 186; and right of US citizens to receive speech, x-xi, 222, 223, 237, 240, 241, 242, 251; and transnational regulatory system’s effect on social media companies, 223 First Amendment, and ban on sodai media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents, 240-52; Madisonian views on, 241-42; and Supreme Court’s deference to gov ernment on foreign policy issues, 244; as unprotected speech, 241-42 First Amendment, and ban, application of strict scrutiny : and compelling interest in protecting democracy INDEX from foreign interests, 246-47; and Court’s deference to government’s factual findings, 245-46, 247, 248; Madisonian vs. libertarian argu ments, 247-48, 25 0-51; and narrow tailoring to achieve compelling gov ernment interest, 246, 247, 250-52 First Amendment, and ban, strict vs. intermediate scrutiny, 242-45; arguments in favor of intermedi ate scrutiny, 243-44; libertarian arguments on, 243; Madisonian arguments on, 243-44 First Amendment, and disclaimer regime, 223-30; and Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act disclaimer rules, 227-30; and burden on social media companies rather than speak ers, 228-29; as compelled speech, 223-24; relevant law, 224-27 First Amendment, and registra tion system, 231-40: compelled disclosure in, 223, 232-40; chill ing effect of, 236-37, 239; First Amendment protection of anony mous speech, 177, 231; libertarian argument against, 235-38; likely result of Supreme Court challenge to, 238-39; Madisonian argument in favor of, 233-35; protection of anonymous speech in transnational regulatory system, 177, 210-11, 231-32, 234; relevant law, 232-33, 238-39; required information as already known to government, 240; safeguards against abuses of, 177, 210-11, 231-32, 234 Floyd, George, Chinese media on, 84 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), 239 foreign citizens outside US, rights of, vs. US citizens, X, II, 222-23 ЗІ5 foreign influence operations (FIOs): definition of, 11-12; and democratic decay, II-I2; direct election inter ference as, 13; information warfare as type of, 12,12ƒ traditional types of, 12; usefulness of trans national regulatory system in combating, 205. See also Russia, foreign influence operations in Europe foreign threats, government’s power to regulate, n former Soviet Union (FSU) states: digital authoritarianism in, 13437; and illusion of free discussion, 1Յ5-Յ6,137; number of autocratic states, 115t, 135; protection of those in power as express goal of, 136; Russian help in creating, 136 Founders, fear of foreign intervention, 235, 243 4chan, US alt-right on, 59 Fox News: dissemination of disin formation, 15, 203; followers on Facebook and Twitter, 91 ť, and US divide between right-wing media ecosystem and mainstream news, 67,126 France: need to address divide between mainstream and alternative news users, 68; pro-Russian political parties in, 58-59; Russian interfer ence in, 58; yellow vest protests in, 126-27 France24, Brexit referendum cover age, 52 Freedom House, 107,108, no, 116,132, 139,140 free speech protections in transna tional regulatory system, 16,145 French National Cybersecurity Agency, 62 SIÓ INDEX French presidential election of 2017: pro-Russian candidates in, 58-59; results of, 58 French presidential election of 2017, Russian interference in, 58-68; altright support for, 59, 61, 67; bots and, 63-64, 66-67; dumping of hacked information about Ma cron, 60-62, 67; failure to defeat Macron, as no cause for compla cency, 68; failure to defeat Macron, reasons for, 62-63; fictitious user accounts in, 60, 66; French regula tion of media and, 63; goals of, 58; hacking of Macron’s campaign, 60; and higher quality of news shared by French vs. US users, 66; and lack of sharing between mainstream and alternative news users, 66-67, 68; and percentage of mainstream vs. alternative sources shared by users, 64-66, 65г, and social media, studies on, 63-67; and sowing of doubts about integrity of election process, 199; spread of misinforma tion about Macron, 59-60; spying on Macron campaign, 60 French social media: alternative news sources as nationalist, anti globalization, and anti-Islam, 67; echo chamber effect in, 66-67, 68, 200 FSU. See former Soviet Union (FSU) states Fukuyama, Francis, 9 Gardiner, Barry, 88-89 Gevers, Victor, 104 Gleicher, Nathaniel, 43 Global Times [China], 83 Goldsmith, Jack, 184,186 Goodell, Chelsea, 45 Google: advertising as main source of revenue for, 108; inadequate regula tion by, 114. See also YouTube Gorwa, Robert, 121-23 government regulation of social media: current forms, ineffectiveness of, 188-92; need for, 183-88. See also Defending American Democracy Act (DADA); transnational regula tory system government surveillance, concerns of US citizens about, 235-36 Great Firewall of China, 89-90,132 GRU. See Main Intelligence Director ate (GRU) [Russia] The Grugq, 61 Guardian, 209 Guccifer 2.0, as Russian fictitious user account, 29 Gunther, Gerald, 245 hacked accounts: as one type of fake sodai media account, 31; trans national regulatory system and, 147-48,196 hackers’ access to registration system information, protections against, 211-12 Han Kuo-yu, 100-101 Harvard University, on right-wing media ecosystem, 67 Hikvision, 86 Holder v. Humanitarian Latv Project (2010), 245-46, 248, 250 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 221 Hong Kong, Britain’s return to China, 77-79 Hong Kong, China’s crackdown on: British-led opposition to, 77; covert social media campaign to discredit dissent, 92-95; diplomatic debate at UN, 77-79, 95; multi-media pro- INDEX paganda campaign in, 93; and new aggressiveness since 2020, 80; and Taiwan election of 2020,101 Howard, Philip, 51,121,125,126 Hua Chunying, 91 Huawei: and Chinese efforts to domi nate cyberspace, 85; and smart cities technology, 85, 86 Hu Jintao, 82 Hungary: democratic decay, 10,11819, 260Ш8, 272Ո9; as unsuitable for Alliance membership, 155 impostor accounts: difficulty of iden tifying, 43,195; as one type of fake social media account, 31; in Russian election interference in 2016, 33; Russians’ increased use of, 43-44; types of, 147-48; transnational regulatory system features to defeat, 147-48,165,196 India: China’s aggressiveness toward, 80; democratic decay, 10; and infor mation warfare, 13-14 information privacy and data security measures in transnational regula tory system, 17, 20,146 information warfare: against China and Russia, difficulty of, ш-12; definition of, ix, 12; vs. disinforma tion, 13; vs. election interference, 15-16; as intersection of FI Os and OSM, 12-13, states practicing, 13; as term, objections to, 14-15; use of true information in, 13. See also China, information warfare by; Russia, information warfare by Infowars, 124 Instagram: banning of Trump, 114; individual’s multiple accounts al lowed on, 166; information warfare on, 5, 26; public vs. private accounts Յր7 on, 167; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 31,40,191; and TalkWalker, 63 Instagram, and anonymous accounts, rules of, 211 Intelligence Community Report on Russian interference in 2016 US election, 25, 27 internet: as important place for speech, Supreme Court on, 242; regulation of, as reasonable infringement on individual liberties, 3 internet, unregulated: Arab Spring and, 6,137; as utopian dream, 6-7 Internet Research Agency (IRA): bud get of, 30,191; increase in informa tion warfare in response to sanc tions, 189; indictment by Robert Mueller, 30; number of employees, 30, 202; number of social media users viewing content by, 31, 32; or ganic posting as primary activity of, 188,191-92, 228; as private company with ties to Russian government, 30; research on US vulnerabilities, 30; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 26, 30-31,191-92; Twitter’s exposure of accounts, 54; use of paid advertisements, 31; use of social media, 30-31 Iran, and information warfare, 13-14 Israel, democratic decay, 118 issue advocacy vs. express advocacy, 225 Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, 38-42 Jones, Alex, 124 judicial review: Madisonian vs. libertar ian views on, 221; three tiers of, 221 Kantar, 50-51 Kavanaugh, Brett, 250-51 Kennedy, Anthony, 218, 227, 242 Зі8 INDEX Kerr, Jaclyn, 135,137 Khusyaynova, Elena, 26 Kilimnik, Konstantin, 189-90 Kim, Young Niie, 43-44 Knowlesys Intelligence System, 109 Kobzaru, George, 72 Kramer, Larry, 220, 281П14 Labour Party (Britain): Chinese influ ence in, 88-89; use of bots on social media, 124-25 La Clair, Ann Louise, 45 Lamont v. Postmaster General (1965), 222 Latvia, and disinformation campaigns, 100 Leave.EU, suspicious donation to, 55-57 Lee, Christine, 88-89 legislatures, wisdom of, Madisonian vs. libertarian views on, 219 Le Pen, Marine: and election of 2022, improved chance of defeating Macron in, 62; and presidential election of 2017,58,59; pro-Russian policies of, 58-59; rising support for, as danger to liberal democracy, 68; US alt-right’s support of, 59 liberal democracies: decrease in past ten years, 9-10, 10ƒ foreign vs. domestic threats to, 11; ideological battle against authoritarian states, 113-15; increase in Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 8-9, 8 i, 9/, as percentage of regimes, by region, 115-16, 115Г; in regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7-8; rise of rar right as threat to, 200; spread of, at end of Cold War, 134; stable, and Alli ance membership, 155-56; under mining of, as Russian and Chinese goal, 3,15, 25, 74; weakening of EU and NATO support for, as goal of Russian information warfare, 47 liberal internationalism: far right as threat to, 15, 200; information war fare as threat to, 6; principles of, 4 libertarians: argument against com pelled disclosure, 235-38; argu ments for strict scrutiny of pro posed ban, 243, 247-48,250-51; constitutional theory vs. Madisonians, 218-22; likely objection to proposed ban, 217; views on Bill of Rights, 219; views on constitu tional construction, 219-21; views on First Amendment, 217, 218-19, 221; views on individual liberty, 219; views on judicial review, 221; views on marketplace of ideas, 221; views on wisdom of legislatures, 219 liberty, individual, Madisonian vs. libertarian views on, 219 Libya, digital authoritarianism in, 137-38 Limbaugh, Rush: dissemination of disinformation, 15; and right-wing media ecosystem, 67,126 LINE, Chinese content farms operat ing on,102-3 LinkedIn, and Russian interference in Brexit vote, 52 Löfven, Stefan, 74 Macron, Emmanuel, and presidential election of 2017: barring of Russian journalists from campaign head quarters, 60; meeting with Putin following, 60; spread of misinfor mation about, 59-63; victory in, as defeat for Russia, 58. See also French presidential election of 2017 Madisonians: and ban on Chinese and Russian state agents, views on, INDEX 241-42; theory of Constitution, 217, 218-22; view on wisdom of legislatures, 219; views on com pelled disclosure in registration system, 233-35; views on constitu tional construction, 219-21; views on First Amendment, 217, 218-19, 222; views on individual liberty, 219; views on judicial review, 221; views on marketplace of ideas, 221; views on strict vs. intermediate scrutiny, 243-44, 247֊48։ 250-51 Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) [Russia]: hacking of DNC comput ers in 2016 election, 27-30; ties to APT 28, 62 Manafort, Patil, 190 marketplace of ideas, Madisonian vs. libertarian views on, 221 Mattis, Peter, 109-10 McConnell v. Federal Election Commis sion (2003), 225-26, 227, 233 McFaul, Michael, 80 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995), 231 media literacy education, ineffectiveness against information warfare, 203 Meese v. Keene (1987), 239 Mélenchon, Jean-Luc, 59, 68 Mexico, as unsuitable for Alliance membership, 154,155 misinformation: in Clinton Pizzagate scandal, 123-24; definition of, 123; origin in domestic sources, 199. See also disinformation Mission content farm, 103 Mook, Robby, 45-46 Morrison, Scott, 105 Mueller investigation: charges against Russians for election interference, 189-90; indictment of Internet Research Agency, 30 ЗІ? Mueller Report, on Russian interfer ence in 2016 U.S. election, 24-25, 26, 27-28, 29, 54 Myanmar, abuse of social media, 159 National Association for the Advance ment of Colored People v. Alabama (1958), 232-ՅՅ National Crime Agency (NCA) [United Kingdom], investigation of pro-Brexit funding, 56-57 National Security Agency (NSA), gathering of phone records, expo sure of, 209, 235-36 national security threats, government restrictions on civil liberties in response to, 14 NATO: Finland’s cooperation with, Russian influence operations to un dermine, 69-70; Russian desire to weaken, 47, 58, 74; Russian news’ negative coverage of, in Sweden, 70 NATO, Sweden’s cooperation with: as response to Russian aggression, 69; Russian foreign influence opera tions to undermine, 70, 72-73,75; Russian opposition to, 69-70 Navalny, Alexei, 190 New Tork Times, 45, 91t, 124,138,162, 211 Nimmo, Ben, 50 NSG. See Nuclear Suppliers Group Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), as model for Alliance for Democracy, 152-53 Obama administration, sanctions against Russians for election inter ference, 189 O’Brien, Robert, 80 OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 320 INDEX One American News Network, 45 openness of Western liberal societies, Russian and Chinese exploitation of, 4, 99-100, Ш-12 Open Technology Fund, 162 Orbán, Viktor, 10 Organization for Economic Coopera tion and Development (OECD): membership in, and Alliance for Democracy membership, 154-56; ready availability of data on citizens in, 170, 206 organized social media manipulation (OSM): in Arab states, 140-41; in Clinton Pizzagate scandal, 123-24; countries practicing, 119; definition of, 12; in digital authoritarianism in Russia and China, 131-32; in digital authoritarianism in states of former Soviet Union, 135-36; information warfare as intersection ofFIOs and, 12-13,12fr number of autocratic states using, 134; quanti tative measurement of, 119; regula tory solutions to, for domestic vs. foreign actors, 13; use in many states,12 organized social media manipula tion, domestic use in democracies: algorithms used to test and refine messages, 125; damage to democ racy from, 129; data mining used for targeting, 125; and democratic de cay, п-13,19,22,114,117-23, ւշօՀ entire industry built around design of, 125; First Amendment and, 13; government regulation, lack of, 114; and increased spread of misinforma tion, 114,117,125-26; in Poland, 19, 120-23; and polarization, 114,117, 127; registration system as remedy for, 22; regulation by big technol ogy companies, as inadequate, 114; use of bots in, 124-25 OSM. See organized social media manipulation Oxford Internet Institute disinforma tion report: on countries abusing social media, 159; on countries practicing OSM, 119,134,138; study on Chinese covert social media operations, 92 Oxford Report, on Russian interfer ence in 2016 U.S. election, 25,31,36 Oxford University: investigation of Russian interference in Brexit vote, 54-55; study of Russian interfer ence in 2017 French election, 63, 64, 65-67, 65 í; study of Russian interference in 2018 Swedish elec tions, 72-73 Pacific Media Group, 89 Packingham v. North Carolina (2017), 236, 242 Pakistan, and information warfare, 13-14 Pariser, Eli, 127 Parler, 187 Partnership for Peace program, 69 Pastebin, 61 Pawn Storm. řAPT 28 PBS, Brexit referendum coverage, number of voters influenced by, 52 People’s Daily [China], 83 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) [China], covert social media opera tions, 92 Philippines, democratic decay, 10, 260Ш8 Pinterest, and Russian interference in Brexit vote, 52 Pizzagate scandal, 123-24 Podesta, John, 28, 29, 39 INDEX Poland: democratic decay, 10,118-19, 260Ш8, 272Ո9; democratic decay, OSM as cause of, 120-23; fake ac counts, use to affect public opinion, 121-22; high rate of social media use, 121; Twitter in, and right-wing bot accounts, 121-22; as unsuitable for Alliance membership, 155; use of fictitious user accounts, 19; Poland, Law and Justice Party victory in 2015: and democratic decay, 12021; use of OSM in, 121-23 polarization: causes, debate on, 126; cognitive, social media and, 127-28, 129; as disincentive for political compromise, 129; as goal of Russian information warfare, 43; origin in domestic sources, 199; OSM and, 114,117,127; Russian amplification of stories likely to increase, 44-46; Russian interference in 2016 US election and, 26, 34, 35, 42; social media filter bubbles and, 127; social media’s exacerbation of, 127-29; in US, as part of larger global polar ization, 126-27 polarization, affective: social media and, 127,128-29; weakening of democracy by, 129 political advertising on social media: and issue advocacy w. express ad vocacy, 225; proposed legislation to regulate, 188,191-92; regulation of, as largely pointless, 191-92; as small part of Russian and Chinese infor mation operations, 188,191, 228 Polyakova, Alina, 43,47 Pompeo, Michael, 8o֊8i popular constitutionalism, 220, 281Ո14 Porter, David, 43 Posobiec, Jack, 45, 61 Post, Robert, 218 321 president, delegation of foreign policy powers to, and Alliance review board, 164-65 Prigozhin, Yevgeniy, 30 privacy and anonymity: clear laws as best protection for, 210; govern ment and social media violations of, 209 privacy and anonymity in transnational regulatory system, 209-15; poten tial increase in, 20, 210; protections against government violations, 21215; protections against social media companies’ violations, 211-12; right to anonymous speech, protection of, 210-11. See also anonymous speech pseudonyms: current policies on, 177; protections for use in registration system, 166,173,177, 212, 232, 234, 240. See also anonymous speech public communication, definition of, importance for transnational regu latory system, 151-52 Putin, Vladimir: and Brexit referen dum, 49, 58; and increased Russian information warfare, 47; meeting with Macron after 2017 election, 60; rise of far-right in Europe as win for, 68, 69, 74; and Russian in terference in 2016 U.S. election, 27; vendetta against Hillary Clinton, 27 Qatar, digital authoritarianism in, 137-+1 Qiaobao, 89 Quan, Jenny, 105 rational basis review, 221 REAL ID Act of 2005: and registration system, 170,171?, 173, 206; undocu mented migrants and, 214 322 INDEX Reddit, US alt-right on, 59 regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7֊8 regions, global: regime types in, as percentage of regimes, 115-16,115í; and regional copycat behavior, 116 registration of social media accounts in transnational regulatory system, 17,146,165-77; and anonymity on social media, protections for, 177; as applicable only to public accounts, 167-68; benefits of, 203-5; blocking of bad actors, and reduced burden on social media companies, 208; chilling effect on free speech, strate gies to mitigate, 20-21; concerns about, as naive, 17-18; costs of implementing, 201; in Defending American Democracy Act (DADA), 216; and duplicate accounts, closing of, 174-75; and duplicate accounts, identification of, 173-74,196,207, 277-78Ո54; exemption for private accounts, 20,146,151-52; and ficti tious user accounts, blocking of, 18, 20,147,165,168-69,171,172,195; and First Amendment issues, 21; grace period for existing accounts, 171; greater effectiveness with increased Alliance membership, 153; and hacked accounts, effectiveness against, 148,196; importance of public messaging strategy, 239; and impostor accounts, 147-48,165,175; and increased cost of creating fake accounts, 20,195-97, 204; informa tion sharing protocols, 172-73; legal permanent residents (LPRs) and, 169,170,171t; and master accounts, limit of one per person, 166-67; master vs. subsidiary accounts, 16667; minors and, 169,171í; national database for, potential political opposition to, 173, 206; national ID cards and, 169-70; as neces sary for effectiveness of system, xii, 18,165,193, 203; number of people to be registered, 202-3; potential loopholes in, 195; purpose of, 165; and required choice of public or private account, 168, 207; security of data on, 173,175-77; as similar to existing licensing requirements, 201-2; six key elements of, 165-66; social media companies’ require ment to share registration data with member state governments, 167, 172; and stolen accounts, effective ness against, 148; undocumented migrants and, 168,170, 214; in US, documents required for, 170,171г; verification of account information, 172-75. See also First Amendment, and registration system registration of social media accounts, data necessary for, 168-72; consis tency across social media compa nies, 170; limits on retention of, 176, 212; for natural persons vs. arti ficial persons, 169; ready availability of, 169—70,195, 205-6; variation by member state, 169,171-72 regulation of internet speech: ample precedent for, 183-84; as necessary for flourishing internet, 184; as rea sonable infringement on individual liberties, 3 regulation of social media: current reactive system, problems with, 187; past proposals’ focus on message content, 17; problems with current system, transnational regulatory system as solution to, 187-88; and rule implementation, necessary INDEX public-private cooperation in, 186-87 regulation of social media, by social media companies; current system of, 184-85; as more like laws than traditional industry regulation, 185-86 regulation of social media, proper mix of public and private regulation in; First Amendment issues and, 186; provision of, by transnational regu latory system, 188; and rulemaking by government as more appropriate in democratic society, 185 rental accounts: as one type of fake social media account, 31-32; in Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 34; transnational regula tory system features to defeat, 148, 178,196; right-wing media: and election of 2020, claimed Democrat voter fraud in, ix; role in disseminating political disinformation, 15 right-wing media ecosystem, U.S.: as cause of polarization, 126; as iso lated and susceptible to misinfor mation, 67; as source of misinfor mation, 203 Roar content farm, 103 Roberts, John, 245 RoW. see regimes of the world (RoW) system RT: and ban on Chinese and Russian state agents, 163-64; dissemina tion of propaganda, 48; and French presidential election of 2017, interference in, 59-60; as global media organization, 49; number of viewers, 49; as propaganda arm of Russia, 49; spreading of incendiary news stories, 44-45 Յ2Յ RT, and Brexit vote interference, 4953; fine for breaching impartiality rules, 50; impact of, 51-53,57-58; monetary value of, 50-51; number of voters reached by, 52-53 Rupdy, and Russian interference in Brexit vote, 52 Russia: difficulty of using information operations against, ш-12,133-34; and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, history of, 71; state-controlled media, potential classification as benign state agents, 163-64. See also Crimea, Russian annexation of Russia, digital authoritarianism: and encrypted data, law requiring government access to, 131; government control over telecommunications infrastructure, 130; and government manipulation of content, 131-32; government monitoring and suppression of dissent, 130; illusion of free discussion created in, 129-30,131; and internet companies’ liability for violations, 131; and Law of Communication, 130; level of restrictions in, 132; protection of those in power as express goal of, 136; and self-censorship, 131; SORM surveillance system and, 130,136; spread to FSU states, 136 Russia, foreign influence operations, forged documents as common tactic in, 71-72 Russia, foreign influence operations in Europe: four types of, 48; RT and Sputnik dissemination of propa ganda, 48; in Sweden and Fin land, goals of, 70; through covert funding of sympathetic people and 324 INDEX Russia (continued) parties, 13,48; through ties with sympathetic political parties, 48. See also Brexit referendum, Russian influence on; Sweden, Russian for eign influence operations in Russia, information operations by: differences from Chinese opera tions, 76, 82; EU failure to impose sanctions for, 190; exploitation of openness of Western democracies, ш-12; US unilateral sanctions for, 190 Russia, information warfare by: disin formation campaigns in Arab states, 138; and fake social media accounts, 43-44; goals of, 4,15; hiring of US journalists to write copy for, 44; improved tactics of, 43-44; limited effect on trust in government, 42-43; names of fake websites, 44; NATO and EU countries affected by, 47,48; and political division, amplification of stories likely to increase, 44-46; removal of EU sanctions as goal of, 47-48; as significant threat to US, 14; since 2016,43-46; social media and, 48; as threat to democracies worldwide, x; as warfare by political means, 1415; weakening of EU and NATO as goal of, 47, 58 Russian election interference: direct, 13; history of, 25; Obama sanctions against, 189 Russian election interference in 2020, +4 Russian hackers, identity theft by, 34 Russian interference in 2016 U.S. elec tion, 24-26, 30-37; agenda-setting by, 39; and Black vote, suppression of, 36, 41-42; boosting Trump as goal of, 26, 27,34,37; dumping of hacked information about Clin ton, 13, 25, 27-30,39; Facebook’s response to, 186-87; framing of public discussion by, 39; goals of, 25, 26-27; government reports on, 24-25; harming Clinton cam paign as goal of, 27, 34,36,38-43; increased intensity over past efforts, 25; increased political division as goal of, 26, 34,35,42; number of voters reached by, 53; Putin’s ordering of, 27; and reweighting of communications environment, 39֊ 40; Russian company responsible for, 30; social media operations, 25, 26, 31; sowing of doubts about integrity of election process, 199; Stein candidacy and, 24,36, 41-42; voter suppression efforts, 36,41-42, 229; voters’ vulnerability to, 40-41. See also Internet Research Agency (IRA) Russian interference in 2016 U.S. elec tion, fake social media accounts in: attacks on Clinton, 33; bots, 33-34; dissemination of disinformation, 34; fictitious user accounts, number of, 24,32-33; groups targeted in, 35; impostor accounts, 33; messages sent from, 24, 32-33; messaging strategies, 34-37; misinformation on how to vote, 35-36; names of fake accounts, 35; number of fake ac counts, 24, 26,31; number of posts generated, 191-92; number of social media users viewing content from, 31, 32, 35; political rallies organized by, 37; as primary activity, 188; rental accounts, 34; retweets of con- INDEX tent by Trump campaign officials, 33; stolen accounts, 34; types used, 32-34; voter suppression messages, 36 Russian interference in 201Ó U.S. elec tion, likely impact of: responsibil ity for Trump victory, 26, 38-42, 199; studies on, 37-42; success in increasing polarization, 42 Salvini, Matteo, 126-27 sanctions in regulation of social media, 188-91; expressive value of, 188; ineffectiveness of, 188-91, 203 Sanders campaign: Russian impos tor account mimicking, 43-44; Russian support for, to undermine Clinton, 36; spread of misinforma tion by supporters of, 45 Saudi Arabia: and digital authori tarianism, 137-41; and information warfare, 13-14 self-regulation of social media: as government by unelected rulers, 7; as inadequate, 3,4, 6,114 Semptian, 109 September nth terrorist attacks, restrictions on US Muslims follow ing, 14 Settle, Jaime, 128 shared reference points based on accu rate information: erosion through cognitive polarization, 127; erosion through OSM, 129; as necessary for democracy, 126 Shorten, Bill, 105 Sina Weibo: number of users, 275Ո8; transnational regulatory system and, 151,162, 276Ո24; use within China, 5 325 Sitaraman, Ganesh, 244 smart city technologies, 85, 86 Snowden, Edward, 209, 235 social media: autocratic rulers’ use for surveillance purposes, 1089; banning of Alex Jones from, 124; and China’s state-run media, followers of, 90-91, 91í; companies selling technology to monitor users on, 108-9; dominance of US platforms, as potential strategic advantage, 6; and election of 2020, claimed Democrat voter fraud in, ix; facilitation of authoritarian government by, 134; fake accounts, types of, 31-32; and filter bubbles, 127; government regulation of, as potential strategic advantage, 6; information warfare on, 5; political communication on, exacerba tion of polarization by, 127-29; unrestricted access by Russia and China, as problematic, 5 social media, undermining of de mocracy by: scholarship on, 117; through increased polarization, 117; through increased spread of misinformation and disinformation, 117,123-24 social media companies: costs imposed on, by transnational regulatory system, 21-22, 207-9; current reac tive regulation system, problems with, 187, 204; and fake accounts, inability to detect, 178-79; legal immunity regarding user content, 184; regulation of internet speech, 184-85; and surveillance capital ism, 108; Type A and В platforms, 168,208; violations of privacy and anonymity, protections against in 32б INDEX social media companies (continued) registration system, 211-12. See also self-regulation of social media social media platforms: in China, 8687; definition of, importance for transnational regulatory system, 151 South Africa, democratic decay, 10, 118-19, 260Ш8, 272Ո9 South China Sea, China’s aggression in, 80 Sputnik: Alliance for Democracy and, 163-64; covert operation of Face book accounts, 53-54; dissemina tion of propaganda, 48; as multi media news agency, 49; negative coverage of NATO and EU, 70; as propaganda arm of Russia, 49 Sputnik, and Brexit vote, interference in, 49-53; impact of, 51-53, 57-58; monetary value of, 50-51; number of voters reached by, 52 Sputnik, and French presidential elec tion of 2017: barring from Macron’s campaign headquarters, 60; govern ment warning for distribution of false polls, 60; interference in, 59-60 Stanford Internet Observatory, 79,103 Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 222 Stein, Jill, and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 24, 36, 41-42 stolen accounts: as more difficult to detect than fictitious user accounts, 43; as one type of fake social media account, 31; in Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 34; Russians’ increased use of, 43; transnational regulatory system features to defeat, 147-48 Sunstein, Cass, 184, 218, 281П2 Supreme Court: on Constitution as inapplicable in other countries, 222; Fourteenth Amendment jurispru dence, 221; on internet as important place for speech, 242; and Madi sonian vs. libertarian interpretation of Constitution, 217; on right to anonymous speech, 210 Suriname, democratic decay, 118-19, 272Ո9 surveillance technology: China’s export of, to authoritarian re gimes, 82, 85-86,106,107-8,109; countries with firms selling, 107; and increased longevity of authori tarian regimes, 107-8,114,137,141; smart city technologies, 85, 86; usefulness of, with proper legal constraints, 85,107. See also digital authoritarianism Sweden: anti-information warfare measures in, 73; and foreign interference, lack of laws restricting, 74; growing ideological divide in, 74; joining of EU, 69; and junk news, 73, 74; political parties in, 68-69; rise of far right in, 68-69, 70, 74 Sweden, and NATO cooperation: as response to Russian aggression, 69; Russian foreign influence opera tions to undermine, 70, 72-73, 75; Russian opposition to, 69-70 Sweden, Russian foreign influence operations in: cyber attacks, 70-71; goals, 70, 74; as hybrid warfare, 71; lack of hard evidence on, 72; stir ring of anti-immigrant sentiment, 70; tools used in, 71-72; types of, 71; undermining of support for NATO and EU as goal of, 70, 7273,74 Swedish Defense Research Agency, study on Twitter bots, 72 INDEX Swedish elections of 2018: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on Social Democratic Party shortly before, 71; immigration as key issue in, 70; and rise of far right, 68-69, 70; Sweden’s anti-information warfare measures and, 74 Swedish elections of 2018, Russian interference in: and social media, high level of junk news shared on, 72-73; and sowing of doubts about integrity of election process, 199; use of bots on Twitter, 72 Swedish Institute of International Af fairs, study of Sputnik’s NATO and EU coverage, 70 Syria, digital authoritarianism in, 137-41 Szefemaker, Pawel, 121 Taiwan: Chinese takeover, as chronic threat, 100; difficulty separating Chinese influence from local views, 102; media outlets in, China friendly owners of, 102; social media, influence of Taiwanese vs. Chinese media on, 102; social me dia, popularity of, 100 Taiwan, Chinese interference in: and content farms used to spread disin formation, 102-3; election interfer ence, 100-103, 201; exposure of, in election of 2020,101; through fake social media accounts, 92 TalkWalker, 63 TenCent, 85, 86 TikTok: banning of, by Trump admin istration, 87; division into domestic and foreign platforms, 163; number of users, 86; as tool for Chinese propaganda, 86-87; transnational regulatory system and, 150,151 Յ27 transnational regulatory system: and bots and cyborg accounts, measures against, 149,179-81,197-98, 204; broad range of OSM and FIOs ad dressed by, 22; central elements of, 16-17,145-46; circumvention strat egies, effectiveness against, 147-51, 194-98; and domestic misinforma tion, 205; effectiveness against in formation warfare, 194-98, 204; ef fectiveness in reducing democratic decay, 198-201; and fake foreign national accounts, measures against, 148-49,178-79,197; focus on re stricting dangerous speakers rather than harmful speech, 17,18-19; free speech protections in, 16,145; goals of, 145,177; improving attack defense ratio through, 20,187; and other types of FIOs, usefulness in combating, 205; and privacy laws to prevent government monitoring of social media accounts, 176; and public communication, impor tance of defining, 151-52; rental accounts, measures against, 148, 178,196; restrictions in, as neces sary to defend against information warfare, 6,18, 21; and social media platform, importance of defining, 151; social media platforms subject to, 150,151,198, 208-9, 276Ո24; as solution to problems of current reactive social media regulation system, 187-88; and useful idiot problem, xi-xii, 150; WeChat and, 151,163,198, 201. See also ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents; costs and benefits of transnational regula tory system; disclaimer regime for social media electoral speech from 328 INDEX transnational regulatory system {continued) nondemocratic countries; informa tion privacy and data security mea sures in transnational regulatory system; registration of social media accounts in transnational regulatory system Trend Micro, 61-62 Trump, Donald: approval rating for, Democrats vs. Republicans, 42; banning from social media, 114; boosting of, as goal of Russian election interference in 2016, 26, 27, 34, 37; campaign of 2016, Facebook data used in, 209; and election of 2020, claimed Democrat voter fraud in, ix; Facebook and Twitter’s labeling of false statements by, 187,193; influence on Republican Party, and DADA, 216; as source of disinformation, 199; as useful idiot, xi-xii, 150; and US loss of moral standing, 153; victory in 2016 election, and dramatic democratic decay, 199; and Washington Post’s publication of Access Hollywood tape, 39 Trump, Donald Jr., retweets by, 45 Trump administration: banning of TikTok and WeChat, 87,163; citi zenship question on census, chilling effect of, 236-37; criminal charges against Chinese agents for cyber espionage, 188-89; and Customs and Border Protection collection of data on immigration activists, 209; states’ refusal to share motor vehicle databases with, 214; with drawal from UN Human Rights Council, 78 trust in government, limited effect of Russian information warfare on, 42-43 Tsai Ing-wen, 100-101,103 Tunisia, increase in democracy, 10 Turkey: democratic decay, 10, 260Ո18; as unsuitable for Alliance member ship, 155 Twitter: banning of Trump, 114; bots and, 33-34; China’s blocking of, 90,162; and China’s fake accounts, removal of, 93, 96; and China’s state-run media, followers of, 90, 91t; China’s use of purchased or stolen accounts, 94; Chinese diplo mats’ accounts on, 91; Chinese state media on, 200-201; fake Chinese accounts on, removal of, 19,103; fictitious user accounts on, 19; in France, small number of users, 62; inadequate regulation by, 114; indi vidual’s multiple accounts allowed on, 166; information warfare on, 3, 5, 26; IRA accounts exposed by, 54; labeling of false claims by Trump, 187; public vs. private accounts on, 167; regulation of speech by, 184-85; removal of fake accounts in Arab states, 137; required personal information to open account, 168; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 28, 33, 34-36, 38, 40,191; Russian fictitious user accounts in 2016 U.S. election, 26; and Russian foreign influence operations in Sweden, 71; and Rus sian interference in 2017 French presidential election, 61, 62, 63-64; and Russian interference in 2018 Swedish elections, 72-73; and Rus sian interference in Brexit vote, 52; INDEX Russian spread of incendiary news stories on, 44-45; in Sweden, high levels of junk news on, 73, 74; and TalkWalker, 63; as unelected regula tor of speech on social media, 7; use by Russians to hire US journalists to write copy, 44 UFWD. See United Front Work Department undocumented migrants, and registra tion system and, 168,170, 214, 237 United Arab Emirates (UAE), digital authoritarianism in, 137-41 United Front system [China], 87-89; and China’s Belt and Road Initia tive, promotion of, 88; control of Chinese communities abroad as goal of, 88; definition of, 82; as large global network, 87; operations in Britain, 88-89; range of espio nage and information operations conducted by, 87-88 United Front Work Department (UFWD): operation of China News Service, 89; operations in Britain, 88-89; as owner of China News Service, 83-84 United Nations: and China’s crack down on Hong Kong, 77-79; US withdrawal from Human Rights Council, 78 United States: democratic decay, 118; democratic process, undermin ing of, as goal of Russian election interference, 25, 26, 27; information operations, ineffectiveness against Russia and China, 133-34; moral standing, Trump’s damage to, 153; and need for information sharing with EU, 75; polarization in, as part Յ29 of larger global polarization, 12627; reputation, harming of, as goal of Russian election interference, 27 University of Edinburgh, investigation of Russian interference in Brexit vote, 54 Usedom, Rachel, 34 useful idiots: definition of, xi; transna tional regulatory system and, xi-xii, 150; Trump as, xi-xii, 150 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database: liberal democracy variable in, decline with OSM use, 118-20, 120/; measure of democratic regime stability, 155; on regime types as per centage of all regimes, by region, 115-16, 115г, RoW country classifica tions and, 7,10; states included and excluded, vs. UN member states, 116; on Trump’s damage to democ racy, 199 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, 100 Venezuela, and information warfare, 13-14 VK: number of users, 275Ո8; transna tional regulatory system and, 151, 162, 276Ո24; use within Russia, 5 Wall Street Journal, 91í Wang Liqiang, 92, ιοί, 102,103 Wang Yang, 87 Want Want China Holdings, 102 Washington Post, 39 WeChat, 103-5; accounts ran by China News Service, 89; Chinese surveil lance of users, 104,130; as “digital bedrock of Chinese society,” 86; government censorship on, 104-5; influence operations in numerous 330 INDEX WeChat (continued) countries, 89; number of users, 86,103,163, 275Ո9; transnational regulatory system and, 151,163,198, 201; Trump administration banning of, 87,163; use by Chinese agents, 5; use by Chinese diaspora, 103-4; use by Western politidans to com municate with members of Chinese diaspora, 105 Weiss, Jessica Chen, 81 whack-a-troll problem, 19,187 WikiLeaks;; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 29; spread of disinformation about Macron, 61; and 2016 U.S. election, 13,39 William-Yulee v. Florida Bar (2015), 245 Wired magazine, 54 Woods, Andrew, 184,186 World Bank government effectiveness indicator: and Alliance for Democ racy membership, 154-56; factors measured in, 276Ш3 Wuerth, Ingrid, 244 Xi Jinping, aggressiveness of China under, 80 Xinhua News Agency, 83,97-98, no Yemen, digital authoritarianism in, 137 YouTube: China’s blocking of, 90; and China’s state-run media, followers of, 90, 91t-, fake Chinese accounts on, 93,103; information warfare on, 5, 26; popularity in Taiwan, 100; regulation of speech by, 184-85; and Russian interference in 2016 US election, 31, 36; and Russian interference in Brexit vote, 52; and TalkWalker, 63 Zhao Lijian, 91 Zimbabwe: and social media, efforts to control and police, 86; use of Chinese surveillance technology, 85-86 ZTE, in Zimbabwe, 86 Zuckerberg, Mark, 7
adam_txt	CONTENTS Tables and Figures vii Preface ix Acknowledgments xv PART ONE - DIAGNOSIS 1 Information Warfare and Democratic Decay 2 Russian Information Warfare and U.S. Elections 24 3 Russian Influence Operations in Europe 47 4 China’s Global Information Operations 76 5 An Uneven Playing Field 113 3 PART TWO ֊ PRESCRIPTION 6 A Proposal for Transnational Regulation 145 7 Policy Analysis: Weighing Costs and Benefits 182 I The First Amendment 216 Glossary 253 Appendix: Proposed Statutory Text 257 Notes 259 Bibliography 287 Index 305 BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, BLOGS 89up. 2018. “Putin’s Brexit?: The Influence of Kremlin Media and Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum.” February, https://www.89up.org/russia-report Abrams, Stacey. 2020. “American Leadership Begins at Home: The Global Imperative to Rebuild Governance and Restore Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, May 1. 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United Kingdom, National Crime Agency. 2019· “Public Statement on NCA Investi gation Into Suspected EU Referendum Offences.” September 24. https://www .nationalcrimeagency .gov. uk/news/public-statement-on-nca-investigation-into -suspected-eu-referendum-offences United Nations Human Rights Council. 2020. “Cross-regional Statement on Hong Kong and Xinjiang.” June 30. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-human-rights -council-44-cross-regional-statement-on-hong-kong-and-xinjiang United Nations Human Rights Council. 2020. “Joint Statement Delivered by Permanent Mission of Cuba.” June 30. http://www.china-un.ch/eng/hom/t17938o4.htm United Nations Security Council, S.C. Res. 1373 (September 28, 2001). INDEX Note: page numbers followed by/and t refer to figures and tables respectively. Those followed by n refer to notes, with note number. ABC News, 56 Abrams v. United States (1919), 221 Aegis surveillance system, 109 Africa, increasing Chinese control over media in, 111 Alibaba, and Chinese efforts to domi nate cyberspace, 85 AI Jazeera, 209 Alliance for Democracy: agreement creating, 153,156, 205; goals of, 152; Nuclear Suppliers Group as model for, 152-53; potential expansion of mission to broader goals, 153; rea sons for necessity of, 153; regulatory harmony, as short-term goal, 152. See also Defending American De mocracy Act (DADA); transnational regulatory system Alliance for Democracy membership: addressing, in founding documents, 156; as carrot to induce nonmember reforms, 156; criteria for, 154-56; states eligible for, 156 Alliance for Securing Democracy, 48, 71 alt-right activists: and reusable politi cal disinformation bots, 63-64; in US, spread of disinformation about Macron, 59-60, 61-62 anonymous speech: First Amendment protection of, 177, 231; protection of, in transnational regulatory system, 177, 210-11, 231-32, 234. See also pseudonyms APT 28 (Fancy Bear; Pawn Storm): hacking of Macron campaign, 60, 61-62; as Russian intelligence unit, 60; ties to GRU, 62 Arab League, 138 Arab Spring and unregulated internet, 6, 137 Arab states: Chinese influence over internet policy in, 139; OSM in, 140-41; political division in, 138. See also digital authoritarianism in Arab states ЗОб INDEX Articles on State Responsibility, guidelines for identifying state agents, 161 ASIO. See Australian Security and Intelligence Organization Assange, Julian, 29 Australia, China’s aggressiveness toward, 80 Australian Security and Intelligence Organization (ASIO), ιοί Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 99,105, no authoritarian governments: decrease in Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 8-9, 8r, 9ƒ desire to push democratic states toward authori tarianism, 113; digital technology’s facilitation of, 134; increase in last ten years, 134. See also closed au tocracies; digital authoritarianism; electoral autocracies Authoritarian Interference Tracker, 71 authoritarian vs. democratic govern ments, global competition be tween, 4; high stakes of competi tion in, 11; information warfare as central to, 5-6 Azerbaijan, digital authoritarianism in, 134-35 Bahrain, digital authoritarianism in, 137-41 Baidu, and Chinese efforts to domi nate cyberspace, 85 Bakamo, study of Russian interference in 2017 French election, 63, 64-67, 65t, 68,199 Banks, Arron, 55-57 ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents, 16,145-46,159-65; appeal process for misclassified individuals, 161-62; benefits of, as greater than costs, 22-23; as costly and difficult to administer, 22; default application to Russian and Chinese nationals, 148,161,162,163,197; in Defending American Democracy Act (DADA), 216; effectiveness in reducing demo cratic decay, 198-201; effectiveness in reducing overt Chinese and Russian information warfare, 19498; exclusion of legal residents of Alliance states from, 161; exemption for benign state agents, 6,16,17, 145-46,163-65,194, 251; extending to other authoritarian states, issues hi, 159-60; and fictitious user ac counts, blocking of, 204; greater ef ficiency than content-focused regu lation, 17,18-19; and identification of state agents, 160-63; as ineffec tive without registration system, 193; as integral part of transnational regulatory system, 159; misclassifica tion of individuals, minimal impact of, 162-63; as necessarily imperfect, 22; as necessary for effectiveness, 6, 21,192; persons affected by, 192; review board for evaluating excep tions, powers granted to, 161-62, 164-65,173; vetting process for, 18. See also First Amendment, and ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents Barbados, increase in democracy, to Barnett, Randy, 218, 219 BC Project. See British Chinese (BC) Project BCRA. See Bipartisan Campaign Re form Act of 2002 Belt and Road Initiative (China), 88 INDEX Benkier, Yochai, 15 Bhagwat, Ashutosh, 218-19 Biden administration, and ban on TikTok and WeChat, 87,163 Bill of Rights, libertarian view of, 219 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA): and DADA dis claimer rules, 227-30; disclaimer and disclosure provisions in, 224-27 Black Lives Matter protests: and China’s criticism of US, 97; pohce gathering of data on, 209, 236; Russian spread of incendiary news stories about, 44-45 Bluman v. Federal Election Commission (2011), 250-51 Bolsonaro, Jair, io bots: definition of, 124,149; features of registration system to defeat, 149, 179-81,197-98, 204; good vs. bad, difficulty of distinguishing, 179-81; legitimate uses of, 149; and micro targeting of political messages, 124-25; as one type of fake social media account, 31; reusable pohtical disinformation bots, 63-64; right wing, on Polish Twitter, 121-22; in Russian information warfare, 149; in Russian interference in 2017 French presidential election, 6364, 66-67; in Russian interference in 2018 Swedish elections, 72; in Russian interference in Brexit vote, 53-54; in Russian interference in US 2016 election, 33-34; strategies for use of, 33-34; use by Arab states, 138; use to amplify social media messages, 124-25; use to spread disinformation, 149 Boumediene v. Bush (2008), 222 ЗО? Brazil, democratic decay, io, 118-19, 272Ո9 Breitbart News: dissemination of dis information, 15, 203; and US right wing media ecosystem, 67,126 Brexit referendum: anti-immigration sentiment and, 56; as defeat for lib eral internationalism, 48-49; and global polarization, 126-27; Putin’s pleasure in, 49, 58; results of, 48; Vote Leave’s use of disinformation in, 126; Vote Leave’s violation of spending cap in, 51 Brexit referendum, Russian influence on, 48-58; covert social media activity, 53-55; exposure of IRA social media accounts spreading pro-Brexit propaganda, 54-55; funding of pro-Brexit groups, 5557; likely impact of, 57-58; limited direct evidence of, 53-54; limited government investigation of, 49, 53, 55, 57; Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee report on, 55; RT and Sputnik in, 49-53, 57-58; studies on, 49, 53, 54-55; as threat to Uberal internationafism, 200 Breyer, Stephen, 218 Britain, China’s United Front opera tions in, 88-89 British Chinese (BC) Project, 88 Brown v. Socialist Workers ^4 Cam paign Committee (1982), 232, 234 Buckley v. Valeo (1976), 224-25, 232, 233-34, 236, 238 BuzzFeed News, 34 ByteDance, 86,163 California, law requiring disclaimers on bot messages, 180 Cambridge Analytica, 209 JO8 INDEX Cameron, David, 48, 50 Le Canard Enchaîné, 59 Capitol riot of January 6th, 2021: as greater threat than foreign social media influence, ix-x, 182-83; as inspired by Trump’s Big Lie, ix; as insurrection, ix CBS, 124 CCP. See Chinese Communist Party censorship online: in Arab states, 139; China and, 87, 89-90, 92, 95, 104-5, по, BL 132, tó2, 201; digital authoritarianism and, 85,114,13435,139; Open Technology Fund and, 163-64; Russia and, 131,132, 162; self-censorship in authoritarian states, 105,131,135,139,140 CGTN. See China Global Television Network Cheong, Ian Miles, 44-45 China: aggressive actions since 2020, 80; and Arab states’ internet, influ ence on, 139; cautious strategy under Deng Xiaoping, 80; diffi culty of using information warfare against, in-12; direct election inter ference by, 13; economic success of, as geopolitical challenge for US, 56; favorability rating, global decline in, in; fictitious user accounts cre ated by, 19; and smart city technol ogies, 85, 86; social credit system in, 132-33; state-run media, potential classification as benign state agents, 163-64; surveillance of citizens, as pervasive and sophisticated, 133; surveillance of social media, 1089; threat to Western interests, as often exaggerated, 80-81; under Xi Jinping, aggressiveness of, 80. See also Belt and Road Initiative; Hong Kong, China’s crackdown on; United Front System; United Front Work Department China, digital authoritarianism: block ing of Western social media, 90, 162; and 50 cent party, 90,131, 202; government control over telecom munications infrastructure, 130; and government manipulation of content, 131-32; government monitoring and suppression of dissent, 90,109,130; government’s covert posting of pro-government messages, 90,131,202; Great Fire wall and, 89-90,132; high level of restrictions in, 132; illusion of free discussion created in, 129-30,133; and impossibility of US informa tion operations in China, 133-34; and internet companies’ liability for violations, 131; public support of government despite, 133; and self-censorship, 105,131; social credit system and, 132-33. See also digital authoritarianism China, information operations: ag gressiveness of, under Xi Jinping, 80; alignment of global norms with authoritarian model as goal of, 76, 77-79, 81; broad range of tools in, 76, 79, 82, 89; and Chinese internet, technology, and communications companies, 84; and content delivery systems, control of, 82; content farms and, 102-3; control of communications infrastructure in global South, no; control of media, culture and narrative as goal of, 76; differences from Russian operations, 76, 82; dominance of Chinese message as goal of, 85; exploitation of openness of Western democracies, 99-100, in-12; and INDEX foreign media outlets, placement of Chinese-written stories in, 105-6; global ambitions of, 76; goals of, 80-81; hackers’ exposure of (2020), 109; and Hong Kong dissent, multi-media propaganda campaign against, 93; and huayuquan (dis course power), 76-77, 200-201; and internet as means of control ling population, 85; and minimiza tion of international human rights emphasis, 81; monitoring of citizens and Chinese diaspora, 86; posi tive image of China as goal of, 81, 82; range of actors involved in, 82; social media platforms and, 86-87; sophisticated propaganda opera tions of, 79; suppression of critics as goal of, 81; and surveillance technology, export to authoritarian regimes, 82, 85-86,106,107-8,109; use of intimidation, 79, 82. Ser also United Front system China, information operations in global South: control of commu nication channels, 106,109-12; control of infrastructure and hard ware, no; exporting of surveil lance technologies to authoritarian regimes, 106,107-8,109; power to crowd out unwanted messages, no; purchase and control of local media, по-п China, information warfare by: Face book and, 201; goals of, 4,15; as ideological war with liberalism and US, 81; positive business environ ment for Chinese companies as goal of, 81; as significant threat to US, 14; as threat to democracies worldwide, x; as warfare by political means, 14-15 ՅՕՏ China, meddling in democratic coun tries by, 99-106; election interfer ence, countries affected by, 99-100; election interference in Taiwan, 92, 100-103 China, social media foreign influence operations: coordination with other efforts, 93-94; covert operations, 91-99; and Covid-19, claims of su perior response vs. Western nations, 97, 98-99, 99í; and Covid-19, efforts to deflect blame for, 95-98; diplomat’s accounts and, 91; experi ence on domestic internet and, 89-90; and Hong Kong dissent, effort to discredit, 92-95; increase in, 92; increasing sophistication of, 98; overt operations, 90-91, 91í; poorly-developed fake personas in, 94; recent turn to Russian-style disinformation campaigns, 98; social media companies’ removal of fake accounts, 93; still-evolving strategies in, 89-99; targeting of specific audiences in, 97; use of fake accounts, 92, 93, 96,101,103; use of purchased or stolen ac counts, 94 China, state-run media in information operations: followers on Western social media, 90-91,91t, 97-98; government control of messaging in, 84; hostility to liberal demo cratic values, 84; as large and grow ing, 82-83; media outlets run by, 82-84; propaganda against Western democracies, 84 China Daily, 83,106 China Global Television Network (CGTN), 83, in China News Service, 83-84, 89 China Plus News, 83 ЗЮ INDEX China Radio International (CRI), 83, 106, по China Times, 102 China Times Media Group, 102 Chinese Communist Party (ССР), party committees controlling inter net, technology, and communica tions companies, 84. See also United Front Work Department Chua, Amy, 126 cigarette warning labels, effectiveness of, 193 Citizens United, v. Federal Election Commission (2010), 224-27, 233, 240-41, 243, 246 civil rights debate, as cause of polariza tion in U.S., 126 Clinton, Hillary, and Pizzagate scan dal, 123-24 Clinton, Hillary, and Russian interfer ence in 2OIÓ U.S. election: fake social media accounts’ attacks on Clinton, 33; hacking and dumping of damaging information about Clinton, 27-30; harm to Clinton campaign as goal of, 27, 34, 36, 38-43; responsibility for Clinton’s defeat, 26, 38-42,199 closed autocracies: decrease in Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 89, 8ř, 9/, increase in past ten years, 9-10, lofi as percentage of regimes, by region, 115-16, H5ř, in regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7 CloudWalk Technologies, 86 CNN, followers on Facebook and Twitter, 91í Cold War: characteristics vs. present conflict, 4-6; increase in democra cies, 8, 8t Colombia, as unsuitable for Alliance membership, 155 conservative media. See right-wing media Constitution, US, Madisonian vs. libertarian theory of, 218-22 constitutional construction: and departmentalism vs. judicial su premacy, 220-21; Madisonian vs. libertarian views on, 219-21; and popular constitutionalism, 220-21, 281Ш4 costs and benefits of transnational regulatory system: and contribu tion of foreign threats to democ racy decay, 182-83; costs imposed on social media companies, 21-22, 207-9; costs of ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian agents, as justified by benefits, 22-23; costs of registration regime, 201-9; effectiveness in reducing Chinese and Russian information warfare, 194-98; effectiveness in reducing democratic decay, 198201; and importance of democratic decay, 182-83, 201. See also privacy and anonymity in transnational regulatory system Covid-19: China’s claims of superior response vs. Western nations, 97, 98-99, 99t; China’s efforts to de flect blame for, 95-98; masking and social distancing, misinformation about, 126; mask mandates, 3 CRI. See China Radio International Crimea, Russian annexation of: inef fectiveness of sanctions against, 190-91; removal of EU sanctions as Russian goal, 47-48; and Sweden and Finland’s turn to NATO, 69 Croatia, democratic decay, 118-19, 272Ո9 Cruz, Ted, 45 INDEX Cuba, and China’s crackdown on Hong Kong, 77 Customs and Border Protection (СВР), US, collection of data on immigration activists, 209 Cyber Policy Center (Stanford Univer sity), 52 cyber troops, definition of, 12 cyborg accounts, features of registra tion system to defeat, 149,179-81 Czech Republic, democratic decay, 118-19, 272Ո9 DADA. See Defending American De mocracy Act data hashing, to protect social media registration data, 176-77, 207, 212 Dataminr, 209 dcleaks.com, and Russian election interference in 2016, 28, 29 DDoS. See Distributed Denial of Ser vice (DDoS) attacks Defending American Democracy Act (DADA): components of, 216; as enacting statute for transnational regulatory system, 216; proposed text for, 257-58; Trump’s influence on Republican Party and, 216. See also First Amendment democracies: desire to push nondemocratic states toward democ racy, 113; increase in Cold War and post-Cold War period, 8-9, 8t, 9f democracy: American, domestic disinformation as threat to, ix-x, xii, 182-83; worldwide, Chinese and Russian information warfare as threat to, x. See also electoral democracies; liberal democracies democratic decay, 7-11; countries with greatest amount of, 118; domestic use of OSM and, 11-13, 22,114, ЗИ 117-23,12oƒ factors influencing, 1112; origin in domestic sources, 199; quantitative measurement of, 11819; transnational regulatory system effectiveness in reducing, 198-201; Trump’s election and, 199 democratic institutions, erosion of faith in, as goal of Russian and Chinese disinformation, 4, 6, 26, 126,199 Democratic Party, Russian hacking into computers of, in 2016 election, 27-30 Deng Xiaoping, 80 Denmark, Russian hybrid warfare in, 71 digital authoritarianism: and advantage for authoritarian states in ideologi cal battle, 114-15; central features of, 134,135,139; and China’s exporting of surveillance technol ogy to authoritarian regimes, 82, 85-86,106,107-8,109; govern ment monitoring and suppression of dissent, 130,134-35,139-+0; illusion of free discussion created in, 129-30,131,133,135-36,137; and increased longevity of authoritarian regimes, 107-8,114,137,141; lack of clear laws, chilling effect of, 131,135; maintenance of public support de spite, 133,137; and self-censorship, 131,135,139,140; spread of Rus sian and Chinese models of, 134; in states of former Soviet Union, 134-37. See also China, digital authoritarianism in; Russia, digital authoritarianism in digital authoritarianism in Arab states, 137-41; central features of, 139; government monitoring and sup pression of dissent in, 139-40; and self-censorship, 139,140 312 INDEX digital technology, facilitation of au thoritarian government by, 134 disclaimer-only system, as impractical, 159,193,251-52 disclaimer-only system, three ver sions of, 248-50; disclaimers on all speech by Russian and Chinese accounts, 249-50; disclaimers on broad areas of speech by Russian and Chinese accounts, 248-49; disclaimers on “electoral speech” only, 248 disclaimer regime for electoral speech from nondemocratic countries, 16,146,148,156-59; as cosdy and administratively cumbersome, 19394; cost of, as justified by effec tiveness, 194; cost to social media companies, 207-8; in Defending American Democracy Act (DADA), 216; definition of “electoral speech” in, 157-58,208; and disclaimer as permanent part of message, 158; disclaimer design, 158; and electoral speech, definition of, 157-58, 208, 223; fake foreign national accounts and, 149,157,179,197,204; and First Amendment issues, 16; as inef fective without registration system, 193; narrow category of speech affected by, 192; noncontroversial benefits of, 192-93; sample dis claimer text, 156-57,192, 223; time constraints on, 230; types of mes sages requiring, 157-58, 208, 223. See also First Amendment, disclaimer regime and disclaimer regime for messages from bots or cyborg accounts, 149,180 disclaimers: evidence on effectiveness of, 193; and repetition suppression effect, 249 disinformation: definition of, 13, 123; vs. information warfare, 13; Trump as source of, 199. See also misinformation disinformation, domestic: difficulty of suppressing, 203; as threat to American democracy, ix-x, xii, 182-83; usefulness of transnational regulatory system in combating, 205. See also First Amendment disinformation campaigns: countries most subject to, 100; sowing doubt and confitsion as main goal of, 126 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks: Russia’s history of, 71; Swedish elections of 2018 and, 71 Doe v. Reed (2010), 232 donkey blogger case, 134-35 Dorsey, Jack, 7 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 213 Drudge Report, 124 Duterte, Rodrigo, 10 echo chamber effect, in French social media, 66-67, 68, 200 ECPA. See Electronic Communica tions Privacy Act Egypt, digital authoritarianism in, 137-41 89UP, study on RT and Sputnik influ ence on Brexit vote, 50-51,52 electioneering communication, defini tion of, in BCRA, 225-26 election interference: direct, by Rus sia and China, 13; vs. information warfare, 15-16; public opinion on importance of, 15. See also French presidential election of 2017, Russian interference in; Swedish elections of 2018, Russian interference in; entries under Russian election interference INDEX election of 2016. See Russian interfer ence in 2016 U.S. election election of 2020: alleged Democratic voter fraud in, ix, xi-xii; improved protections against information warfare in, 204. See also Russian election interference in 2020 electoral autocracies: increase in past ten years, 9-10,10/; as percentage of regimes, by region, 115-16, 115Г, in regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7-8 electoral democracies: decrease in past ten years, 9-10, io/; as percentage of regimes, by region, 115-16,115Հ in regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7-8 “electoral speech,” definition of, in disclaimer regime, 157-58, 208, 223 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 212 EMLEAKS, 61 Equifax data breach, and impostor accounts, 175 Erdogan, Recep, 10 European Union (EU): and anti information warfare measures, 75; General Data Protection Regula tion, 176; Russian desire to weaken, 47, 58, 74; sanctions against Russia for Crimea annexation, 47-48. See also Russia, foreign influence opera tions in Europe express advocacy vs. issue advocacy, 225 Facebook: ads, use in China’s informa tion operations, 96; ads as main source of revenue for, 108; and affective polarization, 128-29; and anonymous accounts, rules of, 211; banning of Trump, 114; blocking of Chinese content farms, 103; ЗІЗ blocking of fictitious user accounts, 195; and Brexit referendum, Rus sian interference in, 53; China’s blocking of, 90,162; and China’s fake accounts, removal of, 93; and China’s state-run media, follow ers of, 90-91, 91í; China’s use of purchased or stolen accounts, 94; Chinese content farms operating on, 102-3; Chinese diplomats’ ac counts on, 91; Chinese state media on, 200-201; detection of fake accounts, 43,178-79; and fictitious user accounts, inability to suppress, 19-20; and fictitious user accounts, number of, 19,195, 204; inadequate regulation by, 114; information warfare on, 3,5, 26; labeling of false claims by Trump, 187,193; in Myan mar’s genocidal campaign against Rohingya, 159; number of monthly users, 15; number of users in Poland, 121; popularity in Taiwan, 100; public vs. private accounts on, 167, 208; regulation of speech by, 184-85; removal of fake accounts in Arab states, 137; required personal information to open account, 168; Russian fictitious user accounts, 26; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 28,31,34-35,40,53, 186-87,191; and Russian interfer ence in Brexit vote, 52; and Russian interference in French presidential election of 2017, 60, 63; Russian purchases of accounts on, 34; in Taiwan, influence of Taiwanese vs. Chinese media on, 102; and TalkWalker, 63; as unelected regula tor of social media speech, 3; user data from, harvested by Cambridge Analytica, 209 ЗИ INDEX fake foreign national accounts: defini tion of, 148-49,178; disclaimer requirements and, 149,157,179, 197, 204; likely increase in, after implementation of transnational regulatory system, 178; transna tional regulatory system, features to defeat, 148-49,178-79,197 fake social media accounts: types of, 20; use by Arab states, 138. See also bots; fictitious user accounts; hacked accounts; impostor ac counts; rental accounts; Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, fake social media accounts in; stolen accounts Fancy Bear. See APT 28 FARA. See Foreign Agents Registra tion Act far-right in Europe, rise of, 68-69, 74, 200 FBI, and social media account registra tion data: access to, and potential for abuse, 213-14; security of, 176; verification of, 172-73, 206 FECA. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), disclosure and disclaimer requirements in, 224-25, 232 Ferrara, Emilio, 63-64 fictitious user accounts: ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents and, 204; blocking of, as goal of transnational regulatory system, 18, 20; as least costly type of fake account, 20; as most-used tool in information war fare, 195; number of, 19; as one type of fake social media account, 31; registration system and, 18, 20,147, 165,168-69,171,172,195; Russia’s frequent use of, 32֊33;Russian use of to interfere in 2016 U.S. election, 24, Յ2-ՅՅ; social media companies’ inability to suppress, 19,195 50 cent party, 90,131,202 Fillon, François, 58,59, 60, 68 Finland, Russian foreign influence operations in, 69, 70 FIOs. See foreign influence operations First Amendment: and anonymous speech, protection of, 177, 231; cat egories of speech not protected by, 241-42; central purpose of, Madi sonian vs. libertarian theories, 21819; corporations’ rights under, 227; goals promoted by, 244; libertarian view of, 221; and limits on govern ment power to regulate disinforma tion, x; Madisonian vs. libertarian interpretation of, 217; and necessity of speech regulation, Madisonian view on, 222; as not applicable to foreign citizens outside US, x, n, 222-23; and open marketplace of ideas, protection of, 240; and regu lation of internet speech, proper mix of public and private regulation in, 186; and right of US citizens to receive speech, x-xi, 222, 223, 237, 240, 241, 242, 251; and transnational regulatory system’s effect on social media companies, 223 First Amendment, and ban on sodai media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents, 240-52; Madisonian views on, 241-42; and Supreme Court’s deference to gov ernment on foreign policy issues, 244; as unprotected speech, 241-42 First Amendment, and ban, application of strict scrutiny : and compelling interest in protecting democracy INDEX from foreign interests, 246-47; and Court’s deference to government’s factual findings, 245-46, 247, 248; Madisonian vs. libertarian argu ments, 247-48, 25 0-51; and narrow tailoring to achieve compelling gov ernment interest, 246, 247, 250-52 First Amendment, and ban, strict vs. intermediate scrutiny, 242-45; arguments in favor of intermedi ate scrutiny, 243-44; libertarian arguments on, 243; Madisonian arguments on, 243-44 First Amendment, and disclaimer regime, 223-30; and Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act disclaimer rules, 227-30; and burden on social media companies rather than speak ers, 228-29; as compelled speech, 223-24; relevant law, 224-27 First Amendment, and registra tion system, 231-40: compelled disclosure in, 223, 232-40; chill ing effect of, 236-37, 239; First Amendment protection of anony mous speech, 177, 231; libertarian argument against, 235-38; likely result of Supreme Court challenge to, 238-39; Madisonian argument in favor of, 233-35; protection of anonymous speech in transnational regulatory system, 177, 210-11, 231-32, 234; relevant law, 232-33, 238-39; required information as already known to government, 240; safeguards against abuses of, 177, 210-11, 231-32, 234 Floyd, George, Chinese media on, 84 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), 239 foreign citizens outside US, rights of, vs. US citizens, X, II, 222-23 ЗІ5 foreign influence operations (FIOs): definition of, 11-12; and democratic decay, II-I2; direct election inter ference as, 13; information warfare as type of, 12,12ƒ traditional types of, 12; usefulness of trans national regulatory system in combating, 205. See also Russia, foreign influence operations in Europe foreign threats, government’s power to regulate, n former Soviet Union (FSU) states: digital authoritarianism in, 13437; and illusion of free discussion, 1Յ5-Յ6,137; number of autocratic states, 115t, 135; protection of those in power as express goal of, 136; Russian help in creating, 136 Founders, fear of foreign intervention, 235, 243 4chan, US alt-right on, 59 Fox News: dissemination of disin formation, 15, 203; followers on Facebook and Twitter, 91 ť, and US divide between right-wing media ecosystem and mainstream news, 67,126 France: need to address divide between mainstream and alternative news users, 68; pro-Russian political parties in, 58-59; Russian interfer ence in, 58; yellow vest protests in, 126-27 France24, Brexit referendum cover age, 52 Freedom House, 107,108, no, 116,132, 139,140 free speech protections in transna tional regulatory system, 16,145 French National Cybersecurity Agency, 62 SIÓ INDEX French presidential election of 2017: pro-Russian candidates in, 58-59; results of, 58 French presidential election of 2017, Russian interference in, 58-68; altright support for, 59, 61, 67; bots and, 63-64, 66-67; dumping of hacked information about Ma cron, 60-62, 67; failure to defeat Macron, as no cause for compla cency, 68; failure to defeat Macron, reasons for, 62-63; fictitious user accounts in, 60, 66; French regula tion of media and, 63; goals of, 58; hacking of Macron’s campaign, 60; and higher quality of news shared by French vs. US users, 66; and lack of sharing between mainstream and alternative news users, 66-67, 68; and percentage of mainstream vs. alternative sources shared by users, 64-66, 65г, and social media, studies on, 63-67; and sowing of doubts about integrity of election process, 199; spread of misinforma tion about Macron, 59-60; spying on Macron campaign, 60 French social media: alternative news sources as nationalist, anti globalization, and anti-Islam, 67; echo chamber effect in, 66-67, 68, 200 FSU. See former Soviet Union (FSU) states Fukuyama, Francis, 9 Gardiner, Barry, 88-89 Gevers, Victor, 104 Gleicher, Nathaniel, 43 Global Times [China], 83 Goldsmith, Jack, 184,186 Goodell, Chelsea, 45 Google: advertising as main source of revenue for, 108; inadequate regula tion by, 114. See also YouTube Gorwa, Robert, 121-23 government regulation of social media: current forms, ineffectiveness of, 188-92; need for, 183-88. See also Defending American Democracy Act (DADA); transnational regula tory system government surveillance, concerns of US citizens about, 235-36 Great Firewall of China, 89-90,132 GRU. See Main Intelligence Director ate (GRU) [Russia] The Grugq, 61 Guardian, 209 Guccifer 2.0, as Russian fictitious user account, 29 Gunther, Gerald, 245 hacked accounts: as one type of fake sodai media account, 31; trans national regulatory system and, 147-48,196 hackers’ access to registration system information, protections against, 211-12 Han Kuo-yu, 100-101 Harvard University, on right-wing media ecosystem, 67 Hikvision, 86 Holder v. Humanitarian Latv Project (2010), 245-46, 248, 250 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 221 Hong Kong, Britain’s return to China, 77-79 Hong Kong, China’s crackdown on: British-led opposition to, 77; covert social media campaign to discredit dissent, 92-95; diplomatic debate at UN, 77-79, 95; multi-media pro- INDEX paganda campaign in, 93; and new aggressiveness since 2020, 80; and Taiwan election of 2020,101 Howard, Philip, 51,121,125,126 Hua Chunying, 91 Huawei: and Chinese efforts to domi nate cyberspace, 85; and smart cities technology, 85, 86 Hu Jintao, 82 Hungary: democratic decay, 10,11819, 260Ш8, 272Ո9; as unsuitable for Alliance membership, 155 impostor accounts: difficulty of iden tifying, 43,195; as one type of fake social media account, 31; in Russian election interference in 2016, 33; Russians’ increased use of, 43-44; types of, 147-48; transnational regulatory system features to defeat, 147-48,165,196 India: China’s aggressiveness toward, 80; democratic decay, 10; and infor mation warfare, 13-14 information privacy and data security measures in transnational regula tory system, 17, 20,146 information warfare: against China and Russia, difficulty of, ш-12; definition of, ix, 12; vs. disinforma tion, 13; vs. election interference, 15-16; as intersection of FI Os and OSM, 12-13, states practicing, 13; as term, objections to, 14-15; use of true information in, 13. See also China, information warfare by; Russia, information warfare by Infowars, 124 Instagram: banning of Trump, 114; individual’s multiple accounts al lowed on, 166; information warfare on, 5, 26; public vs. private accounts Յր7 on, 167; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 31,40,191; and TalkWalker, 63 Instagram, and anonymous accounts, rules of, 211 Intelligence Community Report on Russian interference in 2016 US election, 25, 27 internet: as important place for speech, Supreme Court on, 242; regulation of, as reasonable infringement on individual liberties, 3 internet, unregulated: Arab Spring and, 6,137; as utopian dream, 6-7 Internet Research Agency (IRA): bud get of, 30,191; increase in informa tion warfare in response to sanc tions, 189; indictment by Robert Mueller, 30; number of employees, 30, 202; number of social media users viewing content by, 31, 32; or ganic posting as primary activity of, 188,191-92, 228; as private company with ties to Russian government, 30; research on US vulnerabilities, 30; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 26, 30-31,191-92; Twitter’s exposure of accounts, 54; use of paid advertisements, 31; use of social media, 30-31 Iran, and information warfare, 13-14 Israel, democratic decay, 118 issue advocacy vs. express advocacy, 225 Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, 38-42 Jones, Alex, 124 judicial review: Madisonian vs. libertar ian views on, 221; three tiers of, 221 Kantar, 50-51 Kavanaugh, Brett, 250-51 Kennedy, Anthony, 218, 227, 242 Зі8 INDEX Kerr, Jaclyn, 135,137 Khusyaynova, Elena, 26 Kilimnik, Konstantin, 189-90 Kim, Young Niie, 43-44 Knowlesys Intelligence System, 109 Kobzaru, George, 72 Kramer, Larry, 220, 281П14 Labour Party (Britain): Chinese influ ence in, 88-89; use of bots on social media, 124-25 La Clair, Ann Louise, 45 Lamont v. Postmaster General (1965), 222 Latvia, and disinformation campaigns, 100 Leave.EU, suspicious donation to, 55-57 Lee, Christine, 88-89 legislatures, wisdom of, Madisonian vs. libertarian views on, 219 Le Pen, Marine: and election of 2022, improved chance of defeating Macron in, 62; and presidential election of 2017,58,59; pro-Russian policies of, 58-59; rising support for, as danger to liberal democracy, 68; US alt-right’s support of, 59 liberal democracies: decrease in past ten years, 9-10, 10ƒ foreign vs. domestic threats to, 11; ideological battle against authoritarian states, 113-15; increase in Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 8-9, 8 i, 9/, as percentage of regimes, by region, 115-16, 115Г; in regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7-8; rise of rar right as threat to, 200; spread of, at end of Cold War, 134; stable, and Alli ance membership, 155-56; under mining of, as Russian and Chinese goal, 3,15, 25, 74; weakening of EU and NATO support for, as goal of Russian information warfare, 47 liberal internationalism: far right as threat to, 15, 200; information war fare as threat to, 6; principles of, 4 libertarians: argument against com pelled disclosure, 235-38; argu ments for strict scrutiny of pro posed ban, 243, 247-48,250-51; constitutional theory vs. Madisonians, 218-22; likely objection to proposed ban, 217; views on Bill of Rights, 219; views on constitu tional construction, 219-21; views on First Amendment, 217, 218-19, 221; views on individual liberty, 219; views on judicial review, 221; views on marketplace of ideas, 221; views on wisdom of legislatures, 219 liberty, individual, Madisonian vs. libertarian views on, 219 Libya, digital authoritarianism in, 137-38 Limbaugh, Rush: dissemination of disinformation, 15; and right-wing media ecosystem, 67,126 LINE, Chinese content farms operat ing on,102-3 LinkedIn, and Russian interference in Brexit vote, 52 Löfven, Stefan, 74 Macron, Emmanuel, and presidential election of 2017: barring of Russian journalists from campaign head quarters, 60; meeting with Putin following, 60; spread of misinfor mation about, 59-63; victory in, as defeat for Russia, 58. See also French presidential election of 2017 Madisonians: and ban on Chinese and Russian state agents, views on, INDEX 241-42; theory of Constitution, 217, 218-22; view on wisdom of legislatures, 219; views on com pelled disclosure in registration system, 233-35; views on constitu tional construction, 219-21; views on First Amendment, 217, 218-19, 222; views on individual liberty, 219; views on judicial review, 221; views on marketplace of ideas, 221; views on strict vs. intermediate scrutiny, 243-44, 247֊48։ 250-51 Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) [Russia]: hacking of DNC comput ers in 2016 election, 27-30; ties to APT 28, 62 Manafort, Patil, 190 marketplace of ideas, Madisonian vs. libertarian views on, 221 Mattis, Peter, 109-10 McConnell v. Federal Election Commis sion (2003), 225-26, 227, 233 McFaul, Michael, 80 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995), 231 media literacy education, ineffectiveness against information warfare, 203 Meese v. Keene (1987), 239 Mélenchon, Jean-Luc, 59, 68 Mexico, as unsuitable for Alliance membership, 154,155 misinformation: in Clinton Pizzagate scandal, 123-24; definition of, 123; origin in domestic sources, 199. See also disinformation Mission content farm, 103 Mook, Robby, 45-46 Morrison, Scott, 105 Mueller investigation: charges against Russians for election interference, 189-90; indictment of Internet Research Agency, 30 ЗІ? Mueller Report, on Russian interfer ence in 2016 U.S. election, 24-25, 26, 27-28, 29, 54 Myanmar, abuse of social media, 159 National Association for the Advance ment of Colored People v. Alabama (1958), 232-ՅՅ National Crime Agency (NCA) [United Kingdom], investigation of pro-Brexit funding, 56-57 National Security Agency (NSA), gathering of phone records, expo sure of, 209, 235-36 national security threats, government restrictions on civil liberties in response to, 14 NATO: Finland’s cooperation with, Russian influence operations to un dermine, 69-70; Russian desire to weaken, 47, 58, 74; Russian news’ negative coverage of, in Sweden, 70 NATO, Sweden’s cooperation with: as response to Russian aggression, 69; Russian foreign influence opera tions to undermine, 70, 72-73,75; Russian opposition to, 69-70 Navalny, Alexei, 190 New Tork Times, 45, 91t, 124,138,162, 211 Nimmo, Ben, 50 NSG. See Nuclear Suppliers Group Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), as model for Alliance for Democracy, 152-53 Obama administration, sanctions against Russians for election inter ference, 189 O’Brien, Robert, 80 OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 320 INDEX One American News Network, 45 openness of Western liberal societies, Russian and Chinese exploitation of, 4, 99-100, Ш-12 Open Technology Fund, 162 Orbán, Viktor, 10 Organization for Economic Coopera tion and Development (OECD): membership in, and Alliance for Democracy membership, 154-56; ready availability of data on citizens in, 170, 206 organized social media manipulation (OSM): in Arab states, 140-41; in Clinton Pizzagate scandal, 123-24; countries practicing, 119; definition of, 12; in digital authoritarianism in Russia and China, 131-32; in digital authoritarianism in states of former Soviet Union, 135-36; information warfare as intersection ofFIOs and, 12-13,12fr number of autocratic states using, 134; quanti tative measurement of, 119; regula tory solutions to, for domestic vs. foreign actors, 13; use in many states,12 organized social media manipula tion, domestic use in democracies: algorithms used to test and refine messages, 125; damage to democ racy from, 129; data mining used for targeting, 125; and democratic de cay, п-13,19,22,114,117-23, ւշօՀ entire industry built around design of, 125; First Amendment and, 13; government regulation, lack of, 114; and increased spread of misinforma tion, 114,117,125-26; in Poland, 19, 120-23; and polarization, 114,117, 127; registration system as remedy for, 22; regulation by big technol ogy companies, as inadequate, 114; use of bots in, 124-25 OSM. See organized social media manipulation Oxford Internet Institute disinforma tion report: on countries abusing social media, 159; on countries practicing OSM, 119,134,138; study on Chinese covert social media operations, 92 Oxford Report, on Russian interfer ence in 2016 U.S. election, 25,31,36 Oxford University: investigation of Russian interference in Brexit vote, 54-55; study of Russian interfer ence in 2017 French election, 63, 64, 65-67, 65 í; study of Russian interference in 2018 Swedish elec tions, 72-73 Pacific Media Group, 89 Packingham v. North Carolina (2017), 236, 242 Pakistan, and information warfare, 13-14 Pariser, Eli, 127 Parler, 187 Partnership for Peace program, 69 Pastebin, 61 Pawn Storm. řAPT 28 PBS, Brexit referendum coverage, number of voters influenced by, 52 People’s Daily [China], 83 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) [China], covert social media opera tions, 92 Philippines, democratic decay, 10, 260Ш8 Pinterest, and Russian interference in Brexit vote, 52 Pizzagate scandal, 123-24 Podesta, John, 28, 29, 39 INDEX Poland: democratic decay, 10,118-19, 260Ш8, 272Ո9; democratic decay, OSM as cause of, 120-23; fake ac counts, use to affect public opinion, 121-22; high rate of social media use, 121; Twitter in, and right-wing bot accounts, 121-22; as unsuitable for Alliance membership, 155; use of fictitious user accounts, 19; Poland, Law and Justice Party victory in 2015: and democratic decay, 12021; use of OSM in, 121-23 polarization: causes, debate on, 126; cognitive, social media and, 127-28, 129; as disincentive for political compromise, 129; as goal of Russian information warfare, 43; origin in domestic sources, 199; OSM and, 114,117,127; Russian amplification of stories likely to increase, 44-46; Russian interference in 2016 US election and, 26, 34, 35, 42; social media filter bubbles and, 127; social media’s exacerbation of, 127-29; in US, as part of larger global polar ization, 126-27 polarization, affective: social media and, 127,128-29; weakening of democracy by, 129 political advertising on social media: and issue advocacy w. express ad vocacy, 225; proposed legislation to regulate, 188,191-92; regulation of, as largely pointless, 191-92; as small part of Russian and Chinese infor mation operations, 188,191, 228 Polyakova, Alina, 43,47 Pompeo, Michael, 8o֊8i popular constitutionalism, 220, 281Ո14 Porter, David, 43 Posobiec, Jack, 45, 61 Post, Robert, 218 321 president, delegation of foreign policy powers to, and Alliance review board, 164-65 Prigozhin, Yevgeniy, 30 privacy and anonymity: clear laws as best protection for, 210; govern ment and social media violations of, 209 privacy and anonymity in transnational regulatory system, 209-15; poten tial increase in, 20, 210; protections against government violations, 21215; protections against social media companies’ violations, 211-12; right to anonymous speech, protection of, 210-11. See also anonymous speech pseudonyms: current policies on, 177; protections for use in registration system, 166,173,177, 212, 232, 234, 240. See also anonymous speech public communication, definition of, importance for transnational regu latory system, 151-52 Putin, Vladimir: and Brexit referen dum, 49, 58; and increased Russian information warfare, 47; meeting with Macron after 2017 election, 60; rise of far-right in Europe as win for, 68, 69, 74; and Russian in terference in 2016 U.S. election, 27; vendetta against Hillary Clinton, 27 Qatar, digital authoritarianism in, 137-+1 Qiaobao, 89 Quan, Jenny, 105 rational basis review, 221 REAL ID Act of 2005: and registration system, 170,171?, 173, 206; undocu mented migrants and, 214 322 INDEX Reddit, US alt-right on, 59 regimes of the world (RoW) system, 7֊8 regions, global: regime types in, as percentage of regimes, 115-16,115í; and regional copycat behavior, 116 registration of social media accounts in transnational regulatory system, 17,146,165-77; and anonymity on social media, protections for, 177; as applicable only to public accounts, 167-68; benefits of, 203-5; blocking of bad actors, and reduced burden on social media companies, 208; chilling effect on free speech, strate gies to mitigate, 20-21; concerns about, as naive, 17-18; costs of implementing, 201; in Defending American Democracy Act (DADA), 216; and duplicate accounts, closing of, 174-75; and duplicate accounts, identification of, 173-74,196,207, 277-78Ո54; exemption for private accounts, 20,146,151-52; and ficti tious user accounts, blocking of, 18, 20,147,165,168-69,171,172,195; and First Amendment issues, 21; grace period for existing accounts, 171; greater effectiveness with increased Alliance membership, 153; and hacked accounts, effectiveness against, 148,196; importance of public messaging strategy, 239; and impostor accounts, 147-48,165,175; and increased cost of creating fake accounts, 20,195-97, 204; informa tion sharing protocols, 172-73; legal permanent residents (LPRs) and, 169,170,171t; and master accounts, limit of one per person, 166-67; master vs. subsidiary accounts, 16667; minors and, 169,171í; national database for, potential political opposition to, 173, 206; national ID cards and, 169-70; as neces sary for effectiveness of system, xii, 18,165,193, 203; number of people to be registered, 202-3; potential loopholes in, 195; purpose of, 165; and required choice of public or private account, 168, 207; security of data on, 173,175-77; as similar to existing licensing requirements, 201-2; six key elements of, 165-66; social media companies’ require ment to share registration data with member state governments, 167, 172; and stolen accounts, effective ness against, 148; undocumented migrants and, 168,170, 214; in US, documents required for, 170,171г; verification of account information, 172-75. See also First Amendment, and registration system registration of social media accounts, data necessary for, 168-72; consis tency across social media compa nies, 170; limits on retention of, 176, 212; for natural persons vs. arti ficial persons, 169; ready availability of, 169—70,195, 205-6; variation by member state, 169,171-72 regulation of internet speech: ample precedent for, 183-84; as necessary for flourishing internet, 184; as rea sonable infringement on individual liberties, 3 regulation of social media: current reactive system, problems with, 187; past proposals’ focus on message content, 17; problems with current system, transnational regulatory system as solution to, 187-88; and rule implementation, necessary INDEX public-private cooperation in, 186-87 regulation of social media, by social media companies; current system of, 184-85; as more like laws than traditional industry regulation, 185-86 regulation of social media, proper mix of public and private regulation in; First Amendment issues and, 186; provision of, by transnational regu latory system, 188; and rulemaking by government as more appropriate in democratic society, 185 rental accounts: as one type of fake social media account, 31-32; in Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 34; transnational regula tory system features to defeat, 148, 178,196; right-wing media: and election of 2020, claimed Democrat voter fraud in, ix; role in disseminating political disinformation, 15 right-wing media ecosystem, U.S.: as cause of polarization, 126; as iso lated and susceptible to misinfor mation, 67; as source of misinfor mation, 203 Roar content farm, 103 Roberts, John, 245 RoW. see regimes of the world (RoW) system RT: and ban on Chinese and Russian state agents, 163-64; dissemina tion of propaganda, 48; and French presidential election of 2017, interference in, 59-60; as global media organization, 49; number of viewers, 49; as propaganda arm of Russia, 49; spreading of incendiary news stories, 44-45 Յ2Յ RT, and Brexit vote interference, 4953; fine for breaching impartiality rules, 50; impact of, 51-53,57-58; monetary value of, 50-51; number of voters reached by, 52-53 Rupdy, and Russian interference in Brexit vote, 52 Russia: difficulty of using information operations against, ш-12,133-34; and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, history of, 71; state-controlled media, potential classification as benign state agents, 163-64. See also Crimea, Russian annexation of Russia, digital authoritarianism: and encrypted data, law requiring government access to, 131; government control over telecommunications infrastructure, 130; and government manipulation of content, 131-32; government monitoring and suppression of dissent, 130; illusion of free discussion created in, 129-30,131; and internet companies’ liability for violations, 131; and Law of Communication, 130; level of restrictions in, 132; protection of those in power as express goal of, 136; and self-censorship, 131; SORM surveillance system and, 130,136; spread to FSU states, 136 Russia, foreign influence operations, forged documents as common tactic in, 71-72 Russia, foreign influence operations in Europe: four types of, 48; RT and Sputnik dissemination of propa ganda, 48; in Sweden and Fin land, goals of, 70; through covert funding of sympathetic people and 324 INDEX Russia (continued) parties, 13,48; through ties with sympathetic political parties, 48. See also Brexit referendum, Russian influence on; Sweden, Russian for eign influence operations in Russia, information operations by: differences from Chinese opera tions, 76, 82; EU failure to impose sanctions for, 190; exploitation of openness of Western democracies, ш-12; US unilateral sanctions for, 190 Russia, information warfare by: disin formation campaigns in Arab states, 138; and fake social media accounts, 43-44; goals of, 4,15; hiring of US journalists to write copy for, 44; improved tactics of, 43-44; limited effect on trust in government, 42-43; names of fake websites, 44; NATO and EU countries affected by, 47,48; and political division, amplification of stories likely to increase, 44-46; removal of EU sanctions as goal of, 47-48; as significant threat to US, 14; since 2016,43-46; social media and, 48; as threat to democracies worldwide, x; as warfare by political means, 1415; weakening of EU and NATO as goal of, 47, 58 Russian election interference: direct, 13; history of, 25; Obama sanctions against, 189 Russian election interference in 2020, +4 Russian hackers, identity theft by, 34 Russian interference in 2016 U.S. elec tion, 24-26, 30-37; agenda-setting by, 39; and Black vote, suppression of, 36, 41-42; boosting Trump as goal of, 26, 27,34,37; dumping of hacked information about Clin ton, 13, 25, 27-30,39; Facebook’s response to, 186-87; framing of public discussion by, 39; goals of, 25, 26-27; government reports on, 24-25; harming Clinton cam paign as goal of, 27, 34,36,38-43; increased intensity over past efforts, 25; increased political division as goal of, 26, 34,35,42; number of voters reached by, 53; Putin’s ordering of, 27; and reweighting of communications environment, 39֊ 40; Russian company responsible for, 30; social media operations, 25, 26, 31; sowing of doubts about integrity of election process, 199; Stein candidacy and, 24,36, 41-42; voter suppression efforts, 36,41-42, 229; voters’ vulnerability to, 40-41. See also Internet Research Agency (IRA) Russian interference in 2016 U.S. elec tion, fake social media accounts in: attacks on Clinton, 33; bots, 33-34; dissemination of disinformation, 34; fictitious user accounts, number of, 24,32-33; groups targeted in, 35; impostor accounts, 33; messages sent from, 24, 32-33; messaging strategies, 34-37; misinformation on how to vote, 35-36; names of fake accounts, 35; number of fake ac counts, 24, 26,31; number of posts generated, 191-92; number of social media users viewing content from, 31, 32, 35; political rallies organized by, 37; as primary activity, 188; rental accounts, 34; retweets of con- INDEX tent by Trump campaign officials, 33; stolen accounts, 34; types used, 32-34; voter suppression messages, 36 Russian interference in 201Ó U.S. elec tion, likely impact of: responsibil ity for Trump victory, 26, 38-42, 199; studies on, 37-42; success in increasing polarization, 42 Salvini, Matteo, 126-27 sanctions in regulation of social media, 188-91; expressive value of, 188; ineffectiveness of, 188-91, 203 Sanders campaign: Russian impos tor account mimicking, 43-44; Russian support for, to undermine Clinton, 36; spread of misinforma tion by supporters of, 45 Saudi Arabia: and digital authori tarianism, 137-41; and information warfare, 13-14 self-regulation of social media: as government by unelected rulers, 7; as inadequate, 3,4, 6,114 Semptian, 109 September nth terrorist attacks, restrictions on US Muslims follow ing, 14 Settle, Jaime, 128 shared reference points based on accu rate information: erosion through cognitive polarization, 127; erosion through OSM, 129; as necessary for democracy, 126 Shorten, Bill, 105 Sina Weibo: number of users, 275Ո8; transnational regulatory system and, 151,162, 276Ո24; use within China, 5 325 Sitaraman, Ganesh, 244 smart city technologies, 85, 86 Snowden, Edward, 209, 235 social media: autocratic rulers’ use for surveillance purposes, 1089; banning of Alex Jones from, 124; and China’s state-run media, followers of, 90-91, 91í; companies selling technology to monitor users on, 108-9; dominance of US platforms, as potential strategic advantage, 6; and election of 2020, claimed Democrat voter fraud in, ix; facilitation of authoritarian government by, 134; fake accounts, types of, 31-32; and filter bubbles, 127; government regulation of, as potential strategic advantage, 6; information warfare on, 5; political communication on, exacerba tion of polarization by, 127-29; unrestricted access by Russia and China, as problematic, 5 social media, undermining of de mocracy by: scholarship on, 117; through increased polarization, 117; through increased spread of misinformation and disinformation, 117,123-24 social media companies: costs imposed on, by transnational regulatory system, 21-22, 207-9; current reac tive regulation system, problems with, 187, 204; and fake accounts, inability to detect, 178-79; legal immunity regarding user content, 184; regulation of internet speech, 184-85; and surveillance capital ism, 108; Type A and В platforms, 168,208; violations of privacy and anonymity, protections against in 32б INDEX social media companies (continued) registration system, 211-12. See also self-regulation of social media social media platforms: in China, 8687; definition of, importance for transnational regulatory system, 151 South Africa, democratic decay, 10, 118-19, 260Ш8, 272Ո9 South China Sea, China’s aggression in, 80 Sputnik: Alliance for Democracy and, 163-64; covert operation of Face book accounts, 53-54; dissemina tion of propaganda, 48; as multi media news agency, 49; negative coverage of NATO and EU, 70; as propaganda arm of Russia, 49 Sputnik, and Brexit vote, interference in, 49-53; impact of, 51-53, 57-58; monetary value of, 50-51; number of voters reached by, 52 Sputnik, and French presidential elec tion of 2017: barring from Macron’s campaign headquarters, 60; govern ment warning for distribution of false polls, 60; interference in, 59-60 Stanford Internet Observatory, 79,103 Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 222 Stein, Jill, and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 24, 36, 41-42 stolen accounts: as more difficult to detect than fictitious user accounts, 43; as one type of fake social media account, 31; in Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 34; Russians’ increased use of, 43; transnational regulatory system features to defeat, 147-48 Sunstein, Cass, 184, 218, 281П2 Supreme Court: on Constitution as inapplicable in other countries, 222; Fourteenth Amendment jurispru dence, 221; on internet as important place for speech, 242; and Madi sonian vs. libertarian interpretation of Constitution, 217; on right to anonymous speech, 210 Suriname, democratic decay, 118-19, 272Ո9 surveillance technology: China’s export of, to authoritarian re gimes, 82, 85-86,106,107-8,109; countries with firms selling, 107; and increased longevity of authori tarian regimes, 107-8,114,137,141; smart city technologies, 85, 86; usefulness of, with proper legal constraints, 85,107. See also digital authoritarianism Sweden: anti-information warfare measures in, 73; and foreign interference, lack of laws restricting, 74; growing ideological divide in, 74; joining of EU, 69; and junk news, 73, 74; political parties in, 68-69; rise of far right in, 68-69, 70, 74 Sweden, and NATO cooperation: as response to Russian aggression, 69; Russian foreign influence opera tions to undermine, 70, 72-73, 75; Russian opposition to, 69-70 Sweden, Russian foreign influence operations in: cyber attacks, 70-71; goals, 70, 74; as hybrid warfare, 71; lack of hard evidence on, 72; stir ring of anti-immigrant sentiment, 70; tools used in, 71-72; types of, 71; undermining of support for NATO and EU as goal of, 70, 7273,74 Swedish Defense Research Agency, study on Twitter bots, 72 INDEX Swedish elections of 2018: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on Social Democratic Party shortly before, 71; immigration as key issue in, 70; and rise of far right, 68-69, 70; Sweden’s anti-information warfare measures and, 74 Swedish elections of 2018, Russian interference in: and social media, high level of junk news shared on, 72-73; and sowing of doubts about integrity of election process, 199; use of bots on Twitter, 72 Swedish Institute of International Af fairs, study of Sputnik’s NATO and EU coverage, 70 Syria, digital authoritarianism in, 137-41 Szefemaker, Pawel, 121 Taiwan: Chinese takeover, as chronic threat, 100; difficulty separating Chinese influence from local views, 102; media outlets in, China friendly owners of, 102; social media, influence of Taiwanese vs. Chinese media on, 102; social me dia, popularity of, 100 Taiwan, Chinese interference in: and content farms used to spread disin formation, 102-3; election interfer ence, 100-103, 201; exposure of, in election of 2020,101; through fake social media accounts, 92 TalkWalker, 63 TenCent, 85, 86 TikTok: banning of, by Trump admin istration, 87; division into domestic and foreign platforms, 163; number of users, 86; as tool for Chinese propaganda, 86-87; transnational regulatory system and, 150,151 Յ27 transnational regulatory system: and bots and cyborg accounts, measures against, 149,179-81,197-98, 204; broad range of OSM and FIOs ad dressed by, 22; central elements of, 16-17,145-46; circumvention strat egies, effectiveness against, 147-51, 194-98; and domestic misinforma tion, 205; effectiveness against in formation warfare, 194-98, 204; ef fectiveness in reducing democratic decay, 198-201; and fake foreign national accounts, measures against, 148-49,178-79,197; focus on re stricting dangerous speakers rather than harmful speech, 17,18-19; free speech protections in, 16,145; goals of, 145,177; improving attack defense ratio through, 20,187; and other types of FIOs, usefulness in combating, 205; and privacy laws to prevent government monitoring of social media accounts, 176; and public communication, impor tance of defining, 151-52; rental accounts, measures against, 148, 178,196; restrictions in, as neces sary to defend against information warfare, 6,18, 21; and social media platform, importance of defining, 151; social media platforms subject to, 150,151,198, 208-9, 276Ո24; as solution to problems of current reactive social media regulation system, 187-88; and useful idiot problem, xi-xii, 150; WeChat and, 151,163,198, 201. See also ban on social media accounts for Chinese and Russian state agents; costs and benefits of transnational regula tory system; disclaimer regime for social media electoral speech from 328 INDEX transnational regulatory system {continued) nondemocratic countries; informa tion privacy and data security mea sures in transnational regulatory system; registration of social media accounts in transnational regulatory system Trend Micro, 61-62 Trump, Donald: approval rating for, Democrats vs. Republicans, 42; banning from social media, 114; boosting of, as goal of Russian election interference in 2016, 26, 27, 34, 37; campaign of 2016, Facebook data used in, 209; and election of 2020, claimed Democrat voter fraud in, ix; Facebook and Twitter’s labeling of false statements by, 187,193; influence on Republican Party, and DADA, 216; as source of disinformation, 199; as useful idiot, xi-xii, 150; and US loss of moral standing, 153; victory in 2016 election, and dramatic democratic decay, 199; and Washington Post’s publication of Access Hollywood tape, 39 Trump, Donald Jr., retweets by, 45 Trump administration: banning of TikTok and WeChat, 87,163; citi zenship question on census, chilling effect of, 236-37; criminal charges against Chinese agents for cyber espionage, 188-89; and Customs and Border Protection collection of data on immigration activists, 209; states’ refusal to share motor vehicle databases with, 214; with drawal from UN Human Rights Council, 78 trust in government, limited effect of Russian information warfare on, 42-43 Tsai Ing-wen, 100-101,103 Tunisia, increase in democracy, 10 Turkey: democratic decay, 10, 260Ո18; as unsuitable for Alliance member ship, 155 Twitter: banning of Trump, 114; bots and, 33-34; China’s blocking of, 90,162; and China’s fake accounts, removal of, 93, 96; and China’s state-run media, followers of, 90, 91t; China’s use of purchased or stolen accounts, 94; Chinese diplo mats’ accounts on, 91; Chinese state media on, 200-201; fake Chinese accounts on, removal of, 19,103; fictitious user accounts on, 19; in France, small number of users, 62; inadequate regulation by, 114; indi vidual’s multiple accounts allowed on, 166; information warfare on, 3, 5, 26; IRA accounts exposed by, 54; labeling of false claims by Trump, 187; public vs. private accounts on, 167; regulation of speech by, 184-85; removal of fake accounts in Arab states, 137; required personal information to open account, 168; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 28, 33, 34-36, 38, 40,191; Russian fictitious user accounts in 2016 U.S. election, 26; and Russian foreign influence operations in Sweden, 71; and Rus sian interference in 2017 French presidential election, 61, 62, 63-64; and Russian interference in 2018 Swedish elections, 72-73; and Rus sian interference in Brexit vote, 52; INDEX Russian spread of incendiary news stories on, 44-45; in Sweden, high levels of junk news on, 73, 74; and TalkWalker, 63; as unelected regula tor of speech on social media, 7; use by Russians to hire US journalists to write copy, 44 UFWD. See United Front Work Department undocumented migrants, and registra tion system and, 168,170, 214, 237 United Arab Emirates (UAE), digital authoritarianism in, 137-41 United Front system [China], 87-89; and China’s Belt and Road Initia tive, promotion of, 88; control of Chinese communities abroad as goal of, 88; definition of, 82; as large global network, 87; operations in Britain, 88-89; range of espio nage and information operations conducted by, 87-88 United Front Work Department (UFWD): operation of China News Service, 89; operations in Britain, 88-89; as owner of China News Service, 83-84 United Nations: and China’s crack down on Hong Kong, 77-79; US withdrawal from Human Rights Council, 78 United States: democratic decay, 118; democratic process, undermin ing of, as goal of Russian election interference, 25, 26, 27; information operations, ineffectiveness against Russia and China, 133-34; moral standing, Trump’s damage to, 153; and need for information sharing with EU, 75; polarization in, as part Յ29 of larger global polarization, 12627; reputation, harming of, as goal of Russian election interference, 27 University of Edinburgh, investigation of Russian interference in Brexit vote, 54 Usedom, Rachel, 34 useful idiots: definition of, xi; transna tional regulatory system and, xi-xii, 150; Trump as, xi-xii, 150 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database: liberal democracy variable in, decline with OSM use, 118-20, 120/; measure of democratic regime stability, 155; on regime types as per centage of all regimes, by region, 115-16, 115г, RoW country classifica tions and, 7,10; states included and excluded, vs. UN member states, 116; on Trump’s damage to democ racy, 199 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, 100 Venezuela, and information warfare, 13-14 VK: number of users, 275Ո8; transna tional regulatory system and, 151, 162, 276Ո24; use within Russia, 5 Wall Street Journal, 91í Wang Liqiang, 92, ιοί, 102,103 Wang Yang, 87 Want Want China Holdings, 102 Washington Post, 39 WeChat, 103-5; accounts ran by China News Service, 89; Chinese surveil lance of users, 104,130; as “digital bedrock of Chinese society,” 86; government censorship on, 104-5; influence operations in numerous 330 INDEX WeChat (continued) countries, 89; number of users, 86,103,163, 275Ո9; transnational regulatory system and, 151,163,198, 201; Trump administration banning of, 87,163; use by Chinese agents, 5; use by Chinese diaspora, 103-4; use by Western politidans to com municate with members of Chinese diaspora, 105 Weiss, Jessica Chen, 81 whack-a-troll problem, 19,187 WikiLeaks;; and Russian interference in 2016 U.S. election, 29; spread of disinformation about Macron, 61; and 2016 U.S. election, 13,39 William-Yulee v. Florida Bar (2015), 245 Wired magazine, 54 Woods, Andrew, 184,186 World Bank government effectiveness indicator: and Alliance for Democ racy membership, 154-56; factors measured in, 276Ш3 Wuerth, Ingrid, 244 Xi Jinping, aggressiveness of China under, 80 Xinhua News Agency, 83,97-98, no Yemen, digital authoritarianism in, 137 YouTube: China’s blocking of, 90; and China’s state-run media, followers of, 90, 91t-, fake Chinese accounts on, 93,103; information warfare on, 5, 26; popularity in Taiwan, 100; regulation of speech by, 184-85; and Russian interference in 2016 US election, 31, 36; and Russian interference in Brexit vote, 52; and TalkWalker, 63 Zhao Lijian, 91 Zimbabwe: and social media, efforts to control and police, 86; use of Chinese surveillance technology, 85-86 ZTE, in Zimbabwe, 86 Zuckerberg, Mark, 7
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author	Sloss, David 1957-
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author_facet	Sloss, David 1957-
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ctrlnum	(OCoLC)1314903736 (DE-599)BVBBV048196885
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format	Book
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Sloss</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Stanford, California</subfield><subfield code="b">Stanford University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">[2022]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xvii, 330 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen, Diagramme</subfield><subfield code="c">24 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Stanford studies in law and politics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references and index</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">""This book explains how Russia and China weaponize social media and how to protect Western democracies from information warfare. When Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram were first introduced to the public, their mission was simple: they were designed to help people become more connected to each other. Social media became a thriving digital space by giving its users the freedom to share whatever they wanted with their friends and followers. Unfortunately, these same digital tools are also easy to manipulate. As exemplified by Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, authoritarian states can exploit social media to interfere with democratic governance in open societies. Tyrants on Twitter is the first detailed analysis of how Chinese and Russian agents weaponize Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube to subvert the liberal international order. In addition to the 2016 U.S. election, David L. Sloss explores Russia's use of foreign influence operations to threaten democracies in Europe, as well as China's use of social media and other digital tools to meddle in Western democracies and buttress autocratic rulers around the world. Sloss calls for cooperation among democratic governments to create a new transnational system for regulating social media to protect Western democracies from information warfare. Drawing on his professional experience as an arms control negotiator, he outlines a novel system of transnational governance that Western democracies can enforce by harmonizing their domestic regulations. And drawing on his academic expertise in constitutional law, he explains why that system--if implemented by legislation in the United States--would be constitutionally defensible, despite likely First Amendment objections. 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geographic	Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd Westliche Welt (DE-588)4079237-7 gnd China (DE-588)4009937-4 gnd
geographic_facet	Russland Westliche Welt China
id	DE-604.BV048196885
illustrated	Illustrated
index_date	2024-07-03T19:45:28Z
indexdate	2024-07-10T09:31:43Z
institution	BVB
isbn	9781503628441
language	English
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033577986
oclc_num	1314903736
open_access_boolean
owner	DE-188 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-M382 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-739 DE-12 DE-706
owner_facet	DE-188 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-M382 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-739 DE-12 DE-706
physical	xvii, 330 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme 24 cm
psigel	BSB_NED_20230118
publishDate	2022
publishDateSearch	2022
publishDateSort	2022
publisher	Stanford University Press
record_format	marc
series2	Stanford studies in law and politics
spelling	Sloss, David 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)1013329392 aut Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare David L. Sloss Stanford, California Stanford University Press [2022] xvii, 330 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Stanford studies in law and politics Includes bibliographical references and index ""This book explains how Russia and China weaponize social media and how to protect Western democracies from information warfare. When Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram were first introduced to the public, their mission was simple: they were designed to help people become more connected to each other. Social media became a thriving digital space by giving its users the freedom to share whatever they wanted with their friends and followers. Unfortunately, these same digital tools are also easy to manipulate. As exemplified by Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, authoritarian states can exploit social media to interfere with democratic governance in open societies. Tyrants on Twitter is the first detailed analysis of how Chinese and Russian agents weaponize Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube to subvert the liberal international order. In addition to the 2016 U.S. election, David L. Sloss explores Russia's use of foreign influence operations to threaten democracies in Europe, as well as China's use of social media and other digital tools to meddle in Western democracies and buttress autocratic rulers around the world. Sloss calls for cooperation among democratic governments to create a new transnational system for regulating social media to protect Western democracies from information warfare. Drawing on his professional experience as an arms control negotiator, he outlines a novel system of transnational governance that Western democracies can enforce by harmonizing their domestic regulations. And drawing on his academic expertise in constitutional law, he explains why that system--if implemented by legislation in the United States--would be constitutionally defensible, despite likely First Amendment objections. With its critical examination of information warfare and its proposal for practical legislative solutions to fight back, this book is essential reading [...]." Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd rswk-swf Social Media (DE-588)4639271-3 gnd rswk-swf Einflussnahme (DE-588)4131701-4 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Westliche Welt (DE-588)4079237-7 gnd rswk-swf China (DE-588)4009937-4 gnd rswk-swf Social media / Political aspects / Western countries Social media / Government policy / Western countries Social media / Law and legislation / Western countries Information warfare / Political aspects Information warfare / Russia (Federation) Information warfare / China Democracy / Western countries Social media / Law and legislation Social media / Political aspects China Russia (Federation) Western countries Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g China (DE-588)4009937-4 g Social Media (DE-588)4639271-3 s Einflussnahme (DE-588)4131701-4 s Westliche Welt (DE-588)4079237-7 g Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, EPUB 978-1-5036-3115-1 (DE-604)BV048287651 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033577986&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033577986&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033577986&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Register // Gemischte Register
spellingShingle	Sloss, David 1957- Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Social Media (DE-588)4639271-3 gnd Einflussnahme (DE-588)4131701-4 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4046514-7 (DE-588)4639271-3 (DE-588)4131701-4 (DE-588)4076899-5 (DE-588)4079237-7 (DE-588)4009937-4
title	Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare
title_auth	Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare
title_exact_search	Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare
title_exact_search_txtP	Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare
title_full	Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare David L. Sloss
title_fullStr	Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare David L. Sloss
title_full_unstemmed	Tyrants on Twitter protecting democracies from information warfare David L. Sloss
title_short	Tyrants on Twitter
title_sort	tyrants on twitter protecting democracies from information warfare
title_sub	protecting democracies from information warfare
topic	Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Social Media (DE-588)4639271-3 gnd Einflussnahme (DE-588)4131701-4 gnd
topic_facet	Politik Social Media Einflussnahme Russland Westliche Welt China
url	http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033577986&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033577986&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033577986&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
work_keys_str_mv	AT slossdavid tyrantsontwitterprotectingdemocraciesfrominformationwarfare

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