Who's to blame for Greece?: life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth
This expanded and enlarged third edition of Theodore Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos’ popular Who’s to Blame for Greece?covers almost a decade of Greece's economic crisis from 2009 to 2019, as well as recent developments in the first months of 2020. It provides an overview of recent developme...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cham
Palgrave Macmillan
[2021]
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Ausgabe: | Third edition |
Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | This expanded and enlarged third edition of Theodore Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos’ popular Who’s to Blame for Greece?covers almost a decade of Greece's economic crisis from 2009 to 2019, as well as recent developments in the first months of 2020. It provides an overview of recent developments in the Greek economy and outlines the most important obstacles to a return to robust and sustainable growth rates. It considers the new optimism being developed in Greece after the crisis, but also the policy challenges facing Greece emanating from a deeply hurt economy in the aftermath of the crisis and the structural problems that persist. The book covers the most recent issues that affect the Greek economy including, the migration crisis at the borders with Turkey as well as a faltering global economy hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. This book will appeal to researchers, practitioners and policy makers interested in the EU and the political economy of Greece and offers valuable updates on the second edition |
Beschreibung: | xxiii, 432 Seiten Diagramme, Karte 21,7 cm |
ISBN: | 9783030640804 |
Internformat
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505 | 8 | |a 1. Introduction -- Part I. The "Party Period" Before the Crisis -- 2. The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-crisis Debate -- 3. Greece Before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics -- 4. IMF and EU Reports on Greece -- Part II Greece’s Free Fall 2010–2013 -- 5. The Troika Period Reconsidered -- 6. Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) Since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty -- Part III. Looking Ahead -- 7. Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-Start an Export-Led Growth? -- 8. Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed: Think About the Private Sector, for a Change -- 9. Structural Differences Ensure Permanent Shock Trends That Play into the Above. A Closer and More Democratic Union to Heal Economic Asymmetries and Help Southern European Countries Such as Greece -- Part IV. How Populism (2015–2017) Destroyed a Country with High Potential -- 10. The Rise of Populism in Greece and the Impact on the Economy -- 11. Latest Developments as of December 2017 Developments -- 12. Conclusions -- Part V. Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 13. How "More Europe" Can Heal the Current Institutional Divergence Hurting in Particular Weaker Member States Like Greece -- 14. From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy -- 15. In Defense of Manufacturing -- 16. Greece’s Comparative Advantage as China’s Backdoor to Europe -- 17. Taxing Ourselves to Death: Greece’s Tax Regulations -- 18. How to Finance a Tax Wedge Cut in a Way That Supports Work and Families -- 19. The Greek Economy After Populism: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 20. Final Remarks | |
520 | 3 | |a This expanded and enlarged third edition of Theodore Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos’ popular Who’s to Blame for Greece?covers almost a decade of Greece's economic crisis from 2009 to 2019, as well as recent developments in the first months of 2020. It provides an overview of recent developments in the Greek economy and outlines the most important obstacles to a return to robust and sustainable growth rates. It considers the new optimism being developed in Greece after the crisis, but also the policy challenges facing Greece emanating from a deeply hurt economy in the aftermath of the crisis and the structural problems that persist. The book covers the most recent issues that affect the Greek economy including, the migration crisis at the borders with Turkey as well as a faltering global economy hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. This book will appeal to researchers, practitioners and policy makers interested in the EU and the political economy of Greece and offers valuable updates on the second edition | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | |
adam_txt | |
any_adam_object | |
any_adam_object_boolean | |
author | Pelagidēs, Thodōrēs Mētsopulos, Michalēs 20./21. Jh |
author_GND | (DE-588)142586366 (DE-588)142586447 |
author_facet | Pelagidēs, Thodōrēs Mētsopulos, Michalēs 20./21. Jh |
author_role | aut aut |
author_sort | Pelagidēs, Thodōrēs |
author_variant | t p tp m m mm |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV047959997 |
contents | 1. Introduction -- Part I. The "Party Period" Before the Crisis -- 2. The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-crisis Debate -- 3. Greece Before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics -- 4. IMF and EU Reports on Greece -- Part II Greece’s Free Fall 2010–2013 -- 5. The Troika Period Reconsidered -- 6. Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) Since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty -- Part III. Looking Ahead -- 7. Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-Start an Export-Led Growth? -- 8. Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed: Think About the Private Sector, for a Change -- 9. Structural Differences Ensure Permanent Shock Trends That Play into the Above. A Closer and More Democratic Union to Heal Economic Asymmetries and Help Southern European Countries Such as Greece -- Part IV. How Populism (2015–2017) Destroyed a Country with High Potential -- 10. The Rise of Populism in Greece and the Impact on the Economy -- 11. Latest Developments as of December 2017 Developments -- 12. Conclusions -- Part V. Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 13. How "More Europe" Can Heal the Current Institutional Divergence Hurting in Particular Weaker Member States Like Greece -- 14. From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy -- 15. In Defense of Manufacturing -- 16. Greece’s Comparative Advantage as China’s Backdoor to Europe -- 17. Taxing Ourselves to Death: Greece’s Tax Regulations -- 18. How to Finance a Tax Wedge Cut in a Way That Supports Work and Families -- 19. The Greek Economy After Populism: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 20. Final Remarks |
ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV047959997 |
edition | Third edition |
format | Book |
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geographic | Griechenland (DE-588)4022047-3 gnd Eurozone (DE-588)7553526-9 gnd |
geographic_facet | Griechenland Eurozone |
id | DE-604.BV047959997 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T19:40:13Z |
indexdate | 2025-01-02T13:17:54Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9783030640804 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033341206 |
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owner | DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
owner_facet | DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
physical | xxiii, 432 Seiten Diagramme, Karte 21,7 cm |
psigel | BSB_NED_20230616 |
publishDate | 2021 |
publishDateSearch | 2021 |
publishDateSort | 2021 |
publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Pelagidēs, Thodōrēs Verfasser (DE-588)142586366 aut Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth Theodore Pelagidis, Michael Mitsopoulos Third edition Cham Palgrave Macmillan [2021] xxiii, 432 Seiten Diagramme, Karte 21,7 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier 1. Introduction -- Part I. The "Party Period" Before the Crisis -- 2. The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-crisis Debate -- 3. Greece Before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics -- 4. IMF and EU Reports on Greece -- Part II Greece’s Free Fall 2010–2013 -- 5. The Troika Period Reconsidered -- 6. Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) Since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty -- Part III. Looking Ahead -- 7. Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-Start an Export-Led Growth? -- 8. Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed: Think About the Private Sector, for a Change -- 9. Structural Differences Ensure Permanent Shock Trends That Play into the Above. A Closer and More Democratic Union to Heal Economic Asymmetries and Help Southern European Countries Such as Greece -- Part IV. How Populism (2015–2017) Destroyed a Country with High Potential -- 10. The Rise of Populism in Greece and the Impact on the Economy -- 11. Latest Developments as of December 2017 Developments -- 12. Conclusions -- Part V. Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 13. How "More Europe" Can Heal the Current Institutional Divergence Hurting in Particular Weaker Member States Like Greece -- 14. From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy -- 15. In Defense of Manufacturing -- 16. Greece’s Comparative Advantage as China’s Backdoor to Europe -- 17. Taxing Ourselves to Death: Greece’s Tax Regulations -- 18. How to Finance a Tax Wedge Cut in a Way That Supports Work and Families -- 19. The Greek Economy After Populism: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 20. Final Remarks This expanded and enlarged third edition of Theodore Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos’ popular Who’s to Blame for Greece?covers almost a decade of Greece's economic crisis from 2009 to 2019, as well as recent developments in the first months of 2020. It provides an overview of recent developments in the Greek economy and outlines the most important obstacles to a return to robust and sustainable growth rates. It considers the new optimism being developed in Greece after the crisis, but also the policy challenges facing Greece emanating from a deeply hurt economy in the aftermath of the crisis and the structural problems that persist. The book covers the most recent issues that affect the Greek economy including, the migration crisis at the borders with Turkey as well as a faltering global economy hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. This book will appeal to researchers, practitioners and policy makers interested in the EU and the political economy of Greece and offers valuable updates on the second edition Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd rswk-swf Makroökonomie (DE-588)4037174-8 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftskrise (DE-588)4066466-1 gnd rswk-swf Finanzkrise (DE-588)7635855-0 gnd rswk-swf Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd rswk-swf Fiskalpolitik (DE-588)4071234-5 gnd rswk-swf Griechenland (DE-588)4022047-3 gnd rswk-swf Eurozone (DE-588)7553526-9 gnd rswk-swf Staatsbankrott / (DE-627)091391296 / (DE-2867)19379-3 Finanzpolitik / (DE-627)09135997X / (DE-2867)11728-2 Finanzkrise / (DE-627)091359945 / (DE-2867)19664-4 Wirtschaftskrise / (DE-627)091401062 / (DE-2867)10343-6 Wirtschaftspolitik / (DE-627)091401143 / (DE-2867)10987-4 Geldpolitik / (DE-627)09136230X / (DE-2867)10382-3 Eurozone / (DE-627)091358566 / (DE-2867)19336-0 Griechenland / (DE-627)091364418 / (DE-2867)17184-0 EU-Staaten / (DE-627)091358639 / (DE-2867)17983-5 Griechenland (DE-588)4022047-3 g Fiskalpolitik (DE-588)4071234-5 s Wirtschaftskrise (DE-588)4066466-1 s Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b Eurozone (DE-588)7553526-9 g Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 s DE-604 Makroökonomie (DE-588)4037174-8 s Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 s Finanzkrise (DE-588)7635855-0 s Mētsopulos, Michalēs 20./21. Jh. Verfasser (DE-588)142586447 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-3-030-64081-1 |
spellingShingle | Pelagidēs, Thodōrēs Mētsopulos, Michalēs 20./21. Jh Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth 1. Introduction -- Part I. The "Party Period" Before the Crisis -- 2. The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-crisis Debate -- 3. Greece Before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics -- 4. IMF and EU Reports on Greece -- Part II Greece’s Free Fall 2010–2013 -- 5. The Troika Period Reconsidered -- 6. Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) Since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty -- Part III. Looking Ahead -- 7. Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-Start an Export-Led Growth? -- 8. Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed: Think About the Private Sector, for a Change -- 9. Structural Differences Ensure Permanent Shock Trends That Play into the Above. A Closer and More Democratic Union to Heal Economic Asymmetries and Help Southern European Countries Such as Greece -- Part IV. How Populism (2015–2017) Destroyed a Country with High Potential -- 10. The Rise of Populism in Greece and the Impact on the Economy -- 11. Latest Developments as of December 2017 Developments -- 12. Conclusions -- Part V. Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 13. How "More Europe" Can Heal the Current Institutional Divergence Hurting in Particular Weaker Member States Like Greece -- 14. From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy -- 15. In Defense of Manufacturing -- 16. Greece’s Comparative Advantage as China’s Backdoor to Europe -- 17. Taxing Ourselves to Death: Greece’s Tax Regulations -- 18. How to Finance a Tax Wedge Cut in a Way That Supports Work and Families -- 19. The Greek Economy After Populism: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 20. Final Remarks Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd Makroökonomie (DE-588)4037174-8 gnd Wirtschaftskrise (DE-588)4066466-1 gnd Finanzkrise (DE-588)7635855-0 gnd Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd Fiskalpolitik (DE-588)4071234-5 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)4066493-4 (DE-588)4037174-8 (DE-588)4066466-1 (DE-588)7635855-0 (DE-588)4017214-4 (DE-588)4071234-5 (DE-588)4022047-3 (DE-588)7553526-9 |
title | Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth |
title_auth | Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth |
title_exact_search | Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth |
title_exact_search_txtP | Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth |
title_full | Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth Theodore Pelagidis, Michael Mitsopoulos |
title_fullStr | Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth Theodore Pelagidis, Michael Mitsopoulos |
title_full_unstemmed | Who's to blame for Greece? life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth Theodore Pelagidis, Michael Mitsopoulos |
title_short | Who's to blame for Greece? |
title_sort | who s to blame for greece life after bankruptcy between optimism and substandard growth |
title_sub | life after bankruptcy: between optimism and substandard growth |
topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd Makroökonomie (DE-588)4037174-8 gnd Wirtschaftskrise (DE-588)4066466-1 gnd Finanzkrise (DE-588)7635855-0 gnd Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd Fiskalpolitik (DE-588)4071234-5 gnd |
topic_facet | Europäische Union Wirtschaftspolitik Makroökonomie Wirtschaftskrise Finanzkrise Finanzwirtschaft Fiskalpolitik Griechenland Eurozone |
work_keys_str_mv | AT pelagidesthodores whostoblameforgreecelifeafterbankruptcybetweenoptimismandsubstandardgrowth AT metsopulosmichales whostoblameforgreecelifeafterbankruptcybetweenoptimismandsubstandardgrowth |