Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter: Some empirical evidence
What are the economic effects of implicit bank debt guarantees and who ultimately benefits from them? This paper finds that "financial excesses" - situations where bank credit reaches levels that reduce economic growth - have been stronger in OECD countries characterised by larger values o...
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| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
| Format: | Elektronisch Buchkapitel |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2015
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-384 DE-473 DE-824 DE-29 DE-739 DE-355 DE-20 DE-1028 DE-1049 DE-521 DE-861 DE-898 DE-92 DE-91 DE-573 DE-19 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | What are the economic effects of implicit bank debt guarantees and who ultimately benefits from them? This paper finds that "financial excesses" - situations where bank credit reaches levels that reduce economic growth - have been stronger in OECD countries characterised by larger values of implicit guarantees and where bank creditors have not incurred losses in bank failure resolution cases. Also, implicit bank debt guarantees benefit financial sector employees and other high-income earners in two ways, increasing income inequality. First, implicit guarantees are likely to raise financial sector pay. This is consistent with the observation of "financial sector wage premia", or financial sector employees earning in excess of their profile in terms of age, education and other characteristics. Second, implicit guarantees are likely to result in more and cheaper bank lending. If so, well-off people tend to benefit relatively more since household credit is more unequally distributed than income. JEL classification: D63, E43, G21, G28, O47 Keywords: Bank funding costs, implicit guarantees for bank debt, bank failure resolution, finance and growth, finance and income inequality |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (26 Seiten) 21 x 28cm |
| DOI: | 10.1787/fmt-2014-5js3bfznx6vj |
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| 520 | |a What are the economic effects of implicit bank debt guarantees and who ultimately benefits from them? This paper finds that "financial excesses" - situations where bank credit reaches levels that reduce economic growth - have been stronger in OECD countries characterised by larger values of implicit guarantees and where bank creditors have not incurred losses in bank failure resolution cases. Also, implicit bank debt guarantees benefit financial sector employees and other high-income earners in two ways, increasing income inequality. First, implicit guarantees are likely to raise financial sector pay. This is consistent with the observation of "financial sector wage premia", or financial sector employees earning in excess of their profile in terms of age, education and other characteristics. Second, implicit guarantees are likely to result in more and cheaper bank lending. If so, well-off people tend to benefit relatively more since household credit is more unequally distributed than income. JEL classification: D63, E43, G21, G28, O47 Keywords: Bank funding costs, implicit guarantees for bank debt, bank failure resolution, finance and growth, finance and income inequality | ||
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| spelling | Denk, Oliver Verfasser aut Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence Oliver Denk, Sebastian Schich and Boris Cournède Paris OECD Publishing 2015 1 Online-Ressource (26 Seiten) 21 x 28cm txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier What are the economic effects of implicit bank debt guarantees and who ultimately benefits from them? This paper finds that "financial excesses" - situations where bank credit reaches levels that reduce economic growth - have been stronger in OECD countries characterised by larger values of implicit guarantees and where bank creditors have not incurred losses in bank failure resolution cases. Also, implicit bank debt guarantees benefit financial sector employees and other high-income earners in two ways, increasing income inequality. First, implicit guarantees are likely to raise financial sector pay. This is consistent with the observation of "financial sector wage premia", or financial sector employees earning in excess of their profile in terms of age, education and other characteristics. Second, implicit guarantees are likely to result in more and cheaper bank lending. If so, well-off people tend to benefit relatively more since household credit is more unequally distributed than income. JEL classification: D63, E43, G21, G28, O47 Keywords: Bank funding costs, implicit guarantees for bank debt, bank failure resolution, finance and growth, finance and income inequality Finance and Investment Economics Schich, Sebastian ctb Cournède, Boris ctb https://doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2014-5js3bfznx6vj Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Denk, Oliver Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence Finance and Investment Economics |
| title | Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence |
| title_auth | Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence |
| title_exact_search | Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence |
| title_full | Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence Oliver Denk, Sebastian Schich and Boris Cournède |
| title_fullStr | Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence Oliver Denk, Sebastian Schich and Boris Cournède |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter Some empirical evidence Oliver Denk, Sebastian Schich and Boris Cournède |
| title_short | Why implicit bank debt guarantees matter |
| title_sort | why implicit bank debt guarantees matter some empirical evidence |
| title_sub | Some empirical evidence |
| topic | Finance and Investment Economics |
| topic_facet | Finance and Investment Economics |
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