Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments:
Sub-central tax competition is the strategic interaction of tax policy between jurisdictions with the objective to attract and retain mobile tax bases. The views on tax competition differ widely: while some consider that tax competition brings sub-central fiscal policy closer to citizen?s preference...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2011
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| Schriftenreihe: | OECD Economics Department Working Papers
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Sub-central tax competition is the strategic interaction of tax policy between jurisdictions with the objective to attract and retain mobile tax bases. The views on tax competition differ widely: while some consider that tax competition brings sub-central fiscal policy closer to citizen?s preferences, increases the efficiency of the public sector and avoids tax and spending excesses, others argue that tax competition leads to a distorted tax structure, to growing tax rate disparities and to an under-provision of public services. The main conclusions of the paper are: tax competition is stronger on mobile taxes (corporate and personal income tax) than on immobile taxes (property tax, consumption taxes); tax rates tend to be lower in wealthier jurisdictions; there is little evidence of a "race to the bottom" with respect to tax rates and tax revenues; and inter-jurisdictional differences in tax raising capacity - or economic wealth - appear to be lower in countries with more tax competition. Governments considering tax competition "excessive" may introduce or amend fiscal equalisation; increase sub-central property taxation and reduce other sub-central taxes; or harmonise the tax bases of sub-central governments to some extent |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (48 Seiten) 21 x 29.7cm |
| DOI: | 10.1787/5kgb1mfm6jnw-en |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| spelling | Blöchliger, Hansjörg Verfasser aut Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments Hansjörg Blöchliger and José Maria Pinero Campos = Concurrence fiscale entre administrations infranationales / Hansjörg Blöchliger et José Maria Pinero Campos Concurrence fiscale entre administrations infranationales Paris OECD Publishing 2011 1 Online-Ressource (48 Seiten) 21 x 29.7cm txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier OECD Economics Department Working Papers Sub-central tax competition is the strategic interaction of tax policy between jurisdictions with the objective to attract and retain mobile tax bases. The views on tax competition differ widely: while some consider that tax competition brings sub-central fiscal policy closer to citizen?s preferences, increases the efficiency of the public sector and avoids tax and spending excesses, others argue that tax competition leads to a distorted tax structure, to growing tax rate disparities and to an under-provision of public services. The main conclusions of the paper are: tax competition is stronger on mobile taxes (corporate and personal income tax) than on immobile taxes (property tax, consumption taxes); tax rates tend to be lower in wealthier jurisdictions; there is little evidence of a "race to the bottom" with respect to tax rates and tax revenues; and inter-jurisdictional differences in tax raising capacity - or economic wealth - appear to be lower in countries with more tax competition. Governments considering tax competition "excessive" may introduce or amend fiscal equalisation; increase sub-central property taxation and reduce other sub-central taxes; or harmonise the tax bases of sub-central governments to some extent Economics Pinero Campos, José Maria ctb https://doi.org/10.1787/5kgb1mfm6jnw-en Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Blöchliger, Hansjörg Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments Economics |
| title | Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments |
| title_alt | Concurrence fiscale entre administrations infranationales |
| title_auth | Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments |
| title_exact_search | Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments |
| title_full | Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments Hansjörg Blöchliger and José Maria Pinero Campos = Concurrence fiscale entre administrations infranationales / Hansjörg Blöchliger et José Maria Pinero Campos |
| title_fullStr | Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments Hansjörg Blöchliger and José Maria Pinero Campos = Concurrence fiscale entre administrations infranationales / Hansjörg Blöchliger et José Maria Pinero Campos |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments Hansjörg Blöchliger and José Maria Pinero Campos = Concurrence fiscale entre administrations infranationales / Hansjörg Blöchliger et José Maria Pinero Campos |
| title_short | Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments |
| title_sort | tax competition between sub central governments |
| topic | Economics |
| topic_facet | Economics |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1787/5kgb1mfm6jnw-en |
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