Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games: John Nash and beyond
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cheltenham ; Northampton, Mass
Edward Elgar
c2010
|
| Schlagworte: | |
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| Beschreibung: | The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings. - Includes bibliographical references |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (li, 728 Seiten) ill |
| ISBN: | 9781785362149 |
| DOI: | 10.4337/9781785362149 |
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| 500 | |a The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings. - Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Recommended readings (Machine generated): John F. Nash Jr. (1950), 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 18 (2), April, 155-62 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem', Mathematics of Operations Research, 2 (1), February, 64-5 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Journal of Economic Theory, 16 (2), December, 247-51 -- Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences', Econometrica, 59 (6), November, 1787-801 -- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), 'Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions', Econometrica, 62 (5), September, 1161-78 -- Efe A. Ok (1998), 'Inequality Averse Collective Choice', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 30, 301-21 -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), 'Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 43 (3), May, 513-18 -- A.E. Roth (1979), 'An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games', International Journal of Game Theory, 8 (3), 129-32 -- Ehud Kalai (1977), 'Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1623-30 -- Haruo Imai (1983), 'Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution', Econometrica, 51 (2), March, 389-401; 'Erratum', Econometrica, 51 (5), September, 1603 -- W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), 'Monotonicity and Independence Axioms', International Journal of Game Theory, 9 (1), 37-49 -- P.L. Yu (1973), 'A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems', Management Science, 19 (8), April, 936-46 -- Youngsub Chun (1988), 'The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems', Economics Letters, 26, 103-6 -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Roger B. Myerson (1977), 'Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1631-7 -- M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), 'The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game', International Journal of Game Theory, 10 (3/4), 163-93 -- Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems', Econometrica, 49 (4), July, 883-97 -- Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), 'Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions', International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (4), 501-24 -- Hans Peters (1986), 'Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining', Econometrica, 54 (1), January 153-69 -- Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), 'Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games', in G. Th. Guilbaud (ed) (ed.), La Decision, Paris: Editions du CNRS, 251-63 | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), 'Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining', Econometrica, 51 (1), January, 219-21 -- Yves Sprumont (2000), 'A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 34, 27-38 -- Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), 'An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players', Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 129-42 -- John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), 'The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai- Smorodinsky Solutions', Economics Letters, 36, 365-9 -- Lin Zhou (1996), 'The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems', Econometrica, 65 (3), May, 681-5 -- William Thomson (1987), 'Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point', Journal of Economic Theory, 42 (1), 50-58 -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), 'Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms', Mathematics of Operations Research, 16 (3), August, 447-61 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), 'Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 951-9 -- William Thomson (1983), 'The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population', Mathematics of Operations Research, 8 (3), August, 319-26 -- William Thomson (1983), 'Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (2), December, 211-26 -- William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), 'Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division', Mathematical Social Sciences, 4, 205-18 -- Terje Lensberg (1987), 'Stability and Collective Rationality', Econometrica, 55 (4), July, 935-61 -- Terje Lensberg (1988), 'Stability and the Nash Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (2), 330-41 -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Youngsub Chun (2002), 'The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining', Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 25-43 -- Richard E. Kihlstrom, Alvin E. Roth and David Schmeidler (1981), 'Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', in O. Moeschlin (ed) and D. Pallaschke (ed) (eds), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 65-71 -- Alvin E. Roth and Uriel G. Rothblum (1982), 'Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes', Econometrica, 50 (3), May, 639-47 -- Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha (1990), 'Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 961-5 -- John E. Roemer (1988), 'Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (1), 1-31 -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra and William Thomson (1992), 'On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences', Econometrica, 60 (5), September, 1171-86 | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Zvi Safra and Itzhak Zilcha (1993), 'Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis', Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (2), April, 288-306 -- Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii (1995), 'A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory', Econometrica, 63 (5), September, 1241-9 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1992), 'Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 24, 19-33 -- Walter Bossert (1993), 'An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 25, 205-20 -- Kim C. Border and Uzi Segal (1997), 'Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 65 (1), January, 1-18 -- John Nash (1953), 'Two-Person Cooperative Games', Econometrica, 21 (1), January, 128-40 -- Eric van Damme (1986), 'The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal', Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1), 78-100 -- Ariel Rubinstein (1982), 'Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model', Econometrica, 50 (1), January, 97-109 -- Vincent P. Crawford and Hal R. Varian (1979), 'Distortion of Preferences and the Nash Theory of Bargaining', Economics Letters, 3, 203-6 -- Joel Sobel (1981), 'Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 49 (3), May, 597-619 -- H. Moulin (1984), 'Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June, 32-45 -- Eiichi Miyagawa (2002), 'Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions', Games and Economic Behavior, 41, 292-308 -- M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), 'On Dividing Justly', Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (1), 1-24 | |
| 505 | 8 | |a This book explores game theory's development as a tool to understand economic behavior | |
| 600 | 1 | 4 | |a Nash, John F |c Jr |d 1928-2015 |
| 650 | 4 | |a Negotiation |x Mathematical models |a Collective bargaining |x Econometric models |a Game theory | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Thomson, William |d 1949- |4 oth | |
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| contents | Recommended readings (Machine generated): John F. Nash Jr. (1950), 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 18 (2), April, 155-62 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem', Mathematics of Operations Research, 2 (1), February, 64-5 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Journal of Economic Theory, 16 (2), December, 247-51 -- Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences', Econometrica, 59 (6), November, 1787-801 -- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), 'Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions', Econometrica, 62 (5), September, 1161-78 -- Efe A. Ok (1998), 'Inequality Averse Collective Choice', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 30, 301-21 -- Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), 'Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 43 (3), May, 513-18 -- A.E. Roth (1979), 'An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games', International Journal of Game Theory, 8 (3), 129-32 -- Ehud Kalai (1977), 'Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1623-30 -- Haruo Imai (1983), 'Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution', Econometrica, 51 (2), March, 389-401; 'Erratum', Econometrica, 51 (5), September, 1603 -- W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), 'Monotonicity and Independence Axioms', International Journal of Game Theory, 9 (1), 37-49 -- P.L. Yu (1973), 'A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems', Management Science, 19 (8), April, 936-46 -- Youngsub Chun (1988), 'The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems', Economics Letters, 26, 103-6 -- Roger B. Myerson (1977), 'Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1631-7 -- M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), 'The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game', International Journal of Game Theory, 10 (3/4), 163-93 -- Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems', Econometrica, 49 (4), July, 883-97 -- Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), 'Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions', International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (4), 501-24 -- Hans Peters (1986), 'Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining', Econometrica, 54 (1), January 153-69 -- Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), 'Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games', in G. Th. Guilbaud (ed) (ed.), La Decision, Paris: Editions du CNRS, 251-63 Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), 'Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining', Econometrica, 51 (1), January, 219-21 -- Yves Sprumont (2000), 'A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 34, 27-38 -- Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), 'An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players', Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 129-42 -- John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), 'The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai- Smorodinsky Solutions', Economics Letters, 36, 365-9 -- Lin Zhou (1996), 'The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems', Econometrica, 65 (3), May, 681-5 -- William Thomson (1987), 'Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point', Journal of Economic Theory, 42 (1), 50-58 -- Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), 'Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms', Mathematics of Operations Research, 16 (3), August, 447-61 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), 'Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 951-9 -- William Thomson (1983), 'The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population', Mathematics of Operations Research, 8 (3), August, 319-26 -- William Thomson (1983), 'Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (2), December, 211-26 -- William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), 'Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division', Mathematical Social Sciences, 4, 205-18 -- Terje Lensberg (1987), 'Stability and Collective Rationality', Econometrica, 55 (4), July, 935-61 -- Terje Lensberg (1988), 'Stability and the Nash Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (2), 330-41 -- Youngsub Chun (2002), 'The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining', Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 25-43 -- Richard E. Kihlstrom, Alvin E. Roth and David Schmeidler (1981), 'Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', in O. Moeschlin (ed) and D. Pallaschke (ed) (eds), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 65-71 -- Alvin E. Roth and Uriel G. Rothblum (1982), 'Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes', Econometrica, 50 (3), May, 639-47 -- Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha (1990), 'Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 961-5 -- John E. Roemer (1988), 'Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (1), 1-31 -- Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra and William Thomson (1992), 'On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences', Econometrica, 60 (5), September, 1171-86 Zvi Safra and Itzhak Zilcha (1993), 'Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis', Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (2), April, 288-306 -- Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii (1995), 'A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory', Econometrica, 63 (5), September, 1241-9 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1992), 'Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 24, 19-33 -- Walter Bossert (1993), 'An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 25, 205-20 -- Kim C. Border and Uzi Segal (1997), 'Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 65 (1), January, 1-18 -- John Nash (1953), 'Two-Person Cooperative Games', Econometrica, 21 (1), January, 128-40 -- Eric van Damme (1986), 'The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal', Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1), 78-100 -- Ariel Rubinstein (1982), 'Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model', Econometrica, 50 (1), January, 97-109 -- Vincent P. Crawford and Hal R. Varian (1979), 'Distortion of Preferences and the Nash Theory of Bargaining', Economics Letters, 3, 203-6 -- Joel Sobel (1981), 'Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 49 (3), May, 597-619 -- H. Moulin (1984), 'Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June, 32-45 -- Eiichi Miyagawa (2002), 'Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions', Games and Economic Behavior, 41, 292-308 -- M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), 'On Dividing Justly', Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (1), 1-24 This book explores game theory's development as a tool to understand economic behavior |
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| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 330.015193 |
| dewey-search | 330.015193 |
| dewey-sort | 3330.015193 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| doi_str_mv | 10.4337/9781785362149 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV047923512</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240220</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220411s2010 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781785362149</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-78536-214-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.4337/9781785362149</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-EWE)NLM010891188</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1312703700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV047923512</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-634</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1046</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-898</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-860</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-861</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">330.015193</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games</subfield><subfield code="b">John Nash and beyond</subfield><subfield code="c">edited by William Thomson</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cheltenham ; Northampton, Mass</subfield><subfield code="b">Edward Elgar</subfield><subfield code="c">c2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (li, 728 Seiten)</subfield><subfield code="b">ill</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings. - Includes bibliographical references</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Recommended readings (Machine generated): John F. Nash Jr. (1950), 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 18 (2), April, 155-62 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem', Mathematics of Operations Research, 2 (1), February, 64-5 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Journal of Economic Theory, 16 (2), December, 247-51 -- Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences', Econometrica, 59 (6), November, 1787-801 -- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), 'Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions', Econometrica, 62 (5), September, 1161-78 -- Efe A. Ok (1998), 'Inequality Averse Collective Choice', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 30, 301-21 --</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), 'Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 43 (3), May, 513-18 -- A.E. Roth (1979), 'An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games', International Journal of Game Theory, 8 (3), 129-32 -- Ehud Kalai (1977), 'Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1623-30 -- Haruo Imai (1983), 'Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution', Econometrica, 51 (2), March, 389-401; 'Erratum', Econometrica, 51 (5), September, 1603 -- W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), 'Monotonicity and Independence Axioms', International Journal of Game Theory, 9 (1), 37-49 -- P.L. Yu (1973), 'A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems', Management Science, 19 (8), April, 936-46 -- Youngsub Chun (1988), 'The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems', Economics Letters, 26, 103-6 --</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Roger B. Myerson (1977), 'Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1631-7 -- M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), 'The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game', International Journal of Game Theory, 10 (3/4), 163-93 -- Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems', Econometrica, 49 (4), July, 883-97 -- Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), 'Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions', International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (4), 501-24 -- Hans Peters (1986), 'Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining', Econometrica, 54 (1), January 153-69 -- Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), 'Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games', in G. Th. Guilbaud (ed) (ed.), La Decision, Paris: Editions du CNRS, 251-63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), 'Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining', Econometrica, 51 (1), January, 219-21 -- Yves Sprumont (2000), 'A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 34, 27-38 -- Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), 'An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players', Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 129-42 -- John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), 'The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai- Smorodinsky Solutions', Economics Letters, 36, 365-9 -- Lin Zhou (1996), 'The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems', Econometrica, 65 (3), May, 681-5 -- William Thomson (1987), 'Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point', Journal of Economic Theory, 42 (1), 50-58 --</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), 'Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms', Mathematics of Operations Research, 16 (3), August, 447-61 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), 'Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 951-9 -- William Thomson (1983), 'The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population', Mathematics of Operations Research, 8 (3), August, 319-26 -- William Thomson (1983), 'Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (2), December, 211-26 -- William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), 'Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division', Mathematical Social Sciences, 4, 205-18 -- Terje Lensberg (1987), 'Stability and Collective Rationality', Econometrica, 55 (4), July, 935-61 -- Terje Lensberg (1988), 'Stability and the Nash Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (2), 330-41 --</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Youngsub Chun (2002), 'The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining', Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 25-43 -- Richard E. Kihlstrom, Alvin E. Roth and David Schmeidler (1981), 'Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', in O. Moeschlin (ed) and D. Pallaschke (ed) (eds), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 65-71 -- Alvin E. Roth and Uriel G. Rothblum (1982), 'Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes', Econometrica, 50 (3), May, 639-47 -- Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha (1990), 'Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 961-5 -- John E. Roemer (1988), 'Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (1), 1-31 --</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra and William Thomson (1992), 'On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences', Econometrica, 60 (5), September, 1171-86</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zvi Safra and Itzhak Zilcha (1993), 'Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis', Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (2), April, 288-306 -- Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii (1995), 'A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory', Econometrica, 63 (5), September, 1241-9 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1992), 'Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 24, 19-33 -- Walter Bossert (1993), 'An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 25, 205-20 -- Kim C. Border and Uzi Segal (1997), 'Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 65 (1), January, 1-18 -- John Nash (1953), 'Two-Person Cooperative Games', Econometrica, 21 (1), January, 128-40 -- Eric van Damme (1986), 'The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal', Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1), 78-100 -- Ariel Rubinstein (1982), 'Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model', Econometrica, 50 (1), January, 97-109 -- Vincent P. Crawford and Hal R. Varian (1979), 'Distortion of Preferences and the Nash Theory of Bargaining', Economics Letters, 3, 203-6 -- Joel Sobel (1981), 'Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 49 (3), May, 597-619 -- H. Moulin (1984), 'Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June, 32-45 -- Eiichi Miyagawa (2002), 'Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions', Games and Economic Behavior, 41, 292-308 -- M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), 'On Dividing Justly', Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (1), 1-24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This book explores game theory's development as a tool to understand economic behavior</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="600" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nash, John F</subfield><subfield code="c">Jr</subfield><subfield code="d">1928-2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Negotiation</subfield><subfield code="x">Mathematical models</subfield><subfield code="a">Collective bargaining</subfield><subfield code="x">Econometric models</subfield><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Thomson, William</subfield><subfield code="d">1949-</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785362149</subfield><subfield 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| id | DE-604.BV047923512 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:33:54Z |
| indexdate | 2024-08-05T08:31:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781785362149 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033305099 |
| oclc_num | 1312703700 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-634 DE-1043 DE-1046 DE-573 DE-M347 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-859 DE-860 DE-861 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-20 DE-706 DE-824 DE-29 DE-739 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-634 DE-1043 DE-1046 DE-573 DE-M347 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-859 DE-860 DE-861 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-20 DE-706 DE-824 DE-29 DE-739 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (li, 728 Seiten) ill |
| psigel | ZDB-1-EWE |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Edward Elgar |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games John Nash and beyond Recommended readings (Machine generated): John F. Nash Jr. (1950), 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 18 (2), April, 155-62 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem', Mathematics of Operations Research, 2 (1), February, 64-5 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Journal of Economic Theory, 16 (2), December, 247-51 -- Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences', Econometrica, 59 (6), November, 1787-801 -- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), 'Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions', Econometrica, 62 (5), September, 1161-78 -- Efe A. Ok (1998), 'Inequality Averse Collective Choice', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 30, 301-21 -- Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), 'Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 43 (3), May, 513-18 -- A.E. Roth (1979), 'An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games', International Journal of Game Theory, 8 (3), 129-32 -- Ehud Kalai (1977), 'Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1623-30 -- Haruo Imai (1983), 'Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution', Econometrica, 51 (2), March, 389-401; 'Erratum', Econometrica, 51 (5), September, 1603 -- W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), 'Monotonicity and Independence Axioms', International Journal of Game Theory, 9 (1), 37-49 -- P.L. Yu (1973), 'A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems', Management Science, 19 (8), April, 936-46 -- Youngsub Chun (1988), 'The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems', Economics Letters, 26, 103-6 -- Roger B. Myerson (1977), 'Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1631-7 -- M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), 'The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game', International Journal of Game Theory, 10 (3/4), 163-93 -- Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems', Econometrica, 49 (4), July, 883-97 -- Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), 'Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions', International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (4), 501-24 -- Hans Peters (1986), 'Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining', Econometrica, 54 (1), January 153-69 -- Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), 'Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games', in G. Th. Guilbaud (ed) (ed.), La Decision, Paris: Editions du CNRS, 251-63 Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), 'Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining', Econometrica, 51 (1), January, 219-21 -- Yves Sprumont (2000), 'A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 34, 27-38 -- Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), 'An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players', Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 129-42 -- John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), 'The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai- Smorodinsky Solutions', Economics Letters, 36, 365-9 -- Lin Zhou (1996), 'The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems', Econometrica, 65 (3), May, 681-5 -- William Thomson (1987), 'Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point', Journal of Economic Theory, 42 (1), 50-58 -- Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), 'Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms', Mathematics of Operations Research, 16 (3), August, 447-61 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), 'Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 951-9 -- William Thomson (1983), 'The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population', Mathematics of Operations Research, 8 (3), August, 319-26 -- William Thomson (1983), 'Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (2), December, 211-26 -- William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), 'Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division', Mathematical Social Sciences, 4, 205-18 -- Terje Lensberg (1987), 'Stability and Collective Rationality', Econometrica, 55 (4), July, 935-61 -- Terje Lensberg (1988), 'Stability and the Nash Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (2), 330-41 -- Youngsub Chun (2002), 'The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining', Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 25-43 -- Richard E. 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Bar-Hillel (1984), 'On Dividing Justly', Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (1), 1-24 This book explores game theory's development as a tool to understand economic behavior Nash, John F Jr 1928-2015 Negotiation Mathematical models Collective bargaining Econometric models Game theory |
| title | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games John Nash and beyond |
| title_auth | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games John Nash and beyond |
| title_exact_search | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games John Nash and beyond |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games John Nash and beyond |
| title_full | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games John Nash and beyond edited by William Thomson |
| title_fullStr | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games John Nash and beyond edited by William Thomson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games John Nash and beyond edited by William Thomson |
| title_short | Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games |
| title_sort | bargaining and the theory of cooperative games john nash and beyond |
| title_sub | John Nash and beyond |
| topic | Nash, John F Jr 1928-2015 Negotiation Mathematical models Collective bargaining Econometric models Game theory |
| topic_facet | Nash, John F Jr 1928-2015 Negotiation Mathematical models Collective bargaining Econometric models Game theory |
| url | https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785362149 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT thomsonwilliam bargainingandthetheoryofcooperativegamesjohnnashandbeyond |